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CAPITAL FORMATION AND LEGAL RISK IN  
A NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
FROM FIAT TO EXIT 
 
INCLUDING CASE STUDIES OF THE PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
FINANCING RELATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas 
M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of 
the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. 
 
Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association 
with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley 
and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, 
Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, 
Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and 
precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as 
demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the 
European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital 
Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their 
historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians 
around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and 
controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation.  
 
Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on  to 
explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-
added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial 
production.  
 
Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital 
Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths 
regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy 
makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. 
  
 In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the 
Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital 
Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary 
Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four 
Determinants of Legal Risk. 
 
 In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-
Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with 
the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 
2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 
with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred  thousands of refugees on the way 
Page | 4 
 
caused by war and increasing inequality.  Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in 
the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III 
in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 
and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises 
that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the 
complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible.  
 
 Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the 
form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and 
judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the 
fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void 
misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency 
proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back 
to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions.  
 
In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, 
as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s 
economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that 
strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to 
terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the 
century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or 
restitution of contract by way of judicial order.  
 
Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and 
current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to 
complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to 
EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the 
European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade 
Association.  
 
Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in 
academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most 
notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an 
amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial 
body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal 
of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. 
 
Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a 
real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design 
defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and 
the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle 
resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of 
misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse 
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I.  PREAMBLE  
 
A. RESEARCH SUBJECT 
 
The scope of my dissertation specifically extends to legal risks in the context of capital 
formation.  It is duly noted that despite the attention all kinds of risks received in recent 
years with respect to capital formation, in the context of the banking, sovereign debt and, 
in particular, the financial crisis of 2008, a common definition of Legal Risk1 at this point 
remains elusive.   
 
The same appears to be true with respect to the definition of Capital as the key element of 
capital formation. With good reason Capital2 has been the title of some of the most 
influential publications of economic theory to this date and not without good reason a 
recent publication by economist Thomas Piketty3 just earned the same title.   
 
As Capital is at the core of our disputes and different views of how an economy actually 
works out its adverse interests that are all too often informed by ideology rather than data-
driven analysis and the facts on the ground, a substantial part of this thesis is devoted to an 
analysis of the various definitions, views, and key actors in history and today.  
 
This thesis will also show how those perceptions have been adapted both in the European 
Union, the United States and globally and how the realities have changed since the 
beginning of the millennium and what these changes will mean particularly for this next 
generation of millennials in what we call a New Global Economic Order (NGEO).4   
 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2.I. Literature Review of Legal Risk 
2 Marx, Karl, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Book One: The Process of Production of 
Capital, [online], available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/  (Accessed at September 
20, 2015)  
3 Piketty, Thomas (March 2014) Capital in the 21st Century, Harvard University Press.   
4 Clahoun, C. and Derluguian, G., Editors, Aftermath: A New Global Economic Order?  New York: NYU Press 
(2011) Clahoun and Derluguian “question the challenges and “likely conflicts over global trade policy, currency 
standards, and economic cooperation.”  For an early influential speech made at the Graduate School of Business, 
University of Chicago, see: Johnson, H.G. “The New International Economic Order,” October 5, 1976, 
available at: http://www.chicagobooth.edu/~/media/0ABF9E91CCDB42C4BBA92737DCE91EEA.pdf. 
(Accessed at 3 September 2015) There, Professor Johnson summarises various policy demands for coupling the 
creation of new international reserves or liquidity with distribution of a substantial part of the new money as aid 
to the less-developed countries. Such is the attraction of the idea that the creation of money involves bringing 
into existence something for nothing that this scheme has both excited a great deal of expert discussion, and 
become a general operating principle of International Monetary Fund thinking about world monetary reform.”  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The research question of this thesis relates to how to resolve legal risks of capital 
formation in a new global economic order.  The current debate about the effects of 
globalization and the current global economic crisis is dominated by economists who in 
their passion for classical economic analysis do not address what, in fact, constitutes the 
legal level playing field5; the forum6 as lawyers call it for their economic actors and; 
therefore, what legally (de jure) and factually (de facto) determines the actual framework7 
for their economic analysis.  This debate finds its most vigorous application in the forum 
non conveniens doctrine that supports a court's discretionary power to decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction where another court may more conveniently hear a case.8 
 
The author will show in his analysis as he introduces legal risk and legal certainty, not only 
as concepts that are dichotomous but also in a symbiotic relationship that only an 
institutional and legal framework that manages to reduce legal risk and thereby enhance 
legal certainty will successfully lead to the resolution of legal risks in capital formation. 
 
International financial actors, the so called “Markets”9 who are dependent to anticipate, 
guess or at best estimate the next steps of politicians such as German Federal Chancellor 
                                                 
5 Kapstein, E. B. (2006) Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field.  N.J: Princeton 
University Press. This is a good example of a very competent economist trying to argue for social justice 
without any sense of basic accounting or real legal risk.  In Chapter 1 entitled Economic Justice In An Unfair 
World, the author states, Despite this lack of common ground, it is probably safe to say that almost everyone 
agrees that economic transactions should be carried out on a "level playing field."  But there is no theory, 
model or conception that is directly linked to the wherewithal of the everyday accounts of transactions. 
6 Forum non conveniens doctrine is a discretionary power that allows courts to dismiss a case where another 
court, or forum, is much better suited to hear the case. This dismissal does not prevent a plaintiff from refiling 
his or her case in the more appropriate forum. See Res Judicata. This doctrine may be invoked by either the 
defendant, or by the court, [online] available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forum_non_conveniens 
(Accessed at 15 August 2015) Cornell University Law School. 
7 The building of legal frameworks especially for global finance depends at least initially on individual 
entrepreneurial attempts to stitch together international private agreements according to an almost informal lex 
juris, or lawyer made law. See, Frankel, T. (2002) “The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris,” 12 
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 475, 480, available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1175&context=djcil.  For a critique of lex juris as 
lacking the essential characteristics a minimum legal, see, Markell, B.A. (2002) “Lawyer-Made Law, Lex Juris 
And Confusing The Message With The Messenger A Comment On Frankel,” available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=djcil.  For Markell, law requires a 
jurisdiction where adjudication can occur.  As we shall see, our thesis can be read as essentially resolving legal 
and financial uncertainties into formal legal certainties.   
8 Id.  
9 Scott, Hal S., An Overview of International Finance, Harvard University (2005), [online], available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/research/publications/4scott.pdf (Accessed 15 August 2015)  
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Angela Merkel10, French President Francois Hollande11, or more recently, German Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble12, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras13 or for a short while 
Greek Finance Minister and Economics Professor14 Yannis Varoufakis15 that all pursue 
most different ideologies, interests, and particularly, represent most diverse parts of the 
European electorate, or on the other hand, people like U.S. President Barack Obama16 or 
the Members of the U.S. Congress17 who are in the middle of an election campaign for the 
Presidency of the United States, will often find as an answer “There is no alternative”18 
and react as rational as the decisions are that they follow.19   
 
What we know is that there is no established process.  There is no established rule of 
law20 that pertains to the resolution and settlement in particular of a significant political, 
legal or financial crisis as we will show in this thesis time and time again.   
                                                 
10 Merkel, A. Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Germany [online], available at 
http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Webs/BKin/EN/Homepage/homepage_node.html;jsessionid=BE6A70D3E789F
659659055C6AD5FE3E3.s4t1 (Accessed at 15 August 2015) 
11 Hollande, F. President of the French Republic [online], available at http://www.elysee.fr/la-
presidence/francois-hollande-biographie/ (Accessed at 15 August 2015) 
12 Schaeuble, W. Federal Finance Minister of the Republic of Germany, [online] available at 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/EN/Home/home.html (Accessed at 27 September 2015) 
13 Tsipras, A., Prime Minister of the Hellenic Government [online], available at http://www.wolfgang-
schaeuble.de/zur-person/http://www.alexistsipras.eu/index.php/articles/about-me (Accessed at 28 September 
2015) (Accessed at 20 September 2015)  
14 Varoufakis, Y., (2010b). First as History, Then as Farce: The Euro Crisis Revisited. [online] MR Zine. 
Available from: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/varoufakis171010.html. [Accessed 21 November 2012]. 
15 Varoufakis, Y., Professor of Economics at University of Texas. Austin [online], available at 
http://news.utexas.edu/2015/01/28/yanis-varoufakis (Accessed at 20 September 2015) 
16 Obama, Barack H., President of the United States [online], available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-obama (Accessed at 20 September 2015) 
17 Member of Congress of the United States, [online], available at https://www.congress.gov/members 
(Accessed at 20 September 2015)  
18 McLean, Ian, There Is No Alternative, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, [online], available at 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198295294.001.0001/acprof-9780198295297-chapter-8 
(Accessed at 15 August 2015)  
19 Kapstein (2006) in chapter 1 asks, “Does realist logic inevitably lead states toward conflict and war? The 
surprising answer is no. In fact, states in a multipolar system may be predicted to act in such a way as 
to balance power, so that no hegemon emerges among them. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman 
have put it, "If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it."  
Our investigation into the balance of power leads us to conclude that formal legal power rather than soft 
influential or voluntary codes of conduct is required as a matter of jurisdiction where commercial and 
investment uncertainties can be finally settled should be the concrete institutional goal rather than a distant 
dream. 
20 The concept of the rule of law can be traced to Aristotle’s Politics, Part XVI available at: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html where he distinguishes various forms of government vis-à-
vis binary operations and bilateral relations between individuals of different class.  If equal, then each takes their 
turn at ruling through time, which implies “the law”, while those who rule for a transient duration are merely 
guardians or ministers of the law.  Thus the rule of law has two components: equality of individuals and power 
over others.  The rule of law requires jurisdiction.  Our contention throughout this thesis is that jurisdiction is 
required for finality of judgement.  “Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every one be rules as 
well as rule, and therefore that each one should have their turn.  We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession 
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Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis is that only once the rule of law is guaranteed by a 
commonly accepted transparent and democratic process of transnational judicial 
enforcement legal risk may be successfully resolved and bad actors may finally be held 
accountable.  
 
Recent events such as the new lease of life that was given by President Barack Obama to 
the development of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership21 appear as one 
example that may have the potential, if developed right and in a democratic and transparent 
process, to become the Nasciturus22 of a New Global Economic Order.  Only an 
environment of regulatory cooperation with institutions such as a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Court23 that also wields jurisdiction across sovereign borders will manage to 
reduce legal risk,24 enhance legal certainty,25 and therefore lead to lower economic costs26.   
                                                                                                                                                        
implies law.  And the rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable to that to that of any individual.  On the same 
principles, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and 
ministers of the law.”  
The modern concept of rule of law is enshrined in international doctrines promoted by the United Nations 
documents.  See below: The Charter of the United Nations. In its Preamble, one of the aims of the UN is “to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained”. A primary purpose of the Organization is “to maintain international peace 
and security… and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the historic international recognition that all 
human beings have fundamental rights and freedoms, recognizes that “… it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law…” For the UN, the Secretary-General defines the rule of law as “a 
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, 
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." (Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of 
law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” (2004)) 
21 See Chapter 5, I. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
22 Naciturus, The fiction of the “unborn child”, Oxford Journals [online] available at 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/1/37.full (Accessed at 4 September 2015)  
23 See Chapter 6, III. Plea for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court 
24 See, Chapter 2, II. Four Determinants of Legal Risk 
25 For example, in the typical financial economic argument, the caveat that additional government funding or 
bailing out interventions “may induce moral hazard-type concerns ex ante” generally fails to take into account 
the need for legal certainty.  See, Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2015) “Systemic Risk and 
Stability in Financial Networks,” American Economic Review 2015, 105(2): 564–608, 587, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130456 564.  
26 While the notion of “lower economic costs” may be obvious, as a theoretical concept it exists only in 
reference to and within the habitat of financial accounting.  This is of such fundamental importance that 
arguments relating to systemic crises such as the sub-prime mortgage debacle rely on the failures of “fair value 
accounting and insufficiency of equity capital at financial institutions” as substantial factors to financial 
collapse. It is also within the context of basic accounting principles, especially the balance sheet, that “flaws in 
financial system architecture” can be detected.  As the authors state, “In thinking about regulatory reform, one 
must therefore go beyond considerations of individual incentives and supervision and pay attention to issues of 
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That in turn the author argues will lead to an ability to correct misallocations27, free 
resources for increased investment, foster more sustainable capital formation also known 
as growth, and therefore, a higher and more sustainable formation of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)28.  This all should help to avert the creation of unsustainable asset-price 
bubbles29 and excess accumulation of capital30. 
 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle31, the 
author explains based on his Triple A Model32 of Accounting33, Allocation34 and 
Accountability35 the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT36 to EXIT37. 
 
Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk38 laid by the International Bar 
Association39 with the help of Roger McCormick40 and legal scholars such as Joanna 
Benjamin41, Matthew Whalley42 and Tobias Mahler43, and founded on the basis of Wesley 
                                                                                                                                                        
systemic interdependence and transparency.” See, Hellwig, M. (November 2008) “Systemic Risk in the 
Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis,” Max Planck Institute. Our argument 
is that is that such notions of interdependence and transparency are relevant and make good sense only where 
monetary and judicial solutions converge in legal and financial certainty. See also, Chapter 4 for discussions on 
legal certainty.   
27 Fuchs, W., Green, B. and Papanikolaou, D. Adverse Selection, Slow Moving Capital and Misallocation, 
University of Chicago, April 16, 2014, [online], available at 
https://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/Papanikolaou%20paper.pdf (Accessed at 20 August 2015) 
28 United Nations, Gross Domestic Product per Capita, [online], available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/econ_development/gdp_percapita.pdf 
(Accessed at 29 September 2015)  
29 Scherbina, A., Asset Price Bubbles: A Selective Survey, International Monetary Fund, (February 2013), 
[online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1345.pdf  (Accessed at 20 August 2015) 
30 Fan-Hung, Keynes and Marx on the Theory of Capital Accumulation, Money and Interest, The Review of 
Economic Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (Oct., 1939), pp. 28-41 Published by: Oxford University Press available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2967594 (Accessed at 20 September 2015) 
31 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
32 See Chapter 4, I The Triple A Model for the Analysis of Capital Formation 
33 See Chapter 4, II Accounting And Capital Formation 
34 See Chapter 4, III Allocation And Capital Formation 
35 See Chapter 4, IV Accountability And Capital Formation  
36 Winston Gee, Debt, Deficits, and Modern Monetary Theory, Harvard International Review, October 16, 2011 
Economics [online], available at http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/2853 (Accessed at 20 September 2015)  
37 See Chapter 4.V.A. From FIAT to EXIT 
38 See Chapter 2.I.A. Theoretical Foundations of Legal Risk 
39 About the International Bar Association, [online], available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/About_the_IBA/About_the_IBA.aspx (Accessed at 20 July 2015)  
40 McCormick, R., (2004). The Management of Legal Risk by Financial Institutions. [online] Federal Reserve.  
Available from: http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2005/August/20050818/OP-1189/OP-1189_2_1.pdf 
[Accessed 20 April 2012]. 
41 Benjamin, J., Professor at the London School of Economics, Financial Law, [online], available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff/joanna-benjamin.htm (Accessed at 10 July 2015) 
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Hohfeld’s44 category theory of jural relations, the author develops his mutually exclusive 
Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law45, Lack of Right46, Liability47 and Limitation48. 
Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe 
the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated 
in case studies49 of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and 
the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China50. 
 
Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital 
Formation Life Cycle, the author then explores the theoretical foundations of capital 
formation51, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics52 and its 
forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich von Hayek53 and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx54, and their 
impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation55.  
 
Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, the author moves on to 
explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation56, Man57, Machines58 and Money 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 Whalley, M. A 14 year history of legal risk, [online], available at http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-
insights/articles/legal-risk-definition-history/ (Accessed at 10 July 2015)  
43 Mahler, T. (2007). Defining Legal Risk. [online] SSRN. Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014364 [Accessed 20 April 2012]. 
44 Hohfeld, Wesley N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, (1917) Yale Law 
School [online], available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5383&context=fss_papers  
45 See Chapter 2.II.A Law 
46 See Chapter 2.II.B Lack of Right 
47 See Chapter 2.II.C Liability 
48 See Chapter 2.II.D Limitation 
49 See Chapter 5: Case Study: TTIP – Nasciturus for a New Global Economic Order 
50 See Chapter 4.III.B. Legal Risks in the Allocation of Capital – The China Case Study 
51 See Chapter 3.I.A. Theoretical Foundations of Capital Formation  
52 See Chapter 3.I.B. Classical and Neo-Classical Economics 
53 See Chapter 3.I.C. The Austrians: Eugen v. Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig v. Mises and Friedrich v. Hayek 
54 See Chapter 3.I.D. Karl Marx 
55 See Chapter 3.II. Exponential Expansion of Capital Formation 
56 See Chapter 3.II.A Three Factors of Capital Formation 
57 See Chapter 3.II.A.1 Capital Formation by Man 
58 See Chapter 3.II.A.2 Capital Formation by Machines 
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Creation59 and how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital 
factors of human resources or human capital60 and industrial production61.  
 
Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary 
Capital Formation62, Central Banks63, Commercial Banks64 and Citizens65 he readily 
dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight 
into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, 
the Corporate and Consumer Citizens. 
 
With respect to the second pillar, Allocation, he continues his analysis of the balance sheets 
of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of 
Monetary Capital Formation66, the Sovereign67, Financial68, Corporate69, Consumer70 and 
International71 account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the 
allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. 
 
Ultimately, in his third pillar, Accountability, the author discusses the ever recurring Crisis-
Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH72, since the beginning of the 
millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium73, followed seven 
years later by the financial crisis of 200874 and the dislocations in the global economy we 
                                                 
59 See Chapter 3.II.A.3 Capital Formation by Money Creation 
60 Frauemeni, B. and Liu G., Human capital measurement: country experiences and international initiatives, 
Harvard University (2014) [online], available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jorgenson/files/gangliu_paper_human_capital_measurement_20140512.pdf 
(Accessed June 25, 2015)  
61 Karl Marx. Capital Volume One, Chapter Fourteen: Division of Labour and Manufacture (1867), [online], 
available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch14.htm (Accessed at June 25, 2015) 
62 See Chapter 4, II.A. Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation 
63 See Chapter 4, II.A.1 Role of Central Banks 
64 See Chapter 4, II.A.2 Role of Commercial Banks 
65 See Chapter 4, II.A.3 Role of Citizens 
66 See Chapter 4, III.A Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation 
67 See Chapter 4, III.A 1. Sovereign 
68 See Chapter 4, III.A 2. Financial 
69 See Chapter 4, III.A 3. Corporate 
70 See Chapter 4, III.A 4. Consumer 
71 See Chapter 4, III.A 5. International  
72 See Chapter 4, VI.A CRASH (Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History) 
73 Krishna G. Palepu; Gillian Elcock, Role of Capital Market Intermediaries in the Dot-Com Crash of 2000, 
(2006), Harvard Business Publishing, available at https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/101110-PDF-ENG  
74 Krugman, P. How Did Economists get it so wrong, New York Times (September 6, 2009) [online], available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?_r=0 (Accessed at May 20, 2012)  
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are facing another seven years later today in 201575 with several sordid debt 
restructurings76 under way and hundred  thousands of refugees on the way77 caused by war 
and increasing inequality78.  Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the 
form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200279, the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 201080, the JOBS Act of 201281 or the introduction of the Basel 
Accords82, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 
201083, the European Stability Mechanism of 201284 and the European Banking Union of 
201385, the author analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find 
often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete 
lack of accountability on part of those responsible.  
 
However, in order to answer the research question of how to resolve legal risks of capital 
formation in a new global economic order, he argues that the order of the day requires to 
address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of 
our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary86 and judicial order87. Inspired by a 
1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve 
system88, he supports the proposal of an introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite 
to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational 
insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire 
                                                 
75 Steve Matthews Jeanna Smialek, Bullard Warns Delaying Fed Rate Rise Boosts Asset-Bubble Threats (May 
28, 2015) [online], available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-28/bullard-says-fed-should-
raise-interest-rates-as-economy-improves (Accessed at 15 August 2015)   
76 International Monetary Fund, Greece : Preliminary Draft Debt Sustainability Analysis, IMF Country Report 
No. 15/165 (June 2015), [online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15165.pdf 
77 SEWELL CHAN and PALKO KARASZSEPT, Thousands of Migrants Flood Into Austria, New York Times 
(19 September 2015), [online], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/europe/thousands-flood-
into-austria-as-refugees-are-bounced-around-europe.html (Accessed at 20 September 2015)  
78 See Chapter IV.A.7 Increasing Inequality 
79 See Chapter 5.X.C Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and Legal Risk 
80 See Chapter IV.A.1. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010  
81 See Chapter IV.A.2. Jobs Act of 2012 
82 See Chapter IV.A.8. Basel II/III  
83 See Chapter IV.A.3. EFSF/ESM and Euro-Group 
84 See Chapter IV.A.3. EFSF/ESM and Euro-Group  
85 See Chapter IV.A.4. Banking Union and Fiscal Union  
86Kelton, S., (2012c). Stephanie Kelton on Getting Past Our Oversimplified Understanding of Money. [online] 
Journal of Financial Planning.  Available from: 
http://www.modernmoneynetwork.org/uploads/1/2/5/3/12534585/10q.pdf [Accessed 17 June 2013]. 
87 Bogdandy, Armin von and Venzke, Ingo, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, 
[online], German Law Journal, Volume 12. No. 05, available at 
http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/pdf_vol_12_no_05_979- 
1004_beyond_disptue_special_bogdandy___venzke_final.pdf (Accesses at 20 June, 2015) 
88 Phillips, Ronnie J., The ‘Chicago Plan” and New Deal Banking Reform, Working Paper No. 76 (June 1992), 
[online], available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp/76.pdf (Accessed at 20 June 2015)  
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monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses 
and failed financial institutions.  
 
In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative 
Destruction89, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one90, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of 
Equitable Default91 mimicking an immunotherapy92 that strengthens the corpus 
economicus93 own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate 
precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the 
century old common law concept of equity94 that allows for the equitable reformation, 
rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order95.  
 
Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and 
current court systems with transnational jurisdiction96, he advocates as a first step in order 
to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT97, the creation of money by way 
of credit, to EXIT98, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court99 constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. 
Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of 
the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. 
                                                 
89 Schumpeter, J. A., (2010). Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
90 Schumpeter, J. A., (2009). Can Capitalism Survive? Creative Destruction and the Future of the Global 
Economy. United States: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
91 See Chapter 6.I.B. The Concept of Equitable Default 
92 Immunotherapy is treatment that uses certain parts of a person’s immune system to fight diseases such as 
cancer. This can be done in a couple of ways: Stimulating your own immune system to work harder or smarter 
to attack cancer cells and giving you immune system components, such as man-made immune system proteins. 
Some types of immunotherapy are also sometimes called biologic therapy or biotherapy. In the last few decades 
immunotherapy has become an important part of treating some types of cancer. Newer types of immune 
treatments are now being studied, and they will impact how we treat cancer in the future. Immunotherapy 
includes treatments that work in different ways. Some boost the body’s immune system in a very general way. 
Others help train the immune system to attack cancer cells specifically. Immunotherapy works better for some 
types of cancer than for others. It’s used by itself for some of these cancers, but for others it seems to work 
better when used with other types of treatment. 
93 Latin for “the body economics”, the economy as a whole seen as an organism. 
94 See supra at note 91.  
95 Id.  
96 See Chapter 6.II. Current Court Systems with Transnational Jurisdiction 
97 See supra at note 36. 
98 See supra at note 37. 
99 See Chapter 6.III. Plea for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court 




The methodology of this thesis is essentially multi-disciplinary.   Given the appearance of 
this thesis covering a series of traditional and foundational disciplines, in alphabetical 
order such as accounting, business, economics, finance, history, law, philosophy and 
sociology and risk, one may be tempted to characterize it prima facie merely as “Law and 
Economics.”  It is coherent with the Theoretical Framework in Chapter 1, Section I, C, the 
Contributions to Knowledge in Chapter 1, Section I, E, and the Argument in Chapter 1, 
Section 2.   
 
Our multi-disciplinary methodology unifies the foundational disciplines into a Theory of 
Legal Risk (“LR”) and comprises a broad examination of the literature concerning the 
subject of this thesis100 combined with a comparative analysis of legal risks concepts101 and 
capital formation concepts in classic and neoclassic theory102, an analysis of institutional 
and alternative actors of capital formation103 and their inherent legal risks pertaining to the 
creation of money.104 
 
Our multi-disciplinary methodology starts with a specific definition of Legal Risk 
according to the Four Legal Determinants in Chapter 2, Section II, which in turn informs 
the underlying Theoretical Framework in Chapter 1, Section I, C, and provides specific 
methods of analysis for particular case studies in Chapter 4, Section III, B.1 and Chapter 5, 
Section II to X.  Therefore, the thesis is a methodological application of Legal Risk as 
defined to economic relations at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle in Exhibit A 
and as demonstrated in the respective case studies supra.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the schools of Law and Economics, Critical Legal 
Studies and Legal Theory of Finance, and the scientific methodology of Legal Risk.  Law 
and Economics or economic analysis of law is the application of economic theory 
(specifically microeconomic theory) to the analysis of law. Law and Economics is the most 
                                                 
100 See Chapter 3.I. Literature Review of Capital Formation 
101 See Chapter 2.I. Literature Review of Legal Risk 
102 See supra at note 52.  
103 See Chapter 3.III. Institutional and Alternative Actors of Capital Formation 
104 See Chapter II.B. Legal Risks in the Accounting of Capital Formation 
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controversial school currently employed in legal scholarship and legal education.105 The 
literature is replete with emphatic denunciations and equally emphatic rebuttals.106 L&E 
stresses that markets are more efficient than courts. The second characteristic of L&E is its 
emphasis on incentives and peoples' responses to these incentives.  
 
While well-recognized in the scholarly literature, L&E lacks sufficient precision and must 
be considered inadequate to come to firm conclusions since its premises are not 
incontrovertible.  For the purpose of meeting the standards of scientific “methodology” as 
pointed out below any methodology requires the application of firmly defined concepts of 
that may be systematically observed, tested, and measured.  
 
To showcase the assumptions made in L&E for instance for the purpose of damage 
payments in accident [tort] law. L&E does not aim primarily to compensate injured parties 
but rather to provide incentive to potential injurers to take efficient [cost justified] 
precautions to avoid causing the accident assuming individuals are rational and respond to 
incentives. Based on the hypothesis of a direct correlation between penalties and 
compliance it is more likely than other legal analyses to use empirical or statistical 
methods to measure these responses to incentives.107  
 
According to L&E scholars, the private legal system must perform three functions all 
related to property and property rights.   
 
First the system must define property rights.  This is the task of property law 
itself.  Second the system must allow for transfer of property.  This is the rule of 
contract law.  Finally the system must protect property rights.  This is the function 
of tort law and criminal law.  These are the major issues studied in law and 
economics.  Law and economics scholars also apply the tools of economics such 
as game theory to purely legal questions such as various parties' litigation 
strategies.  While these are aspects of law and economics they are of more 
interest to legal scholars than to students of the economy.108 
                                                 
105 Rahmatian, A., International Intellectual Property Scholars Series: A Fundamental Critique of the Law-and-
Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights, 17 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 191 (2013). [online], 
available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol17/iss2/2 (Accessed at 7 April 2016) 
106 Chayes, A et alt, The Bridge, Criticisms of Economic Analysis and responses thereto, Harvard University, 
[online], available at https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/LawEconomics/critique.htm (Accessed at 7 April  
2016] 
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108 Rubin, P., Law and Economics, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (2008), Library of Economics and 
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Historically, modern law and economics dates from about 1960 when Ronald Coase who 
later received the Nobel Prize published "the problem with social cost".109  Its success 
continued with University of Chicago’s Gary Becker's 1968 paper on crime.110  Also 
Becker received a Nobel Prize.111  Richard Posner, also a L&E scholar, published the first 
edition of economic analysis of law in 1972.  Today, Posner is a federal judge while 
remaining a prolific scholar.112   
 
The Coase theorem the most fundamental result and economic study of law states: 
 
If rights are transferable and transactions costs are not too large, then the exact 
definition of property rights is not important, because parties can trade rights and 
rights will move to the highest valued uses.113    
 
In many circumstances however who owns the right will matter.  Transactions costs are 
never zero, especially in jurisdictions with little legal certainty and high legal risk. Hence, 
if transactions costs are greater than the increase in value from moving the resource to the 
efficient owner, in all likelihood, there will be no corrective mechanism.   
 
Andreas Rahmatian, from the University of Glasgow School of Law seconds: 
 
The objection to a law and economics analysis of legal institutions and legal 
relations and consequently to economic propositions with regard to legal reform 
is threefold.  First, the conditions and assumptions in which the purposed 
economic models rest are oversimplifying, distorting, incomplete and sometimes 
blatantly incorrect.  Secondly even if correct conditions apply, they are still 
unable to translate legal institutions and legal relations into an economic 
abstraction as a true mirror image of the law and its extras because economic 
considerations are by definition largely irrelevant to the lawyer for a legal 
decision.  Thirdly the application of a law and economics approach to legal 
decision making either in the context of principally law enforcement such as 
judicial decisions or of law making such as legal policy can have questionable 
and morally reprehensible effects.114  
 
                                                 




113 Coase, Ronald H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1–44. The 
key article in law and economics and the origin of the famous Coase theorem, [online], available at 
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~tedb/Courses/UCSBpf/readings/coase.pdf (Accessed at 7 April 2016) 
114 See supra note 105. 
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Proponents of the Austrian School of Economics stress the fact that the methodological 
foundations of L&E are based on the concept of law as an optimal outcome of judicial 
balancing of social economical costs and benefits. 
 
For example, Tomasz Machelski from the University of Bialystok argues: 
 
From the Austrian perspective it is sound legal theory that can serve as the best 
tool to the legal practitioner.  Sound legal theory can provide categorical 
distinctions and formal sets of descriptive relationships that can then be subjected 
to moral evaluation for action purposes. Challenging the judicial legal concept of 
causation and then assuming that economic efficiency remains the only adequate 
criteria of just law undoubtedly leads to a final premise that there is no justice 
apart from economic efficiency which is a conclusion that clearly must be refuted 
and disputed.115   
 
In a clear distinction to the apparently flawed school of L&E and prompted by the financial 
crisis of 2008 that to a large extent was also caused by the flagrant lack of understanding of 
the oft troubling consequences of an ignorant intersection and interaction of the disciplines 
of law and finance, Katharina Pistor of Columbia Law School has developed her so called 
Legal Theory of Finance, in short LTF.116  She says: 
 
The more a financial system moves from relational finance to entities and 
ultimately markets the more it depends on a formal legal system with the capacity 
to authoritatively vindicate rights and obligations of contractual parties or to lend 
its coercive powers to the enforcement of such claims. [….] Financial systems are 
not state or market, private or public but always and necessarily both.  This falls 
from the facts that financial instruments must be enforceable that finance is 
hierarchical and that in the last instance the sovereign has to stand in to protect 
the financial system from self-destruction.117  
 
Pistor points out that law lends credibility to financial instruments by providing for its 
enforceability but the actual enforcement of all legal commitments made in the past in 
respective of changes and circumstances would inevitably bring down the financial system. 
The propensity of a financial system to reach the point of crises or self-destruction at 
which only the suspension of ex ante commitments can save it is determined by how it is 
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constructed in the first place according to Pistor.118 Pistor finds that emerging markets are 
more likely to issue the debt under foreign law and detailed debt covenants specify their 
obligations and contracts designed by law firms in London or New York and issued for the 
most part under the laws of these jurisdictions with underwriter involvement.119  
 
In conclusion LTF as a positive theory could be seen taken together as the elements of LTF 
suggests that law is essential to finance in at least three respects: 
 
First law lends credibility to financial instruments enabling their enforceability. 
Second it spurs regulatory pluralism by delegating rulemaking to different 
stakeholders and in doing so helps draw boundaries between different markets and 
third it vindicates financial instruments and other financial contracts.120   
 
According to Pistor the most important space of regulatory arbitrage is the transnational 
financial system.121 Most financial regulation remains at the national level of regulatory 
standardization.  
 
The author concurs with Pistor and would like to emphasize therefore the importance of 
establishing a system of transnational regulatory cooperation and jurisdiction as will be 
pointed out in Chapter 5, Section I, B. To be clear, this shall not be construed as an 
endorsement of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership. At this time, a final document has yet to be presented to the public and the 
jury is still out on the results.  
  
Ultimately, Pistor, with her Legal Theory of Finance, stands more in the tradition of 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) that can be understood as an effort to offer alternative, more 
radical approaches to L&E. The movement of CLS, was initiated and founded by writings 
of two Harvard Law School scholars, Roberto Unger and Duncan Kennedy and eventually 
institutionalized by the Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977.122 
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Aside from the distinct political convictions of the CLS and the Chicago school of L&E, 
arguably their shared goal was to explain the law pursuant to their own distinctive schools 
of thought. The major critique by CLS scholars like Duncan Kennedy may be summarized: 
[L]aw and economics, though typically couched as an apolitical, technical exercise, is 
in fact an intensely political project. Arguments in law and economics both rely upon 
and themselves embody controversial political judgment. Law and economics 
arguments, like legal argument, is ideological; both genres are structured by 
intractable though not immutable political contradictions. The dream of a meaningful 
technical efficiency discourse purged of political contradictions is a chimerical 
nightmare […].123 
Kennedy and Kelman, have embodied within their work two main directions of their 
critical law and economics, namely the so called “distributive turn” analyzing the 
distributional consequences of contractual terms and legal rules and strategies and together 
with Specht124 the so called “ideological turn”, analyzing the cost-benefit and efficiency 
arguments in a transparent disclosure of the ideological context.125 
 
Aside from housing law as the most prominent body of CLS L&E, CLS scholars have also 
engaged in areas such as transitional economies and international law (David Kennedy)126 
and the application of social science to law through empirical sociology (Richard Abel).127 
 
In spite of the fact that CLS critique of the ideological bias of L&E has not “resulted in 
amicable relations between the movements”, according to Eastman, “the CLS critique has 
likely enhanced the viability of liberal L&E”. Thus given the rather inexact science of law 
and economics analysis, there is no alternative than to return to the fundamentals of what 
constitutes appropriate methods in order to come to firm conclusions. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary, however, defines the scientific method as:  
 
A method or procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, 
consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the 
formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses.128 
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Following this definition, it is apparent, that any methodology analyzing the fundamental 
legal risks in our current economic order requires the application of firmly defined 
concepts of Legal Risk, that are universally effective, mutually exclusive and practically 
applicable and that more importantly can be systematically observed, tested, and measured 
and ultimately refined, altered or expanded.  
 
Furthermore, pursuant to this definition it is a time tested process to describe the scientific 
method as an ongoing process of developing a general theory, making observations and 
discovering certain universally effective, mutually exclusive and practically applicable 
principles and the continuous testing and affirmative as well as negative validation of 
resulting hypotheses, the development of testable predictions and the gathering of data to 
test predictions.129 
 
As for Pistor’s LTF, we hold, that we concur with her fully discoverable observations of 
her theory that financial markets are legally constructed and that they as such occupy an 
essentially hybrid place between state and market, public and private.  Pistor also points 
out the principle that the legal sources of financial instability are the fundamental 
uncertainty paired with the liquidity constraint that renders financial markets unstable.130 
These observations are fully reflected in our Legal Risk Model that defines inter alia Legal 
Risk as a combination of legal and factual uncertainty such as a liquidity constraint and 
describes in great detail the jural correlatives between public state and private market 
actors.  
 
Pistor finds, we agree and come to similar conclusions that law is essential to the very 
existence of contemporary finance, that significantly changed circumstances since a 
contract was entered into may warrant the judicial reformation of such contracts and argues 
that “many see a unified regulatory regime at the transnational level as a possible 
solution”.131 
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Pistor herself however maintains that “LTF holds potentially important lessons for future 
reforms of domestic and global markets. Since [she] has only introduced a theory that has 
not been subject to extensive testing [and therefore] it would be premature to spell out in 
detail what the policy implications might be.”132   
 
However, whilst L&E and CLS in its interpretation of L&E pride themselves as the 
application of economic theory to the analysis of law, the mission here was to develop a 
scientific methodology that provided for the application of a legal theory to the analysis of 
economic relations between natural persons that is universally effective, mutually 
exclusive and practically applicable and that could be systematically and continuously 
tested.  In other words, the author’s mutli-disciplinary methodology is completely 
distinguishable from Pistor, CLS and other L&E theories from its scientific character and 
its range of applications. 
 
In the course of our case studies, our methodology of Legal Risk was applied both to the 
financing relation between the United States and China in Chapter 4, Section III, B.1 and 
the nine industry verticals that are currently negotiated in the context of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in Chapter 5, Sections II to X with respect to any 
stage of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as described in great detail in Exhibit A  with its 
discrete accounting and legal relations founded in the mathematical principles of double 
entry bookkeeping that were first published in a system by the Italian mathematician Luca 
Pacioli in 1494.133 
 
Following the Triple A Model for the analysis of capital formation of Accounting, 
Allocation and Accountability, it was proven that aforementioned theory of Legal Risk 
indeed meets the bar of being universally effective, mutually exclusive and practically 
applicable being systematically tested both in the affirmative, i.e. with respect to the 
presence of Legal Risk and in the negative with respect to the absence of Legal Risk to all 
accounting and legal relations of the Capital Formation Life Cycle.134 
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Whilst the system of Accounting135 of capital formation deals with the monetary capital 
formation process, the process of Allocation136 follows on the one hand the transfer of 
monetary capital resources from the balance sheets of the Sovereign Accounts of the 
Central Banks137 via the accounts of the Financial Institutions and Commercial Banks138 to 
the Domestic or International Accounts of Corporate or Consumer Citizen139 and on the 
other hand the translation of the exchange value of non-monetary capital formation by 
human resources or industrial production.  
 
This scientific mutli-disciplinary method that the author calls a Theory of Legal Risk 
consistently seeks to apply the firmly defined Four Determinants of Legal Risk140 at each 
stage of the Capital Formation Life Cycle141 determining for each of the economic 
relations and jural correlatives that are tested whether any of the four Legal Risks exist or 
not.  
 
The resolution of Legal Risk in this thesis is understood as a process of either avoiding the 
realization of Legal Risk142 in the form of default, i.e. non-payment or non-performance or 
once Legal Risk has actually materialized describing a process of reformation, rescission 
or restitution in integrum of contracts143 that allows the counterparties of the transaction to 
return to a status ex-ante144 of the realization of that Legal Risk by establishing new terms 
and conditions of a contract that are equitable in nature, that are sustainable and that can be 
enforced with or without the agreement of the counterparties of the original contract in 
question145.   
 
Ultimately, the author reviews and reflects on how may these legal risks be cured? His 
conclusion: Monetary capital formation must be put back from commercial banks into the 
hand of the sovereign central banks that neither require bail-ins nor bail-outs, that do not 
                                                 
135 See Chapter 4, II Accounting And Capital Formation 
136 See Chapter 4, III Allocation And Capital Formation 
137 See Chapter 4, II.A.1 Role of Central Banks 
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fail when they have to write off securities in default, i.e. credit-lines in default, nor do they 
create a systemic risk. Commercial banks take the roles brokerage firms have today with 
segregated accounts.  Courts must be established that ensure that failed banks indeed fail in 
a clearly prescribed and predictable lawful process of liquidation. Domestically, most of 
the time, we call them bankruptcy courts, in the European Union we have no such 
institution, in the United States, we have an Orderly Liquidation Authority.146 But most 
international financing today spans multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World 
Bank, and international commercial banks. For those cases, we do need a Transnational 
Trade and Investment Court.  
 
For the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity 
for reform our Global Economic Order with the negotiations of a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The EU and the United States are the two leading 
economies of the world. Together EU and USA represent 46.7% of global GDP, 
American-European trade represents about 31.1% of world trade and 56% of American 
Foreign Direct Investments are made in the EU whilst 71% of Foreign Direct Investments 
are made in the USA stem from the EU. The European Union and the United States trade 
$2.7 billion worth of goods and services every day. The transatlantic economy supports an 
estimated 15 million jobs.147  
 
Those facts alone would have warranted that the author conduct a detailed Legal Risk 
analysis in the form of case studies of the non-tariff barriers for European businesses in 
nine industry verticals in the United States affected by the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership148 and with respect to the financing relation between the United 
States and China.149  
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With respect to the comparative analysis both on the side of the United States and the side 
of the European Union, a plethora of research, studies and analysis by both academia and 
professional consulting practices and think tanks were analyzed and studied.150 With regard 
to the literature review concerning Legal Risk151, Capital Formation152 and the current and 
envisaged new Global Economic Order153, the author has researched financial economic 
industry and technical literature and sources in the form of books, articles, economic 
journals, databases, public web sites and all sorts of publically and non-publically available 
media.   
 
As part of his research, the author had also the privilege to personally consult, advise and 
discuss with a number of European and U.S. policy makers and industry representatives 
the fundamental systemic design defects of our monetary and judicial order and ultimately 
lead to the financial and banking crisis of 2008, previous asset-price bubbles and 
misallocations and unless repaired will continue to lead to the same dislocations. He also 
had the opportunity to advise on certain aspects of the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership.154  
 
Finally, following the application of firmly defined concepts of Legal Risk, that are 
universally effective, mutually exclusive and practically applicable and that more 
importantly can be systematically observed, tested, and measured and ultimately refined, 
altered or expanded and therefore meet the universal standards for scientific methodology 
to each of the case studies, the author could prove that regulatory cooperation and 
transnational jurisdiction significantly reduces Legal Risk. Combined with his radical 
proposals as original contributions to this multi-disciplinary area of scholarship and 
applied as logically coherent solutions consistent with the precise analysis of the four 
fundamental legal risks to each of these case studies, these proposals are a direct result of 
carrying out the multi-disciplinary investigatory methodology of this work.   
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E. CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
This thesis aims to make the following contributions to knowledge.  First, it aims to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of legal risk whilst not being limited by the 
descriptive nature of characterizing certain legal transactions and is rooted in a 
fundamental understanding of the categorically different and mutually exclusive effects of 
a certain legal transaction based on legal and factual qualifications.  By integrating and 
attributing these categories of legal risk to the different forms of capital formation that are 
discussed in this thesis, it will hopefully contribute significantly to the body of knowledge 
how these legal risks can be mitigated and ultimately be resolved in the future.  
 
Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014155 after being 
discussed in academic circles since 2011156, his or similar proposals have found numerous 
public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, 
David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on 
TTIP calling for an independent judicial body157 and the Member of the European 
Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International 
Investment Court on September 16, 2015158. 
 
The author concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that 
there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two 
fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of 
the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution 
of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate 
with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the TTIP may complete the Capital 
Formation Life Cycle159 resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority 
for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the 
ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.. 
                                                 
155 See supra at note 147.  
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II.  THE ARGUMENT 
 
A. CAPITAL 2.0 
 
After The Wealth of Nations was published by Adam Smith160, the study of economics 
began to accelerate.  Throughout the 19th century, political economists such as Joseph A. 
Schumpeter161 wrote about government, the welfare of society and the nature of its 
institutions, but, at the University of Vienna, concern with policy prevailed much less than 
it did elsewhere.  In Vienna, members of the so-called Austrian School162 were trying to 
make the discipline more rigorous by refusing its fixation on political issues.  This was not 
easy.  The practice of mixing economics with politics often serves as to some preconceived 
ideology, continues today, when the United States alone produces about 64,000 PhDs163 in 
academics, business and government, yet, a preoccupation with policy clashed with 
Schumpeter's concept of economics as a science164, a discipline which put the light in 
public debates by producing knowledge free from particular interests, which itself should 
aspire to neutrality.   
 
Throughout his life, Schumpeter believed that when economists injected politics into 
technical discussions, they tainted their scientific integrity165.  Albeit, I personally disagree 
with the notion of discussing economic developments without also reflecting upon the 
interests of the parties involved as being useful to insight, I would like to continue in the 
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tradition of the great University of Vienna of that time with the interdisciplinary nature of 
law, finance, economics and social sciences, in general, in this thesis166.   
 
Although this thesis will elaborate a great deal on the workings of monetary policy167, 
economic policy168 and fiscal policy169 over the last years and its impact on distribution, 
inequality and in general, allocation of resources, the focus of this work will remain on the 
issue of Legal Risk and Capital Formation in a New Global Economic Order that we are 
proclaiming today. 
 
Therefore, we will discuss predominantly the relationships of the different 
counterparties170 involved in each of the legal relationships171 and transactions172 that 
constitute the respective processes of capital formation173.  This discussion will lead us in a 
very structured process through the main issues of this debate, starting with what 
represents legal risk174.  How does legal risk differentiate itself from general risks that we 
perceive in a transaction?175  And, how do we know that legal risk is present?  In this 
thesis, we will focus our discussion exclusively on the capital formation process. 
 
It is no secret that the character and our understanding of Capital is swiftly changing since 
the beginning of this millennium. With the advent of the digitization of the capital 
formation process since the nineties and the complete pervasion of all areas of life, 
engineering, banking, management and learning with information technology and social 
media, in particular with the advent of companies like Facebook176, Twitter177, Skype178, 
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and the rise of a complete new industry for financial technology, short FinTech179, and the 
rise of millennials180 to maturity we may announce that we have officially arrived at the 
Age of Capital 2.0. 
 
Especially in the last 7 years181, since the financial crisis of 2008, the process of capital 
formation has undergone an almost complete transformation. What do we mean by that? 
The way capital is formed, not only through traditional forms of sovereign production of 
money, but also by way of the privatization of the money creation sector182, starting with 
commercial banks, a development that is going on for the better part of the post-war 
period183but, of course, being highly accelerated with the advent of shadow banking184 and 
with the significant increase of digitization of money185, certainly finding its climax in the 
advent of the creation of the bitcoin186, which probably is the purest form now of a 
digitized currency.  Going forward to other forms of capital formation that in light of the 
digitization process could be probably considered almost more traditional, such as all 
forms of securitization187, may it be in the form of derivatives, as we have seen them in the 
run up to the financial crisis of 2008188, with all sorts of asset-backed securities189, 
collateralized debt obligations190 and other most inventive forms of repos191 in the money 
markets, may it be in the form of classic securitization of “ideas” that we have seen in the 
public markets by initial public offerings for relatively immature young companies192, 
where effectively ideas have been securitized and floated in the public markets and thereby 
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created some sort of non-money currency that effectively acts as a very valuable exchange 
for companies, such as Facebook193, Google now Alphabet194, or Yahoo195 or others that 
are the new virtual investment companies of our time, which ultimately leads us to the 
necessary discussion in our reflection on the capital formation process and its legal risks, 
as to how these legal risks can be evaluated, assessed, measured and ultimately mitigated 
in an economic and monetary order that is, or has been, constantly in change over the past 
20 years196. 
 
Of particular interest in this discussion must be that we will often find us almost in a 
vacuum of jurisdiction, left without a legal framework for transnational transactions, be it 
on the global level, and be it on an intercontinental level.  Over and over, time and again, 
we have seen that institutions, such as the United Nations197, or the World Trade 
Organization,198 or even the World Bank199 or the International Monetary Fund200, have 
very limited jurisdiction beyond the contractual rights that, have been agreed respectively 
between its counterparties, but, rarely ever any of these institutions have been able to wield 
something as akin to a transnational jurisdiction.   
 
This is why we often, as lawyers, as international or transnational lawyers in 
particular, find ourselves in situations where we stand to realize that the worst form 
of international deregulation is no regulation, is no legal framework, is no 
transnational jurisdiction that actually has the ability to set a legal framework and a 
process for the creation of laws and regulation and enforcement for contractual 
obligations that ultimately can lead to a resolution of conflicts and resolution of legal 
risks in a legally effective form that is actually enforceable, without any back-door 
political dealings.201 
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When international financing contracts are governed either at a rate of 45% of all public 
companies by the laws of New York202 or in the alternative by the laws of England and 
Wales203 - and only in rare domestic cases by other local jurisdictions - which have become 
somehow the substitute for international or transnational law, lawyers, do understand that 
this is not only about two counterparties that agree on the terms of the conditions of a 
contract and have a meeting of the minds about a particular agreement, but this is also 
about having a forum204, a common venue and jurisdiction once one of the counterparties 
actually defaults on his terms of the deal and legal risk stands to be fully materialized that 
is in place to effectively resolve the disagreement, the effect of the default and resolve 
these risks in an enforceable manner.   
 
However, this thesis has not only been written for legal scholars or economists but, also for 
those who want to understand our global economic system with a few practical tools that 
should help them locate their place and their interests within that economic system, 
evaluate the risks, and in particular, the legal risks that are associated with and also how 
they personally can mitigate their position within that chain of the Capital Formation Life 
Cycle205 and what they can contribute as a citizen of this New Global Economic Order206 
to change that very order to become a more equitable working process.207 
 
B. THE TRIPLE A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
Let me introduce three key principles with which the pt. reader will be able to better 
understand, assess, evaluate and ultimately improve the entire debate about capital 
formation and legal risks in this rapidly changing new global economic order that, for 
purposes of focus and scope, in this thesis will be in particular discussed before the 
backdrop of the current negotiations of a TTIP208.   
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Why are we going to discuss Global Capital Formation in particular before the backdrop of 
the TTIP?  Well, first and foremost, because the size and scope of a discussion of all 
international venues, potential frameworks, such as the WTO or the United Nations or the 
many other regional agreements probably would be way beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but, more importantly because, TTIP and the creation of a transnational economic area that 
for the first time in recent history spans the European Union and the United States209, is the 
attempt of creating an economic area much in the tradition of what Europe has experienced 
in the development of its own progression from the European Communities210 and a 
European Free Trade Association211 all the way to an economic212 and eventually, even 
monetary union213. 
 
Certainly, with all its shortcomings, pitfalls and difficulties, it is the first time in recent 
history that there is a potentially successful attempt to create something like a single 
market between the European Union and the United States214, based on peaceful principles 
of regulatory cooperation and democratic values and not on the basis of war or occupation 
or any other forms of political or economic imperialism, as we have experienced in other 
regions of the world before.215  
 
Here are the three core principles that will allow us to evaluate and discuss and understand 
all the key issues, with respect to legal risk, capital formation and the development of this 
new transnational legal framework.216  I call these three core principles the Triple A 
model217 for the analysis of global capital formation.  First: Accounting, second: Allocation 
and third: Accountability. All these three pillars, or principles, of global capital formation, 
accounting, allocation and accountability, help us guide through the process of assessing 
what are the legal risks in this process of global capital formation.    
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Accounting218 will help us understand, what is the source, where does the money come 
from? How does the accounting work in the process of global capital formation?  
 
Allocation219 will follow the trail of capital. How does the allocation in this capital 
formation process work?  What happens with the privatization of money and the 
securitization of money and how is it accounted for?  And, how is it accounted for between 
Central Banks, Commercial Banks and, ultimately, the Citizen, be it consumer or business 
that lends from a Central Bank?  
 
Accountability220, most importantly, will inform us in what ways who will be accountable 
for what is happening so often lately, in the case of misallocation of capital? 
 
C. FOUR DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL RISK 
 
As we will hear in great detail that there has been no standard definition of legal risk that 
has been established in academic discourse as the point of reference to assess legal risk in 
general and in particular with respect to capital formation. According to Whalley, the last 
discussion of legal risk took place in 2005.221  
 
We will find several definitions starting with one provided by the International Bar 
Association that primarily sees risk as caused by a defective transaction followed by 
Matthew Whalley’s definition of legal risk222 that identifies two parts of legal risk as 
primary risk and secondary risk where the primary risk is seen as a descriptive layer and a 
secondary definition that uses real examples demonstrating where the primary risks apply 
for instance in non-standard terms and conditions.223   
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Probably the most has been written so far on legal risk by Roger McCormick224 who duly 
notes that the expression legal risk is not a term of art.  When McCormick looks for 
regulatory definitions of legal risk he as in an opinion of the European Central Bank225 or 
in the capital requirements directive226, and he then lifts these definitions into a basic 
concept being a particular kind of risk that is commonly understood to relate to the risk of 
being sued or being the subject of a claim.  Within the narrower scope of financial markets 
he also interprets it as the risk of technical defects in the manner in which a transaction is 
carried out resulting in loss.  He then goes on to describe and enumerate a number of 
examples where legal risk has lately materialized.  All these definitions however have had 
one problem in common that is that they are rather descriptive and rather enumerative but 
neither abstract nor mutually exclusive and therefore can hardly be the basis for a rigorous 
theory.  
 
Tobias Mahler227 from the University of Oslo who at this point probably has developed the 
most advanced theory on legal risk, then developed a definition of legal risk that addresses 
the issue of mutual exclusivity and defines legal risk in terms of deontic norms and 
qualification norms that meet that requirement.  Deontic norms on the one hand being 
those that see a risk applied due to an obligation, a permission, or prohibition.  
Qualification norms on the other hand see the risk materialize because the norm was not 
valid or not based on competence, or as he states “his goal was to systematize and analyze 
existing definitions of legal risk prosing a context-independent definition and a 
classification of legal risk based on norm theory”228.   
 
Mahler comes to the following findings229.  First, only legal uncertainty is legal risk, and 
legal risk is sometimes defined as the risk that is caused by or which depends on legal 
uncertainty.  Then he discusses the relation between legal and factual uncertainty given 
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that for risk management professionals legal risk often covers both legal and factual 
uncertainty.230 
 
The distinctions are really made explicit though the examples indicating that uncertainty is 
not excluded from legal risk.  Ultimately, Mahler ends up with a conclusion that is based 
on three questions.  Can there be legal risk in the absence of any uncertainty?  Can we 
speak of legal risk if the law is not sound but well defined and predictable?  Does legal risk 
encompass only normative uncertainty or also factual uncertainty?  Mahler concludes that 
the term legal risk should include both legal and factual uncertainties.231   
 
Then Mahler moves on to a so-called norm theoretic typology whereby deontic norms 
prescribe what is obligatory, prohibited, or permitted for an actor or otherwise referred to 
as duty imposing norms or prescriptive norms as opposed to qualification norms that are 
used by the same concept and is referred to as a constitutive norm, a secondary norm.232 
 
It may be confusing that the financial loss again materializes through a deontic norm 
making it for instance not obligatory for a defendant to pay back a certain amount of 
money.  However the deontic norm is not the root of the uncertainty in such a case.  The 
root of the uncertainty was the defendant’s unexpected lack of competency.233   
 
This distinction between deontic and qualification norms fulfills the requirement of 
exclusivity set out by Mahler who then moved on to combine his norm theoretic approach 
with the discussed distinction between legal and factual uncertainty which finally provides 
him with a matrix of legal risk with legal uncertainty and factual uncertainty on one side 
and deontic norms and qualification norms on the other side.  Albeit the fact that Mahler’s 
matrix leaves us finally with a mutually exclusive definition and qualification of the root 
causes of legal risk it still remains rather descriptive and not on the level of abstraction that 
is required for a definition that would become universally applicable to each and any 
transaction be it in or outside the realm of financial markets or capital formation.   
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This is why I decided to add a third dimension to Mahler’s legal risk matrix by qualifying 
the concept of legal uncertainty and factual uncertainty with what we call the theory of 
rights a concept that has been developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld234 and is 
predominantly categorized by an analytical table of juror relations.235   
 
Hohfeld in particular demonstrates that there is no legal relation between a person and a 
thing as a legal relation always operates between individual human beings, and as legal 
relations between individuals are complex it is very helpful to break them down into their 
simplest form.236  This form of abstraction from the particulars of everyday legal 
transaction is a genuine scientific approach to model building of the law, 
 
Hence when Hohfeld breaks down his juror relations in pairs of duty and right, no right 
and liberty, liability and power, and disability and immunity on a simple matrix it becomes 
very obvious that the Rubicon of legal risk flows exactly right through the middle of these 
jural relations237 whereby you will find legal risk on the one end compounded by legal 
uncertainty and factual uncertainty and legal certainty on the other side of the legal river 
that separates the shores of legal risk and legal certainty.  It is also where you find that the 
pairs of duty and no right relate to the deontic evaluative norms of Mahler238 and the juror 
relations of liability and disability relate to the descriptive qualification norms that also 
Mahler has defined.239   
 
One key observation albeit in furtherance of Hohfeld’s category theory has been made by 
Professor Tanega in his theory of default invariance240 One of the key point to his theory is 
that full payment of a financial contract under an Arrow-Debreu-Sharpe model 
extinguishes or nearly extinguishes all legal risks.   
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When Professor Tanega learned - hopefully also in small part thanks to the contributions of 
the many discussions we had in the course of developing the core essence of this thesis - 
the only point in time there was no legal risk was actually at the point of payment.241 
 
This is why Tanega found himself bound to correct even Nobel Prize winners Arrow, 
Debreu, and Sharp that had basically set out the contingent claim model which underlies 
everything we know and do in risk management, corporate governments, portfolio theory, 
and practically everything else we call modern finance theory.  Here I would like to 
highlight two particular findings.   
 
Whereas in classical structures, the point of non-payment would always be characterized 
on a time line as that point that is enumerated as T0 and the point where payment occurs as 
that point that is enumerated as T1242.  Tanega found that legal certainty will only be seen 
at the point of payment whereas even if there is non-payment due to default this may 
continue as an infinite contingency as he states what follows naturally is what this term 
default invariance.  The values of pay and not-pay must be 0 and 1 respectfully.   
 
This result has extraordinarily large implications for law and finance theory.  From this 
theory, a financial contract been paid exits from the infinitely contingent states of the 
world and thus become a legal certainty of discharged obligations, however if I am paid, it 
remains as part of the infinitely contingent states of the world and a contingent potential 
legal liability.243   
 
Tanega concludes that as one implication of this new theory is that other types of credit 
ratings exist in the real world.  The current credit ratings are obviously based on AAA 
which sees pay as the only relevant event at T1.  From this premise, the hierarchy of 
ratings AAA, AA, and so on unfolds.  But this sort of credit rating obviously does not 
capture the continuing ("stretched out") event of non-payment except to nominate it 
at the bottom of ratings.   
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He suggests that “[f]rom a "not-pay" event, an alternative credit rating agency would 
appropriate "XXX" to warn potential investors of the severity or intensity of default. 
 (Think of warning labels on videos that are not appropriate to non-adults.) Some 
might argue that the XXX-rating is already incorporated in the AAA-rating system”. 244 
Thus, during the height of the credit crisis in 2005-2009 where over 20,000 ratings of 
Asset-Backed-Securities were down rated, the AAA ratings were interpreted by asset 
managers as having 100% default probability245.   
 
In his three approximations of pure pay, pure default and pay and not pay246, Tanega shows 
that each phase consist of a state pre-default and the state post-default and each state can 
be either in financial innovation or in bailout247.  If either state is in financial innovation 
and there is a delay of payment as a manifestation of technical default but that delay is 
cured, it would require the judgment by a court whereas in either state is in bailout, 
repayment due is taken over by a government entity248.  
 
In particular, the third approximation249 could be used explicitly as a mapping of very large 
systems of financial markets, judicial and political interactions where financial innovation 
and government bailout and bail-in schemes are the predominate solutions to apparent 
continuous financial crises such as in Europe today with his key finding that uncertainty 
and default are for purposes of law and finance essentially equivalent in that it is in 
principle impossible to know when or how default may be cured except by way of the 
judicial system, and of not by way of the judicial system then by way of political bailout.250 
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D. THREE FACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION  
 
This thesis will analyze three factors of capital formation251 of which are two so-called 
nonmonetary factors of capital formation252 and one will be the monetary factor of capital 
formation253, money in and of itself.   
 
Aside from certain nonmonetary factors of capital formation, monetary factors will be by 
far the major focus of this work.254  By dealing with nonmonetary factors of capital 
formation, we talk about in the classic sense of capital created by Man, that is capital 
created by man and woman, also more recently characterized in management literature as 
human capital255 and capital formed by Machines, also known in accounting terms as PPE 
or property, plant and equipment256 or in industrial terms very classic as industrial 
capital257 or machines.   
 
Therefore, once we analyze the legal risks that are inherent in the capital formation of 
human capital or industrial capital and once we will talk about the legal risks that are 
materialized in processes that either foster or impede the capital formation in these two 
nonmonetary areas, we have to analyze what policies and projects are currently pursued.   
 
It is for these major reasons that primes our discussion motivates the analysis of the TTIP 
as major case study. We will discuss the effects and legal risks that are incurred or are 
reduced by the implementation of such a partnership in particular within the nine verticals 
of of industries so we can see how these industries are affected by the formation of 
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nonmonetary capital such as human capital by Man258 or industrial capital by Machines259 
and what are the legal risks that come along side260.   
 
In order, however, to have the discussion of the legal risks within those two areas of 
nonmonetary capital formation, we need to define and understand the nature of the factors 
of Man and Machines in our capital formation process and discuss the progress was made 
in the historic understanding of those two non-monetary factors of capital formation261. 
 
On the other hand, we will see that we essentially deal with three actors of monetary 
capital formation262 that control the process of creating what we colloquially today call 
Money.263 
 
E. THREE ACTORS OF MONETARY CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
In this chapter I aim to explain which role the three central actors of money capital 
formation, the Central Bank264, the Commercial Banks265 and the Citizens266, be it in the 
form of the Corporate Citizens, i.e. the businesses, or as the Citizen Consumer, who are all 
what we as a terminus technicus267call “users of the currency”.268  
 
With respect to the role of the Central Banks the author considers it of particularly 
importance that the pt. reader dismisses the many myths that surround the issuance of 
currency and the relationship between a Central Bank and its main customer, the 
Commercial Banks269. Many of these fundamental misunderstandings, unfortunately, are 
today the root cause, why even prominent and highly educated decision makers in the most 
upper echelon not only come to wrong, but simply put, false conclusions, when it comes to 
the time to make decisions pertaining to monetary and fiscal policy.  
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In keeping with the theme, the author further explains the relationship with the respective 
Central Bank, which role Commercial Banks play in the creation of so-called FIAT 
money270 that needs rather sooner than later be shown the EXIT given the many 
misallocations and dislocations that resulted from the fact that banks today create beyond 
eighty percent of all money in circulation by way of credit and electronically.271  
 
Once we understand how the balance sheets of the Central Bank and the Commercial 
Banks are intrinsically linked272, we can move on in the Capital Formation Life Cycle273 to 
the final actor in the process of monetary capital formation which is the user of the 
currency274 in the form of the citizen275, that encompasses corporations and consumers but 
also extends to – and this, unfortunately, is often misunderstood in terms of monetary 
policy – the not any longer sovereign Member States of the European Union or the states 
within the United States of America.276  
 
Here, we will show the role and in particular, the limitations, that are inherent to users of a 
currency as opposed to sovereign currency issuers and what the problems are that are 
associated when monetary and fiscal policy are not united in the same level and sphere of 
government.  
 
We demonstrate along the Capital Formation Life Cycle the implications when legal risks 
materialize in case of default and what repercussions are to the banking sector if we do not 
soon deal with the fundamental design defects of our monetary and judicial order and of 
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F. FIVE KEY ACCOUNTS OF MONETARY CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
 
Following the Capital Formation Life Cycle it is our stated aim to create a better 
understanding of how capital is formed and how in particular money, as one key factor of 
capital formation, is created. However, we will also develop a better insight into how the 
allocation of capital between these Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation278, 
the Sovereign,279 Financial,280 Corporate,281 Consumer282 and International283 accounts 
effectively works.   
 
Once we understand where capital is actually allocated, we will also understand  following 
the accounting process, whether capital tends to be invested or it tends to be consumed284 
and where it is actually allocated and how a different allocation process of the global 
capital formation process may also lead to different results.285 
 
All of this, it helps us analyze how potential legal risks, change the course of allocation and 
potentially change the course, therefore, of how not only risks are distributed, but by 
distributing risks, how rewards are distributed in this process286.  
 
In line with the accounting and the allocation principle, we eventually, follow the money 
and show how the current account trade deficits that Europe had after the war287, mostly by 
importing almost everything after the war into the destroyed Europe, were eventually 
recycled by way of the Marshall Plan288 in Europe289 and ultimately, also in Japan290, by 
the United States into these two countries, and, also how these trade deficits once there 
                                                 
278 See Chapter 4.III. Five Key Accounts of Capital Formation 
279 See Chapter 4.III.A.1 Sovereign 
280 See Chapter 4.III.A.2 Financial 
281 See Chapter 4.III.A.3 Corporate 
282 See Chapter 4.III.A.4 Consumer 
283 See Chapter 4.III.A.5 International  
284 Weitzmann, Martin L. The Bose Model and National Income, Harvard University [online], available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/weitzman/files/bosemodelnationalincome.pdf (Accessed at 20 June, 2015) 
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286 Lazonick, W. and Mazzucato, M. The Risk-Reward Nexus, p.8, A Discussion Paper, policy network paper, 
(November 2012), [online], available at http://www.policy-network.net/uploads/media/154/8167.pdf (Accessed 
at 20 June, 2015) 
287 Varoufakis, Y., The Global Minotaur, (2011) [online], available at http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/books/the-
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288 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, The Marshall Plan, (1948) [online], available at 
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were no surpluses anymore on the United States' side, but became trade deficits on the 
United States side291 vis a vis for instance, Europe or China, were eventually recycled back 
again through the United States by way of Wall Street and by way of capital markets.292 
 
G. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CAPITAL IN THE US, EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBALLY 
 
Following the trail of capital and the trail of the accounts along the Capital Formation Life 
Cycle and analyzing the allocation of capital, helps us understand and assess exactly not 
only where are the legal risks in this process located, but also, how the consequences of 
these legal risks are mitigated and resolved, and how the actors in this process are 
rewarded or held accountable if it came to a significant misallocation of capital293.  
 
This leads us to the third pillar and third principal of the global capital formation process, 
which is accountability294. This is such an important pillar in this discussion, given what all 
of us have to see daily in the news, where we see the necessary restructuring of sovereign 
debt295, where we see the increasing inequality in the allocation of resources, particularly 
through the more recent findings of ever greater growing rates of return of capital than the 
growth of the actual economies this becomes such a significant and current issue in our 
actual daily, political and economic debate. 
 
Where we see what was once dubbed the principle of creative destruction296, in particular, 
of the insolvencies of enterprise and business that was once established by Schumpeter as 
the prime engine of innovation in a dynamic and growing economy297, has been now 
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295 See Chapter 4.IV.5. Sordid Debt Restructuring 
296 Schumpeter, J. A, Principle of Creative Destruction, (1942) [online], available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html (Accessed at 20 June, 2015) 
297 Schumpeter, J. A., (2009). Can Capitalism Survive? Creative Destruction and the Future of the Global 
Economy. United States: Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
298 Texas Penal Code Section 28.04, Reckless Damage or Destruction, A person commits an offense if, without 
the effective consent of the owner, he recklessly damages or destroys property of the owner. [online], available 
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H. FROM FIAT TO EXIT 
 
This is why we advocate in this thesis for a transition from the principle of creative 
destruction to a principle of equitable default299 that follows the history and tradition of 
decades of experience in domestic insolvency courts300. Consequentially, the creation of an 
EXIT and the destruction of FIAT301 money as a new principle of creative destruction does 
not only hold the debtor accountable for the alleged misuse of the resources that have been 
provided to him, but equally important, does also hold the creditor accountable for the 
misallocation of their resources. Often, we find these expansive credit misallocations 
motivated by simple impetus like irrational exuberance302 or a complete irrational 
expectation of a rate of return for what must be understood also as exuberant risk. All too 
often though, we find it encouraged by moral hazard303 or what would otherwise be just 
summed up in one simple word: Greed. Like Lucius A. Seneca said:  
 
Parum Enim Avidis Natura 304 
 
That very last piece, that very pillar of accountability, within the global capital formation 
process, at this point in time, is still severely missing, as demonstrated every day and 
evening on our nations’ TV news channels305 and we would like to see this thesis make a 
minor contribution in adding accountability back into the equation of global capital 
formation.   
 
These three principles, these three pillars of our Triple A model of Accounting, Allocation 
and Accountability306 that regardless of what your persuasion in economic theory or 
political ideology is, will help you analyze and hopefully understand how capital formation 
in this changing global economic order works, what legal risks are associated with it and 
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301 See Chapter 6.I.C. From FIAT to EXIT – Terminal Resolution of Misallocations in a New Global Economic 
Order  
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how these legal risks and consequently, the impact of the realization of these risks can be 
mitigated and resolved in an equitable manner. 
 
In essence, it is these three principles which will empower you to understand how in 
today's global economic order we actually account for capital, how we allocate capital and 
how we hold actors within the system eventually accountable for the misallocation of 
capital and for the realization of legal risks and their consequences. 
 
We will provide in this process for a way of allocation of resources that is more 
equitable307 and thereby less susceptible to the realization of its inherent legal risks and 
arguably also more economically efficient. Ultimately, it is upon each of us to advocate for 
a process of capital formation that includes a pillar of accountability holding those 
responsible for the misguided allocation of resources that continues to lead to more 
inequality, more human suffering and to provide for a mechanism of resolution308 in the 
form of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court309 that allows us to 
transform - what has been perverted into a process of reckless destruction - to a resolution 
that will be seen as equitable default.310  
                                                 
307 See Chapter 6.I.2. The Concept of Equitable Default 
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CHAPTER 2: LEGAL RISK 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW OF LEGAL RISK 
 
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL RISK 
 
FIGURE 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL RISK DEFINITIONS311  
 
 
Matthew Whalley312 in his brief BLP-centric history of legal risk definitions finds that their 
legal risk timeline indicates that discussions about legal risk stopped in 2005 and points out 
that: 
The concept of “legal risk” first came to prominence in 2004, when the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision used the words “…including legal risk.” in their 
description of operational risk. For banks, this meant that operational risk frameworks 
would need to flex, in order to accommodate the language and concepts that are 
embedded in the law and its interactions with their business. Over the last few years I 
have often said that not enough is written about legal risk to help lawyers, and in-
house lawyers in particular, add depth and clarity to the concept. 
                                                 
311 FIGURE 1: Whalley, Matthew, A Brief History of Legal Risk Definitions, Berwin Leighton Paisner, (June 12, 
2014) [online], available at https://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-insights/articles/legal-risk-definition-history/ 
(Accessed 20 September 2015) 
312 Whalley Matthew, Berwin Leighton Paisner, Attorney Profile [online], available at 
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The author concurs in principle and wants to allay any concerns by laying these 
Theoretical Foundations of Legal Risk. An interesting observation aside, the brief history 
of legal risk definitions stopped right at the start of the latest asset-price bubbles starting 
with the commencement of the housing bubble in 2005313 that eventually culminated in the 
financial crisis of 2008.314 Arguably, it is therefore long overdue, to analyze Legal Risk in-
depth helping both academics and practitioners to define Legal Risk in a manner that is 
universally effective, mutually exclusive and practical in application. The emphasis must 
be added either to prevent Legal Risk315 where possible or terminally resolve Legal Risk316 
whenever necessary.  
 
Dictionary definitions of Risk give us an informal sense of the meaning of the term of art, 
for example: 
 
The possibility that something bad or unpleasant (such as an injury or a loss) will 
happen, someone or something that may cause something bad or unpleasant to 
happen, a person or thing that someone judges to be a good or bad choice for 
insurance, a loan.317 
 
It may include the possibility of loss or injury, that someone or something that creates 
or suggests a hazard, the chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of an 
insurance contract; also:  the degree of probability of such loss, a person or thing that 
is a specified hazard to an insurer, an insurance hazard from a specified cause or 
source “war risk”, the chance that an investment (as a stock or commodity) will lose 
value318.  
 
The financial crisis of 2008 exposed risks that were not foreseen and in the subsequent 
quest to attribute blame to the financial institutions their managers, auditors, regulators, 
credit rating agencies, and politicians many asked the same questions:  “Where were the 
lawyers?”319  How do we go about identifying legal risks? 
                                                 
313 Stuhlpfarrer, Lukas M., Tax Effective Structuring of Real Estate Investments, (2005), State University of New 
York at Buffalo.  
314 Scherbina, A., Asset Price Bubbles: A Selective Survey, International Monetary Fund, (February 2013), 
[online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1345.pdf  (Accessed at 20 August 2015) 
315 See Chapter 5, Case Study: TTIP – Nasciturus for a New Global Economic Order 
316 See Chapter 6.I.C From FIAT to EXIT – Terminal Resolution of Misallocations in a New Global Economic 
Order 
317 Risk, Definition by Merriam Webster Dictionary [online], available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/risk (Accessed May 20, 2014)  
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319 Andersen K, Black, J. Prof., Legal risks and risks for lawyers, Herbert Smith Freehills and London School of 
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A successful legal risk culture is one which provides a framework for legal risks to be 
identified, assessed, managed, and monitored consistently at all levels of an organization. 
The key starting point is having an agreed definition of legal risk in place and it being 
sufficiently understood and consistently applied across the organization.320  Some may 
question whether a definition is required. However, without it the process of identifying 
risks would be difficult.  So far, there is no standard definition of legal risk.321 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION ON LEGAL RISK 
 
The International Bar Association offers a definition as being322: 
 
[a] risk of loss that is primarily caused by first, a defective transaction; second, a 
claim including a defense to a claim or counter claim being made or some other event 
occurring that results in a liability for a party or other loss for example, as a result of 
the termination of the contract.  Third, failing to take appropriate measures to protect 
assets for example, intellectual property owned by the party; fourth, a change in 
law.323   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/lfm/0356o%20LSE%20HSF%20discussion%20paper_d6.pdf 
(Accessed at 16 August 2015)  
320 Id. 
321 Id.  
322 The full definition of Legal Risk produced by the working party of the International Bar Association (IBA) 
reads as follows. Legal risk is the risk of loss to an institution which is primarily caused by a defective 
transaction or be a claim including a defense to a claim or a counter claim being made or some other event 
occurring which results in a liability for the institution or other loss, for example as a result of the termination of 
a contract or c) failing to take appropriate measures to protect assets, for example intellectual property owned by 
the institution or the change in law.  The reference to a defective transaction in a) above includes: 
1. Entering into a transaction which does not allocate rights and obligations and associated risk in the manner 
intended. 
2. Entering into a transaction which is or may be determined to be void or unenforceable in whole or with 
respect to material part for whatever reason. 
3. Entering into a transaction on the basis of representations or investigations which are shown to be misleading 
or false or which fail to disclose material facts or circumstances. 
4. Misunderstanding the effect of one or more transactions for example believing that the right of set off exists 
when it does not, or that certain rights will be available on the insolvency of a party when they will not. 
5. Entering into a contract which does not or may not have an effective or fair dispute resolution procedure or 
procedures for enforcement of judgments or arbitral decisions applicable to it. 
6. Entering into a contract inadvertently. 
7. Security arrangements that are or maybe defective for whatever reason.  All references above the transaction 
shall include a trust, any kind of transfer or creation of interests in essence of any kind, any kind of insurance, 
any kind of debt or equity instrument, and any kind of negotiable instrument.  All references to entering into 
transaction include taking an assignment of a contract or entering into a transaction in reliance upon a contract 
which is itself a defective transaction. 
323 IBA, International Bar Association: Legal Risk Definition, [online], available at 
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Other risks include regulatory risks, resulting in enforcement actions, professional 
liability risks for lawyers acting not in compliance with their professional obligations324.  
Identifying a risk which falls within the often descriptive definitions is usually inefficient 
and possibly impossible.   
 
More important in identifying those risks which firms are, or should be, particularly 
concerned about are thresholds. For instance the amount of a claim is important and the 
cost of remedy as may be estimated from past cases.  Some risks may be difficult to 
quantify for example, the risk and associated costs of any regulatory sanction for non-
compliance325.   
 
The measuring of reputational risks where an allegation could threaten the good 
reputation of an organization is inherently difficulty.  Legal risk management systems must 
also be capable of anticipating and identifying risks that have not materialized yet.326  
 
Legal risks may derive from legal uncertainty or from a court interpretation of the law 
which is contrary to the accepted understanding. They also may be a result of the fact that 
whoever is in charge of compliance in an organization is not aware that individuals or 
divisions within the organization are not complying with legal or regulatory standards.  .327   
 
Legal risk management, needs to be anticipatory.  Knowledge of the present law is not 
sufficient, neither does ignorance protect. Given the pace of legal and regulatory change, 
firms are increasingly looking for efficient, effective ways of scanning the legal and 
regulatory horizon.328  A successful legal risk framework will define mutually exclusive 
and clear defined determinants of legal risk.   
 
When anticipating changes of the law and regulations, organizations must be aware of all 
jurisdictions they operate and include such risks in any jurisdiction which may have an 
impact on the organization’s operation or its reputation.329   
 
                                                 
324 See supra note 323. 
325 Id.  
326 Id.  
327 Id.  
328 Id.  
329 Id.   
Page | 55 
 
Once legal risks are identified the next stage is to assess those risks330. The key to 
successful legal risk managements is the assessing, monitoring, and reporting of legal 
risks.  This requires appropriate training to ensure knowledge of the relevant law, but also 
sufficient acquaintance with the organization.  In this regard, lawyers need to increasingly 
learn to articulate issues quantitatively331.   
 
There are three fundamental functions that legal can employ in legal risk management. 
First, as in-house counsel or compliance offer by advising and supporting the organization 
through the identification of legal risks, facilitating and understanding of the implications 
of risk, assessing risks, and planning actions to remedy breaches.332  Legal counsel needs 
to have a good understanding of the business and its risks, the organizations needs to have 
a full comprehension of legal risk and both legal and organization need to be adequately 
skilled to manage legal risks.   
 
Second, there is the control and oversight function333.  That includes the formulation of 
policies and procedural controls, defining the risk limits, reporting risk, if necessary legal 
action is taken, keeping management informed, but also by reviewing and challenging the 




                                                 
330 It is also important that legal risks are assessed on a holistic basis even if they are being reported on the 
business unit basis.  Assessors should take stock of trends and apply lessons learned across the firm.  Legal risk 
committees could serve to consolidate issues across the board and to determine the scope of legal risks which 
need to be managed.  Assessment of legal risks has to be accompanied by systems for their effective 
management.  Responsibility should be assigned for assessing and managing aggregated issues across a firm.  
Legal risk policies for assessment must strike an appropriate balance between prescription and high-level 
principles.  If there is too much prescription assessors risk focusing on ticking the boxes rather than standing 
back and looking at what is intending to be achieved.  An overly prescriptive policy may also create blind spots 
or gaps for risks to fall into even if there are sophisticated risk management processes in place.  Legal risks cut 
across many other forms of risks and need to be integrated into wider risk management systems.  There is a 
tension between legal risk management and general risk management resulting from difficulties in reconciling 
the categorization of commercial risks tailored to particular businesses and their management process with the 
more sweeping scope of legal risk.  Integrating the management of legal risks within the wider risk management 
framework may also create difficulties in preserving legal privilege since it could lead the circulation and 
escalation of information that would otherwise be privileged beyond the legal teams and legal risk management 
systems. Nevertheless there are significant benefits to the facilitation of closer integration of the legal function 
with the firm's governance risk and compliance management capabilities.  In pure governance terms the 
origination and management of legal risk remains the primary responsibility of the business.   
331 See supra note 317.  
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The third legal risk management function will include internal audit334.  In a recent survey 
firms were asked to participate to give a picture of where these respective legal risk 
management functions currently sit with a separate reporting lens for legal teams sitting in 
different functions and where they believe the legal function should sit.  Here are the 
results:   
 
40.7 percent of respondents stated that they had a legal team sitting in more than one 
line of defense.  The most common line of defense including those within more than 
one line of defense was the second line where 66.7 percent, that is two-thirds, of legal 
functions had a presence.  That's the control and oversight function.  44.4 percent of 
legal functions, again including those within more than one line of defense, had a 
presence in the first line of defense and the minority, 14.8 percent, in the third with 
22.2 percent of legal functions having a presence outside the three lines of defense.335   
 
Where legal teams are not actively involved in the legal risk management function, there is 
the right information for the effective management of legal risks must be reported both 
horizontally and vertically within the organization.   
 
25.9 percent of the respondents reported that if they had a free hand to design where 
they should sit it should be in a combination of the first and second lines of defense 
the second line being the most popular for those who wish it to be more than one line 
or just one line of defense336.   
 
These statistics are perhaps unsurprising where historically legal and compliance risk 
management were often closely aligned.  Where legal functions are separated its creates a 
challenge for many firms as 88.8 percent of respondents whose legal teams have a 
presence in a combination of the three levels and who responded to the question do not 
have separate reporting lines.337   
 
There are two recent examples where regulators have sought to hold in-house lawyers 
responsible for regulatory breaches.  One of it was in the United States where the 
Securities Exchange Commission sought to make a former general counsel of an 
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investment bank liable for failing to supervise a rogue broker for whom he had no line 
management responsibility338. 
 
The administrative judge held that since the general counsel was aware of an issue 
with a broker and became involved in addressing red flags he effectively assumed 
supervisory responsibility for the broker; particularly given that his views were 
regarded as authoritative and his recommendations were generally followed by the 
business, although not in this instance.  So the administrative judge at first instance 
took the view that the general counsel had in fact discharged his obligations as 
supervisor competent.339   
 
The SEC's appeal was dismissed as the commissioners were divided on both issues.340  The 
allegation that the mere office of in-house counsel could amount to an assumption of 
supervisor responsibility remains troubling.341 
 
The definition of the International Bar Association does not make any specific reference to 
reputational risk.  A legal risk event could give rise to reputational risk such as in the most 
recent multi-billion-dollar case of Volkswagen that is without precedent with respect to the 
fact that a multi-national enterprise of such high regard attempts to intentionally defraud 
the government of a host nation.342 [Then Volkswagen CEO] Martin Winterkorn issued a 
statement that stopped short of admitting guilt, but said:  
 
He was deeply sorry that we have broken the trust of our customers and the public. 
We do not and will not tolerate violations of any kind of our internal rules or of the 
law," he added. The company also said it had stopped selling the vehicles at issue.343  
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was tipped off by testing done by the 
California Air Resources Board. The federal and state regulators said Friday that the 
German company cheated on its emissions standard compliance by programming some 
diesel-fueled cars to turn on emission controls only when being tested. The software is 
installed in nearly 500,000 Volkswagen Group (VLKAY) cars on U.S. roads, including 
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some of its luxury-brand Audi cars, the EPA said. Winterkorn said the company will 
"cooperate fully" with the EPA investigation and has ordered "an external investigation of 
this matter."344  
 
This proves that the management of reputational risk these days is of great important for 
many organizations, particularly following well-publicized bank involvement and 
corporate scandals345. Different considerations, however, apply to regulators, politicians 
and others in the public eye who are likely to be only too conscious of reputational risk, 
independent of any financial or legal consequences.   
 
The International Bar Association identified four categories of social phenomena that 
represent sources of legal risk.  First the behavior of financial institutions346, second the 
nature of the financial markets, third problems within the law and fourth the interaction of 
law and finance.347   
 
The IBA’s Joanna Benjamin348 observes:  
 
The growth part of business is arguably the major source of legal risk in the financial 
sector.  Many of the new markets were started by banks that were outside their home 
jurisdiction and some were located in parts of the world where the potential size of the 
market may not be matched by a particularly well developed legal infrastructure. The 
continuing expansion of the emergence of new market economies following the 
collapse of Soviet communism and the gradual opening up of China to foreign 
investment are just some of the better known new opportunities for financial market 
activity that have been experienced in recent years, but such new markets present a 
range of legal risks for the unwary.349   
                                                 
344 See supra note 339. 
345 Id.  
346 The Bank for International Settlements, BIS, described the issues that concern regulators in the paper 
published in February 2005.  Outsourcing has the potential to transfer risk management and compliance to serve 
parties who may not be regulated and who may operate offshore.  In these situations how can financial service 
businesses remain confident that they remain in charge of their own business and in control of the business 
risks?  Outsourcing is a phenomenon that is not confined to the financial markets.  It usually brings cost savings 
and should at least in theory result in a better, more specialized service but the bank that subcontracts out the 
service typically a back office function by outsourcing is still liable to its customer if the service is not delivered 
properly and the customer suffers loss as a result.  Indemnities from the subcontractor are likely to be of limited 
value.  This is legal risk at its most basic and there is a spillover to reputational risk.  The outsource supplier 
may not have the assets or insurance to cover necessary for such risks. 
347 McCormick, R., (2011). Legal Risk in the Financial Markets. 2nd ed. P. 132, United States: Oxford 
University Press. 
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349 The following ten scenarios may feature in some or all of the countries presenting such opportunities: 
First, there may be no clear legal mechanism for obtaining security over a borrower's cash flows, most valuable 
asset.  Second, it may be prohibitively expensive or to perfect the security interest over other assets such as land 
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C. MCCORMICK: LEGAL RISK IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The basic concept of legal risk was thought as legal risk being  
 
[a] particular kind of risk and commonly understood to relate to the risk of being sued 
or being the subject of a claim or proceedings due to some infringement of laws or 
regulations or the commission of a tort, such as negligence or some other act giving 
rise to civil liability referred to as Type 1 risks.350 
 
However, in the context of the financial markets 
 
[t]he phrase [legal risk] is also frequently used to mean the risk of technical defects in 
the manner in which a transaction is carried out, resulting in loss, sometimes very 
serious financial loss, for those that put money at risk in the transaction.  We shall call 
that kind of risk a Type 2 risk.351   
 
In more extreme situations, as indicated above, legal risks352 can have a "domino" effect in 
the market and that's because the financial failure of one major institution may trigger 
failures in other institutions that have funds at risk with it or because the market as a whole 
has misunderstood the legal position on a point which is of particular importance to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and buildings.  Third, there may be no means of recording a security interest in the public registry and no 
certainty that it will prevail against a third party rival creditor or upon the borrower's liquidation.  Fourth, it may 
be unlawful to have important documentation governed by anything other than local law, a problem that may be 
compounded by the fact that the judiciary is known or suspected to be corrupt and that international arbitration 
would not be respected by the local courts.  Fifth, the concept of the trust and the difference between legal and 
beneficial ownership may not be recognized.  Sixth, there may be a risk of penal withholding taxes or regulatory 
restrictions being applied to payments including payments of interest by the borrower to the bank or the 
borrower's access to the foreign currency needed to make such payments.  Seventh, the bank security may be at 
risk if a new government opposes a project being funded by the bank. This risk may also be compounded if 
there are no clear laws entitling the bank or its customer to compensation in the event of nationalization or 
confiscation.  Eight, a project being funded by the bank may require regular renewal of key permits and licenses 
and there may be no clear right of appeal against the refusal of renewal which may occur for a relatively 
arbitrary reason.  Ninth, it may not be clear whether the banks transacting business in a country will result in it 
being liable to pay taxes there or require some form of regulatory consent and/or ongoing consent to regulatory 
requirements even though the bank has no branch or office there, and Tenth, it may not be clear whether certain 
of the products that the bank wishes to market fall foul of local laws on for example a) the payment of interest, 
b) gaming or c) the marketing of securities. 
350 McCormick, R., (2011). Legal Risk in the Financial Markets. 2nd ed. P. 10, United States: Oxford University 
Press. 
351 Id.  
352 From the opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 February 2005 on capital requirements directive 
[ECB/2005/4]: "[a] general definition of legal risk would facilitate proper risk assessment and risk management, 
as well as ensure a consistent approach between European union credit institutions.  It would also be worthwhile 
examining the extent to which one should take into account the fact that the legal risks are inherently 
unpredictable and do not generally conform to a pattern.  In addition, the management of legal risk would have 
to be consistent with the management of operational risk as a whole."   
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recoverability of funds sought to be safely or relatively safely invested.  This is sometimes 
referred to as systemic risk353.  
 
International organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction Development354, 
EBRD355 and the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, OECD 
initiated a number of important law reform initiatives356 with the goal to enable countries 
who wish to contract investment for infrastructure improvement and facilitate transaction 
for trade financing to reform the laws relating to secured transactions in a form that they 
enable lending banks to take collateral.   
 
McCormick concludes that  
 
[t]he fact that the initiatives are needed and are being taken at such high levels 
demonstrates that for the time being at least there are significant legal risks involved 
in the markets assuming globalization of legal concept that in reality is only just 
beginning and consequently not having adequate regard to the variety inherent in the 
many legal cultures that underpin the global financial market.357  
                                                 
353 McCormick describes "systemic risk as the most serious kind of risk that, from time to time, threatens the 
financial markets.  The fear of a collapse of a bank triggering other collapses elsewhere with financial panic 
spreading like a contagion around highly sensitive and suggestible markets, is a fear that regulators have lived 
through from the late 19th century, but there are a number of characteristics of the modern globalized financial 
markets that have given rise to increased cause for concern in this area.” As the International Law Reform 
Organization, Uni Trois, observed in a recent paper, "legal risk may become systemic in a less destructive sense.  
Consider, for example, the scenario in which an entire market suddenly changes its behavior because the 
participants become aware of a major legal problem inherent in this specific kind of transaction unsuspected 
until then.  In order to avoid this risk, the market participants avoid entering into this type of transaction as long 
as the legal problem remains unsolved.  Such a mass reaction, if not properly restrained, could seriously damage 
the market." With respect to one of the financial centers of the world, the City of London he finds that "[a]ll 
jurisdictions, of course, present their own distinct legal risk issues, but English law is one of the favorite 
governing laws for financial market documentation and the "home law" for the City of London, is worthy of 
analysis in its own right in the context of legal risk management.  Such analysis is far from a parochial exercise.  
Many of the issues considered in the English courts in the London market have parallels elsewhere.  Indeed, it is 
a feature of the markets that phenomena, such as the imposition of sanctions or penalties for various forms of 
market abuse, frequently arise with new simultaneity on both sides of the Atlantic.  Further, legal issues 
affecting the wholesale financial markets in London usually affect the markets in the EU as a whole and vice 
versa depending, to some extent, on the degree of harmonization achieved.” 
354 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established to help build a new, post-
Cold War era in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, a mere 18 months elapsed between the first mooting of the 
idea of a European bank, by President François Mitterrand of France, in October 1989 and its opening for 
business with headquarters in London in April 1991.Urgency and the ability to respond to momentous events 
whether it be the end of the Soviet Union, financial crises or the ‘Arab Spring,’ have been among the EBRD’s 
hallmarks much like banking systems reform, and the creation of proper legal frameworks for property rights. 
355 The OECD provides a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek 
solutions to common problems. We set international standards on a wide range of things, from agriculture and 
tax to the safety of chemicals. 
356 EBRD, Legal Reform News Update, [online], available at http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/legal-
reform.html (Accessed at 15 August 2015)  
357 Id.  
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D. WHALLEY ON LEGAL RISK 
 
FIGURE 2: PRIMARY LEGAL RISK CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS358 
 
According to Whalley, effective legal risk definitions need a two-part structure.  Legal risk 
definitions are central to proactive legal-risk management as they set the boundaries for 
your discussions with the business.  He comes to the conclusion that a two-part definition 
helps in-house legal teams that identify and manage legal risks.359   
 
First, primary risk:  This is the legal term that defines a broad area of risk, for instance, the 
contractual risk, and it will help you focus on the likely sources of legal-risk.  The primary 
risk is sometimes called the prescriptive layer.360   
 
Second, the secondary definition:  This uses real examples to explain and demonstrate 
where the primary risks apply, for instance, non-standard terms and conditions.  Legal risks 
are owned by the business, so the business should help to define and flesh out these easy to 
                                                 
358 See supra note 311.  
359 Whalley, M.,  Berwin Leighton Paisner, Legal Risk Benchmarking Survey, [online], available 
http://www.blplaw.com/download/BLP_Legal_Risk_Benchmarking_Report.pdf (Accessed at 15 August 2015)  
360 Id. 
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understand non-lawyer definitions.  The secondary definition is sometimes called the 
normative layer.361   
 
Altogether, Whalley finds five primary legal-risk categories with examples of secondary 
definition.  The table above shows our five primary legal-risk categories and gives 
illustrative secondary definition examples of some real-life business risk. As discussed 
further in this Chapter 2.II. Four Determinants of Legal Risk, we agree with the first four 
categories as concurrent qualifying as legal risks.  
 
However, with the fifth category of legal risk pursuant to Whalley, dispute risk362, we 
disagree, due to the fact that the risk of dispute will always be a consequence of default 
rather than constituting a legal risk in and of itself. Even if we consider the secondary 
examples, that Whalley offers, that the failure to comply with dispute resolution timelines 
are either breaches of contractual obligation or where enacted by law, failures of 
compliance with the same. Certainly, the risk of making strategic mistakes363 managing a 
dispute or operational decisions does not constitute a legal issue and therefore, definitely 
not a legal risk.  
 
Unfortunately, in terms of the five Primary Legal Risk Categories’ qualification as 
defining legal risk, they fall short of the level of general abstraction and mutual exclusivity 
necessary of its determinants in order to be uniformly applicable to any kind of jural 
relation364. However, Whalley’s undertaking has definitely been great progress from the 
purely citatory and regulatory approach of his predecessors and comes with great value for 
the practitioner for their understanding of the issues of legal risk.  
 
 
                                                 
361 See supra note 358.  
362 Calihan, Robert B., Dent, John R. and Victor, Marc B., The Role of Risk Analysis in Dispute and Litigation 
Management, American Bar Association, (October 2004), [online], available at 
http://www.litigationrisk.com/Paper%20on%20Risk%20Analysis%20for%20ABA%20Forum%20on%20Franc
hising.pdf (Accessed at 16 August, 2015)  
363 Deloitte, Exploring Strategic Risk, 300 executives around the world say their view of strategic risk is 
changing, [online], available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-
Risk-Compliance/dttl-grc-exploring-strategic-risk.pdf (Accessed 16 August 2015)  
364 Kocourek, A.  Various Definitions of Jural Relation Columbia Law Review Vol. 20, No. 4 (Apr., 1920), pp. 
394-412, Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. [online], available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1111982 
(Accessed at 21 September 2015)  
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E. MAHLER: LEGAL RISK AND DEONTIC VS. QUALIFICATION NORMS 
 
However, Tobias Mahler365 from the University of Oslo proposes a context independent 
definition and a classification of legal risk based on Norm Theory366. Given that the 
banking sector has been particularly interested in the definition of legal risk and has 
produced many incoherent definitions.  Following Mahler there are many different 
definitions of legal risk, but most seem to fall into one of the following two groups. Mahler 
finds that  
 
[t]he first set of definitions links legal risk to uncertainty.  Almost all definitions 
define legal risk by giving a number of examples, which include, in addition to legal 
uncertainty, uncertainty about factual elements.  The definition of legal risk should 
distinguish legal risk from other types of risk.  A starting point for this distinction is 
the relationship between legal norms and risk.  In addition, it will improve our 
understanding of legal risk if we can categorize the different types or forms in which 
legal risk materialize.367 
 
Mahler adopts an approach put forward by McCormick (2006)368 who distinguishes two 
types of legal risk.  However, McCormick fails to explain what exactly distinguishes and 
limits these two types of legal risks. Mahler’s distinction is in line with Norm Theory, 
which provides a relevant reference framework from which to analyze the relationship 
between legal norms and risks.369   
                                                 
365 Mahler, Tobias (2007). Defining Legal Risk. [online] SSRN. [online}, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014364 [Accessed 20 April 2012]. 
366 Kelsen, Hans and Hartney, Michael, General Theory of Norms, (1991), [online], available at 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.001.0001/acprof-9780198252177 
(Accessed at 10 June 2015). Hans Kelsen is considered by many to be one of the foremost legal thinkers of the 
twentieth century. One of his many accomplishments include the fact that he is considered to be the “Father of 
the Austrian Constitution”. He made important contributions to many areas, but especially to legal theory and 
international law. Over a number of decades, he developed an important legal theory which found its first 
complete exposition in Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, and its fullest expression in the second edition of Reine 
Rechtslehre, 1960. During the last decade of his life he was working on what he called a general theory of 
norms. When he died in 1973, he left a lengthy manuscript, which was published in 1979 as Allgemeine Theorie 
der Normen. This book is the translation, General Theory of Norms. It is the last work of one of the most 
important legal theorists this century. In it, Kelsen develops his ‘pure theory of law’ into a ‘general theory of 
norms’. In so doing, he provides a new basis for some of the positions he espoused earlier on, but also revises 
some of his earlier positions. The most important new topic is that of the applicability of logic to norms: Kelsen 
develops an original and extreme position some people have called ‘normative irrationalism’. In the book, 
Kelsen also examines the views of over 200 philosophers and legal theorists on law, morality, and logic, ranging 
from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary thinkers. 
367 See supra note 365. 
368 See supra note 347.  
369 See supra note 366.  
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Mahler, in his paper, defines legal risks on the basis of two questions:370   
 
How legal risk defined and what is meant when practitioners use the term legal risk 
and how should the term be understood and used? 371  
 
Mahler analyzes the definition of legal risk from a descriptive and prescriptive perspective.  
The descriptive approach analyzes like before him McCormick, Benjamin and Whalley 
how legal risk is understood by literature and practice.372  The evidentiary basis for this 
part of his analysis encompasses definitions of legal risks in books, journals, reports by 
banks, lawyers, economists, risk management practitioners.373  However, an answer to how 
organizations use the term legal risk in practice is more difficult to obtain, and has been 
considered in a subordinated manner in Mahler’s papers. 
 
The second perspective is taken from a much more innovative, prescriptive approach 
which constitutes a significant progress and development compared to earlier attempts 
defining legal risk which effectively deals with how legal risk should be meaningfully 
defined.  The method of definition depends on the answer to the following question:374   
 
Is legal risk a concept we construct as we find suitable, or is it a phenomenon we can 
observe and describe based on evidence of legal risk in the outside world?375 
 
The latter alternative can be chosen only if we can determine what should constitute 
evidence of legal risk.  According to Mahler no such evidence seems to exist.  There is 
evidence only of how relevant actors perceive and describe the situation.  Mahler points 
out in his paper that the concept of risk has been studied in different disciplines based on 
varying definitions.376 
 
                                                 
370 Mahler, Tobias (2007). Defining Legal Risk. [online] SSRN. [online}, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014364 [Accessed 20 April 2012]. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
373 Id.  
374 Id.  
375 Id.  
376 Id.  
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In principal, the concept of risk has the potential to be a transdisciplinary field, comparable 
to, for instance, systems theory.  However, this potential has not yet been fully realized, 
partly due to the lack of a common definition.377   
 
Mahler is particularly interested in the relationship between risk and uncertainty, because 
legal risk often is misunderstood as equal to legal uncertainty.  Risk is often distinguished 
from “true uncertainty” by understanding risk as probabilistically measurable uncertainty.  
This distinction between risk and uncertainty was influential for Decision Theory378 which 
commonly distinguishes decisions on the risk379 from decisions on the uncertainty.380   
 
Instead the question is: Whose risk is this?  For instance the concept applies to the parties 
to bear the consequences of a loss that results from certain contingencies.  The concept of 
risk in contract law is thus related to the question of risk allocation or bearing.  Risk 
management takes a similar perspective in the context of risk transfer when identified risk 
is thought to be transferred to another entity.381  
 
Following Mahler, the key difference between the traditional legal understanding of risk 
and the risk concept developed above is the time perspective.382  The principal perspective 
of law is the judges’ viewpoint after default has materialized.  At this point in time the 
question of the event’s likelihood makes no sense. Default has already occurred.  
 
Therefore, Mahler approaches in his paper legal risks by relating to two concepts of risk 
and legal norm.  It follows the idea of a Pure Theory of Law that was first propounded by 
the formidable Austrian jurist and philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881–1973).  
                                                 
377 Mahler, Tobias (2007). Defining Legal Risk. [online] SSRN. [online}, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014364 [Accessed 20 April 2012]. 
378 North, Warner. D. A Tutorial Introduction to Decision Theory, Duke University, [online], available at 
https://stat.duke.edu/~scs/Courses/STAT102/DecisionTheoryTutorial.pdf (Accessed at 25 June 2015)  
379 The International Standards Organizations (ISO) however defines risk as follows: Risk is the combination of 
the probability of an event and its consequences. It is implicit in this definition that the possibility of negative 
consequences at least exists.  In other words, the possibility of positive outcomes is no obstacle to the existence 
of risk.  It is common to determine a value for each risk by combining the values of probability in a percentage 
for instance with, for instance the monetary value of the event’s consequences.  For example a low probability 
of the event and a low consequence indicates low risk.  Notably this probabilistic concept of risk differs from 
the understanding of risk in law, in particular contract law.  Lawyers do not typically assess probabilities when 
addressing risk. 
380 See supra note 378.  
381 See supra note 377. 
382 Id.  
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Kelsen began his long career as a legal theorist at the beginning of the 20th century.383 The 
jurisprudence Kelsen propounded “characterizes itself as a ‘pure’ theory of law because it 
aims at cognition focused on the law alone” and this purity serves as its “basic 
methodological principle”384. The concept of law is the topic of a wide range of literature 
and is well known in the legal discipline.  As such we are particularly interested in the 
basic structure of law which consists of legal norms:385 
 
Every legal norm consists of an antecedent, A, and a consequence, B.  Antecedent and 
consequence linked by a normative modality which states how antecedent and 
consequence are related.  For example if A is the case then there may be a legal 
obligation to perform B.386   
 
The contribution of the risk perspective to law consists of at least the following three 
elements:  First, risks involve mostly negative consequences of events of default.  In order 
to know whether a legal norm may incur negative consequences, we need to apply the 
norm, take stock of the potential effects and evaluate the result from the subjective 
perspective of the norm’s addressee as either beneficial or detrimental. Second, risk may 
imply that future events put us into a position where we ought to deal with situations of 
uncertainty.387   
 
However, in the legal context there is a necessary but not sufficient388 basic distinction for 
the definition of legal risk between two conditions of uncertainty of an event regulated by a 
legal norm.  For instance if an obligation depends on the interpretation of the law, we will 
find a case of legal uncertainty.  If triggering the consequences of the norm firing depends 
on certain facts or conditions, we have a case of factual uncertainty. 
 
 
                                                 
383 The traditional legal philosophies at the time, were, Kelsen claimed, hopelessly contaminated with political 
ideology and moralizing on the one hand, or with attempts to reduce the law to natural or social sciences, on the 
other hand. He found both of these reductionist endeavors seriously flawed. Instead, Kelsen suggested a ‘pure’ 
theory of law which would avoid reductionism of any kind. 
384 Kelsen, Hans, The Pure Theory of Law, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [online], available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-theory/ (Accessed at 18 June, 2015)  
385 Id.  
386 Id. 
387 Id.  
388 Norman Swartz, The Concepts of Necessary Conditions and Sufficient Conditions (1997) 
Department of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University [online], available at 
http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions1.htm (Accessed at 18 June 2015)  
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Mahler concludes that the  
 
[d]istinction between legal and factual uncertainty is a key factor for understanding 
legal risk.  Here legal uncertainty is used generally to denote that it is not fully known 
how the law regulates a given set of facts even if we have a fairly clear idea of the 
probability of a particular outcome in a case.  Factual uncertainty is used here to 
denote that the future set of facts is unknown in the present.  Factual uncertainty will 
be used independent of whether or not the likelihood of these facts is probabilistically 
measurable.389   
 
There is no agreement with respect to whether the concept of legal risk is limited to legal 
uncertainty or if the existence of factual uncertainty suffices.  A law’s vagueness does not 
have to be the most important source of legal uncertainty according to Mahler.  Whether 
the law is necessarily vague is subject to a separate discussion.   
 
For the purpose here it suffices to say that the law’s weakness in addition to other factors 
permits different legal decisions and that such decisions may lead to unforeseen negative 
consequences for a norm’s addressee390.  Therefore, legal uncertainty is indeed a very 
relevant source of legal risk.391   
 
However, we need to ask whether legal uncertainty should be understood as the only 
source of legal risk or if we write a definition which includes factual uncertainty as more 
appropriate.  It may seem that legal uncertainty is the purest legal risk because we can 
concentrate on legal methods to approach or calculate it.   
 
                                                 
389 See supra note 377.  
390 Stevenson, Drury D., Kelsen's View of the Addressee of the Law: Primary and Secondary Norms, South 
Texas College of Law (June 21, 2014) [online], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457480 (Accessed at 18 June 2015)  
391 The conventional wisdom, among both laypersons and academicians, is that laws are addressed to the 
citizenry, or at least to those citizens who could face liability proscribed by a given law. Hans Kelsen, in 
contrast, argued in several of his major works that the primary addressees of laws are the state actors who must 
implement, enforce, and apply the laws, and that the governed citizens are, at most, secondary addressees. This 
approach is logically consistent with Kelsen’s overall views of the law and the state, and is phenomenological 
consistent with the formulations used in modern codes, which use indicative mood rather than imperative mood 
for the verbs. This approach to the law’s addressee remains unpopular in the United States because it grates 
against American ideals of populism and democracy, and the cultural tendency to treat all political issues as 
moral issues. Yet Kelsen’s approach provides a fertile analytic tool for understanding the persistence of 
technical terms and jargon within laws; for understanding certain interpretive rules pertaining to legislative 
delegations to executive agencies; for understanding the boundaries of executive and judicial power; and for the 
inherent problems with executive subdelegations of state functions to private corporations. This paper will 
review Kelsen’s core discussions of the addressee issue and will explore its implications for these and other 
areas of legal research. 
Page | 68 
 
From the perspective of a norm addressee who analyzes his risks however it may be 
difficult or impossible to distinguish the factual from the legal uncertainty because the 
same risk may include elements of both types of uncertainty.  Therefore, Mahler believes 
that the term legal risk should include both legal and factual uncertainties.392   
 
What are the other limits of the concept of legal risk?  First, a legal norm may lead to incur 
a loss for the norm addressee.  In this case the legal norm is one of the sources of the risk 
and the legal risk has a legal norm as the source of the risk.  The second setting is less 
obvious.  A legal norm in particular, a right or legal position, may play a role in protecting 
a certain asset or interest.  An example of a legally protected asset393 would be an 
intellectual property right394.  In this case the norm addressee is the rights holder.  
Sometimes the literature uses the term legal risk in relation to a possible event that will 
effect an asset to which a norm addressee has a legal right.395   
 
Mahler summarizes that  
 
[r]isk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequence.  A risk 
therefore is a legal risk if its source involves a legal norm.  The risk needs to be the 
manifestation of a legal norm’s potential detriment.396  
 
Both factual and legal uncertainty may influence legal risk according to Mahler.  Mahler 
then addresses the second question in his paper as to whether we can identify meaningful 
types of legal risk, so typologies of legal risk.  The literature has suggested a number of 
typologies of legal risk or sources of legal risk397.   
                                                 
392 See supra note 377.  
393 World Trade Organization, What are Intellectual Property Rights, [online], available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm (Accessed at June 20 2015)  
394 Intellectual property rights are the rights given to persons over the creations of their minds. They usually give 
the creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her creation for a certain period of time. 
395 Id. 
396 Id.  
397 According to Mahler “[t]he following typologies are proposed in the context of the financial market.  A paper 
by the English Financial Law Panel proposes three types of legal risk397: First, organizational legal risk 
comprising risk related to the maintenance of a company’s assets.  Second, legal methodology risk relating to 
the possible utilization of inadequate methods to protect assets against claims or liabilities.  Third, conduct of 
business legal risk which comprises obligations greater than foreseen and rights being more limited than 
expected.  The first two groups, first and second, focus on deficiencies in assets legal protection and the third is 
based on a legal norm as a source of a risk.  The types of legal risk described here seem to be nonexclusive.  A 
risk related to the maintenance of a company’s assets may be posed by insufficient protective methods.  It may 
even be characterized as pertaining to the “conduct of business.”  The typology seems to point to different 
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Mahler criticizes McCormick’s typology and suggests this typology of risk is simply 
systematizing examples and describing the difference between the two suggested types and 
suggests instead his “Norm Theoretic typology.” 398 The author concurs with Mahler’s 
critique and emphasizes Kelsen’s notion that the legal system forms a “scheme of 
interpretation”399 .  The norm theory presented here seems to clarify and understand the 
micro perspective of this scheme of interpretation.   
 
First, Deontic Norms400.  A Deontic Norm prescribes what is obligatory, prohibited or 
permitted for an actor.401   
 
Deontic norms are sometimes referred to as “Duty Imposing Norms” or “Prescriptive 
Norms” but here we use the term “Deontic Norm” which forms the basis of Deontic Logic.  
Legal systems are for a set of possibilities to enforce Deontic Norms.  Second, 
Qualification Norms.  In addition to Deontic Norms, there are other norms which do not 
impose an obligation, prohibition or permission.402   
 
Second, Qualification Norms, because they qualify a set of facts to something which 
has a legal meaning.403    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
aspects as criteria for differentiation referring to the first, the protection of assets, second, and the methods 
employed for protection, how the business is conducted.  Mahler argues: “These criteria are so weakly defined 
that they cannot be understood as exhaustive.””397   
398 See supra note 377.  
399 See supra note 384.  
400 Jones, Andrew J. Towards A Methodology, Imperial College of Science, technology and Medicine, 
University of London (September 1991), available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00118478#page-1 (Accessed at 19 June 2015)  
401 There seems to be no clear consensus in the existing literature about the role of deontic logic in legal 
knowledge representation — in large part, we argue, because of an apparent misunderstanding of what deontic 
logic is, and a misplaced preoccupation with the surface formulation of legislative texts. Our aim in this paper is 
to indicate, first, which aspects of legal reasoning are addressed by deontic logic, and then to sketch out the 
beginnings of a methodology for its use in the analysis and representation of law. 
The essential point for which we argue is that deontic logic — in some form or other —needs to be taken 
seriously whenever it is necessary to make explicit, and then reason about, the distinction between what ought to 
be the case and what is the case, or as we also say, between the ideal and the actual. We take the library 
regulations at Imperial College as the main illustration, and small examples from genuinely legal domains to 
introduce specific points. In conclusion, we touch on the role of deontic logic in the development of the theory 
of normative positions. 
Deontic logic and the theory of normative positions are of relevance to legal knowledge representation, but also 
to the analysis and. representation of normative systems generally.  
402 Id. 
403 See supra note 377.  
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This is often expressed by saying that “X shall count as Y.”  Qualification norm is a term 
used by Mahler but the same concept is referred to as a Constitutive Norm.404 The concept 
of a Qualification Norm may be understood more easily by referenced examples.   
 
An example of a Deontic Norm as source of a risk would be the above-mentioned Type 1 
legal risk described by McCormick405:   
 
The risk of being sued or being the subject of a claim or proceeding queued to some 
infringement of laws or regulations, or the commission of a tort, such as negligence or 
some other act giving rise to civil liability.406   
 
The possibility of being sued is perceived as risk primarily because it may end with a 
judgment which obliges the stakeholder to perform a particular action or which prohibit 
him from performing an action he considers beneficial.  The Deontic legal risk is thus 
related to an event influenced by Deontic Norm.   
 
A Qualification Norm as the source of risk included in McCormick’s example of a Type 2 
risk:  
 
Technical defects in the manner in which a transaction is carried out resulting in loss, 
sometimes very serious financial loss for those that put money at risk in the 
transaction. The technical defects in this example are bound to be related to 
Qualification Norms, in particular those dealing with competence and validity. 407 
 
This distinction between Deontic and Qualification norms fulfils the requirements of 
exclusivity set out, provided that we can single out one norm as the single source of risk.  






                                                 
404 Sun, X and Van der Torre, L., Combining Constitutive and Regulative Norms in Input/Output Logic, 
University of Luxembourg, [online], available at  http://icr.uni.lu/xin/papers/technical%20report.pdf (Accessed 
at 21 September 2015)  
405 See supra note 347.  
406 Id.  
407 Id.  
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FIGURE 3: LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS408     
 
   Legal risk       assessment
The legal and factual context
Identification of risks, 
particularly legal risks
Risk analysis:




















































































Mahler also combines his Norm Theoretic approach with the above-mentioned distinction 
between legal and factual uncertainty resulting in a matrix of legal risks, of legal 
uncertainty and factual uncertainty on the one side and Deontic norms and Qualification 
norms on the other side.409   
 
This results in a legal risk matrix with legal risk characteristics that are mutually exclusive.  
However, the inconsistent use of the term legal risk in literature and practice leaves Mahler 
with the impression that legal risk is little more than one of many perspectives on risk.  
Legal risk may often be at the same time also financial risk410 or political risk411 and it is 
therefore necessary to specifically define the differentiating criteria legal risk must fulfil. 
  
                                                 
408 Mahler, T.  Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law,Institute for Private Law. The faculty of 
Law. University of Oslo, [online], available at 
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUS5650/v12/undervisningsmateriale/Legal_risk_management_enforce
ment_course12.pdf (Accessed at 21 September 2015)  
409 Examples could be: 
1) For Deontic Norms and legal uncertainty: I may have to pay taxes, depending on interpretation of tax laws.   
2) For Deontic Norm and factual uncertainty: I may have to pay damages depending on whether I cause an 
accident while driving and drinking.    
3) For Qualification Norm and legal uncertainty. The contract may not be valid depending on uncertain validity 
rules.  
4) For Qualification Norm and factual uncertainty: The contract may not be enforceable depending on whether 
the claim as submitted within the time limitation.   
410 Campbell R. Harvey, Claude B. Erb, Political Risk, Economic Risk and Financial Risk, Duke University, 
[online], available at http://people.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_risk/pol/pol.htm (Accessed at 18 August 2015)  
411 Id.  
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Mahler concludes that  
 
[m]any typologies suggested by practitioners are essentially context dependent, non-
exhaustive and do not consist of mutually exclusive types of legal risk.  Hence they 
may be very useful in a specific context but they do not form a solid basis for general 
theory of legal risk.  Quite the opposite is the case for the Norm Theoretic approach 
outlined above.  The distinction between Deontic and Qualification norms as sources 
of legal risk enable us to clearly distinguish two types of legal risk under the condition 
that we face a single relevant norm.412   
 







































With the development of his risk management process and the introduction of the 
distinction between deontic and qualification or constitutive norms, Mahler manages to 
complement two necessary but not sufficient conditions in the development of a universal 
Legal Risk definition in the form of the Four Determinants of Legal Risk by missing to add 
a third dimension to his matrix that specifically defines the jural relations and jural 
opposites under which Legal Risk applies. Unsurprisingly, as a consequence, we find in 
Figure 4, Legal Risk Management, much like Whalley with his dispute risk, that he 
conflates and confuses litigation risk and structural risk414 with Legal Risk.  
 
 
                                                 
412 See supra note 377.  
413 See supra note 408.  
414 Structural Risk Management (Asset/Liability Management) (ALM), Reference Manual (Spring 2005), 
[online], available at 
https://www.dico.com/design/SBFP_En/Structural%20Risk%20Management%20(Asset%20Liability%20Mana
gement).pdf (Accessed at 19 August 2015)  
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F. HOHFELD’S CATEGORY THEORY APPLIED TO LEGAL RISK 
 
Having discussed the concept of Tobias Mahler defining legal risk by combining the 
concepts of legal uncertainty and factual uncertainty as the preeminent components of legal 
risks, by making them mutually exhaustive by inserting them into a matrix with the 
concept of a Deontic norm versus a Qualification norm; we would now like to add a third 
dimension by qualifying the concept of legal uncertainty and factual uncertainty, i.e. legal 
risk with the qualifications of a Deontic norm and a Qualification norm in a third 
dimension of what we call the theory of rights415; a concept that has been developed by 
Wesley Hohfeld416 and is predominately characterized by an analytical table of juror 
relations.   
 
FIGURE 5: NAÏVE HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS 417 
 
 
                                                 
415 Hohfeld, W. (1913) Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 
16, 28–59 (1913), available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/cdonahue/courses/prop/mat/Hohfeld.pdf 
416 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was born in California in 1879 and he graduated from the University of 
California Berkley in 1901.  He went on to Harvard Law School where he served as editor of the Harvard Law 
Review and graduated in 1904 with honors.  From 1905 to 1913 Hohfeld taught at Stanford Law School.  He 
then moved to Yale Law School where he taught until his death in 1918, only 14 years after he graduated.  
Hohfeld as Professor of Jurisprudence, Jurisprudence is the branch of philosophy which deals with principals of 
law and the legal systems through which the law is applied416.   
417 Hohfeld’s eight terms are arranged in two tables of 'correlatives' and 'opposites' that structure the internal 
relationships among the different fundamental legal rights. "Correlatives" signifies that these interests exist on 
opposing sides of a pair of persons involved in a legal relationship. If someone has a right, it exists with respect 
to someone else who has a duty. If someone has a privilege, it exists with respect to someone else who has no-
right. If someone has a power, it exists with respect to someone else who has a liability. If someone has an 
immunity, it exists with respect to someone else who has a disability. 
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The beauty about the comprehensiveness of the Hohfeld generalizations is that the 
relations apply to the performance of any actions or the existence of any state of affairs, 
any number of other people, ranging from one person to the indefinite group of people who 
make up the world at large418.  When we look at the Hohfeldian table we see basically four 
pairs of juror relations which are first right and duty, second liberty and no right, third 
power and liability, and fourth immunity and disability.419  
 
A privilege is the opposite of a duty; a no-right is the opposite of a right.  
A disability is the opposite of a power; an immunity is the opposite of a liability.  
 
Let us focus on the first order juror relations of right and duty and liberty and no right420.  
With respect to right and duty one is normatively protected with the backing of the state of 
necessary against the interference or uncooperativeness of one or more other people.  
Anyone, whom the right obtains is under a duty to comply with its terms where the terms 
call for non-interference or for assistance.421   
 
With respect to liberty and no right the holdover liberty is free of any duty to some other 
persons with regard to the act or omission of state of affairs covered by the same422.  
Everyone whom the liberty is held has no right that would limit the liberty holder's 
freedom in the area of conduct covered by the liberty, though everyone may well have a 
liberty to interfere with the exercise of that freedom.  A liberty can be surrounded by a 
pyramid of rights which serve to protect one's ability to exercise the liberty.  Liberties do 
not entail rights and rights do not entail liberties.423   
 
With respect to the higher order juror relations, that is power and liabilities and immunities 
and disabilities, the holder of power can change or cancel other people's entitlements and 
his own entitlements.  The bearer of a liability is exposed to amplifications or shifts or 
reductions in his or her entitlements.  Shifts in one's entitlements are frequently not 
unpleasant.   
 
                                                 
418 See supra note 415.   
419 Id. 
420 Id/ 
421 Id.  
422 Id.  
423 Id.  
Page | 75 
 
The promisee can benefit greatly from the rights vested in him by a promissor.  The 
explanation here is that the distinctive functions of the second order entitlements are 
defined in the purely non-evaluative and descriptive manner.  Note the contrast with rights 
the identification of which inevitably rests on evaluative assumptions; take the example of 
duty to support one's parents and duty to inform on one's parents.424   
 
The holder of an immunity is not exposed to exercise of a power within the domain 
covered by the immunity425.  In that domain everyone against whom the immunity obtains 
is disabled from claiming the immunity holder's entitlement.426  Most of the entitlements 
conferred by so-called bills of rights are immunities, so immunities must accompany other 
entitlements to prevent them from being meaninglessly hollow.427  
 
The relationship between the power of liability axis and the immunity disability axis is 
precisely similar to the relationship between the liberty no right axis and the right duty 
axis.428  Just as a liability is the absence of an immunity and a disability is the absence of a 
power, so a no right is the absence of a right and a duty is the absence of a liberty429.   
 
Hohfeld created a very precise analysis which distinguished between fundamental legal 
concepts and then identified the framework of relationships between them.  His work 
offers a sophisticated method for deconstructing broad legal principles into their 
component elements430.  By showing how legal relationships are connected to each other 
the resulting analysis illuminates policy implications and identifies the issues which arise 
in practical decision making.   
 
Hohfeld noticed that even respected jurists conflate various meanings of the terms of 
rights431, sometimes switching senses of the word several times in a single sentence.  He 
wrote the imprecision of language indicated an imprecision of thought and thus also of the 
resulting legal conclusions432.   
                                                 
424 See supra note 415. 
425 Id. 
426 Id.  
427 Id. 
428 Id.  
429 Id.  
430 Id. 
431 Id. 
432 Id.  
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The jural opposites are first right no-right, second privileged duty, third power disability, 
and fourth immunity and liability433.  The jural correlatives are first right duty, second right 
privilege no right, third power liability, and fourth immunity disability.434  The use of the 
words right and privilege correspond respectively to the concept of claim rights and liberty 
rights435 so you always sometimes see it instead of right duty, privilege no right, you see 
right duty and liberty no right436.   
 
Hohfeld argued that right and duty are correlative concepts437.  That means the one must 
always be matched by the other.  If A has a right against B this is equivalent to B having a 
duty to honor A's right, if B has no duty that means that B has a privilege or a liberty438.  
That means B can do whatever he or she pleases because B has no duty to refrain from 
doing it and A has no right to prohibit from doing so.  Each individual is located within a 
matrix of relationships with other individuals. 439  
 
In particular Hohfeld demonstrates that there is no such thing as a legal relation between a 
person and a thing, since a legal relation always operates between two individuals440.  As 
the legal relations between any two people are complex it is helpful to break them down 
into their simplest form.  Legal rights do not correspond to single Hohfeldian relations, but 












                                                 
433 See supra note 415. 
434 Id. 
435 Id.  
436 Id.  
437 Id.  
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G. TANEGA’S DEFAULT INVARIANCE APPLIED TO LEGAL RISK 
 






Following Tanega “uncertainty and default are for purposes of law and finance essentially 
equivalent and that is in principle impossible to know when or how default may be cured 
except by way of the judicial system and if not by way of the judicial system then by way 
of political bail out”.442  
 
Default invariance according to Tanega is the idea that “default does not change at any 
scale of law and finance.  Default is a conserved quantity in a universe where fundamental 
principles of law and finance operate”443.   
                                                 
442 Tanega, J. (2015) Default Invariance, A Naïve Category Theory of Law and Finance   The Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics of Finance in the 21st Century: From Hubris to Disgrace (Economics as Social Theory), 




false  (Accessed at 4 September 2015) 
443 Id. 
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Tanega postulates and the author concurs that  
 
[I]t exists at the micro level as part of the fundamental structure of every financial 
transaction and that the micro level is a fixed critical point within the relatively stable 
faces of the law and finance cycle.  A key point is that default is equivalent to 
maximizing uncertainty at the micro level and at the micro level is equivalent to the 
phased transition where unbearable fluctuations occur in all forms of risk 
transformation including maturity, liquidity and credit risk.  As such, default 
invariance is the glue that links the micro structures of law and finance.444 
 
Tanega’s approximations are implied by his five findings445.  While the entirety of the five 
findings can be encapsulated by three approximations that are basically summarized by 
pay, not pay, and pay and not pay, the basic concepts of his Naïve Category Theory of Law 
and Finance by the use of mappings with common concepts drawn from law and finance 
focusing especially on financial contracts, shadow banking446 and credit crisis.   
 
With respect to our discussion of legal risk and capital formation the second finding is the 
most relevant. Expressed in commuting triangles they are the equivalent to financial 
derivative contracts.  It is also a fundamental structure of the law and finance universe and 
low risk derivatives and high derivatives in Tanega's theory share the same diagonal and 
morphism.  No risk derivatives are lower right commuting triangles of the commuting 
square.  Higher risk derivatives are higher left commuting triangles of the commuting 
square.447 
 
                                                 
444 See supra note 442. 
445 The first finding is expressed in naïve category theory by a so-called commuting square.  “The relation 
between that commuting square in naïve category theory and law and financing would be a contingent financial 
contract.  So a commuting square thereby is one of the fundamental structures of the law and finance universe 
since each and every financial contract, especially one defined as having only one condition left to perform has a 
commuting square structure.  So contingent financial contracts are a fundamental unit of the law and finance 
universe.”  
The third finding is a shared co-domain as a terminal object and co-products.  “In a shared co-domain the 
terminal object is paid and as the morphism is to a single commuting square so we have a shared co-domain 
with a terminal object of not pay than we have multiple commuting squares because we have chained complex 
of risk homology or we have shared co-domain of pay and not pay then we have a co-product from a ring 
structure which results in a cyclic matrix.”445  So we have three different types of shared co-domains that defines 
three different types of structures that approximate the law and finance universe.445   
446 For our purposes, it is important to note that in the pivotal article on Shadow Banking, Adrian, Tobias; 
Ashcraft, Adam; Boesky, Hayley; and Pozsar, Zoltan. "Shadow Banking." Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, July 2010, the authors set out a model where the shadow banking system is simply a 
interconnected series of on-balance sheet transactions.   
447 See supra note 403. 
Page | 79 
 
Tanega asserts with proof that all risk models are essentially of this risk homological chain 
complex. 
 
The second approximation “Not Pay” as the shared co-domain defines an initial object 
of risk modular structure which is a chain complex comprising adjacent commuting 
squares labeled in order from left to right.  Market systems, judicial systems, political 
system and communication system.448   
 
Tanega finds:  
 
The great cycle of default invariance is composed of four phases with each phase 
composed of two states separated by default.  Regularly functors can be met between 
phases of the great cycle.  The orderly liquidation authority of the Dood-Frank Act for 
instance is a regulatory functor from Phase 2 to Phase 3.  A Transatlantic Trade Court 
that would be empowered with the right of insolvency proceedings over sovereign 
debt would have a similar function or equivalent function.  Not only for U.S. 
securities but also for transnational securities that have been submitted to such an 
institution.  The whistle blower incentives in production is a regulatory functor for 
Phase 3 to Phase 1.   
 
Unintended regulatory, circulatory subsystems are category 2 pathways.  For instance 
the orderly liquidation authority though it's a functor through the whistle blowing 
incentive and protection in Phase 1 and Phase 2 tends to create a swift innovation to 
bailout out cyclic structures that emphasize quick return to market conditions.  But an 
orderly liquidation or functor to the whistle blowing incentives and protection in 
Phase 3 and Phase 1 tends to create bailout innovation, bailout subsystems that tend to 
emphasize being stuck in government takeovers, expropriations and asset-bubble 
making.449  
 
So what are the fundamental propositions of the five findings?   
 
First with respect to the commuting square.  The commuting square is equivalent to a 
financial contract.  The commuting square is isomorphic to the contingent financial 
contract.  The contingent financial contract is the fundamental unit of the law and 
finance universe.   
 
Second, the commuting triangle.  The commuting triangle is isomorphic to the 
epistemological and ontological routes to the annihilation of uncertainty.  And 




                                                 
448 See supra note 442. 
449 Id.  
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Third, shared co-domains.  Three approximations of financial reality are determined 
by a shared co-domain.  P implies a single commuting square that as isomorphic to 
the first approximation of the law and finance universe.  P square implies chain 
complex with markets, jural and political systems to settle uncertainty into certainty.  
That is isomorphic to the second approximation and is a risk homological chain 
complex.  P and P squared meaning pay and not pay as a coproduct assumes 
distributivity which implies a ring structure and for our purposes implies a cyclic 
matrix called the great cycle of default in variance.  The illustration of the first and the 
second approximation is a de jure and de facto credit rating agencies correspond to 
first and second approximations.  So, will it pay or will it not pay?   
 
The fourth is the chain complex.  The second approximation of law and finance, the 
risk cosmological chain complex of market, judicial and political systems is 
essentially a lineal composite structure.  The risk homological chain complex is 
isomorphic to the shadow banking system, is isomorphic to the actuarial risk curve 
and to the risk symmetries framework and therefore to the modern finance theory and 
proximate theory of behavioral finance.  The resolution of uncertainty to certainty is 
composite from infinite contingency to uncertainty annihilation.   
 
And fifth, the functors as a third approximation of law and finance product universe to 
the great cycle of default invariance, i.e. essentially a great cycle of default invariance 
is essentially a cyclic group structure.  So uncertainty in default are for purposes of 
law and finance essentially equivalent in that it is in principle impossible to know 
when and how default may be cured except by way of the judicial system and if not 
by way of the judicial system then by way of political bailout.   
 
In other words it requires the absence of duty and liability and the presence of liberty and 
immunity and the transformation from default invariance to a situation where there is an 
absence of duty and liability in the presence of liberty and immunity.  And only that will 
complete the resolution of uncertainty to certainty transforming from a state of infinite 
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IV. FOUR DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL RISK IN CAPITAL FORMATION 
 




Now that we have developed a more comprehensive understanding of the different factors 
that constitute a definition of legal risk, we turn now to an integrative definition of legal 
risks taking into consideration the different legal risk characteristics that will allow us to 
analyze and assess each and any legal relationship or jural relation450 be it with respect to 
the process of capital formation451, be it to understand general economic relationships452 or 
transactions.453   
                                                 
450 See supra note 417.  
451 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
452 The United States and the European Union (EU) economic relationship is the largest in the world—and it 
is growing. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved since World War II, broadening as 
the 6-member European Community expanded into the present 28- member European Union. The ties have 
also become more complex and interdependent, covering a growing number and type of trade and financial 
activities. The United States and the EU have embarked on negotiations to establish a free trade agreement—
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In 2012 (latest data available), $1,500.5 billion 
flowed between the United States and the EU on the current account, the most comprehensive measure of U.S. 
trade flows. The EU as a unit is the largest merchandise trading partner of the United States. In 2012, the EU 
accounted for $265.1 billion of total U.S. exports (or 17.1%) and for $380.8 billion of total U.S. imports (or 
16.7%) for a U.S. trade deficit of $115.7 billion. The EU is also the largest U.S. trade partner when trade in 
services is added to trade in merchandise, accounting for $193.8 billion (or 30.7% of the total in U.S. services 
exports) and $149.7 billion (or 35.4% of total U.S. services imports) in 2012. In addition, in 2012, a net 
$150.0 billion flowed from U.S. residents to EU countries into direct investments, while a net $105.9 billion 
flowed from EU residents to direct investments in the United States. Policy disputes arise between the United 
States and the EU, generating tensions which sometimes lead to bilateral trade disputes. Yet, in spite of these 
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Following our previous discussion of legal risk characteristics, the author comes to the 
conclusion that there are Four Determinants of Legal Risk. First, Law; second, Lack of 




When Hohfeld described the dual correlatives of duty and right454, we found that duty was 
not only characterized as a dual opposite to right but it was also seen as the absence of a 
liberty.455 Let's take the example of having to pay taxes.  Not only is there a duty to pay 
taxes but there might be also a legal uncertainty456.  It might be depending on the 
interpretation of tax laws.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
disputes, the U.S.-EU economic relationship remains dynamic. It is a relationship that is likely to grow in 
importance assuming the trends toward globalization and the enlargement of the EU continue, forcing more 
trade and investment barriers to fall. Economists indicate that an expanded relationship would bring economic 
benefits to both sides in the form of wider choices of goods and services and greater investment opportunities. 
U.S. and EU policy makers are likely to face the task of how to manage the increasingly complex bilateral 
economic relationship in ways that maximize benefits and keep frictions to a minimum, including developing 
new frameworks. The debate will likely become especially acute as the United States and the EU pursue 
negotiations to form a free trade agreement—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
453 Cooper, William H., Specialist in International Trade and Finance, EU-US Economic Ties: Framework, 
Scope and Magnitude, Congressional Research Service (February 2014), [online], available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30608.pdf (Accessed at18 August 2015)  
454 See supra at note 417. 
455 Id.  
456 D’Amato, Anthony, Legal Uncertainty, Faculty Working Papers No. 108,  (2010), [online], available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=facultyworkingpap
ers (Accessed at 20 June 2014) D’Amato argues that first, rules may become more uncertain "on the books."  
For example, a statute that seemed to mean one thing may be construed by a court to mean something 
different. Although the court will usually say that it is clarifying the statute, it does not always do so. It may 
create an exception, an exemption, a privilege; it might construe the rule narrowly to avoid constitutional 
problems, or broadly to give effect to an unnoticed legislative intent buried in the legislative history. The 
court's decision becomes a part of the meaning of the rule, so that the rule now becomes more complex-it is a 
statute plus a judicial decision. The more complex rule may invite further adjudication and more inventive 
subsequent constructions by courts. 
The "law on the books" may also become increasingly uncertain due to the legislative process itself. Persons 
disadvantaged by existing rules may lobby to get new statutes passed that create exceptions, exemptions, or 
privileges, or to get "special legislation" of other kinds. These also render the law more complex and 
convoluted: witness the innumerable tax provisions and regulations, many enacted at the behest of special 
interest groups that clog up the Internal Revenue Code and sometimes render it internally inconsistent. 
The second way rules may become more uncertain is in their application. Persons "disadvantaged" by 
existing rules may modify their activity so that it falls in the cracks between existing rules or comes more 
ambiguously within any given rule. Thus, although the rules "on the books" remain unchanged, if people 
change their conduct so that existing rules less clearly apply to what they do, we can say that overall the law 
has become less certain. 
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Inherent of this legal risk and this duty is a risk due to the interpretation of law that has 
been seen as a legal uncertainty457.  Recall when Mahler458 made the very important 
distinction between deontic norms and qualification norms?459  That former being a risk 
due to an obligation permission or prohibition. We will see that this risk factor will 
characterize itself due to a deontic legal uncertainty.  Do you have to follow the law?  Yes, 
because you have a duty to do so but this duty will depend on an interpretation of the law.  
It might be also due to a failure to follow certain legislative requirements as Matthew 
Whalley460 defined this particular risk factor.  The law might not be developed precise 
enough as it leaves actual room for interpretation461. Thus if we have to summarize the root 
cause for a duty that is characterized by a deontic legal uncertainty and also may represent 
a failed legislative process, then this legal risk factor is probably best summarized in one 
word -- Law.   
 
The legal risk factor of Law, however, will be shown as mutually exclusive from the legal 
risk factor having a Lack of Right.   
 
B. LACK OF RIGHT 
 
What does a lack of right characterize?  Recall Hohfeld's dual relatives of no right and 
liberty.  They weren't only characterized as a dual correlative but also as an absence of a 
right.  Whether a right is present or absent clearly turns on a set of facts.  Therefore, this 
legal risk factor is probably best described as a factual uncertainty, a legal risk that is 
depending on the set of facts.462   
 
                                                 
457 Feldman, Yuval, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 74:133, Duke 
University, (2011), [online], available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1630&context=lcp (Accessed at 20 June 2014). 
Feldman argues that in legal scholarship, it is almost self-evident that “certainty” is an advantage for 
regulation. “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, is usually viewed as an inevitable by-product of vague 
legal standards that may be justified by the prohibitive cost of creating bright-line rules or by the 
inability of the legislature to account ex ante for the complexity of a particular situation.
  
 
458 See supra note 43. 
459 See supra note 401.  
460 See supra note 312. 
461 See supra note 457.  
462 Tillers, P., Konstanz 2003 International Summer School Lectures on Probability and Uncertainty in Law 
(2003), [online], available at http://tillers.net/uncertainlaw/uncertain.html (Accessed at September 22 2014)  
as 
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But, it is also a risk that depends on whether there has been a certain obligation permission 
or prohibition, so this legal risk factor in the terms of Mahler would likely be characterized 
as a deontic factual uncertainty463 which makes it mutually exclusive from the legal risk 
factor of Law that represents a deontic legal uncertainty.  Whalley would discuss this legal 
risk factor of a Lack of Right as a failure to assert a non-contractual right and therefore a 
non-contractual right risk.464   
 
When we discussed the example of so-called intangibles or intellectual property465, for 
instance, patents or trademarks, then we can easily see where the failure to assert a non-
contractual right, for instance in the form a trademark, could lead to a situation where 
someone does not have the right to use a certain brand or logo or trademark.  We determine 
such a situation where there is an absence of a right, a Lack of a Right.   
 
In this case this deontic factual uncertainty is a risk due to a prohibition, the fact that there 
is no right to use a certain intellectual property and depending on a set of facts whether or 
not a certain party does actually own or control a patent or trademark or another intangible. 
Therefore, we find that this legal risk factor is not only mutually exclusive from the other 





The third legal risk factor that we discuss is liability.  Hohfeld posits the dual jural 
correlatives of liability and power. A liability was also characterized by Hohfeld as an 
absence of an immunity466.   
 
                                                 
463 Botterell, Andrew and Essert, Christopher. "Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty." 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47.4 (2009) [online], available at 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol47/iss4/2 (Accessed at September 21 2014). The authors argue 
the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law and the law's insistence that fair terms of interaction be 
maintained between individuals--a requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to 
prove factual or "but-for" causation--sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such 
proof. In particular, they argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain situations where 
multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, where the plaintiff suffers the very 
sort of harm that rendered the risk unreasonable, and where the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants 
was the but-for cause of her loss. 
464 See supra note 358.  
465 See supra note 393.  
466 See supra note 417.  
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Whalley has probably best characterized this legal risk factor as a “failure to enforce a 
contractual right”467.  Therefore, it is a contractual risk and a failure to enforce that 
contractual risk may lead to a liability.  This could be, for instance, as in Whalley’s 
secondary definitions468 by the use of non-standard terms and conditions or by a technical 
default.469   
 
However, this legal risk factor of liability would be qualified by Mahler as a qualification 
factual uncertainty. Given that it is a risk depending on the set of facts, we ought to ask 
ourselves whether we have we failed to enforce our contractual rights, have we used non-
standard terms and conditions or was there a technical default?  But, it is also a risk that is 
dependent on whether there was a non-valid norm or was there any legislative or normative 
action that was not based on a certain competence.  Hence, we come to the conclusion that 
here indeed we find a qualification factual uncertainty that Hohfeld had summarized as 




Last but not least we find that the final and fourth mutually exclusive legal risk factor is a 
Limitation.  Hohfeld had talked about the dual correlatives of disability and immunity.471  
A disability was also referred as an absence of a power.  It was the absence of the legal 
certainty of a power.472   
 
Whalley would have characterized this legal risk factor as a non-contractual obligation 
risk473 that is a failure to meet standards of care of non-contractual obligations.474  One 
example may be the collectability of sovereign debt.  There may be an absence of a power 
to collect sovereign debt in certain jurisdictions, because sovereigns may be immune475; 
                                                 
467 See supra note 358. 
468 Id.  
469 Id. 
470 See supra note 417.  
471 See supra note 43. 
472 Id.  
473 See supra note 358. 
474 Id.  
475 Stewart, David P., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, Federal Judicial Center 
(2013), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/fsiaguide2013.pdf/$file/fsiaguide2013.pdf 
(Accessed at 15 August 2014) Stewart argues that under the U.S.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA), foreign states and governments, including their political subdivisions, agencies, and 
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they have immunity and so there is an absence of power.  The contract may not be 
enforceable and there are non-contractual obligations that are not met.  Inherently they 
create certain limitations.476  
 
Mahler would have characterized this legal risk factor as a qualification legal uncertainty 
because it depends on the interpretation of the law; it's the sovereign immune or is he not, 
does it depend on an interpretation of the law.  Depending on uncertain validity rules, 
sovereign debt for instance, may not be collectible477, be it due to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act or that the Statute of Limitations has run.  There may be a lack of 
competence, for instance a lack of standing.478 Alternatively, the norms or contractual 
obligations may not be valid. Any of these fact patterns have in common, that there would 
be an infringement on a certain non-contractual obligation would cause a qualification 
legal uncertainty.479 This legal risk factor, therefore, is mutually exclusive from the risk 
factors of Law, Lack of Right and Liability and therefore best described as a Limitation.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
instrumentalities, are immune from suit unless one of the statute’s specific exceptions applies. Thus, 
jurisdiction exists only when one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applies. If the claim 
does not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions, the defendant is entitled to immunity and the 
courts lack both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. All FSIA cases therefore require courts to 
address three related questions at the outset: 1. Is the defendant a “foreign state or government” within the 
meaning of the statute? 2. Has valid service been made as provided by the statute? 3. Does a statutory 
exception to immunity apply? If the answer to the first question is yes, the statute applies. Even when the 
answer to the second question is yes, the case nonetheless must be dismissed if no exception applies—
“even in situations where the wrongfulness of the foreign sovereign’s conduct is clear and indisputable.” 
Where an exception does apply, so that the defendant lacks immunity and jurisdiction exists, the statute 
continues to govern the proceedings against qualified defendants.  
476 Chaplin, Michael E. Reviving Contract Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations: An Examination of the 
Legal and Ethical Foundation for Revival, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1571 (2000) available    at:   
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol75/iss4/7 (Accessed at 7 September 2015) Chaplin argues that the Statutes 
of limitations have played a significant role in American jurisprudence from the earliest enactment of 
colonial laws. Because of their settled place in legal history, there is little doubt that statutes of 
limitations are accepted as a matter of fact. Statutes of limitations are so widely accepted, the 
principle of repose so revered, and the truth-seeking function of Article III courts so important that, 
in an uninterrupted line of cases dating back to 1830, the Supreme Court has held that if federal 
statutes that confer federal rights on civil litigants are silent on the limitations question, courts should 
borrow from and apply analogous state or federal statutes of limitations. 
477 Porter, R., Contract Claims Against the Federal Government: Sovereign Immunity and Contractual 
Remedies, Harvard Law School, Briefing Paper No. 22 (5-2-2006), [online], available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/ContractClaims_22.pdf (Accessed at 24 June 2014)  
478 Berniat, Ewa, The Locus Standi of Private Applicants under article 230(4) EC and the principle of Judicial 
Protection in the European Community, (December 2003), [online] available at 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/031201.rtf (Accessed at 20 June 2014), Berniat analyses recent 
reactions of both Community courts to the growing criticism of the standing rules. Finally it is discussed 
whether Convention on the Future of Europe and the draft Constitution for Europe could provide a remedy to 
the lacuna in the system of judicial protection of individuals in the European Union. 
479 See supra note 375.  
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Other purported legal risk factors that have been offered in the literature such as dispute 
risk,480 the risk of loss481 or the risk of default482 are often conflated and used 
synonymously. Dispute or loss may be the consequences of default but default is the 
materialization of legal risk that exists in an infinite contingency until it is settled as stated 
before by either performance or judgment.483 Therefore, neither of them constitute a legal 
risk in it of itself. In fact, the very allegation of a legal risk must inherently constitute the 
risk of a dispute given the only way to settle a legal risk is either by performance, i.e. 
payment or performance of a certain act or, in the alternative, by enforcement of a valid 
judgment that has taken effect or by a bailout or bail-in that in turn would qualify again as 
performance or payment. 484 Thus the prerequisite for such a judgment will always be a 
dispute over a legal or factual uncertainty as materialized in one of the Four Determinants 
of Legal Risk. Therefore, dispute risk must always be the consequence of a legal risk rather 
than constitute a Legal Risk Per Se485  
 
The significant difference between dispute risk as a consequence of a legal risk and default 
risk, is that the possibility of default is actually a prerequisite for a legal risk.  So long there 
is no possibility of default, i.e. the likely non-performance or non-payment, there is no 
legal risk, since default is the ultimate materialization of legal risk.  Given that pursuant to 
the theory of default invariance, ground zero for legal risk, that is the destruction of legal 
risk, exists only at the point of payment and performance whereas the legal risk, so long 
there is no performance or no payment, that is default, may remain in an infinite 
contingency until resolved by either judgment, bail-in, bailout and thus ultimately 
performance or payment.486 
                                                 
480 See supra note 358. 
481 See supra note 351. 
482 See supra note 350. 
483 Tanega, J. (2015) “Default Invariance, A Naïve Category Theory of Law and Finance,” The Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics of Finance in the 21st Century: From Hubris to Disgrace (Economics as Social Theory), 
edited by Patrick O’Sullivan, Nigel F.B. Allington, and Mark Esposito, pp. 175 – 240 
484 Id.  
485 See supra Figure 7.  
486 See supra note 483.  
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CHAPTER 3: CAPITAL FORMATION 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
The term capital made its first appearance in Medieval Latin487 as an adjective capitalis 
(from caput, head) modifying the word pars, to designate the principal sum of a money 
loan. The principal part of a loan was contrasted with the "usury"--later called interest--the 
payment made to the lender in addition to the return of the sum lent. This usage, unknown 
to classical Latin, had become common by the thirteenth century and possibly had begun 
as early as 1100 A.D., in the first chartered towns of Europe.488  
 
The meaning "main, principal, chief, dominant, most important" is from the early 15th 
century in English. Capital letter for an upper case one is attested from the late 14th 
century. The modern informal sense of "excellent, first-rate", perhaps from earlier use of 
the word in reference to ships, "first-rate, powerful enough to be in the line of battle," 
attested from 1650, fallen into disuse after 1918.489 When we search for definitions of the 
process of classic monetary capital formation490, we traditionally find that it involves three 
steps491:  
 
First, an increase in the volume of real savings.   
Second, immobilization of savings through financial and credit institutions and  
Third, an investment of savings.   
                                                 
487 Early 13 century, "of or pertaining to the head," from Old French capital, from Latin capitalis "of the head," 
hence "capital, chief, first," from caput (genitive capitis) "head". 
488 Fetter, Frank A., Reformulation of the Concepts of Capital and Income in Economics and Accounting, 
(1937), in "Capital, Interest, & Rent," 1977 
489 Etymology Dictionary, [online], available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=capital (Accessed 
at 20 July 2014)  
490 Aguilar, Luis A. Facilitating Real Capital Formation (April 2014)  [online] available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch040411laa.htm (Accessed at July 25, 2014) Aguilar argues that as 
an SEC Commissioner focused on the real economy and on our recovery from the financial crisis, I am gratified 
that the SEC’s mandate includes the consideration of capital formation. When Congress included the 
consideration of capital formation in the SEC’s mandate it did not define the term.  It is generally understood 
that capital formation is a macroeconomic benchmark that measures changes in the amount of productive capital 
in the economy as a whole. In essence, capital formation is about all the ways of creating productive capital in 
our economy, including but not limited to improving infrastructure, building plants, and hiring workers. But, in 
the discussions about capital formation, it seems to have become synonymous with the ability to raise funds. 
Whatever makes it easier and cheaper for issuers to raise money seems to constitute capital formation.  However, 
the singular act of raising capital does not necessarily result in capital formation. 
491 Ruggles, Nancy and Richard, Household and Enterprise Saving and Capital Formation in the United States: 
A Market Transaction View, Review of Income and Wealth, Series 38, Nuimber2, Yale University (June 1992), 
[online], available at http://www.iariw.org/kendrickprizepdfs/Ruggles-1992.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014). 
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Thus the problem of capital formation becomes twofold, one, how to save more, and two, 
how to utilize the current savings of the community for capital formation.492 However, the 
term Fixed Capital Formation refers to the process of a firm increasing its stock of fixed 
capital.493 
 
Fixed capital are assets used in the productive process that a firm holds for over a 
year. Fixed capital formation does not include current raw materials used in the 
productive process). Fixed capital can also be referred to as Property, Plant, and 
Equipment and is often abbreviated with the accounting term, PP&E. For example, if 
a firm builds a new factory or invests in new machines, this will be an accumulation 
of fixed capital. Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the 
like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and 
commercial and industrial buildings. Net acquisitions of valuables are also considered 
capital formation.494 
 
FIGURE 8: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION % OF GDP 
 
 
                                                 
492 Lewis, Craig M. The Future of Capital Formation, Harvard Law School Forum, (May 2014), [online], 
available at http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/05/02/the-future-of-capital-formation/ (Accessed at 25 July 
2014)  
493 OECD, Capital formation by activity, ISIC rev3 [online], available at 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE8 (Accessed at 23 September, 2015)  
494 World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, [online], available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.CD (Accessed at 12 July 2015)  
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However, the process of modern day non-monetary capital formation today also includes 
human capital formation495.  Human capital formation also relates to human resource 
development.  Human resource is an active means of production, the optimum allocation of 
resources of a country depends on the availability of human resources.   
 
The term human capital formation refers to:  
 
[t]he process of acquiring and increasing the number of persons who have the skills, 
education and experience which are critical for the economic and the political 
development of a country.  Human capital formation is thus associated with 
investment in man and his development as a creative and productive resource. 496 
 
The related concept of human resources has many different meanings; both manpower and 
human resources refer to and mean people.  Human resources can be equated with labor in 
the sense of a fact of production or simply production497.  Human resource may also be 
fueled as a kind of natural resource or a people resource just as we have mineral and forest 
resources498.  In the process of economic growth, it used to be more important to talk about 
the accumulation of tangible capital.  In today's knowledge society499; however, it is 
increasingly recognized that the formation and growth of the so-called tangible capital 
stock is significantly dependent on the development of human capital formation that is 
considered the process of acquisition of knowledge, skills and the capacities500 of all 
people in a country. Even economists like Adam Smith501 had early on stressed the 
importance of human capital in production and included in a country stock a fixed capital 
of all the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants. 
                                                 
495 Mejia, Daniel and St. Pierre Marc, Unequal Opportunities and Human Capital Formation, Harvard 
University (August 2004), [online], available at  http://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/events/Munich/PEPG-
04-14Mejia.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
496 Becker, Gary S. Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, The Journal of Political Economy, 
Volume 70, Issue 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings (Oct. 1962), 9-49 [online], available at 
http://marbles.sonoma.edu/users/c/cuellar/econ421/humancapital.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
497 Singh Y.K and Rawat H.S., Human Resource Management APH Publishing Corporation, p. 61 (2006)   
498 Id.  
499 UNESCO World Report, Towards Knowledge Societies, [online] (2005), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001418/141843e.pdf (Accessed at 22 July 2014) 
500 See supra note 461. Generally there are five ways of developing human resources: 1) on-the-job training 
including in particular apprenticeships, 2) organized by companies, 3) formerly organized education at 
elementary, secondary and high school levels, university education, 4) adult education that is not organized by 
companies but by adult education service providers and, last but not least, 5) by the migration of individuals and 
families to adjust to changing job opportunities. 
501 Smith, Adam (1776, 1904) Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, available at:  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html. (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
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B. CLASSICAL AND NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
 
Classical502 and neoclassical503 economics regard capital as one of the factors of production 
alongside other factors as land and labor.  Other inputs to production are called intangibles 
in classical economics.  This includes organization, entrepreneurship, knowledge, good 
will or management.  Effective production is characterized by the fact that it's not used up 
immediately in the process of production and it can be produced or increased other than 
land and nonrenewable resources.504   
 
Marxian economics distinguished between different forms of capital, constant capital, 
which refers to capital goods, variable capital, which refers to the labor inputs, whereas the 
cost is variable based on the amount of wages and salaries that are paid and fictitious 
capital which refers to intangible or abstractions of physical capital such as stocks, bonds 
and securities or a tradable paper claims to wealth.505  
 
Classical economics are represented in the late 18th and early 19th century by economists 
such as Adam Smith506, David Ricardo507 and John Stewart Mill508.  Adam Smith is 
                                                 
502 O’Brien, D.P., The Classical Economists Revisited, Princeton University (2004). O’Brien argues that “there 
can be little doubt that the heyday of Classical economics was during the years 1800-1850. Delineation of the 
period during which Classical economics developed as a body of thought, came to be the ruling approach to 
economics, ultimately experienced a measure of stagnation and decay, and was finally supplanted by the young 
and vigorous development of neo-Classical economics in the "Marginal Revolution," is however a good deal 
less easy. At one end it is usual to date the era of Classical economics as beginning in 1776, with the publication 
of Adam Smith's mighty Wealth of Nations. Such an approach has a strong prima facie appeal, but closer 
examination raises doubts about it. On the one hand Classical economics owed a great deal to David Hume in 
certain critical areas, especially that of monetary theory. The relevant part of Hume's Essays was published in 
1752; and it is therefore doubtful if too much weight can be placed on the year 1776. Indeed the influence of 
Hume upon Smith cannot be ignored; they were close friends, and Hume was appointed by Smith to be his 
literary executor.1 In addition the work of Adam Smith himself did not suddenly spring from nothing in 1776. 
He lectured in Edinburgh from 1748, moved to the University of Glasgow and was a professor there from 1751 
to 1763. Of course he covered other subjects in addition to economics; but there is a set of notes on his lectures 
taken in 1762-63, and their editor, Edwin Cannan pointed out many passages in them which are parallel to 
passages in the Wealth of Nations. Indeed it is apparent that quite a lot of the book was substantially in existence 
before Smith resigned his chair”.  
503 Robinson, Joan and Eatwell, John, An Introduction to Modern Economics, McGraw-Hill Book Company 
(UK), 1973. Neoclassical Economics is the name given to an economic theory that was developed at the end of 
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century in Europe.  The main contributors to this theory were Léon Walras 
(1834-1910), Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). Neoclassical economists dealt with 
was the distribution of power between industrialists and workers.  The end of the 19th Century saw a marked 
increase in the strength of workers’ organizations in Europe.  In 1871 England passed a law that legalized 
unions. 
504 Id.  
505 See supra note 30.  
506 Adam Smith defined human capital as follows, "Firstly of the acquired and useful abilities for all the 
inhabitance of members of the society, the acquisition of such talents by the maintenance of the acquiring during 
his educational study or apprentice always cost a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized as it were in 
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probably most renowned for his work of Wealth of Nations in 1776509 and probably defines 
the beginning of classical economics.510  His key message was that the wealth of nations is 
not based on gold but on trade.  Whenever two parties freely agree to exchange things of 
value, total wealth increases.511   
 
However, Adam Smith is probably most known for his expression of the so-called, 
"invisible hand" which signifies that according to his view markets generally move 
towards the natural equilibrium when free from interference and where buyers are able to 
choose from competing suppliers and companies that are not effective are allowed to fail.  




                                                                                                                                                        
his person.  Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune so do they likewise stand off to society to which he 
belongs.  The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument 
of trade which facilitates an abridged laborer and which it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a 
profit." 
507 Ricardo’s first published work was The High Price of Bullion, a Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes 
(1810), an outgrowth of letters Ricardo had published in the Morning Chronicle the year before. His book 
refueled the controversy then surrounding the Bank of England: freed from the necessity of cash payment both 
the Bank of England and the rural banks had increased their note issues and the volume of their lending. The 
directors of the Bank of England maintained that the subsequent increase in prices and the depreciation of the 
pound had no relation to the increase in bank credit. Ricardo and others, however, asserted that there indeed was 
a link between the volume of bank notes and the level of prices. Furthermore, they argued that the price levels in 
turn affected foreign exchange rates and the inflow or outflow of gold. It followed, then, that the bank, as 
custodian of the central gold reserve of the country, had to shape its lending policy according to general 
economic conditions and exercise control over the volume of money and credit. The controversy was therefore 
critical to the development of theories concerning central banking. A committee appointed by the House of 
Commons, known as the Bullion Committee, confirmed Ricardo’s views and recommended the repeal of the 
Bank Restriction Act. 
508 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), British philosopher, economist, moral and political theorist, and administrator, 
was the most influential English-speaking philosopher of the nineteenth century. His views are of continuing 
significance, and are generally recognized to be among the deepest and certainly the most effective defenses of 
empiricism and of a liberal political view of society and culture. The overall aim of his philosophy is to develop 
a positive view of the universe and the place of humans in it, one which contributes to the progress of human 
knowledge, individual freedom and human well-being. His views are not entirely original, having their roots in 
the British empiricism of John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume, and in the utilitarianism of Jeremy 
Bentham. But he gave them a new depth, and his formulations were sufficiently articulate to gain for them a 
continuing influence among a broad public. 
509 Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. London: 
Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1904. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html (Accessed 23 September 2015) 
510 See supra note 502.  
511 See supra note 509.  
512 Id.  
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In classic economic theory, factors influencing capital formation are savings by individuals 
or households and by not spending all of their incomes on consumer goods513.  In other 
words, the meaning of capital formation is that society does not apply the whole of its 
current productive activity to the needs and the size of immediate consumption but direct a 
part of it to the tools and making of capital goods.  Tools and instruments, machine and 
transport facilities, plants and equipment, all the various forms of real capital that can so 
greatly increase the efficacy of productive effort.514 
 
Classical economics are distinct from libertarian economics insofar as that they do see a 
role for the state to play and acknowledge that there are ways where the market is not the 
only way to serve the public good and where a level playing field is required.  For instance 
in the field of education.515 
 
When viewed in legal terms, the owner of labor power is usually the owner of his own 
human capital; however, how this can be traded, how someone can be employed, get 
access to employment, can actually exchange his personal labor power is all subject to a 
sophisticated range of international, federal, national and often local rules.516 
 
The creation of labor power, human capital, and man-formed capital is not something that 
is freely attainable by the mere will of the person who attempts or aspires to achieve or 
own it or create it but it is subject to a numerous set of laws, potential liabilities, potential 
act of rights and a number of limitations. Therefore, we are going to analyze regulations 
and legislations in the context of the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and how TTIP517 would affect the potential legal risks with respect to the 
factors of nonmonetary capital formation.518  
 
 
                                                 
513 See supra note 502.  
514 Id.  
515 Id.  
516 Dowling, Jr., Donald C., The Practice of International Labor & Employment Law: Escort Your 
Labor/Employment Clients into the Global Millennium, The Labor Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 
pp.1-23, [online], available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40862752 (Accessed at July 28, 2014) 
517 Stahl, Lukas M., Business Briefing, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Potential 
Impact and Dimensions of the World’s Largest Trade Agreement, 21st Austria (June 2014) New York, NY, 
[online], available at http://www.21st-austria.at/files/21austria/files/business_briefings/21st_austria_-
_businessbriefing_june_2014.pdf (Accessed at 20 September 2015). 
518 See Chapter 5: Case Study: TTIP – Nasciturus for a New Global Economic Order  
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C. THE AUSTRIANS: EUGEN V. BOEHM-BAWERK, LUDWIG V. MISES & FRIEDRICH V. HAYEK 
  
Eugen Boehm Ritter von Bawerk519 was an Austrian economist who made important 
contributions to the development of the Austrian School of Economics.  He was the 
Austrian minister of finance intermittently from 1895 to 1904 and also wrote a serious of 
extensive critiques of Marxism520.  After working at the Ministry of Finance, he published 
the first two out of three volumes of his work Capital and Interest.521   
 
As Finance Minister, he fought continuously for strict maintenance of the legally fixed 
gold standards and the balanced budget.  He wrote extensive critiques of Karl Marx522 
economics in the 80s and 90s of the 19th century and taught many students including 
Joseph Schumpeter523 and Ludwig von Mises524, Boehm von Bawerk particularly became a 
critique of Karl Marx with respect to his downplaying the influence of supply and demand 
in determining permanent price and with respect to a perceived self-contradiction of Marx's 
law of value with respect to the rate of profit and the prices of production525.   
 
His most important contribution probably to develop Menger's526 ideas of marginal utility 
in his principals of economics and to develop the idea of subjective value as related to 
marginalism that things only have value and so far as such people want such goods.  To 
illustrate the principle, Boehm von Bawerk, used always a practical example of a farmer 
who was left with five sacks of corn after harvest to provide for his needs until the next 
harvest, while he used the first for his own purposes, the second to supplement the bare 
living, the third he would use for bread, but the fourth and the fifth he would use for 
making brandy and feeding the parrots, so the question always became how much utility 
                                                 
519 Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s work became so well known that before World War I, his Marxist 
contemporaries regarded the Austrians as their typical bourgeois, intellectual enemies. His theories of interest 
and capital were catalysts in the development of economics, but today his original work receives little attention. 
520 Von Boehm-Bawerk, Eugen, The Positive Theory of Capital. London: Macmillan. (1891) Translated by 
William Smart. Available online at: http://www.econlib.org/library/BohmBawerk/bbPTC.html 
521 Von Boehm-Bawerk, Eugen, Capital and Interest. London: Macmillan. (1890) Translated by William Smart. 
Reprint, 1959. Available online at: http://www.econlib.org/library/BohmBawerk/bbCI.html 
522 Id.  
523 Schumpeter, J. A, Principle of Creative Destruction, (1942) [online], available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html 
524 Von Mises, L., (1953). The Theory of Money and Credit. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
525 See supra note 521.  
526 Menger, C., Principles of Economics. Translated by J. Dingwall and B. F. Hoselitz, with an introduction by 
Friedrich A. Hayek. New York: New York University Press, 1981. 
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will one lose if a sack of corn gets lost, what would be the marginal utility in this case of 
keeping the parrots.527 
 
Ludwig von Mises528 attended the University of Vienna where he graduated in February 
1906 with a juris doctorate and started a career as civil servant in Austria's financial 
administration, leaving after a few months to take a trainee position in the Vienna law 
firm529.  During that time, Mises began lecturing on economics and in early 1909 he joined 
the Vienna Chamber of Commerce in Industry where he became chief economist for the 
Austrian Chamber and later an economic advisor of the Austrian Chancellor.  In 1940, 
Mises and his wife fled the German advance in Europe from Geneva Switzerland, where 
he became a professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in 1934 and 
immigrated to New York City.  Mises ultimately retired from teaching at the age of 87 and 
died at the age of 92 in New York. 530  
 
Mises sees economic calculation as the most fundamental problem in economics.531  The 
economic problem to Mises is that of action.  Man acts to dispel feelings of uneasiness but 
can only succeed in acting if he comprehends causal connection between the ends that he 
wants to satisfy and the available means.  The reasoning mind evaluates and grades 
different options, this is economic calculation.532  Economic calculation is common to all 
people.  Mises stresses the importance of entrepreneurship because only entrepreneurs 
actually do monetary calculation.  This fact puts entrepreneurs at the center of all progress 
and failure.  Entrepreneurs who estimate cost more correctly then their rivals earn high 
profits while also serving consumers.  Such men rise to the top positions in industry.  
Entrepreneurs who err seriously in their calculation experience financial losses and cease 
to direct production.  Mises described this market test of entrepreneurial skills as the only 
process of trial and error that really matters.533   
                                                 
527 See supra note 524.  
528  Von Mises, Ludwig, The sections entitled “Finance and Banking” in two articles, “Austrian Empire” and 
“Republic of Austria,” (1921) in the 12th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Available online at: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Mises/msEnc.html (Accessed at 23 July 2014)  
529 The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), [online], available 
)http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Mises.html (Accessed at July 24, 2014)  
530 Id.  
531 Von Mises, Ludwig, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.” Reprinted in Collectivist 
Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. Edited by Friedrich Hayek. London: 
Routledge and Sons, 1935. 
532 Id.  
533 Id.  
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Friedrich von Hayek534 was an Austrian and British economist and philosopher best known 
for his defense of classical liberalism.  Hayek, who was also a second cousin to the 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein535, earned doctorates in law in political science at the 
University of Vienna.  He also started philosophy, psychology and economics.  Initially 
sympathetic to Wieser's democratic socialism536 Hayek's economic thinking shifted away 
from socialism to classical liberalism after reading from Mises's book Socialism.537   
Economists who started with Hayek at the LSE in the 30s and 40s include Ronald Coase538 
from the University of Chicago, John Kenneth Galbraith539, Abba Lerner540 or David 
Rockefeller.541  
 
Unwilling to return to Austria after the Anschluss, Hayek remained in Britain and became a 
British subject in 1938.  He held this status for the remainder of his life, although he did 
not live in Great Britain after 1950, he lived in the United States from 1950 to 1960 and 
then mostly in Germany but also briefly in Austria.542   
 
                                                 
534 Von Hayek, Friedrich, The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
535 Considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein played a central, 
if controversial, role in 20th-century analytic philosophy. He continues to influence current philosophical 
thought in topics as diverse as logic and language, perception and intention, ethics and religion, aesthetics and 
culture. Originally, there were two commonly recognized stages of Wittgenstein's thought—the early and the 
later—both of which were taken to be pivotal in their respective periods. In more recent scholarship, this 
division has been questioned: some interpreters have claimed a unity between all stages of his thought, while 
others talk of a more nuanced division, adding stages such as the middle Wittgenstein and the third 
Wittgenstein. Still, it is commonly acknowledged that the early Wittgenstein is epitomized in his Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. By showing the application of modern logic to metaphysics, via language, he provided 
new insights into the relations between world, thought and language and thereby into the nature of philosophy. 
536 Friedrich von Wieser was born in Vienna in 1851 of aristocratic parents. At the age of seventeen he entered 
the University of Vienna to study law. After graduating in 1872, Wieser was briefly employed in government 
service, although his strong intellectual interests attracted him to academics once more, this time to a study of 
economics. With a travel grant and along with his boyhood friend (and later brother-in-law), Eugen von Bohm-
Bawerk, Wieser studied economics at the universities of Heidelberg (under Karl Knies), Jena, and Leipzig. 
Already much impressed with Menger's Principles, Wieser, while in Germany, wrote a seminar paper on value 
that formed the foundation for his later ideas. In 1884, he was appointed a professor of economics at the German 
University in Prague. In 1903, Wieser inherited Menger's position at the University of Vienna. He became 
Minister of Commerce in 1917, but (owing to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) later returned to 
teaching. 
537 Von Mises, Ludwig, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. 3d English ed. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1981. Available online at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Mises/msS.html 
538 Galer, S. and Manier, J., Ronald H. Coase, Founding Scholar in Law and Economics (1910-2013), [online], 
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/coaseinmemoriam (Accessed at July 25 2014)  
539 Galbraith, J. K., (1997). The Great Crash – 1929. New York: Mariner Books / Houghton Mifflin Company. 
540 Lerner, Abba, “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty.” American Economic Review 62 
(May): 258–266. 
541 David Rockefeller Sr. is the eldest and richest member of the legendary oil family, which changed America 
in the Gilded Age and minted America's first billionaire in Standard Oil founder John D. Rockefeller. David is 
the magnate's only living grandchild and also the world's oldest billionaire, turning 100 in June of 2015. 
542 Samuel Brittan, 'Hayek, Friedrich August (1899–1992)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 
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Hayek is probably most known for his book The Road to Serfdom543, in which he warns of 
the danger of tyranny that in his opinion inevitably results from government control of 
economic decision makings through central planning.  He argues that abandonment of 
individualism and classical liberalism inevitably leads to a loss of freedom, the creation of 
an oppressive society, the tyranny of a dictator and the serfdom of the individual544.   
 
Albeit the Road to Serfdom makes a strong case against centrally planned economies by 
some of the Austrian economists, it was perceived as only lukewarm in its support of a free 
market system and less a fair capitalism.  With Hayek even going so far as to say that 
government has a role to play in the economy through work hours, regulations, social 
welfare and institutions for the flow of proper information.545   
 
D. KARL MARX 
 
Smith argued that the productive power of labor is dependent on the division of labor546.  
In Marxian economics, this concept was reflected in Marx differentiation between labor 
and labor power, whereby labor power was referred to as the person's ability to work his or 
her muscle power or brain power and in certain ways this could be compared to the 
concept of human capital.547   
 
Marx, of course, derogated this reification and this obvious attempt to convince a worker 
that he was really a capitalist although his capital would have been only his own abilities.  
His evidence were that often is quoted from the capital Volume 2, the following paragraph 






                                                 
543 See supra note 534.  
544 Id.  
545 Hayek on Social Security, Washington Post, (July 2010) [online], available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/hayek_on_social_insurance.html (Accessed at 25 July 
2014)  
546 See supra note 509.  
547 Marx, Karl. Capital, volume III, ch. 29 pp. 465–6 of the International Publishers edition 
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Apologetic economists say the worker’s labor power, then, represents his capital in 
commodity form, which yields him a continuous revenue.  Labor power is indeed his 
property [ever self-renewing, reproductive], not his capital.  It is the only commodity 
which he can and must sell continually in order to live in which excess capital 
[variable] only in the hands of the buyer, a capitalist.  The fact that a man is 
continually compelled to sell his labor power, i.e. himself, to another man proves 
according to those economists that he is a capitalist because he constantly has 
"commodities" [himself] for sale.  In that sense a slave is also a capitalist although he 
is sold by another once and for all as a commodity.  For it is in the nature of this 
commodity, a laboring slave, that inspired does not only make it work anew every day 
but also provides it with the means of subsistence that enable it to work ever anew.548   
 
Marx differentiation was strong also in particular to drive a distinction between him and 
David Ricardo549, who in his opinion did not accomplish to explain how surplus value 
could be produced from an exchange between capital and labor.  In his view labor power 
that is human capital in modern views becomes a commodity; it is exchanged on the 
market for a wage or a salary.550   
 
Marxian economics traditionally defined capital as follows.  
 
Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labor and means of subsistence of all 
kinds, which are employed and producing new raw material, new instruments and 
new means of subsistence.  All these components of capital are created by labor, 
products of labor, accumulated labor.  Accumulated labor that serves as a means to 
new production is capital. 551 
 
With respect to human capital, he says:  
 
In the process of production human beings work not only upon nature but also upon 
one another.  They produce only by working together in a specified manner and 
reciprocally exchanging their activities.  In order to produce they enter into definite 
connections of relations to one another and only within these social connections and 





                                                 
548 Marx, Karl, Capital Volume 2, Chapter 20, Section 10. (1867) [online], available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/ch05.htm (Accessed at 24 July 2014)  
549 See supra note 507.  
550 See supra note 548.   
551 Id.  
552 Id.   
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He further states,  
 
Capital also is a social relation of production.  [….] Capital consists not only of means 
of subsistence, instruments of labor and raw materials not only as material products, it 
consists just as much of exchange values.  All products of which it consists are 
commodities.  Capital, consequently, is not only a sum of material products, it is a 
sum of commodities of exchange values of social magnitudes.  Capital remains the 
same whether we put cotton in the place of wool, rice in the place of wheat, steam 
ships in the place of railroads, provided only that the cotton, the rice, the steam ship, 
the body of capital have the same exchange value, the same price as the wool, the 
wheat, the railroads in which it was previously embodied.  The bodily form of capital 
matrons forms itself continually while capital does not suffer the least alteration but 
though every capital is the sum of commodities, i.e. of exchange values, it does not 
follow that every sum of commodities of exchange values is capital.553  
 
In conclusion, the use of the term capital formation and investment can be somewhat 
confusing partly because the concept of capital itself can be understood in different ways:  
 
First, capital formation is often seen as a mix of total investment, i.e. the fraction of capital 
that is earmarked for investment and not held as savings or used for consumption.  In 
national accounts, the concept of gross capital formation is used as the additions of 
nonfinancial produced assets to the capital stock minus the disposals of these assets.554   
 
Second, capital formation is often referred to as synonymous with the notion of capital 
accumulation regarding to the investment of money or a financial asset for the purpose of 
making more money or assert gross capital formation that is often referred to as gross fixed 
capital formation, measuring the value of acquisition of new or existing fixed assets by the 
business sector, governments and households less disposals of fixed assets.555  It is called a 
gross fixed capital formation since the measure does not make any adjustments to deduct 
the consumption of fixed capital, for instance through the depreciation of fixed assets. A 
significant exclusion from gross fixed capital formation is land sales and purchases”.556   
 
In a much broader sense, capital formation today refers to any method to increasing the 
amount of capital owned or under one's control or any method in utilizing or mobilizing 
capital resources for investment purposes.  In this way, capital could be formed in the 
                                                 
553 See supra note 548.  
554 See supra note 491.  
555 See supra note 492.  
556 See supra note 493.  
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sense of being brought together for investment purposes in many different ways.  This 
broad meaning is not related to the statistical measurement concept nor to the classical 
understanding.557  
 
In that capital is distinct from land or nonrenewable resources and can be increased by 
human labor as will be demonstrated in the next chapter when we discuss the Three 
Factors of Capital Formation558, physical capital is often also referred to as the capital 
stock559, which should not be confused with the capital stock of a corporation560 that may 
be used for non-monetary but money-like capital formation in the financing process of an 
enterprise. In principal, capital consists of any product that can improve a person's power 
to perform economically useful work.   
 
Capital is also an input into the production function.  In particular in Marx's political 
economy, capital exists only within the process of economic exchange.561  It is wealth that 
grows out of the process of circulation itself and for Marx it formed the basis of the 
economic system of capitalism.  In more contemporary schools of economics, this form of 
capital is referred to as financial capital and is distinguished from capital goods.562   
 
                                                 
557 See supra note 490.  
558 See infra Chapter 3.II. Three Factors of Capital Formation  
559 Nehru, Vikram, and Ashok Dhareshwar. 1993. "A New Database on Physical Capital Stock: Sources, 
Methodology and Results." Revista de Analisis Economica, 8(1), pp. 37-59, June 1993  
560 7 U.S. Code § 1504 - Capital stock of Corporation 
561 Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political economy” Karl Marx: Critique of Political Economy 
Review by Frederick Engels, First Published: Das Volk, Nos. 14 & 16, August 6 & 20, 1859; [online], available 
at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/appx2.htm (Accessed at July 25, 
2014)  
562 Goodwin, Neva R., Five Kinds of Capital, Useful Concepts for Sustainable Development, p. 5, Global 
Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper 03-07 (September 2003) [online] available at 
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/working_papers/03-07sustainabledevelopment.pdf (Accessed at 
August 5, 2015) Goodwin argues “that Financial capital is essentially money and can be regarded as a capital 
stock if it will be invested in some activity that produces something – at the very least if it will produce, for its 
owner, more money. In that case we would refer to it as financial capital. It is in the nature of most production 
processes that you have to pay for inputs before you can profit from outputs.  Before it   can make its first sale, a 
start- up business needs to buy or rent a building and equipment, hire staff, and lay in inventories of materials 
and supplies. Students need to pay for textbooks well in advance of receiving any increase in salary that their 
education might eventually gain for them. Local governments often take on a big project like building a major 
bridge before collecting the tolls that will pay for it. Financial capital is what allows all these productive 
activities to get going, in a money economy, in advance of the returns that will flow from them. In actual fact, a 
great deal of financial capital, especially as it is used in international transactions, does nothing more than 
accommodate changes in ownership, for example in ownership of future shares of the agricultural output of some 
region, or of the currency of a nation that is expected to rise in value, or in ownership shares (also, confusingly, 
called “stocks”) of a corporation. Of all the kinds of capital, the adjective, “productive,” is most often 
questionable when applied to financial capital.” 
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II. EXPONENTIAL EXPANSION OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
A. THREE FACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
Dealing with nonmonetary factors of capital formation, we talk about in the classic sense 
of capital created by Man, that is capital created by man and woman, also more recently 
characterized in management literature as human capital563 and capital formed by 
Machines, also known in accounting terms as PPE or property, plant and equipment564 or 
in industrial terms very classic as production capital or machines.   
 
Hence when we talk about the legal risks that are inherent in the capital formation of 
human capital or industrial capital and when we'll talk about the legal risks that are 
materialized in processes that either foster or impede the capital formation in these two 
nonmonetary areas, we have to analyze what projects and policies are currently pursued.   
 
1. CAPITAL FORMATION BY MAN 
 
Friedrich Engels in his The Principles of Communism, 1847,565 saw labor power of a 
commodity.   
 
Labor is a commodity like any other and its prize is therefore determined by exactly 
the same laws that applied to other commodities.  In the regime of pick industry or 
free competition as we shall see, the two come to the same thing.  The prize of a 
commodity is on the average always equal to its cost of production, hence the price of 
labor is also equal to the cost of production of labor but the cost of production of labor 
consists of precisely the quantity of means of subsistence necessary to enable the 
worker to continue working and to prevent the working class from dying out.  The 
worker will therefore get no more for his labor than is necessary for this purpose.  The 
price of labor or the wage will in other words be the lowest, the minimum required for 
the maintenance of life.566   
 
                                                 
563 See supra note 60. 
564 See supra note 494.  
565 Friedrich Engels, The Principles of Communism, 1847 Selected Works, Volume One, p. 81-97, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1969, [online], available at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-
com.htm (Accessed 25 July 2014)  
566 Id. In 1820, Friedrich Engels was born in Germany into a wealthy family. Managing a branch of his father's 
business in Manchester, England, from 1842-1845, Engels became appalled at the poverty of the workers. He 
wrote his first socialist work, Conditions of the Working Class in England. After their meeting in 1844, Engels 
and Karl Marx became lifelong colleagues. After Marx' death in 1883, Engels edited and translated his writings. 
According to freethought encyclopaedist Joseph McCabe, Engels' acquaintance, Belfort Bax, called him "the 
devout Atheist" (A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Rationalists). D. 1895. 
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Modern day economists define human capital formation as: 
 
[a]n aggregate outcome of the investments in education, health, transport and 
communication sector, technical knowhow and on-the-job training and migration.  
These factors are explained as follows.  Education increases the productive capacity 
and productivity of a nation's workforce by developing its skills.  It also increases the 
ability of modern techniques and increases the income earning capacity but also 
reduces the skewed distribution of income thereby reducing income in equality.  
Investment education has always long-lasting returns. It not only improves the present 
economic condition but always enhances future prospects of a country.567 
 
Therefore looking at the potential legal risks in the context of nonmonetary capital 
formation in particular with respect to the formation of man-made or human capital, we 
may review an array of transactions that may incur certain legal risks and in particular with 
respect to the realization of TTIP where we will review these issues specifically568.   
 
For instance, legal risk may attach with respect to minimum and maximum wage rates for 
work, maximum and minimum working hours and the retirement age, minimum 
requirements for working conditions, workplace health and safety issues, requirements for 
labor contracts, trade union, organization and wage bargaining; civil rights and the 
entitlements of workers.   
 
Other effects may be incurred by way of direct and indirect tax rates, levies and tariffs for 
wage earners and employers, social insurance policies, pension charges, unemployment 
benefits and other social benefits, the subsidizing of workers or their employers, eligibility 
to various benefits or supplements to salaries, certain means of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy by, for instance, instituting price control for certain specific consumer goods and 
services, regulation that effects the consumption of goods and services by workers, the 
policing of workers on the job and off work and the prosecuting of criminal activity with 
respect to workers' lives. All those potential areas where legal risks may be incurred are 
potentially detrimental for the capital formation by Man, also now known as human capital 
or human resources.  
 
                                                 
567 Becker, Gary S. Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, The Journal of Political Economy, 
Volume 70, Issue 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings (Oct. 1962), 9-49 [online], available at 
http://marbles.sonoma.edu/users/c/cuellar/econ421/humancapital.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014) 
568 See Chapter 5: TTIP – Nasciturus for a New Global Economic Order 
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Other areas where certain legal risks may attach in the space of human capital formation 
are the requirements of military service from young workers at fixed pay rates, policies 
that impact or prevent labor mobility and job mobility, policies that prevent the inflow of 
immigrant workers or the immigration of workers and the stipulation of legal requirements 
with relation to the accommodation of health, sex life, family striation, pregnancy of 
workers.  The wealth of a country can be significantly improved with a healthy 
workforce569.  It doesn't only increase efficiency and productivity of a nation's workforce; 
it also reduces healthcare costs and the costs for the provisioning of medical facilities, 
rehabilitation and disability.570 
 
Another area of human capital formation concerns already at the very young age of 
adolescence the vocational training of an economy’s youth. Having been in charge of the 
Vocational Training Initiative of the Federal Government of Austria on behalf of Austria’s 
Federal Chancellor and Prime Minister571,at the end of the last millennium, the author had 
the privilege already at a very young age to see firsthand the significant importance and 
impact in particular apprenticeships have for the timely integration of youth into the 
production process.  
 
Apprenticeships refer to the act of acquiring skills, knowledge and competence on the job 
in a corporation or at the very least within a model company that provides a simulated 
environment as if the training would be indeed on the job.  Preferably, training on the job 
and apprenticeship does not only expose the trainees to a real life work environment, it also 
helps transitioning those used into long-term employment and in particular in those critical 
years of youth and young adulthood it provides young people an entrance into society that 
welcomes it as a full productive participant rather than someone necessarily feeling 
excluded.  Therefore, expenditures on such training do not only improve the quality of 
human capital and enhance its productivity and efficiency, it is also a crucial element in 
maintaining, advancing and developing our democracies.  
 
                                                 
569 Lee, J, Kim, H. An examination of the impact of health on wealth depletion in elderly individuals.(2003) 
[online], available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12646601 (Accessed at 27 July 2014)  
570 Id.  
571 Federal Chancellery of Austria, Office of the Prime Minister, [online], available at 
https://www.bka.gv.at/site/3327/Default.aspx (Accessed at September 23, 2015)  
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The existence of appropriate legal frameworks such as for instance the Austrian 
Jugendausbildungssicherungsgesetz [Youth Training Guarantee Act]572 guaranteeing the 
participation of youth in vocational training and education that has been passed by the 
Austrian Parliament during my tenure and since been renewed are an absolutely necessary 
condition to avoid the materialization of a number of legal risks that will be discussed 
further below. 
 
Another area that is of more current importance due to the increasing number of military 
conflicts than ever since World War II, is migration.  Migration refers to the movement of 
people from either under developed to developed countries or from less developed to 
developed countries but more recently it also refers to the movement of people from war-
torn and terrorist ridden countries to countries that at the very least maintain some basic 
level of peace and civilization573.   
 
Scholars have looked at the role of human capital in the process of economic development 
and stressed the fact that many developing economies have experienced fast increases in 
growth and have also experienced considerable increases in human capital.  Macro 
economists and development economists have been interested in the relationship between 
human capital and growth and have proposed models with human capital externalities.  
The work on the production function for human capital has a long tradition in economics 
going back to the seminal work of University of Chicago Professor Gary Becker574.   
 
More recently Hackman and his collaborators have greatly advanced the study of human 
capital formation and proposed a very useful framework.  We consider human capital as a 
multidimensional object that starts evolving very early in life, possibly before birth.  I will 
be calling these different dimensions factors.  One factor could be cognition.  Another 
                                                 
572 Republic of Austria, Jugendausbildungssicherungsgesetz (JASG) (1998), [online], available at 
https://www.jusline.at/Jugendausbildungs-Sicherungsgesetz_(JASG).html (Accessed at September 23, 2015) 
573 SEWELL CHAN and PALKO KARASZSEPT, Thousands of Migrants Flood Into Austria, New York Times 
(19 September 2015), [online], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/europe/thousands-flood-
into-austria-as-refugees-are-bounced-around-europe.html (Accessed at 20 September 2015) 
574 Becker, Gary S. Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, The Journal of Political Economy, 
Volume 70, Issue 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings (Oct. 1962), 9-49 [online], available at 
http://marbles.sonoma.edu/users/c/cuellar/econ421/humancapital.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014) 
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factor could be health and nutritional status, yet another factor could be social emotional 
skills Atanassio calls the process of formation of human capital its production function.575   
 
This may be very likely an incomplete list of production functions, transactions and legal 
relations as they pertain to the capital formation of man-made capital or otherwise known 
as human capital but they are of determining character for our daily lives and may have 
inherent a number of legal risks that we ought to analyze in their impact and how we can 
mitigate them developing more insights and a better comprehension in their inner 
workings.  
. 
2. CAPITAL FORMATION BY MACHINES 
 
In old economics textbooks one may have found only two kinds of capital, financial, i.e. 
monetary, and physical and the discussion of physical capital would all have been about 
things made by human beings: road, communication lines and other kinds of infrastructure, 
as well, factories and machines. 576 
 
Capital also represents major physical assets individuals and companies use when 
producing goods or services. These assets include production facilities, equipment, 
vehicles and other similar items. Individuals may create their own capital production 
resources, purchase them from another individual or business or lease them for a specific 
amount of time from individuals or other businesses. Therefore this category of capital is 
often referred to also as production capital. We refer to it as capital formation by Machines 
as opposed to capital formation by Man, i.e. capital assets, intellectual or physical in 
nature, created by human beings. 577 
 
                                                 
575 Atanassio, Orazio P., Insights from Structural Models of Human Capital Formation: measurement error and 
predictive validity, (2015), [online], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/SIEF/20150204-ECD-and-nutrition-measurement/07-
Insights-from-Structural-Models-of-Human-Capital-Orazio-Attanasio-University-College-London.pdf 
(Accessed at August 25, 2015)  
576 Goodwin, Neva R., Five Kinds of Capital, Useful Concepts for Sustainable Development, p. 5, Global 
Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper 03-07 (September 2003) [online] available at 
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/publications/working_papers/03-07sustainabledevelopment.pdf (Accessed at 
August 5, 2015) 
577 Id. 
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In Marxian economics this distinction between capital formation by Man, i.e. by way of 
labor power and by capital formation by Machines was described in his Fragment on 
Machines578 with remarkable foresight: 
 
As long as the means of labor remains a means of labor in the proper sense of the 
term, such as it is directly historically adopted by capital and included in its 
realization process, it undergoes a merely formal modification by appearing now as a 
means of labor not only in regard to its material side but also at the same time as a 
particular mold of the presence of capital determined by its total process as fixed 
capital, but once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labor 
passes through different stages whose culmination is the machine or rather an 
automatic system of machinery.  The automatic one is merely its most complete, most 
adequate form and alone transforms machinery into a system.  In no way does the 
machine appear as the individual worker's means of labor, it's distinguishing 
characteristic is not in the least as with the means of labor to transmit the worker's 
activity to the object.  This activity rather is posited in such a way that it merely 
transmits the machine's work, the machine's action onto the raw materials, supervises 
it and guards against interruption, not as with the instrument which the worker 
animates and makes into his organ with his skill and strength and whose handling 
therefore depends on his skills rather it is the machine which possesses skill and 
strengths in place of the worker.” 579  
 
Why does he author believe this distinction to be of absolute importance in the context of 
capital formation and legal risk? Recall that Hohfeld demonstrated that there is no such 
thing as a legal relation between a person and a machine, since a legal relation always 
operates between two individuals.  Legal rights do not correspond to single Hohfeldian 
relations, but are commutations of them.580  
 
Legal Risks in the context of capital formation by Machines will therefore play a 
subordinated role in our analysis, in particular in the context of our assessment within the 
framework of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. However, to the extent 
tis legal framework determines the right of importation, the right of use, the required 
standards of material and production, certain obligations under which machines in the 
widest sense may be admitted, certified and operated in a jurisdiction it will concern our 
analysis of legal risks.  
 
                                                 
578 Marx, Karl, Fragment on Machines, (February 1858) [online], available at 
http://thenewobjectivity.com/pdf/marx.pdf (Accessed at 25 August 2015)  
579 Id.  
580 See supra note 234.  
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3. CAPITAL FORMATION BY MONEY CREATION 
 
Any time before a new decision by the European Central Bank or the Federal Reserve, we 
hear pronouncements of the Central Banks starting to turn on the printing press, or we here 
there is a minimum security reserve in the debate, or the banks are parking their money 
instead of loaning it out to businesses.  It is all of this sort of news which confuses and 
diffuses the real picture that we are facing, especially when so many people still hang on to 
so many myths. 
 




The survey results from a master’s thesis from the Institute of Finance and Banking at 
Zurich University confirm that Swiss people have no idea about how Swiss Francs are 
created. The results are astonishing: 
Only 13 percent know that private commercial banks provide the majority of the 
money in circulation. However, 78 percent of the Swiss population would like money 
to be produced and distributed solely by a public organization working for the 
common good, such as the National Bank. Only 4 percent preferred the system we 
actually have today – that money is mostly created by private, for-profit companies 
such as commercial banks. Only 13 percent of the population are aware that, in the 
current system, private banks produce the majority of the money through the 
extension of loans. 73 percent mistakenly believe money is created by the state or by 
the Swiss National Bank. 581 
                                                 
581 Positive Money Initiative, [online], available at http://positivemoney.org/2015/09/survey-confirms-people-
have-no-idea-about-how-money-is-created/ (Accessed at 23 September 2015)  
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However, at the end of the day, this apparent lack of general knowledge about one of the 
most fundamental matters of our daily life, is not all too surprising, when we consider that 
the subject of money creation is barely thought in economics classes in our schools and 
universities. More importantly, considering the many misconceptions and false beliefs we 
find and hear most people, from professors to politicians, from journalists to janitors, 
everyday people and experts582, hang on to, whenever the case of money creation is 
discussed in public, teaching the subject as it stands without full understanding of the facts 
on the ground, may actually further compound the problem. Hence, let us dispose of the 
most commonly held beliefs in the following: 
 
First misconception:  Money per se.  
 
Money is subject to a hierarchy.  Money does not equal money at any point.  We have 
Central Bank money and we have bank-created money, and they represent two very 
different forms of money.  Book money or, as many call it, FIAT money from the Latin 
word, fiat,583 let it become, money, is actually the sort of money that we find on an on our 
individual or corporate bank accounts.  This is the sort of money that indeed is entered into 
this world by way of book entry and loan creation.  From a balance sheet perspective, this 
FIAT or non-money as it is called in the Bank of England’s chart584 actually represents a 
liability.  
 
To the contrary, Central Bank money is created by lending money or credit from the 
Central Bank to the Commercial Banks, and therefore it represents from a balance-sheet 
perspective, a liability of the Central Bank.  That money exists in the form of cash money, 
and that includes both coins and bills, in the same way as the FIAT money of the 
Commercial Banks at the Central Bank. 
 
 
                                                 
582 See supra note 581.  
583 fiat: noun, Latin: let it be done, 3rd singular present subjunctive of fierī to become 
1. an authoritative decree, sanction, or order: a royal fiat. 
Synonyms: authorization, directive, ruling, mandate, diktat, ukase.  
2. a fixed form of words containing the word fiat, by which a person in authority gives sanction, or 
authorization.  
3. an arbitrary decree or pronouncement, especially by a person or group of persons having absolute authority to 
enforce it: The king ruled by fiat. 
584 See infra Figure 10.  
Page | 109 
 
FIGURE 10: MONEY CREATION BY THE AGGREGATE BANKING SECTOR585 
 
 
                                                 
585 McLeay, M., Radia, A and Thomas, R., Money creation in the modern economy, Bank of England, Quarterly 
Bulletin (2014 Q1), [online], available at  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q1prereleasemoneycreati
on.pdf (Accessed at 23 August 2014) 
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Second misconception: The Minimum Reserve:  
 
Reserves are Central Bank money that the commercial banks actually lend and take as a 
credit from the Central Bank.  Therefore, it is actually a loan by the Commercial Banks 
from the Central Bank586.  Depending on the jurisdiction they operate in and the current 
regulatory environment, the Commercial Banks have to hold 1 or 2 percent of its liabilities 
at the Central Bank587. The legal framework for instance the minimum reserve system in 
the Eurozone is set out in Regulation (EC) No. 2818/98 of the European Central Bank of 1 
December 1998 on the application of minimum reserves (ECB/1998/15) 588. However, this 
money does not have its origin at the deposits of its clients.   
 
Or as the Bank of England puts it: 
 
[R]eserves are, in normal times, supplied on demand by the Bank of England to 
commercial banks in exchange for other assets on their balance sheets. In no way does 
the aggregate quantity of reserves directly constrain the amount of bank lending or 
deposit creation.589  
 
Third misconception: The Reserve Account 
 
Banks cannot loan their reserves to businesses or to the economy.  Each bank must hold its 
reserves up to the minimum amount at its reserve account at its national Central Bank.  
This is where the reserve actually earns interest at the current lead interest rate.  Any 
excessive reserves will not earn an interest rate, so a bank can actually move these 
excessive reserves to its facility at the Central Bank where the Central Bank usually pays a 
lower interest rate.590  On the other hand, as we will see later, when Central Banks discuss 
                                                 
586 See supra note 585.  
587 Gray, Simon, Central Bank Balances and Reserve Requirements, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/36 (2011), 
[online], available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1136.pdf (Accessed at 25 March 2015)  
588 European Central Bank, How to calculate the minimum reserve requirements, [online], available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/mr/html/calc.en.html (Accessed at July 23, 2015) In order to 
determine an institution's reserve requirement, the reserve base is multiplied by the reserve ratio. The ECB 
applies a uniform positive reserve ratio to most of the balance sheet items included in the reserve base. This 
reserve ratio was set at 2% at the start of Stage Three of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and is 
lowered to 1% from 18 January 2012. As noted above, the reserve requirement for each individual institution is 
calculated by applying the reserve ratio to the reserve base. Institutions have to deduct a uniform lump-sum 
allowance of 100,000 € from their reserve requirement. This allowance is designed to reduce the administrative 
costs arising from managing very small reserve requirements. 
589 See supra note 587.  
590 See supra note 587.  
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negative interests rates591 on their facilities, they are usually not very effective with this 
instrument as a steering tool, because Commercial Banks just tend to remove their deposits 
into their own accounts where they do not earn any interest but do not cost them negative 
interest at the Central Bank592. 
 
Besides governments, Commercial Banks are the only institutions to have accounts at a 
Central Bank593.  Aside from the cash in the safety deposit boxes of the Commercial 
Banks, the reserves only circulate within the inter-banking market without ever leaving the 
accounts of the Commercial Banks for instance within the Euro system594. 
 
Fourth Misconception: Reducing Reserves. 
 
Reducing reserves means banks are paying Central Bank money that they actually lend 
from the ECB back to the ECB.  So, aside from actually paying out cash money to their 
own clients, this is the only possibility by which the total volume of reserves that are kept 
within the banking system can be reduced.  When there is the question why there should 
even be a minimum reserve, usually there are two responses to that:  “The minimum 
reserve makes the financial system more secure or it limits the ability to create FIAT 
money by commercial banks.” 595 Both of these responses are wrong and false and we will 
discuss in a minute why. 
 
Fifth Misconception: The Security Buffer.  
 
The minimum reserve is not a security buffer.  It's the equity capital of the banks that 
makes the financial system more secure.  Whether there is, on the active side of the balance 
sheet of a bank, 10 million Euros in T-bills, or 10 million Euros in deposits at the ECB 
makes no difference to the security of the financial system.  What makes a difference is 
that there are 10 million Euros more on the active side of the balance sheet.  That makes a 
                                                 
591 World Bank, Negative Interest Rates in Europe: A Glance at their Causes and Implications,  Global 
Economic Prospects  (June 2015), [online], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015b/Global-Economic-Prospects-June-2015-
Negative-interest-rates.pdf  (Accessed at August 23, 2015)  
592 Id.  
593 See supra note 587.  
594 See supra note 588.  
595 See supra note 587. 
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difference, at least to a degree, insofar any write offs from credits gone bad do not exceed 
beyond the equity capital of the bank.596 This very fact is one of the biggest destabilizers in 
our current FIAT money system. The reality that in times of economic downturn, or 
following any severe misallocation, be it due to fraud, incompetence or structural systemic 
deficits as in the case of certain countries, or often a combination thereof, rational 
reorganizations of both sovereign or consumer debt are impeded by the mere fact that they 
would take down in a cascading domino-effect, intrinsically linked commercial banks, that 
does not only make them individually but the entire system “too big to fail”, is one of the 
most fundamental design defects of our monetary order today. How we believe this issue 
should be resolved, we discuss in the next chapter.597  
 
Sixth Misconception: The Creation of Money 
 
The creation of money by commercial banks is not limited by any requirements for 
minimum reserve598.  Imagine a scenario of the money supply whereby the disposition over 
a loan by the commercial banks with a minimum requirement of 1% multiplies 1 US$ of 
Central Bank money to about the 100 Euros in FIAT money. This is just plain wrong and 
false.  As discussed previously, the money creation process actually works completely the 
opposite way.  A bank actually gives a credit of 78 Euros and then covers the minimum 
reserve by actually lending that money, i.e. 22 Euros for its reserves from the Central 
Bank599.  This has never been denied by the European Central Bank600.  After all, it is the 




                                                 
596 Kapan, T. and Minoiu, C., Balance Sheet Strength and Bank Lending During the Global Financial Crisis, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/13/102 (May 2013) [online], available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13102.pdf (Accessed at 25 July 2014)  
597 See Chapter 4.V. Resolutions of Legal Risks in Capital Formation 
598 See supra note 546.  
599 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
600 In order to meet their reserve requirements, credit institutions have to hold balances on their current accounts 
with the National Central Banks. This means that compliance with minimum reserve requirements is determined 
on the basis of the average daily balances on the counterparties' reserve accounts over one reserve maintenance 
period. The Eurosystem aims to ensure that the minimum reserve system neither puts a burden on the banking 
system in the euro area nor hinders the efficient allocation of resources. For this reason, credit institutions' 
holdings of required reserves are remunerated. The remuneration corresponds to the marginal rate (weighted 
according to the number of calendar days) of the main refinancing operations during the reserve maintenance 
period.  
601 See supra note 588. 
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Seventh Misconception: The Interest in the Money Market 
 
The actual purpose of the minimum reserve is a different one.  The minimum reserve 
requirement guarantees the control of the ECB over the short-term interest rate on the 
money market.602  So, aside from the requirements for cash money by banking clients, and 
the actual payment processing between banks, the minimum reserve requirement is a third 
artificially implemented factor that creates a structural liquidity deficit.  It is this liquidity 
deficit that ascertains that the demand by the banks for Central Bank money is 
continuously and constantly positive.  So, under these conditions, the European Central 
Bank can determine, as a monopoly for Central Bank money, the price of that Central 
Bank money, which is the interest rate at which banks lend each other Central Bank 
money. Therefore, the minimum reserve is a means to control the short-term interest rate 
for money market funds, and to keep that control at the Central Bank. 
 
Eighth Misconception: The Lead Interest Rate 
 
If the banking system continuously keeps excessive reserves, the deposit interest rate 
becomes de facto the lead interest rate.  The control by the ECB over the interest rate at 
which banks lend each other Central Bank money, is only indirect603.  Before the crisis, 
this indirect control was exercised by way of the main refinancing interest rate, at which 
the banks could actually refinance at the ECB its demand for Central Bank money, but in 
times of massive, long-term, excessive reserves, most banks could actually cover their 
demand or their requirements in Central Bank money without any problem at the inter-
banking markets, so that the main refinancing interest rate actually lost its importance604. 
Important now, however, is that the deposit rate the ECB is actually paying to the banks 
through its excessive reserves, because Bank A will leave its excessive reserves only as 
long at Bank B, or lend it to Bank B only as long as Bank B pays an interest rate that is 
over and over above the deposit interest rate of the ECB.605 
                                                 
602 The key functions of the minimum reserve system are to stabilize money market interest rates and to enlarge 
the structural liquidity shortage of the banking system (Source: The Monetary Policy of the ECB. European 
Central Bank, Frankfurt 2004). 
603 Heider, F., Hoerova, M and Holthausen, C. Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads, The Role of 
Counterparty Risk, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series, No 1126 (December 2009), [online], 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1126.pdf (Accessed at 19 July 2015) 
604 Id.  
605 Id. 
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Ninth Misconception: The Negative Deposit Interest Rate 
 
The reduction of the deposit interest rate to a negative level would be only a symbolic act. 
Banks would transfer their excessive reserves out of their deposit facility into their reserve 
accounts.606  Their excessive reserves would not receive any interest but the negative 
interest rate could be simply circumvented by leaving the money on their own reserve 
accounts which is still better than a having to pay a penalizing negative interest rate.  
Therefore, a negative interest rate on the deposit rate at the ECB or as currently discussed 
at the Federal Reserve607, would, at best, have a very minimal amelioration of the 
interbanking market and might in the case of the Eurozone cause marginally lower interest 
rates for instance for banks in the south in Europe608.  It might also cause a small 
devaluation of the US$ which may be the hope by the Federal Reserve to keep the U.S. 
economy more competitive in light of its recent appreciation.609  However, it will not free 
any reserves that can be actually then translated to credit facilities for the so-called real 
economy, i.e. industry and businesses610.  
 
Where are we standing with respect to the aftermath of the financial crisis in time?  In this 
currently, difficult, double crisis of the world credit market and the Eurozone, banks are 
still sitting on balance sheets with enormously high debt mountains. Other than in the 
United States, in Europe, no government has actually dared to close or nationalize banks 
with only few mishandled exceptions611. Therefore, whatever the latest decisions of the 
European Central Bank, it is becoming very obvious to the author that the main goal is not 
to avoid deflation, but to have a long-term healing and restructuring of the banks, which is 
something that requires a significant amount of time.  The fight against the dangers of 
deflation require higher salaries and higher wages and more demand, and in this request, 
the European Central Bank or the Federal Reserve are actually without any relevance. 
                                                 
606 Bloomberg, Negative Interest Rates May Spark Existential Crisis for Cash, (April 2015), [online], available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/negative-interest-rates-may-spark-existential-crisis-for-
cash (Accessed at 25 July 2015)  
607 Rosenberg, A., Could negative rates be next on the Fed's policy menu? CNBC, (20 Sep 2015 | 5:02 PM ET), 
[online], available at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/20/ (Accessed at 23 September 2015) 
608 See supra note 603.  
609 Id.  
610 See supra note 587.  
611 Market Watch, Austria nationalizes Hypo Group Alpe Adria, (December 2009), [online], available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/austria-nationalizes-hypo-group-alpe-adria-2009-12-14 (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
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III. INSTITUTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE ACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
A. INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION (FED, ECB, IMF, WB AND WTO) 
 
The Federal Reserve System, often referred to as the Federal Reserve or simply "the Fed," 
is the central bank of the United States. It was created by the Congress to provide the 
nation with a safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system. The 
Federal Reserve was created on December 23, 1913, when President Woodrow Wilson 
signed the Federal Reserve Act into law612. 
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for Europe's single currency, the 
euro. The ECB’s main task is to maintain the Euro's purchasing power and price stability 
in the Eurozone. The Eurozone comprises the 19 European Union countries that have 
introduced the Euro since 1999.613 The tasks of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) and the Eurosystem are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union614. They are specified in the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank. The Statute is a protocol attached to the 
                                                 
612 The Federal Reserve Act, (December 1913) [online], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/officialtitle.htm (Accessed at 23 September 2015). The Federal 
Reserve's responsibilities fall into four general areas. 1. Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing 
money and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of full employment and stable prices. 2. Supervising and 
regulating banks and other important financial institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation's 
banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of consumers. 3. Maintaining the stability of the 
financial system and containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets. 4. Providing certain financial 
services to the U.S. government, U.S. financial institutions, and foreign official institutions, and playing a major 
role in operating and overseeing the nation's payments systems.  
613 About the European Central Bank, [online], available at  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html  
(Accessed at 23 September 2015) 
614 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union generally refers to the ESCB rather than to the 
Eurosystem, since it was drawn up on the premise that all EU Member States would eventually adopt the euro. 
The Eurosystem is made up of the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the EU Member States whose 
currency is the euro, whereas the ESCB comprises the ECB and the NCBs of all EU Member States (Article 
282(1) of the Treaty). As long as there are EU Member States whose currency is not the euro, it will be 
necessary to make a distinction between the Eurosystem and the ESCB.  Article 127(1) of the Treaty defines the 
primary objective of the Eurosystem:  "The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks […] 
shall be to maintain price stability". It continues as follows: "Without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union."  The 
European Union has multiple objectives (Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union), which include the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, and a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress. Consequently, price 
stability is not only the primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy, but also an objective of the European 
Union as a whole. Thus, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on European 
Union establish a clear hierarchy of objectives for the Eurosystem, making it clear that price stability is the most 
important contribution that monetary policy can make to achieve a favorable economic environment and a high 
level of employment. 
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Treaty.615 The ECB has the exclusive right to authorize the issuance of banknotes within 
the Eurozone.616  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 188 countries, working to 
foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, 
promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around 
the world. The IMF, also known as the Fund, was conceived at a UN conference in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, United States, in July 1944.617 The 44 countries at that 
conference sought to build a framework for economic cooperation to avoid a repetition of 
the competitive devaluations that had contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s618. 
The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary 
system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries 
(and their citizens) to transact with each other. The Fund's mandate was updated in 2012 to 
include all macroeconomic and financial sector issues that bear on global stability.619 
 
Today, France, Germany, China, and Russia are actively promoting the replacement of the 
U.S. dollar with an International Monetary Fund basket of currencies620 — known as the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)621 — as the global reserve currency. The United States is 
resisting.622 
 
                                                 
615 European Central Bank, Tasks of the Eurosystem, [online], available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/html/index.en.html (Accessed at 15 July 2015)  
616 Treaty on the European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [online], available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1341/1342/html/index.en.html (Accessed at 15 July 2015)  
617 International Monetary Fund, About the IMF, [online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/about.htm 
(Accessed at 15 July 2015)  
618 Id. 
619 Id.  
620 International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing Rights, Factsheet (April 2015), [online], available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm (Accessed at 6 August 2015)  
621 The SDR was created by the IMF in 1969 to support the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. A 
country participating in this system needed official reserves—government or central bank holdings of gold and 
widely accepted foreign currencies—that could be used to purchase the domestic currency in foreign exchange 
markets, as required to maintain its exchange rate. But the international supply of two key reserve assets—gold 
and the U.S. dollar—proved inadequate for supporting the expansion of world trade and financial development 
that was taking place. Therefore, the international community decided to create a new international reserve asset 
under the auspices of the IMF. 
622 Michael Pettis, An Exorbitant Burden, Foreign Policy (September 2011), [online], available at 
http://t.co/6mkBbrIBs1 (Accessed at 15 July 2015).  
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The World Bank Group consists of five organizations623: The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure 
that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.624 Trade relations often 
involve conflicting interests. Agreements, including those painstakingly negotiated in the 
WTO system, often need interpreting. The most harmonious way to settle these differences 
is through some neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose 
behind the dispute settlement process written into the WTO agreements. The best 
international agreement is not worth very much if its obligations cannot be enforced when 
one of the signatories fails to comply with such obligations. An effective mechanism to 
settle disputes thus increases the practical value of the commitments the signatories 
undertake in an international agreement. The fact that the Members of the (WTO) 
established the current dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations underscores the high importance they attach to compliance by all 
Members with their obligations under the WTO Agreement.625 
                                                 
623 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lends to governments of middle-income 
and creditworthy low-income countries. The International Development Association (IDA) provides interest-
free loans — called credits — and grants to governments of the poorest countries.  Together, IBRD and IDA 
make up the World Bank. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the largest global development 
institution focused exclusively on the private sector. We help developing countries achieve sustainable growth 
by financing investment, mobilizing capital in international financial markets, and providing advisory services 
to businesses and governments. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was created in 1988 to 
promote foreign direct investment into developing countries to support economic growth, reduce poverty, and 
improve people’s lives. MIGA fulfills this mandate by offering political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors 
and lenders. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides international 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. 
624 World Trade Organization, [online], available at https://www.wto.org/ (Accessed at 6 August 2015). The 
WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations. The bulk of the 
WTO’s current work comes from the 1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, 
under the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ launched in 2001.  Where countries have faced trade barriers and 
wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to open markets for trade. But the WTO is not just about 
opening markets, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers — for example, to 
protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed 
by the bulk of the world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground rules for international 
commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits. 
Although negotiated and signed by governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, 
and importers conduct their business, while allowing governments to meet social and environmental objectives. 
The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable 
side effects — because this is important for economic development and well-being. That partly means removing 
obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade rules are 
around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy. In other 
words, the rules have to be ‘transparent’ and predictable. 
625 There are two main ways to settle a dispute once a complaint has been filed in the WTO: (i) the parties find a 
mutually agreed solution, particularly during the phase of bilateral consultations; and (ii) through adjudication. 
There are three main stages to the WTO dispute settlement process: (i) consultations between the parties; (ii) 
adjudication by panels and (iii) the implementation of the ruling, which includes the possibility of 
countermeasures in the event of failure by the losing party to implement the ruling. 
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B. ALTERNATIVE ACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
1. MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
 
Zoltan Poszar626 explains the institutional preference for managing cash pools outside the 
traditional banking systems largely by the poor track record of bank management which 
became evident in the post-crisis environment627.   
 
The origin of the U.S. money market fund industry in early 1970s was inspired by 
restrictive banking regulation prohibiting banks from paying market rates on savings 
accounts.  Despite the restrictions on rates being lifted over 30 years ago economic 
sources still often rationale money market funds through the prism of their 
competitive position with commercial banks.628 
 
The theory predicted that "full deregulation of financial institutions will in all likelihood in 
turn lead to the end of the money market mutual fund experiment in ad hoc deregulation.  
The current size of the U.S. money market fund industry has proved this theory wrong. 
 
Baklanova's analysis629 of the U.S. money market fund gross offers an additional critique 
of the regulatory arbitrage-based hypothesis.  Restrictive banking regulations limiting the 
interest paid on savings accounts was fully phased out by 1986 eliminating money market 
fund yield advantage introduced by regulatory arbitrage yet the U.S. money market funds 
asset under-management continued to grow over years reaching the all-time high in 
January 2009630.   
 
Following Baklanova631 money market funds could be classified on the basis of their 
portfolio investments.  The portfolios of these funds typically comprise short-term 
securities issued by a wide range of issuers from state and local governments to 
government and super-national agencies to financial institutions and non-financial 
                                                 
626 Poszar, Zoltan, Adrian, Tobias, Ashcraft, Adam and Boesky, Hayley, Shadow Banking, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Staff Reports, Number 458 (July 2010), [online], available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.html (Accessed at 20 July 2015)  
627 Baklanova, Viktoria, Money market funds in the US and the EU: a legal and comparative analysis (2012), 
PhD Thesis, University of Westminster, page 55 [online], available at 
westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/10935/1/Viktoria_BAKLANOVA.pdf (Accessed at 6 August 2014)  
628 Id. at page 52.  
629 Id. at page 53.  
630 According to Baklanova these funds have retained the relatively stable asset level through a prolonged period 
of ultra-low interest rates in 2007 through the present.  Baklanova concludes that a post-crisis analysis of money 
market funds' cash flows illustrates that investors are willing to pay a high price for the safety of their money.   
631 See supra note 588 at page 71 
Page | 119 
 
corporations.  Money market funds can also invest in short-term securities in the range of 
privately negotiated transactions.   
 
The key requirements for securities to be eligible for money market funds are credit, 
quality and maturity.  Normally eligible securities must be of high credit quality and short 
maturities although specific objective standards concerning credit quality and maturity do 
vary depending on the jurisdiction632.   
 
Money market funds hold a significant share of the commercial paper market that provide 
short-term funding for corporate boards and a large portion of state and local government 
debt markets.633  The US Treasury and government housing agencies also substantially rely 
on money market fund investments.634   
 
Money market funds are commonly seen as providing a number of benefits for instance as 
suppliers of credit and liquidity to the financial system as a provider of a diversification of 
funding and cost saving to capital markets in particular for debt issues in terms of non-
financial corporations providing access to capital markets and funding flexibility.635   
                                                 
632 See supra note 627.  
633 Kacperczyk, Marcin and Schnabl, Philipp, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2009, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 24, Number 1 (2010), page 35, [online], 
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/mkacperc/public_html/commercial.pdf (Accessed at 20 August 
2014).  
634 Id.  
635 Nazareth, Annette L, SEC Adopts Money Market Reforms, (August 2014), [online], available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/08/16/sec-adopts-money-market-fund-reforms/ (Accessed at 6 August 
2015). On July 23, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted significant amendments 
(the “amendments”) to rules under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) and 
related requirements that govern money market funds (“MMFs”). The SEC’s adoption of the amendments is the 
latest action taken by U.S. regulators as part of the ongoing debate about systemic risks posed by MMFs and the 
extent to which previous reform efforts have addressed these concerns. The reforms stem primarily from the 
2008 financial crisis and come on the heels of several years of vigorous debate between regulators and industry 
participants, as well as among regulators themselves, regarding the optimal way to regulate the roughly $3.0 
trillion MMF industry. The perception of MMFs as a potential source of systemic risk requiring heightened 
regulation became prevalent following the announcement in September 2008 that the Reserve Primary Fund 
would “break the buck” and the subsequent run on MMFs. Given the broad economic importance of MMFs in 
the short-term financing markets and their wide use as vehicles for savings, the U.S. government temporarily 
intervened to halt the run. Amendments to MMF regulations were adopted by the SEC in 2010 to reduce the 
interest rate, credit and liquidity risks of MMF portfolios and to prevent the occurrence of similar runs in the 
future. Reforms advocated in 2012 by former SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro, such as capital buffers and 
redemption holdbacks, were strongly opposed by industry participants and by three SEC Commissioners and 
were never brought to a Commission vote. The Financial Stability Oversight Council separately issued proposed 
recommendations for further MMF reform in November 2012, which suggested the adoption of one or a 
combination of three alternative frameworks for additional MMF regulation. Last June, the SEC issued its 
proposed amendments by unanimous approval of the Commissioners and such proposed amendments were 
adopted with modifications by a 3-2 vote on July 23, 2014. 
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2. SHADOW BANKING 
 
When we talk about the most prolific alternative actors of capital formation we have seen 
after the credit crisis many comments on financial innovations that were generally referred 
to as "shadow banking system".636  In these comments money market funds are described 
as one of the major funding sources for shadow banks that show a high level of influence 
on credit availability for both financial institutions and the real economy637.  The point 
being taken that the credit crisis has exposed a high level of interconnectedness of modern 
capital markets through financial innovations638.  Zoltan Poszar defines:  
 
[S]hadow banks as "financial intermediaries that conduct maturity credit and liquidity 
transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit 
guarantees" and conducted a comprehensive inventory of financial innovations 
deemed to fit the definition of shadow banks.639  
 
This is what Laura E. Kodres of the International Monetary Fund has to say about shadow 
banking.640  Many financial institutions that act like banks are not supervised like banks.  
There is the old saying if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and acts like a duck then 
it is a duck or so the saying goes.  But what about an institution that looks like a bank and 
acts like a bank often it is not a bank?  It is a shadow bank.641   
 
Kodres says shadow banking in fact symbolizes one of the many failings of the financial 
system leading up to the global crisis642.  The term shadow bank was first coined by 
economist Paul McCulley in a 2007 speech at the annual financial symposium hosted by 
the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank in Jackson Hole, Wyoming643.   
 
Shadow banks first caught the attention of many experts because of their growing role in 
turning home mortgages into securities.  The securitization chain started with the 
                                                 
636 See supra note 627. 
637 Id.  
638 See supra note 626. 
639 Id.  
640 Kodres, Laura E., Shadow Banking – Measures for Monitoring and Mitigating? International Monetary Fund 
(November 2013), [online], available at http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/blogs/wp-
content/ourfinancialsecurity.org/uploads/2013/11/LAURA-KODRES-SHADOW-BANKING-PPT.pdf   
(Accessed at 24 August 2014) 
641 Kodres, Laura E. What is Shadow Banking?, International Monetary Fund, (June 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/basics.htm (Accessed at 24 August 2014)  
642 Id.  
643 Id.  
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origination of a mortgage that then was bought and sold by one or more financial entities 
until it ended up part of a package of mortgage loans used to back a security that was sold 
to investors.644  In theory, the value of the security was related to the value of the mortgage 
loans in the package or so you hope and the interest on a mortgage package-backed 
security was paid from the interest and principal homeowners paid on their mortgage 
loans.645  Almost every step from creation of the mortgage to sale of the security took place 
outside the direct view of regulators.646  At the very end of the securitization process the 
original title that connected the securitized right to the mortgage was often never properly 
transferred and perfected. Arguably, the paper was worthless.647 
 
Problems arose during the recent global financial crisis however when investors became 
skittish about what those longer-term assets were really worth and many decided to 
withdraw their funds at once.  To repay these investors shadow banks had to sell assets.  
These fire sales generally reduced the value of those assets forcing other shadow banking 
entities and some banks with similar assets to reduce the value of those assets on their 
books to reflect the lower market price creating further uncertainty about their health.648   
 
But real banks were caught in the shadows too.  Some shadow banks were controlled by 
commercial banks and for reputational reasons were salvaged by the stronger bank parent.  
In other cases the connections were at arm's length but because shadow banks had to 
withdraw from other markets including those in which banks sold commercial paper and 
other short-term debt these sources of funding to banks were also impaired.  And because 
there was so little transparency it often was unclear who owned or who would owe later 
what to whom.649 Estimating the size of the shadow bank system is particularly difficult 
because many of its entities do not report to government regulators.  It still appears to be 
the largest in the United States but non-bank creditor intermediation is present in other 
countries as well and growing.650    
 
                                                 
644 See supra note 640.  
645 Id.  
646 Id.  
647 Levitin, Adama J., The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 
Duke Law Journal, Vol 63:637, (2013), [online], available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3406&context=dlj (Accessed at 20 June 2014)  
648 Id.  
649 Id.  
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3. ISSUERS OF SECURITIZED EQUITY AND DEBT 
 
In the most tradition form for savings to result in capital formation, they must be invested. 
In an asset securitization or structured finance transaction, the primary structural goal is to 
isolate the assets or collateral which will generate the cash flow to investors. Outside credit 
risks or exposure should be removed to the greatest extent possible651. 
 
Project loans can be securitized in at least two ways. The first way is for the holder of such 
loan, or the holders of various loans, to sell the loan or loans to a Special Purpose Entity 
(SPE) which will obtain the funds to make such purchase by issuing debt or equity 
securities to long-term institutional investors.652 The second way is for long-term investors 
to make a new loan in order to refinance the origination loan made to finance one project 
or, if applicable, the origination loans made to finance several related projects. Such 
refinancing, especially if it involves more than one project, may utilize an SPE, owned by 
the project entities, to be the new borrower and issuer of the debt securities.653  
 
An SPE may be a corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership or trust. 
Consequently, the SPE should not be able to incur additional debt or obligations that might 
enable a creditor to bring action against the SPE which might interfere with payment to the 
investors.654 
 
The SPE also should be structured to reduce the possibility that a bankruptcy court, in a 
proceeding involving the parent or other affiliate, would order "substantive consolidation" 
of the assets of the SPE with those of its parent or affiliate. The transfer to the SPE should 
further be structured to be a true sale in order that the assets will not be deemed a part of 
the transferor's estate in the event of the transferor's bankruptcy or insolvency.655  
 
                                                 
651 Weitzu Chen, Chi-Chun Liu, Stephen G. Ryan, Characteristics of Securitizations that Determine Issuers’ 
Retention of the Risks of the Securitized Assets, [online], available at 
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/rtfiles/.../RYAN.doc 
652 Id. 
653 Id.  
654 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report on Special Purpose 
Entities, page 73, (September 2009), [online], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (Accessed at June 
20 2014)  
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FIGURE 11: THE COMPLEX WORLD OF DODD-FRANK656 
 
Size or Type of Fund  Test Regulatory Regime 
Fund advisers that advise PE Funds with 
more than $150 Million in AUM 
Register with the SEC as Investment Adviser 
Fund advisers that advise PE Funds with 
between $100-150 Million in AUM 
Regulated by the SEC as “Exempt Reporting Adviser”; i.e., no registration, no 
examinations, but some paperwork and reporting 
Fund advisers that advise PE Funds with 
less than $90-100 Million in AUM 
Register with the state securities regulator, depending on state   law 
Fund advisers that “solely” advise VC 
funds 
Regulated by the SEC as “Exempt Reporting Adviser”; i.e., no registration, no 
examinations, but some paperwork and reporting 
Advisers that “solely” advise SBIC Funds SBICs are already Regulated by the SBA. Therefore, Congress exempted these 
funds from SEC Registration but, depending on state law, may have to register 
with the state regulator. 
Advisers that advise SBIC Funds and VC 
Funds 
SBICs and VC Funds Lose their Exemption and Must Register if AUM is greater 
than $150 Million. This Results in Double Regulation by SEC and SBA for SBIC 
Funds. 
Advisers that advise SBIC Funds and PE 
Funds 
The SEC Counts the SBIC AUM in the SEC Registration threshold, triggering 
automatic registration if above $150 Million in AUM. This Results in Double 
Regulation by the SEC and SBA for SBIC Funds. 
 
Under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act657, the regulatory landscape for the securitization of 
equity and debt has dramatically changed. Today, the changes require most private equity 
funds to register with the SEC or their state securities regulator. In most cases, the 
investment adviser rules are not designed for private equity firms. Small Business 
Investors can rarely afford the significant costs that are attached to the required with the 
SEC registration in the United States658. 
 
Dodd-Frank created an “Assets under Management” test659 to determine how most advisers 
of Private Equity Funds are regulated. Other types of fund advisers are specifically 
                                                 
656 Small Business Investor Alliance, Capital Formation Agenda, (2015, [online], available 
2015_SBIA_Promoting_Capital_pdf. (Accessed at 20 September 2015) 
657 Six federal agencies approved a final rule requiring sponsors of securitization transactions to retain risk in 
those transactions.  The final rule implements the risk retention requirements in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. According to the regulators, the final rule largely retains the risk 
retention framework contained in the proposal issued by the agencies in August 2013 and generally requires 
sponsors of asset-backed securities, or ABS, to retain not less than five percent of the credit risk of the assets 
collateralizing the ABS issuance.  The rule also sets forth prohibitions on transferring or hedging the credit risk 
that the sponsor is required to retain. As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the final rule defines a “qualified 
residential mortgage,” or QRM, and exempts securitizations of QRMs from the risk retention requirement.  The 
final rule aligns the QRM definition with that of a qualified mortgage as defined by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.  The final rule also requires the agencies to review the definition of QRM no later than four 
years after the effective date of the rule with respect to the securitization of residential mortgages and every five 
years thereafter, and allows each agency to request a review of the definition at any time.  The final rule also 
does not require any retention for securitizations of commercial loans, commercial mortgages, or automobile 
loans if they meet specific standards for high quality underwriting. 
658 See supra note 656. 
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exempted from registration such as Venture Capital Funds and Small Business Investment 
Companies, but only if they advise solely these funds660.  
 
In the European Union, the situation is similar. The AIFMD Directive661 has instituted a 
regime that allows Private Equity funds to “passport” their fund throughout all member 
states in the EU662, so long the fund is registered within one Member State with the 
pertinent Financial Conduct Authority, as would be the case in the United Kingdom.663An 
Alternative Investment Fund, AIF, is a 'collective investment and includes hedge funds, 
private equity funds, retail investment funds, investment companies and real estate funds, 
among others. The AIFMD establishes an EU-wide harmonized framework for monitoring 
and supervising risks posed by AIFMs and the AIFs they manage, and for strengthening 
the internal market in alternative funds. The Directive also includes new requirements for 
firms acting as a depositary for an AIF.664 
 
Dodd-Frank, AIFMD and the JOBS-Act665 are all reactive regulatory attempts to mitigate 
the risks that were predominantly caused by asset-price bubbles due to monetary 
misallocation. Rather than dealing with the root cause, that is rarely missing regulation, a 
regulatory activism continues complicating capital formation as a closed-shop for “big 
boys’ clubs” which are inaccessible for young, innovative entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
660 See supra note 656.  
661 The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers was published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union on 1 July 2011. Its aim is to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory and supervisory 
framework for alternative investment fund managers within the EU. The Directive, as is generally the case with 
EU Directives, is not directly applicable itself and requires each EU Member State to enact domestic legislation 
to implement the Directive. It is therefore important when analysing the law in any given EU Member State to 
consider how the relevant Member State has implemented the Directive and whether the relevant Member State 
has any guidance regarding how the law should be interpreted in that jurisdiction. The vast majority of EU 
Member States have now implemented the Directive in their domestic legislation. 
662 DIRECTIVE 2011/61/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 8 June 2011 
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and 
Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 [online], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011L0061 (Accessed at 20 August 2015) Managers of alternative investment 
funds (AIFMs) are responsible for the management of a significant amount of invested assets in the Union. The 
recent financial difficulties have underlined how the activities of AIFMs may also serve to spread risks through 
the financial system. Uncoordinated national responses make the efficient management of those risks difficult. 
This Directive therefore aims at establishing common requirements governing the authorisation and supervision 
of AIFMs in order to provide a coherent approach to the related risks and their impact on investors and markets 
in the Union. In order to provide comprehensive and common arrangements for supervision, it is necessary to 
establish a framework capable of addressing those risks taking into account the diverse range of investment 
strategies and techniques employed by AIFMs. This Directive does not regulate AIFs. AIFs should therefore be 
able to continue to be regulated and supervised at national level. 
663 Id. 
664 Id.  
665 See Chapter IV. A.2. JOBS Act of 2012 




Releasing the first version of Bitcoin in January 2009, the fabled founder of Bitcoin 
Satoshi Nakamoto666, opened a new era of capital formation, the Age of Capital 2.0.   
Nakamoto’s identity remains hidden667 even after he created his own currency coin, a 
computer program that is breathtaking in both its technological complexity as well as in its 
fundamental simplicity.  
 
Bitcoin was intended from its start to be the first decentralized global currency that 
operates based on its libertarian philosophy independently of any government authority or 
monetary policy.  Unsurprisingly, regulators are confronted with difficult legal questions 
that produce contradictory responses.  Is Bitcoin a currency or an asset?  Should it be 
regulated as a security?  Does the U.S. even have jurisdiction over Bitcoin and how should 
those currency exchanges be regulated?668  
 
The early beginnings of Bitcoin have probably their roots with a group of scientists in 
California that wanted to ascertain their access to cryptographic tools and protocols that 
have proven effective in cyphering digital messages and information. In the late nineties 
computer scientist Nick Szabo669 began developing the idea of "Bitgold" which today is 
often considered as direct predecessor to Bitcoin670.  Szabo's suggested that the value of a 
digital coin generated by a highly sophisticated cryptographic equation might be equal or 
traced in its value to the allocated computer power that was needed to generate that 
equation in the first place. However, this did not solve the so-called “double-spending 
problem” given that a computer code could always be copied. In a classic (digital) 
currency this is avoided by handing a supervisory function to central authorities like a 
central bank. Their idea was more in line with the creation of a digital gold standard.671  
 
                                                 
666 Nakamoto, Satoshi, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, [online], available at 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (Accessed at 23 August 2015).  
667 O’Leary, Martin: The Mysterious Disappearance of Satoshi Nakamoto, Founder & Creator of Bitcoin, 
[online], available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/martin-oaleary/the-mysterious-
disappeara_2_b_7217206.html (Accessed at August 25, 2015)  
668 Futures Magazine, CFTC claims jurisdiction over Bitcoin, [online], available at 
http://www.futuresmag.com/2015/09/18/cftc-claims-jurisdiction-over-bitcoin (Accessed at September 23, 2015) 
669 Knibbs, Kate, Nick Szabo Is Probably Satoshi Nakamoto, [online], available at http://gizmodo.com/nick-
szabo-is-probably-satoshi-nakamoto-1704755126 (Accessed at August 6, 2015) 
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671 See supra note 666.  
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This issue was not effectively resolved until about 2009 when the anonymous founder of 
Bitcoin known only as Satoshi Nakamoto based on Szabo’s ideas introduced the world to 
Bitcoin.  Bitcoin was launched on January 3, 2009672 and started producing Bitcoins 
providing the program on their computers.  Nakamoto disappeared. 
 
What differentiates Bitcoin from Szabo’s earlier efforts like Bitgold? Similar to Szabo's 
Bitgold concept the first miner or pool or miners to solve the assigned puzzle is rewarded 
by the Bitcoin program in the form of newly generated Bitcoins as well as a cut of recently 
verified Bitcoin.  Everyone else who lost the race receives no Bitcoin and a new round 
begins.  Where at its most basic the Bitcoin software had created a mathematical puzzle 
that is difficult to solve it needs to be tried again by either individual users or by a pool of 
users, the so-called miners.  The validation of a successful mining effort is conducted 
through majority verification by the rest of the miners in an act of associativity mining in 
the system.673   
 
Nakamoto disposes of Szabo's problem of double spending, using the mining process not 
only to introduce new Bitcoins into circulation but also to verify every single Bitcoin 
transaction that has ever occurred.  Therefore Bitcoin operates independently of any 
controlling central authority because no one outside supervisor or authorities needed to 
monitor, track and ensure the valid expenditure of Bitcoins674.  Only once the validity has 
been verified a block is added to the block chain, its successful miners are rewarded with 
Bitcoins and everyone else who had been working on their own blocks gets nothing.  A 
new round begins as fresh blocks are issued releasing a set number of new Bitcoins at a 
predetermined rate.  Therefore Bitcoin incorporates a finite money supply that will 
eventually be kept once 21 million coins have entered circulation.675   
 
Bitcoin offered protection from the traditionally inflationary policies of state-backed 
currencies.  Nakamoto said: "The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency 
but the history of feared currencies is full of breaches of that trust."676 Just like Milton 
                                                 
672 History of Bitcoin, [online], available at http://historyofbitcoin.org/ (Accessed at 4 July, 2015)  
673 See supra note 666. 
674 Id.  
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676 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin Open Source Implementation of P2P Currency, P2P Found [February 11, 2009 at 
10:27 p.m., http//p2pfoundation.ning.com/form/topics/bitcoin-open-source (Accessed at 4 August, 2015)  
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Freedman677 said who once advocated the abolishing the Federal Reserve that “inflation 
would be better checked by an automated system that increased the money supply at a 
predetermined rate.”  Just like Bitcoin.  
 
In March 2014 the IRS declared that virtual currencies such as the Bitcoin were not 
"currency but assets."678  A strong statement bar legal basis given that the tax code does not 
actually define the term currency.  However, under the IRS ruling, Bitcoin investors are 
now treated like people who invest in equity with all the advantages of long-term capital 
gains.679 Investors who lost money for Bitcoin can subtract capital losses from capital gains 
including subtracting up to $3,000.00 of capital losses from ordinary income per year.  
Those who made it their profession to mine Bitcoins are now paying now personal income 
tax on any new Bitcoin on the Bitcoin's value at the day of mining680.  Bitcoin mining 
business operations are subject to payroll taxes and worker’s compensation rules on their 
miners.  The ruling took effect immediately covering both past as well as future 
transactions and tax liability creating logistical nightmares to current operations.  
 
Globally, financial regulators have remained divided as to how to treat Bitcoin based on 
laws and regulations on their books. Whether Bitcoin now must be considered an asset or 
still can be seen as money depends by far on whom you ask, even within the same 
jurisdiction.  UCC Section 9-332681 ensures that money can be transferred free of 
preexisting security interests so as to allow it to function as a viable means of exchange. 
Therefore, Bitcoin advocates allege that the IRS is wrong to treat Bitcoins as assets and 
that Bitcoins should be treated like any other form of money under the UCC.  However, 
this is unlikely under commercial law as the UCC's existing definition of "money" under 
                                                 
677 Friedmann, Milton, Interview, Library of Economics and Liberty, (September 2006), [online], available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Friedmantranscript.html (Accessed at 4 July 2015) 
678 IRS Virtual Currency Guidance : Virtual Currency Is Treated as Property for U.S. Federal Tax Purposes; 
General Rules for Property Transactions Apply, [online], available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-
Virtual-Currency-Guidance (Accessed at 4 July 2015) 1 
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681 § 9-332. TRANSFER OF MONEY; TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM DEPOSIT ACCOUNT, [online], 
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/9-332 (Accessed at 4 July 2015) (a) [Transferee of money.] A 
transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the 
debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. (b) [Transferee of funds from deposit account.]  A transferee 
of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the 
transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party. 
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Section 1-201[B]24682 specifically states that it must be a "medium of exchange currently 
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government."683  Short of convincing the 
U.S. or a foreign jurisdiction to officially authorize or adopt Bitcoin as a recognized 
medium of exchange, this will not likely be the case. 
 
In all of this only one thing appears to be certain.  For the first time a [digital] currency 
does not require a third party authority to effectuate its validity but derives its validity from 
the acceptance of its users pursuant to a predetermined process that only became available 
by the advancement of technology and the widespread distribution of digital media.   
 
Whilst usually the key argument purported for the acceptance of regular currency as 
money is that it is anchored by the fact that it is accepted for the payment of taxes,684 i.e. 
by the government, the enormous progress made by Bitcoin it is anchored by the 
acceptance of its users. We, the people, the users of the currency, determine its acceptance 
in a common process.  
 
Like Minsky said:  
 
Everyone can issue money, the trick is to get it accepted. 685 
 
Nakamoto might just have pulled it off. Whether Nakamoto’s digital gold standard will 
suffer the same fate as Bretton-Woods or the Euro these days remains to be seen once 
Bitcoin hits its ceiling. Certainly, a genius like Nakamoto will swiftly learn that the base of 
a currency is its economic product and neither metal nor the limitation of code. None 
appear on the balance sheet that actually expresses the value of money. After all, it is all 
about the accounting identity.  
 
                                                 
682 (24) "Money" means a medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign 
government. The term includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or 
by agreement between two or more countries. 
683 Id.  
684 Kelton, Stephanie, Monetary Operations and Government Finance, p.20, (June 2015), University of 
Missouri-Kansas, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/conf_june10/Kelton.pdf (Accessed at August 15, 2015) 
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CHAPTER 4: CAPITAL FORMATION AND LEGAL RISK 
I. THE TRIPLE A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
The Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability for the analysis of 
Capital Formation follows directly the intrinsically linked balance sheets of the Capital 
Formation Life Cycle.686 Whilst the system of Accounting of capital formation deals with 
the monetary capital formation process, the process of Allocation follows on the one hand 
the transfer of monetary capital resources from the balance sheets of the Sovereign 
Accounts of the Central Banks via the Accounts of the Financial Institutions and 
Commercial Banks to the Domestic or International Accounts of Corporate or Consumer 
Citizen  and on the other hand the translation of the exchange value of non-monetary 
capital formation by human resources or industrial production into monetary terms via the 
accounts of the Financial Institutions to the Domestic or International accounts of 
Corporate or Consumer Citizen.  
 
Ultimately, a judicial authority that is commensurate in its jurisdiction in geographic as 
well as legal scope needs to be in place in order to ascertain Accountability serving justice 




The most important prerequisite to understand the centuries old principle of accounting is 
to comprehend the principles of Double-entry bookkeeping, DEB, that were probably 
developed in business practices as early as the 13th Century when it was first published in 
1494 as a system by the Italian mathematician Luca Pacioli688. His insights open the door 




                                                 
686 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
687 See Chapter 6.III. A Plea for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court 
688 Lauwers, L. Five Hundred Years of Bookkeeping, A Portrait of Luca Pacioli, Tidschrift voor Economie en 
Management, Vol. XXXIX,3,1994 [online], available at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/119065/1/tem1994-3_289-304p.pdf%2520kuleuven.be 
(Accessed at 15 July 2015)  
689 See supra note 686.  
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1. PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE-ENTRY-BOOKKEEPING 
 
Double-entry bookkeeping has thus been used for well over five centuries in commercial 
accounting systems.  If the mathematical formulation of any field should be well 
understood, one would think it might be accounting.690   
 
Remarkably, however, the mathematical formulation of double-entry accounting that is 
algebraic operations on ordered pairs of numbers is largely unknown is mathematics, as 
well as in accounting.  Double-entry bookkeeping implicitly uses a very specific and 
precise mathematical construction that is not part of undergraduate abstract algebra.  That 
construction was developed in the 19th Century by William Rowan Hamilton691 as a result 
of using ordered pairs to deal with the complex numbers.  The multiplicative version of 
this construction is the group of fractions which uses ordered pairs of whole numbers to 
enlarge the system of positive whole numbers to the system of positive fractions containing 
multiplicative inverses.   
 
The ordered pairs construction that is relevant to double-entry bookkeeping is the additive 
case usually called the group of differences.  It is used to construct the number system with 
additive different versions by using operations and ordered pairs of non-negative, or, to be 
more précised, unsigned numbers.  The key to grasp the connection with double-entry 
bookkeeping is to make the identification. 
 
What is the double in double-entry bookkeeping?  
 
A business transaction does not affect just one item alone.  There are at least two 
items to be considered in each transaction.  The dual aspect of each transaction forms 
the basis underlying what is called double-entry accounting.692   
 
The mathematical fact that every event that is recorded in the accounts affects at least two 
items is a characteristic of the transaction itself. The double-entry method is a method of 
                                                 
690 Pense, Christine M., Risk response systems, PhD Thesis, Lehigh University (2008) 
691 See supra note 688. 
692 See supra note 690. 
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encoding an equation using ordered pairs of unsigned numbers, for instance T-accounts, to 
record transactions and make changes in the equation.693   
 
The characteristic doubleness of the double-entry method is the double-sidedness of the T-
accounts and the mathematical properties that follow.  For instance, equal debits and 
credits in a transaction equal debit and credits in the trial balance of the whole set of 
accounts or ledger.  The alternative to the double-entry method is to record a transaction by 
making an entry by adding assigned positive or negative number to each affected single-
sided account.  The exact same two or more accounts in the equation would still always be 
affected by this alternative method of recording a transaction since that is a property of the 
transaction itself not a property of the recording method.694   
 
In conclusion, it may be said that there is a precise mathematical system underlying the 
system of double-entry bookkeeping used in business for over five centuries.  The 
underlying mathematical construction was only explicitly developed in mathematics itself 
in the 19th Century.695  The precise mathematical treatment of double-entry bookkeeping 
helps to clear up some misconceptions in the accounting literature by showing that what is 
specifically double in double-entry bookkeeping is the two-sidedness of the T-accounts 
which gives the system its debits and credits, not the fact that every transaction affects two 
or more accounts.   
 
It also resolves the question of whether or not a common unit of account, for instance 
money, is necessary to use the double-entry method since the mathematics extends easily 
to a vector version of double-entry bookkeeping thereby representing the different types of 
goods and services involved in business transactions where no common measure of value 




                                                 
693 See supra note 690.  
694 Ellerman, David, On double-entry bookkeeping, the mathematical treatment, University of California, 
Riverside, Pages 1 to 20, (December 2013)  [online], available at http://www.ellerman.org/wp-
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B. ALLOCATION 
The division of things into shares or portions. In economics, the term refers primarily to 
the “allocation of resources,”697 the process by which economic resources get allotted 
(apportioned, assigned) to their particular uses for directly or indirectly satisfying human 
wants. The five basic questions that are asked in the study of the allocation problem are:698  
1. What goods and services should be produced? This requires a valuation or ranking 
of goods and services from most valued to least valued.699 
2. How many units of each good (or service) should be produced? Since not 
everything can be produced, some goods must be sacrificed for other goods.700 
3. How should those goods (and services) be produced? There are often different 
ways to produce a good. The amount of the good to be produced may influence the 
ways in which a good is produced701 
4. When should the goods (and services) be produced? The time that a good (or 
service) is available may affect its value. Producers of skis must have their new 
equipment ready for the ski season. Economists, accountants and others use the 
concept of present value to adjust the value of goods (or money) that will be acquired 
at some point in the future. Generally, goods to be obtained or consumed at some 
future date are perceived to have a lower value than those available currently.702 
5. How should those goods (and services) be distributed among the members of 
society? Societies must devise rules or principles that govern how goods are shared or 
distributed among its members. The ways that goods are distributed may alter 
incentives that influence the behavior of individuals. The distribution of goods among 
the members of society may also influence the ways in which different goods are 
valued.703 
Following the Capital Formation Life Cycle it is during this process of Allocation from 
Sovereign accounts to the key accounts of the Financial Institutions and Commercial 
Banks and forward to Domestic and International Corporate and Consumer Citizens where 
the biggest misallocations have happened over the past 30 years704 that translated to further 
                                                 
697 https://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/allocation  
698 Larry Reynolds. “Economics as a Study of the Allocation of Scarce Resources.” Basic Microeconomics. 
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misallocations in the translation of the exchange value of non-monetary capital formation 
and of course also other limited natural resources such as land or oil, that altogether 
ultimately reared their ugly head in the form of asset-price bubbles705.  
 
What makes the difference between an allocation that effectively creates value added706 
and may be considered an investment yielding returns over a long period of time and an 
allocation that provides for consumption and the maintenance of necessities or the 
difference between a long-term income-stream and an misallocation where the 
corresponding product, good, service, property, plant or equipment ultimately does not 
keep its promise being of equivalent exchange value but of inferior worth as expressed in 
its declining market price, can simply be followed by observing the balance sheets of the 
Capital Formation Life Cycle707.  
 
For instance, as in the case demonstrated in Exhibit A, a machine was not working 
properly, and its purchaser is all by a sudden in a position that he cannot repay the loan he 
took out to purchase the production facility.  
 
In our case, he needs to declare default due to an insolvency708. Extrapolate this case to a 
cross-border transaction where the financing took place in the European Union, the 
purchase of the machine and the construction of the production facility took place in the 
United States and you end up with the level of complexity we are dealing with in our 
transatlantic legal practice every day. And this is a case of simple default due to mere 
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706 Bezemer, Dirk J., Schumpeter May Be Right Again: the Functional Differentiation of Credit, Economics of 
Credit and Debt, [online], available at 
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707 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
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The term Accountability stems from the Latin accomptare (to account), a prefixed form of 
computare (to calculate), which in turn derived from putare (to reckon). While the word 
itself does not appear in English until its use in 13th century Norman England the concept 
of account-giving has ancient roots in record keeping activities related to governance and 
money-lending systems that first developed in Ancient Egypt, Israel, Babylon, Greece, and 
later, Rome.709 
 
Looking at who did and in particular did not take responsibility for such misallocations, 
how they were determined, dealt with and ultimately disposed of, is the last stage of this 
Triple A Model, by analyzing the Accountability of those in charge and responsible. 
 
Unsurprisingly, we all assume, that responsibility requires a correspondent institution that 
has the judicial authority to determine default710, fault711, and failure712 with the power to 
bring those responsible to justice in case of fault providing restitution, and offer terminal 
resolution correcting misallocations by availing itself of the other equitable remedies of 
rescission or reformation of contract in the mere case of failure. 
 
Unfortunately, we also find, that such commensurate judicial authority only exists on the 
local level for domestic cases713. However, given the highly international, transatlantic and 
often even global nature of these cases of misallocation and sometimes misappropriation or 
even outright fraud714, do not find an institution of correspondent and concurrent 
geographic and judicial scope and authority with the requisite powers to remedy ultimately 
providing Accountability715. 
 
                                                 
709 Dubnick, Melvin, Accountability as Cultural Keyword, VU University, (May 2012), [online], available at 
http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net/papers/2012/Dubnick%20VU%202012.pdf (Accessed at July 21, 2014) 
710 See supra note 240.  
711 Posner, Eric A., Fault in Contract Law, University of Chicago Law School (2009), [online], available at 
http://www.ericposner.com/fault_in_contract_law.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
712 Canova, Timothy A., Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism 
to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, (October 2009), Harvard Law & Policy Review, Vol. 3 2009, [online], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489492 (Accessed at 20 July 2014)  
713 Mead, Joseph W., Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, Nevada Law Journal, Vol.12:787, 
[online], available at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1521&context=nlj (Accessed at 
July 20, 2014)  
714 See supra note 342. 
715 See supra note 709.  
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II. ACCOUNTING AND CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
A. THREE ACTORS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 




1. ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS 
 
The Role of the Central Banks717 is nowadays primarily being an agency for monetary 
policy.  Usually, it also has important financial stability factions and those become more 
prominent during times of financial turmoil718.  The structure of those roles, the 
                                                 
716 Kelton, Stephanie, Chief Economist, U.S. Senate Budget Committee, (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://stephaniekelton.com/ (Accessed at July 24, 2014)   
717  Archer, David, Bank for International Settlements, Roles and objectives of modern central banks, [online], 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp04_2.pdf (Accessed at July 25, 2014)  
718 Wray, Randall L, The Credit Money and State Money approaches, Center for Full Employment and Price 
Stability, [online], available at http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp32.html (Accessed at July 25, 2014). Wray 
argues that “with respect to the effective role that the dominant state actor in monetary capital formation, the 
Federal Reserve plays, Schumpeter made a useful distinction between the period "monetary theory of credit," 
and the "credit theory of money."  The first sees private "credit money" is only a temporary substitute for "real 
money." Final settlement must take place in real money, which is the ultimate unit of accounts or failure at 
means of payment.  Exchanges might take place based on credit, but credit expansion is strictly constrained by 
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responsibilities given and the range of other factions allocated vary between countries.  
The main issues are as follows:  What degree of independent authority does the central 
bank have to decide policy make policy decisions and implement those decisions?  This 
question also relates to the degree of influence over exchange rate policy and the setting of 
objectives for both monetary and exchange policies.   
 
When a modern government spends, it issues a check drawn on the treasury.  As we can 
see in Figure 11719, its liabilities increase by the amount of the expenditure, and its assets 
increase in the case of a purchase of a good produce by the private sector, or some other 
liabilities are reduced in the case of a social transfer.  The recipient of the check will 
almost certainly present it to a bank for currency or deposit.  In the former case, the bank's 
reserves are first increased and then are reduced by the same amount.  In the latter case, the 
reserves are credited in the amount of the deposit.  The reserves credited are the bank's 
assets and as the Central Bank's liability are nothing less than a claim on government-
issued money.720  In other words, Treasury spending by check really is the equivalent of 
                                                                                                                                                        
the quantity of real money.  Ultimately, only the quantity of real money matters so far as economic activity is 
concerned. The credit theory of money, by contrast, emphasizes that credit normally expands to allow economic 
activity to grow. This new credit creates new claims on high-powered money, even as it leads to new 
production.  However, because there is a clearing system that cancels claims and debits without use of high-
powered money or HPM, credit is not merely a temporary substitute for HPM.  Schumpeter does not deny the 
role played by HPM as an ultimate means of settlement.  He simply denies that it is required for most final 
settlements. Note that if the Central Bank paid interest on excess reserves, the Treasury would never need to sell 
bonds, because the overnight interest rate could never fall below the rate paid by the Central Bank on excess 
reserve.  Note also that in spite of the widespread belief that government deficits push up interest rates, they 
actually reduce the overnight rate to zero unless the Treasury and Central Bank coordinate efforts to drain the 
resulting excess reserves.  On the other hand, budget surpluses drain reserves causing a shortage that drives up 
the overnight rate, unless the Central Bank and the Treasury buy and/or retire government debt.  Needless to 
say, orthodoxy has got the interest effects of government budgets exactly backwards. To put it as simply as 
possible, the state chooses the unit of account in which the various money things will be denominated.  In all 
modern economies, it does this when it chooses the unit in which taxes will be denominated and names what is 
accepted in tax payments.  Imposition of the tax liability is what makes these money things desirable in the first 
place, and those things will then become the money thing at the top of the money pyramid used for ultimate 
clearing.  Of course, most transactions that do not involve the government take place on the basis of credits and 
debits, that is, privately issued money things.  This can be thought of as leveraging activity”. 
719 See supra note 716.  
720 See supra note 718. Wray argues further that “these additions to subtractions from reserves are carefully 
monitored and regulated by coordination between the commercial bank and the Treasury.  Things would be 
much simpler and more transparent if tax receipts and Treasury spending were perfectly synchronized.  In that 
case, the Treasury's spending would increase reserves, and the simultaneous tax payments would reduce them.  
If the government ran a balanced budget, there would be no net impact on reserve, so there would be no need for 
complex coordination between the commercial banks and Treasury using tax and loan accounts.  However, 
when spending exceeds tax revenues, a budget deficit, there is a net injection of reserves.  It is possible that the 
extra reserves created happened to coincide with growing bank demand for services, for reserves, in which case 
the Treasury and the commercial bank need to do nothing more. More probably, the net injection of reserves 
leads to excess reserves offered in the overnight market.  Excess reserves cause the overnight rate to fall below 
the commercial bank's target, inducing it to drain reserves either through market sale or by reducing its 
discounts. When the Treasury runs a sustained deficit, the commercial bank must continuously intervene, 
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printing money.  In that, it increases the supply of bank reserves.  Unless bank required 
reserves increase by an equivalent amount, the banking system finds itself with excess 
reserves after the Treasury has spent721. 
 
The important thing to notice is that the Treasury, the ECB or the Bank of England can 
spend before and without regard to previous receipt of taxes or prior bond sales722.  In the 
United States, taxes are received throughout the year, although not uniformly, as tax 
payments are concentrated around April 15.  These are mostly paid into special tax 
accounts held at private, commercial banks.  It is true that the treasury transfers funds to its 
account at the Central Bank or at the commercial bank when it wishes to spend, but this is 
really a reserve maintenance operation designed to minimize effects on reserves.723   
 
When the Treasury spends, bank reserves increase by approximately the same amount, less 
only cash withdrawals.  The simultaneous transfer from tax accounts to the Central Bank 
neutralizes reserve effects.  Tax payments lead to a reserve drain, as the Treasury submits 
checks and received to the Central Bank for clearing, at which point, the Central Bank 
debits bank reserves.724  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
eventually running out of bonds to sell.  While it may sound strange, we conclude that the Treasury bond sales 
are not a borrowing operation at all, but a reserve draining operation that substitutes one kind of government 
liability for another.  Indeed, the Treasury cannot really sell bonds unless banks already have excess reserves, or 
unless the Central Bank then is ready to provide reserves, the banks will need to buy the bonds.  If the Treasury 
typically tried to first borrow by selling bonds before it spent, it would be draining reserves it will create only 
once it spends.  As it drained required reserves, it could cause the Fed funds rate to rise above the Central Bank's 
target inducing an open-market purchase and injection of reserves. Another way of putting it is that the 
government spends by issuing IOUs, and the private sector uses those IOUs to pay taxes and buy government 
bonds.  Obviously, if government spending were the only source of these IOUs, the private sector could not pay 
taxes or buy bonds before the government provided them.  In the real world, government spending on goods and 
services is the main, but not the only source of the IOUs needed by the private sector to pay taxes and buy 
government bonds.  In addition, the Central Bank provides reserves for discounts or open market operations or 
gold and foreign currency purchases, and these IOUs are perfect substitutes for Treasury IOUs.” 
721 See supra note 718.  
722 McLeay, M., Radia, A and Thomas, R., Money creation in the modern economy, Bank of England, Quarterly 
Bulletin (2014 Q1), [online], available at  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q1prereleasemoneycreati
on.pdf (Accessed at 23 August 2014) 
723 Wray, Randall L, Monetary Policy, An Institutionalist Approach,, Center for Full Employment and Price 
Stability, [online], available at http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp21.html (Accessed at July 25, 2014)  
724 Id.  
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Stephanie Kelton, Chief Economist at U.S. Senate Budget Committee, summarizes these 
operations in her simple, and thus so fundamental, piece “What happens when the 
government tightens its belt”, as follows725: 
 
The laws of accounting allow us to demonstrate that similarly powerful concepts 
apply to the science of economics. Beginning with the simple identity for GDP in a 
closed economy, we have:726  
 
Y = C + I + G, where: 
Y = GDP = National Income 
C = Aggregate Consumption Expenditure 
I = Aggregate Investment Expenditure 
G = Aggregate Government Expenditure 
 
It simply recognizes that the total amount of money spent buying newly produced 
goods and services will yield an equivalent income to the sellers of these products. 
Thus, it demonstrates that expenditures are a source of income.727 Because the 
economy’s financial flows are a closed system – every payment must come from 
somewhere and end up somewhere – one sector’s surplus is always the other sector’s 
deficit. As the government “tightens” its belt, it “lightens” its load on […], shifting 
the relative burden onto you. 728 
 
The author concurs with Kelton when she points out that this is not rocket science, but  
 
[I]it appears to befuddle scores of educated people, including President Obama, who 
said, “small businesses and families are tightening their belts. Their government 
should, too.” This kind of rhetoric may temporarily boost his approval ratings, but the 
policy itself will undermine the efforts of the very families and small businesses that 
are trying to improve their financial positions.729 
 
However, to understand the fundamental role and function of the Central Bank is to see 
that the economy’s financial flows are a closed system and one sector’s deficit is another’s 
surplus, the same way it is impossible for every country in the world, to have a trade 
surplus—at least one country must have a trade deficit for the others to have surpluses.730 
                                                 
725 Kelton Stephanie, now Chief Economist, U.S. Senate Budget Committee, What happens when the 
government tightens its belt (May 2011), [online], available at 
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2011/05/what-happens-when-government-tightens-2.html (Accessed at 





730 Fulwiller, Scott, The Sector Financial Balances Model of Aggregate Demand—Revised, (July 2009), 
[online], available at http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2009/07/sector-financial-balances-model-of_26.html 
(Accessed at July 25, 2014)  
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2. ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
The Role of Commercial Banks731 is to be a type of bank that provides services such as 
accepting deposits, making business loans, and offering basic investment products. The 
term “Commercial Bank” can also refer to a bank or a division of a bank that mostly deals 
with deposits and loans from corporations or large businesses, as opposed to individual 
members of the public (retail banking), in the United States it also served as a distinction 
from an investment bank pursuant to bank regulation. After the Great Depression, through 
the Glass–Steagall Act732, the U.S. Congress required that commercial banks only engage 
in banking activities, whereas investment banks were limited to capital market activities. 
This separation was mostly repealed in 1999 by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act733 but was 
restored by the Volcker Rule, implemented in January 2014 as part of the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010734. 
 
Commercial banks have historically been playing a special role in financial markets for 
two reasons.  One is that they perform a critical role in facilitating payments.  The other is 
that they have long played an important, although obviously less exclusive, role in 
channeling credit to households and businesses.  Commercial banks, as well as other 
intermediaries, provide services in screening and monitoring borrowers.  And by 
developing expertise, as well as diversifying across many borrowers, banks reduce the 
costs of supplying credit.735  Therefore, in their role as lenders, banks are often not merely 
banks and once that rather they are providing significant financial services associated with 
extending credit to their customers.  And to the extent that the investors want to hold bank 
liabilities, banks can fund borrowers directly.736 
 
                                                 
731 Samolyk, Katherine, The Future of Banking in America, The Evolving Role of Commercial Banks in U.S. 
Credit Markets, FDIC Banking Review, (2004), [online], availale at 
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2009/07/sector-financial-balances-model-of_26.html (Accessed at 25 July 
2014)  
732 Journal of Business & Economic Research, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act And The Current Financial 
Crisis, (January 2011), [online], available at http://www.unarts.org/H-II/ref/949-3747-1-PB-1.pdf (Accessed at 
26 July 2014) 
733 Federal Trade Commission, Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act, (Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 
12, 1999) [online], available at  https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/gramm-
leach-bliley-act  
734 H.R.4173 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, (July 2010), [online], available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173 (Accessed at July 25, 2014)  
735 See supra note 731. 
736 Id.  
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In the early 90's, as the U.S. banking industry emerged from its most significant rise since 
the great depression, policymakers were asking whether the importance of banks in 
financing economic activity had become permanently diminished737.  Ten years later, the 
share of domestic debt funded on commercial bank balance sheets stand at just over 
20 percent, down from 30 percent 3 decades ago.  Commercial bank loans now account for 
only 60 percent of short-term borrowing by non-financial businesses compared with 
75 percent in the mid-70's.738  If now non-profitability and other measures of performance 
indicate that banking has rebounded from the crisis, the role of banks in U.S. credit 
markets remain under scrutiny. 
 
The FDIC concludes that, although commercial banking's own balance sheet activity has 
declined as a piece of the greater market pie739, the industry's off-balance sheet activities 
are a growing source of income740.  Hence, the ultimate finding is that banking is evolving, 
but does not appear to be declining.  Even according to some fairly traditional measures, 
the commercial banking industry remains remarkably important in funding credit flows in 
the United States, especially credit flows to non-financial businesses. 
 
The core problem is that the Central Bank does not really have any effective breaks for the 
expansion of the enormous credit volume of the commercial banks.  It, in all actuality, does 
not have the ability to effectively limit the expansion of the credit volume by way of its 
interest policy.741  It is a rarity that within our monetary system banks can actual create an 
almost unlimited amount of credit and thereby fiat money, book money, out of nowhere.  
The required equity capital, even after the new rules of Banking Regulation, Bank of 
Supervisor, Basel 3, is still only 4.5 percent as the so-called core capital742, the hardcore 
capital, and that is very low, especially when banks, buy treasury bills or state bonds they 
do not need actually for those credits to the governments any coverage by equity.  So, the 
effective coverage requirement by equity is zero.743 
                                                 
737 See supra note 732.  
738 Id.  
739 Id.  
740 Id.   
741 See supra note 585.  
742 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report on Special Purpose 
Entities, page 73, (September 2009), [online], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (Accessed at June 
20 2014) 
743 Bank for International Settlements, Basel III: Capital (June 2011), [online], available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (Accessed at 6 August 2015).  
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3. ROLE OF CITIZENS/CONSUMER/CORPORATE  
 
The role of the citizen, be it the corporate citizen or the consumer is largely explained by 
one word. She is a user.744 This is a role they also share with local governments. And in 
this context, local governments include purportedly sovereign Member States of the 
European Union and the states of the United States of America. They are not sovereign 
when it concerns their currency. They are solely users of the Euro or the US dollar. This is, 
of course, very different for the situation in the United Kingdom or Switzerland.745  
 
However, citizens, users of the currency, play also a significant role not only by using 
money as a means of exchange but also by making sure it remains in circulation and, yes, 
ultimately gets destroyed again.746 When someone repays the loan, the opposite process 
happens and money is actually destroyed.  It effectively disappears from the economy 
entirely.  This is vitally important because it means that if we the public start reducing our 
debt by collectively borrowing less and repaying more, then the amount of money in the 
economy will actually start to shrink.  If we all collectively reduced our debt by 1 billion, 
then the money supply of the economy would actually fall by a billion.747  There would be 
a billion Euros less money changing hands in the economy.  If we significantly reduce the 
debt, then the shrinkage in the money supply could actually cause the economy to slow 
down or grind to a halt. Since this is so counter-intuitive to what we hear day in, day out by 
economists and, in particular, politicians, it truly is important to understand. Again, it is an 
accounting identity748. 
 
Although we all think it's a good idea to get out of debt, and most of us – as currency users 
- are trying to get out of debt, as long as we keep the current system, it will be impossible 




                                                 
744 Kelton, Stephanie, Monetary Operations and Government Finance, p.20, (June 2015), University of 
Missouri-Kansas, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/conf_june10/Kelton.pdf (Accessed at August 15, 2015) 
745 Id.  
746 Id.  
747 See supra note 730.  
748 See supra note 729.  
749 Id.  
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B. LEGAL RISKS IN THE ACCOUNTING OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
Going back to the four factors of Legal Risk, the Law, Lack of Right, Liability and 
Limitation, here are the legal risks, the author found in the accounting of capital formation: 
 
We all know that it's illegal to create your own money and that the police will come and 
arrest you if you do, but there's a real twist in this story, which is that cash, the physical 
money, is only 3 percent of all the money that exists750.  So, what about the other 97 
percent?  They are just numbers in computer systems, so, when you check your bank 
balance, there is no cash there in the bank, it's just a number in a computer. Banks are 
entitled to extend credit751 by the mere fact of their banking license but then the question 
is, who creates these deposits and what is the risk of creating your own currency such as 
the infamous Bitcoin?  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the creation of your own currency such as Bitcoin could be 
qualified under Whalley as the risk of a business failing to implement regulatory 
requirements. The production of Bitcoin constitutes a risk due to the intepretation of the 
law. However, it the production of your own currency also presents a risk given the  
obligations that for instance in the United States originate in the Uniform Commercial 
Code and in the Internal Revenue Code that requires taxes to be paid in legal currency.  
 
Following Mahler the production of bitcoin or any other currency could be also qualified 
as a Deontic Legal Uncertainty. Given the obligatory nature of the norm, pursuant to 
Hohfeld, it therefore could also be characterized as a Duty. In conclusion, following our 




                                                 
750 See supra note 585.  
751 Id.  
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A debt contract with your bank is an agreement in which you agree to repay funds to a 
lender. For example, in a mortgage transaction, you agree to make monthly payments to 
the bank. In a short-term debt contract, you must repay the loan within 12 months. The 
maturity of a long-term debt contract exceeds a year. 
 
As discussed earlier, the bank holding a debt contract on its books is holding a demand 
against its customer for repayment and therefore an asset on its books. The customer of the 
bank, however, is holding a liability752.If you want less debt, we also have to have less 
money in the economy, and that is a catch 22.  The government has a choice between 
encouraging people to borrow more or getting them to pay down their debts, but if they 
pay down their debts, it might shrink the economy.753 
  
The legal risk in the form of a debt liability finds its ultimate realization in the state of 
default on a debt contract. Whether or not the debtor will be in a position to repay will 
depend on a factual uncertainty if the contract will ultimately be enforceable. The classic 
example for qualification factual uncertainty is the use of non-standard terms and 
conditions or a technical default.754  
 
Our current system of practically unlimited monetary expansion and skewed allocation that 
is based on FIAT money and interest driving up prices in certain sectors of the economy as 
we experienced in this century first in the dot-com bubble of 2000755, then in the real-estate 
bubble of 2005-2007756, then ultimately in the financial crisis of 2008 and now finally in 
the asset-price bubble of 2015757, in almost pure biblical intervals of 7 years at the time, 
could very well characterized as a system based on a contract capitale of capital formation 





                                                 
752 See supra note 585. 
753 See supra note 744.  
754 See supra note 223.  
755 See Chapter 4.IV.A. CRASH 
756 Id. 
757 See supra note 29. 
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Whilst the unwitting user, i.e. the debtor perceives the process of bank lending as one 
where deposits of savers are changing hands with the credit lines of the debtors with the 
sole difference that the middleman, the bank, is charging interest for its service of 
administering the good deed, both the economic and legal reality of the transaction is a 
completely different one. And all by a sudden the floor quite literally falls out of the 
bottom of the barrel of the economy.758  
 
As a result both Commercial Banks and citizens will possibly end up declaring default. 
First, the citizen by having to declare her failure to repay, then – as we can skillfully 
observe at so many occasions since the financial crisis of 2008 in the United States and 
more recently also in Europe – once it reaches critical mass and bank equity does not any 
longer suffice, also the banks.759  
 
The Legal Risk posed by credit agreement with a commercial bank could be qualified 
under Whalley as the risk of failing to comply with certain terms of a contract. Of course, 
there may have been a use of non-standard terms and conditions which we most likely 
would characterize them as so unusual and skewed that they are a case for the Consumer 
Finance Protection Bureau or however such institution is called in your jurisdiction.  
 
We would see them as the kind of “tricky contract” that tries to woe consumers into 
closing an agreement whilst the, mostly criminally minded, perpetrators already know that 
they will likely take great monetary advantage of the unwitting consumer. Thus it poses a 
risk depending on a set of facts.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler, it could be also characterized as a Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. Hohfeld described a liability also as the absence of an immunity. Hence, short 
of a constitutional law that declares bank debt invalid it can be concluded that following 




                                                 
758 See supra note 743.  
759 Id.  
760 Who would have guessed? 
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We have all heard over the past seven years the ongoing sleuth of news over the so called 
sovereign debt crisis761 and its failed attempts of resolution. They concern us at home in 
the United States, in the UK, but also significantly in mainland Europe with the continuous 
onslaught of the Euro-crisis, in particular, in Greece, but also with respect to the instable 
financial position in the other so-called PIIGS countries762; that is derogatory, short speak 
for Portugal, Italy and Ireland, Greece and Spain.  
 
In the context of the discussions over haircuts, reorganizations, and the requirement to 
transfer assets to so-called trust funds for the purpose of privatizing Greek airports by 
selling them state-owned German Fraport, sometimes the concept of “sovereign immunity” 
gets still timidly invoked.  
 
Here, we will have to come to the conclusion that the concept of the normative force of the 
fact developed by the great Austrian legal scholar Georg Jellinek763 has long established a 
situation where the absence of power by legitimate democratic leaders in the form of 
parliamentary institutions and the government has become so apparent that any denial has 
long become obsolete.  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the sovereign debt crisis could be qualified under Hohfeld as the 
absence of a power or as Whalley had put it the failure to meet the standard of care of non-
contractual obligations. It is a legal uncertainty that is dependent on the interpretation of 
the law, a risk that manifests itself due to the fact that it is based on norms that are either 
not valid or not based in competence, what Mahler would call a Qualification Legal 
uncertainty. Here it could be seen as a situation where depending on uncertain validity 
rules for instance sovereign debt may not be collectible and the legal risk of a Limitation 
may materialize.  In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the FDCA rules constitute the 
Legal Risk of Limitation.  
                                                 
761 Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S., Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned 
and Those Forgotten, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/266, International Monetary Fund, (2013), [online], available 
at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf (Accessed at 8 August 2015)  
762 Brazys, Sam and Hardiman, Niamh, The ‘PIIGS’ acronym had a clear negative impact on the response of 
financial markets to the ‘PIIGS’ countries during the crisis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
[online], available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/12/12/the-piigs-acronym-had-a-clear-negative-
impact-on-the-market-treatment-of-the-piigs-countries-during-the-crisis/ (Accessed at 26 August 2015) 
763 Enzyklopaedie der Rechtsphilosophie, Georg Jellinek, {online], available at http://www.enzyklopaedie-
rechtsphilosophie.net/autorenliste/19-beitraege/102-jellinek-georg (Accessed at 8 August 2015) 
Page | 146 
 
III. ALLOCATION AND CAPITAL FORMATION  
 
A. FIVE KEY ACCOUNTS OF MONETARY CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
Capital formation involves the growing of capital assets by efficient utilization of the 
available monetary, production and human resources of a local economy. The stock of 
capital goods can be built up and increased through two main sources, domestic resources 
and external resources.  Domestic sources play an important part in promoting 
development activities in the country.764   
 
These sources are inter alia voluntary savings through households and businesses.  Those 
voluntary savings depend upon various factors such as the income per capita, the 
distribution of wealth, the availability of banking facilities.  The involuntary savings in 
developing countries are usually met by two traditional methods that are taxation and 
compulsory schemes for lending to the government765.   
 
The third way of domestic resources is government borrowing.766  The government can 
issue a long and short-term balance of various denominations and mobilize savings from 
the general public as well from financial institutions and deficit financing.  Deficit 
financing is regarded as an important aspect of capital formation and is used for increasing 
effective demand and ensuring continued high levels of economic activity.   
As external resources we see foreign economic assistance, developing nations needing 
foreign capital and technical assistance. 
Note: the data below does not include financial assets, only "tangible" assets in US 
territory. The total value of marketable financial assets in the USA was estimated in 2007 
at about US$46 trillion.767 This total obviously does not include assets, deposits and 
reserves that are not traded. The data series on national wealth provided in the budget 
annex were discontinued by the administration of President Barack Obama. 
                                                 
764 See supra note 490.  
765 See supra note 493.  
766 Id. 
767 Lipsky, John: The Global Economy and Financial Markets: Where Next? International Monetary Fund (July 
2007), [online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/073107a.htm (Accessed at 8 August 
2015)  
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In the 2005 Analytical Perspectives document, an annex to the US Budget768 an annual 
estimate is provided of the value of total tangible capital assets of the USA. 
FIGURE 13: ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF TOTAL TANGIBLE ASSETS (USA 2015) 
 
Publicly owned physical assets: 
  Structures and equipment . . . . . .   $5.6 
  Federally owned or financed  . . .    $2.2 
  Federally owned  . . . . . . . . . . .$1.0 
  Grants to state and local govt . .  . $1.0 
  Funded by state and local govt . . .  $3.3 
  Other federal assets . . . . . . . .  $1.4 
       Subtotal (1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $6.9 trillion 
     Privately owned physical assets: 
    Reproducible assets . . . . . . . . $28.7 
    Residential structures. . . . . . . $12.4 
    Nonresidential plant & equipment  . $11.8 
    Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.5 
    Consumer durables . . . . . . . . . $3.1 
    Land  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10.2 
Subtotal (2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $38.9 trillion 
      Education capital: 
     federally financed . . . . . . . . . $1.4 
   financed from other sources  . . . . $44.0 
  Subtotal (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . $45.4 trillion 
       Research and development capital: 
   federally financed R&D  . . . . . . . $1.1 
   R&D financed from other sources   . . $1.7 
Subtotal (4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .$2.9 trillion 
TOTAL ASSETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $94.1 trillion 
Net claims of foreigners on US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4.2 trillion 
Net wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .........$89.9 trillion 
 
                                                 
768 US Budget 2005, Table 12-4: National Wealth, p. 201 
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FIGURE 14: SECTOR FINANCIAL BALANCES AS % OF GDP769 
 
This form of DEB770, double entry book-keeping, is also the underlying foundation to 
understand the Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, the 
Commercial Banks, the Corporate or Consumer citizen (which includes local governments) 
and International trade (which includes jurisdictions outside the sovereign currency area).  
 
Looking at Figure 14 we have to note the accounting identities with respect to government 
deficits, any U.S. government deficit exactly equals exactly the total net increase in the 
holdings of U.S. dollar financial assets of the rest of us, businesses and households, 
residents and nonresidents, what is called the non-government sector.  In other words, 
government deficits equal increased monetary savings for the rest of us to the penny.  
Simply put, government deficits add to our savings to the penny.  From the symmetry of 
Luca Pacioli we can reach down to the atomic level of financing of everyday lives into 
                                                 
769 Kelton, Stephanie, Chief Economist, U.S. Senate Budget Committee, (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://stephaniekelton.com/ (Accessed at July 24, 2014)   
770 See Chapter 4.I.A.1, Principles of Double-Entry Bookkeeping 
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everyday transactions.771  Let's demonstrate how deficits do add to savings in the Federal 
Reserve System of the United States. First, start with the government selling $100 billion 
in treasury securities.  Presumably, the buyer that buys the securities believes that he's 
better off buying them than not buying them.  They get sold at auction to the highest bidder 
who is willing to accept the lowest yield.  Second, when the buyers of these securities pay 
for them, checking accounts of the Fed are reduced by $100 billion to make the 
payment.772   
 
In other words, money in checking accounts at the Federal Reserve is exchanged for the 
new treasury securities which are the equivalent to saving accounts at the Federal Reserve.  
At this point, non-government savings is unchanged.  The buyers now have the new 
treasury securities as savings rather than the money that was in the checking accounts 
before they bought the treasury securities.  Now the treasury spends $100 billion after the 
sale of the $100 billion of new treasury securities on the usual things government spends 
its money on.  Fourth, this treasury spending adds back $100 billion to someone's checking 
account.  Fifth, the non-government sector now has its $100 billion of checking accounts 
back and it has the $100 billion of new treasury securities.773 
 
The deficit spending of $100 billion directly added $100 billion of savings in the form of 
new treasury securities to non-government savings, non-government means everyone but 
the government.774   
 
The savings of the buyer of the $100 billion of new treasury securities shifted from money 
in his checking account to his holdings of the treasury securities that is savings accounts, 
and when the treasury spends $100 billion after selling the treasury securities, the savings 
of recipients of that $100 billion of spending saw their checking accounts increase by that 
amount, so to the original buoyant, deficit spending doesn't just shift financial assets 
outside of the government.775  Instead, deficit spending directly adds exactly that amount 
of savings of financial assets to the non-government sector and likewise, a federal budget 
surplus directly subtracts exactly that much from our savings.  
                                                 
771 See supra note 744.  
772 Id.  
773 Id.  
774 Id. 
775 Id.  
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FIGURE 15: WALL STREET JOURNAL JUNE 29, 1999   
 
 
On June 29, 1999, the front page of the Wall Street Journal had two headlines, see the 
picture of the Wall Street Journal involved.  Down to the left was a headline praising 
President Clinton and the record government budget surplus and explaining how well fiscal 
policy was working.  On the right margin was a headline stating that Americans weren't 
saving enough and we would have to work harder to save more.   
 
Then a few pages later, there was a graph with one line showing the surplus going up and 
another line showing savings going down.  They were nearly identical but going in 
opposite directions and clearly showing the gains in the government surplus roughly equal 
to the losses in private savings. Why?   
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Because there cannot be a budget surplus with private savings increasing, including 
non-resident savings if you asked all the financial assets.  There is no such thing, yet not a 
single mainstream economist or government official had it right that day.   
 
Clearly the mainstream did not yet realize that deficits add to savings. Again, the only 
source of net U.S. dollar monetary savings, that is financial assets for the non-government 
sectors, combine both residents and nonresidents is U.S. government deficit spending.776  
 
In Europe, two decades before one politician had it right but then Austrian Chancellor and 
Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky was castigated in 1979 for stating:  
 
And if someone asks me: how do you hold it with the debt? I will tell him what I 
always say time and again that a few billion [Austrian Schillings] will afford me 
fewer sleepless nights than some hundred thousand unemployed [workers] 777 
 
Kreisky at the time was Prime Minister of a nation that was still (semi-)sovereign in 
currency matters, albeit the Austrian Schilling was already pegged to the German D-Mark 
thereby creating what could be called the nucleus of a “virtual currency union” with its 
most important trade partner, the Federal Republic of Germany, and then also known as 
“West-Germany”. Hence one could allege that already then most important monetary 
policy decisions were made at the German Bundesbank. Given the homogenous and 
intrinsically linked nature of the Austrian and German economies it did not create the same 
misallocations as they necessarily had to occur when such different economies as those of 
the core of the European Union membership such as Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and its periphery such as Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain 
formally joined the Eurozone on 1 January 1999778 when the Euro was first introduced as 




                                                 
776 See supra at 744.  
777 Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky on State Debt Financing of employment intensive industries, 
[online], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LXf8DakAf8 (Accessed at 23 September 2015)  
778 European Commission, History of the Euro, [online], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm (Accessed at 10 August 2014) 
779 Id.  
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But watch how the very people who want us to save more, at the same time want to 
balance the budget by taking away our savings either through spending cuts or tax 
increases.780  They are part of the problem not part of the solution.  This becomes very 
obvious since once you understand that spending cuts or tax increases are actually the only 
instruments available to end up in a government surplus. And what do spending cuts and 
tax increases accomplish?  They drain our savings accounts. Ceterum censeo: You cannot 
deny an accounting identity.   
 
By now we also understand the jural relations here that take place between those two 
accounts.  Given that there is an accounting identity, there always has to be a debit and a 
credit, so therefore we know that federal deficits are not the awful thing that the 
mainstream believes them to be.  Deficits do matter.  Excess spending can cause inflation, 
but sovereign currency issuers, sovereign governments such as the United States of 
America, China, Russia, the United Kingdom or Japan are not going to go broke.   
 
Of course, his is different when we talk about currency users like member states of the 
Eurozone or, of course, states within the United States of America. Monetary policy is not 
in their hands. Where fiscal policy is under their control, but monetary policy is not, we are 
confronted with the centrifugal forces that the European Union now faces due to the 
subsequent misallocations that occur when decisions of money supply and the majority of 
taxation are not unified in one hand, be it on the level of the nation state as in the United 
Kingdom, be it on the federal level as in the case of the United States. It is this finding that 
leads current critics of the Eurozone often speak of a “birth defect of the European 
Union”781with its joint monetary regime.782 Therefore, note to always differentiate between 
sovereign currency issuers and currency users such as (member) states or provinces. 
                                                 
780 See supra note 729. 
781 Bayer, Kurt, Ways forward from the Eurozone Crisis, Blog (June 2010) [online], available at 
https://kurtbayer.wordpress.com/2010/06/11/ways-forward-from-the-eurozone-crisis/ (Accessed at 20 August 
2015) 
782 It was clear from the start that the Eurozone did not correspond to the ideal of an “optimal currency union”, 
because it combined too many countries with very different inflation and economic policy differences. The 
(compromise) idea of the founding fathers was that by supplementing the common monetary policy with the 
strictures of the stability and growth pact (SGP) on the fiscal policy side, countries would eventually be guided 
towards becoming more like an optimal currency union (“coronation theory”). So we had a joint monetary 
regime, run by the ECB, setting equal conditions for all Eurozone members, combined with a rules-based fiscal 
policy coordination tool, the SGP, which was supposed to force individual members into “responsible” and 
sustainable fiscal policy. Two things were wrong with this thinking: a) from the macroeconomic policy point of 
view, there was no joint Eurozone fiscal stance aligned with the ECB’s monetary policy stance, only individual 
countries’ obligation to conform to the SGP, and b) the third element of an economic policy triangle was 









One of the main contributions of money modern theory has been to explain why 
monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy space that is 
unencumbered by hard financial constraints.784 Through a detailed analysis of the 
institutions and practices surrounding the fiscal and monetary operations of the 
Treasury and Central Bank of many nations, modern money theory has provided 
institutional and theoretical insights about the inner workings of economics with 
monetarily sovereign and non-sovereign governments.785   
 
 
The author found that the role of the sovereign in the process of capital formation is best 
explained and understood by Tymoigne and Wray’s explanations of Modern Money 
Theory786, MMT, providing policy insights with respect to financial stability, price stability 




                                                                                                                                                        
completely neglected, i.e. the growth component. GDP growth was – as the then mainstream predicated – to 
arise spontaneously, if only the monetary/fiscal policy mix was right (but even that lacked a mechanism, since 
ECB and some member states refused to agree to a regular policy dialogue between the fiscal and monetary 
authorities). The French demand for an “economic government” as policy partner to ECB was denied. 
783 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, Randall L., Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics, page 5, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 778 (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_778.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 2014); Figure reproduced. 
784 Id. at Abstract 
785 Id. at Abstract 
786 Id.  
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For the purpose of discussing sovereign monetary capital formation, let us first assume a 
very simple economy.   
 
We have a federal government that injects currency by spending and imposes a tax 
that must be paid with this currency.  The federal government also provides advances 
of government currency to the other sectors that must be serviced by repaying 
government currency.  This government is assumed to be free of any self-imposed 
constraints on its financial operations.  The monetarily sovereign government is the 
monopoly supplier of its currency and can issue currency of any denomination.  As 
such, the government has an unlimited capacity to pay for the things it wishes to 
purchases and to fulfill promised future payments and has an unlimited ability to 
provide funds to the other sectors.  Thus, insolvency and bankruptcy of this 
government is not possible.  It can always pay.787   
 
Having said that, going back to our definitions of legal risk, payment is the ultimate form 
of legal certainty.  It is the T0 point in our Hohfeldian categorically relationship, and it is 
also the one very point where there will be no default.788   
 
Tymoigne and Wray point out that an important legal and logical conclusion is that  
 
[t]he injection of government currency into the other sectors must occur before the 
destruction of the government currency through tax enforcement and repayment of 
advances789.  In an economic system in which a sovereign government operates 
through its own monetary system, spending or lending must occur before taxing. In 
addition, taxes are not a funding source in that logic.  They are a part of the 
destruction of government currency, i.e. to return currency to the issuing 
government.790   
 
A fiscal deficit therefore represents a net injection of currency that usually needs to be 
drained.791 Taxing, borrowing and monetary integration are not mutually exclusive 
methods of funding government at different stages of the circuit.  
 
Tymoigne and Wray concede that inflation is a real constraint, not a financial constraint, so 
inflation does not prevent the government from funding itself.792  They agree that the 
capacity of the government to fund itself is independent of the state of the economy.  
                                                 
787 See supra note 783. 
788 See supra note 240.  
789 See supra note 783. 
790 Id.  
791 Id.  
792 Id.   
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However, at full employment as one factor, increasing government spending will be 
inflationary.  Before full employment793, government can cause bottlenecks and inflation 
of the prices of key inputs.794   
 
Furthermore, surprisingly, when money supply grows greater than growth of output, it 
would undermine the value of money.  Here we have two schools.  One is of the view that 
inflation will result if the relationship between government spending and taxing were 
wrong, so, as long as enough taxation reduces the money supply orderly, inflation would 
not incur795.   
 
The other view is that the ratio of money supply and GDP were wrong.  If the ratio of 
money supply and GDP is right, the level of taxation must be right too, as these both are 
factors that do not live independently because the amount of taxation still is depending on 
the level of GDP.  Ultimately, the price stability or, in other words, the value of money, is 
based and rooted in the productivity of the base, and it is the GDP.   
 
Whether the amount of taxation is right as a crucial factor in this equation depends 
significantly whether money supply and GDP are in equilibrium.  However, the author 
concurs with the conclusion that taxation is the instrument in any instance to bring money 
supply in equilibrium with the underlying base of GDP, and therefore, taxation is the 
critical tool to prevent inflation.   
 
 
                                                 
793 Leubsdorf, Ben, The Fed Doesn’t Think the U.S. Economy Is at Full Employment, Wall Street Journal 
(March 2015), available at  http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/03/18/the-fed-doesnt-think-the-u-s-economy-
is-at-full-employment-after-all/ (Accessed at 20 August 2015) Full employment in the U.S. isn’t here quite yet, 
according to the latest Federal Reserve economic projections. Back in December, Fed policy makers pegged the 
economy’s normal longer-run unemployment rate somewhere between 5.2% and 5.5%. But in updated 
projections released on Wednesday, they lowered their estimate of the longer-run jobless rate to a range between 
5% and 5.2%. It’s a significant threshold because it represents what some economists call the nonaccelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment, or Nairu. The Fed could try to push the unemployment rate lower, but in theory 
that would stoke inflation. The central bank’s so-called dual mandate is to pursue stable prices and maximum 
employment. In February, the U.S. unemployment rate fell to 5.5%. That was the top of the Fed’s target range 
for full employment — at least, at the time . But under the new projections, full employment is still a while 
down the road. Still, officials expect to get there soon. The projections released Wednesday see the U.S. 
unemployment rate hitting 5% to 5.2% in the fourth quarter of 2015, and falling a bit lower in 2016 and 2017. 
 “Clearly, we haven’t seen the wage and price pressure that at least some people might have expected as we start 
getting to 5.6% and below,” Mr. Rosengren said. “People particularly at the high end of the Nairu estimates are 
going to be in a position where they have to think through why they’re not seeing more wage and price pressure  
794 See supra at note 744. 
795 Id.  
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While MMT is criticized for consolidating Treasury and Central Bank operations for the 
purposes of a balance sheet exposition because the Fed is supposedly "independent", this is 
actually done by many others.  For example, Paul McCauley argues: 
 
We pretend that the Feds balance sheet and Uncle Sam's balance sheet are in entirely 
separate orbits because of the whole notion of the politically independence of the 
Central Bank in making monetary policy.  But when you think about it, not from the 
standpoint of making monetary policy, but of providing balance sheet support to 
buffer a reverse Minsky journey, there is no difference between Uncle Sam's balance 




                                                 
796 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, Randall L., Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics, page 23, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 778 (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_778.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 2014); Figure reproduced. 
797 McCauley, Paul, 17th Annual Hyman. P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and World Economies, 
Credit, Markets and the Real Economy: Is the Financial System Working? (April 2008), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pro_Apr_08.pdf (Accessed at 27 August 2014) 
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Even though it is correct that under current institutional arrangements, Treasury must 
receive funds to its account at the Central Bank before it spends, and that this is 
accomplished through taxes and bond auctions, this is not the point when using the 
consolidation logic.  The logic of the argument is about the government sector that 
combines the Central Bank and the Treasury into one entity that issues currency.798   
 
This logic ignores current self-imposed institutional and political constraints on the 
Treasury and the Central Bank for three reasons:799   
 
First, the balance sheet outcome is the same regardless of the institutional framework. 
Second, the impact of Treasury spending, taxing and bond offering on interest rates 
and aggregate income is the same with or without consolidation.   
Third, ultimately the Central Bank and the Treasury work together to ensure that the 
Treasury can always meet its obligation and that the Central Bank can smooth interest 
rates800.   
 
The Central Bank is involved in fiscal policy, and the Treasury is involved in monetary 
policy.801 In the Eurozone this works differently. When it comes to understand the 
deficiencies in the construction of the Euro, the accounting approach uses balance sheets to 
analyze the key accounts of monetary capital formation, the sovereign and non-sovereign 
local governments, corporate and consumer citizens and international trade accounts.802  
For the moment, the international trade will be left aside.  As we discussed supra a balance 
sheet is an accounting document that records what an economic unit owns in assets and 
owes in liabilities and net worth.  Therefore, the fundamental principle of the following 
equality must hold all the time:   
 
Financial assets plus real assets equals financial abilities plus net worth.  Or, net worth 
minus real assets equals financial assets minus financial liabilities803.   
                                                 
798 Tymoigne, Eric, Modern Money Theory, and Interrelations between Treasury and the Central Bank: The 
Case of the United States, Lewis and Clark College, Modern Money Network, [online], available at 
http://www.modernmoneynetwork.org/uploads/1/2/5/3/12534585/tymoigne_debt_and_sovereignty.pdf 
(Accessed at 29 July 2015); Figure reproduced 
799 See supra note 796. 
800 Id.  
801 Id.  
802 Id.  
803 Wray, Randall L., The Basics of Macro Accounting, New Economic Perspectives (June 2012), [online], 
available at http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2011/06/mmp-blog-2-basics-of-macro-accounting.html 
(Accessed at 27 July 2014)  Wray argues that “it is a fundamental principle of accounting that for every 
financial asset there is an equal and offsetting financial liability. The checking deposit is a household’s financial 
asset, offset by the bank’s liability (or IOU). A government or corporate bond is a household asset, but 
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It is particularly important for the understanding of the Eurozone that state and local 
governments that are non-sovereign in the currency sense strive to have budget surpluses.  
In that case of the United States, almost all states have constitutional prohibitions of 
deficits.  Outside deep recession, state and local governments are obliged to run surpluses, 
and the foreign sector effectively runs significant surpluses against the United States.804   
 
And, the Treasury is the only federal government entity involved in injecting Central Bank 
currency through purchases of goods and services.  That is, the spending of Central Bank 
currency.  This operation involves the exchange of financial assets for real assets.  That is 
fiscal policy.  In conclusion, Treasury spending always involves monetary creation as 
private bank accounts are credited, while taxation involves monetary destruction as bank 
accounts are debited.  The question becomes how the Treasury acquired the deposits it has 
in its account at the Central Bank.  In the current institutional framework, the apparent 
answer is through taxation and bond offerings.805   
 
Therefore, it does not make sense to argue that a government program cannot be 
implemented because the government ran out of money.  A government that is sovereign in 
currency matters, like the United States or the UK can always afford to buy anything for 
sale denominated in its own currency, so discussing the pros and cons of a government 
program should not be framed around financial constraints.  Instead, the focus should be 
considerations of equity, full employment, financial stability and price stability.  The key 
issue is whether this will create an increase in net savings and therefore, a capital formation 
and whether this is accomplished by an investment that has a long-term positive effect.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
represents a liability of the issuer (either the government or the corporation). The household has some liabilities, 
too, including student loans, a home mortgage, or a car loan. These are held as assets by the creditor, which 
could be a bank or any of a number of types of financial institutions including pension funds, hedge funds, or 
insurance companies. A household’s net financial wealth is equal to the sum of all its financial assets (equal to 
its financial wealth) less the sum of its financial liabilities (all of the money-denominated IOUs it issued). If that 
is positive, it has positive net financial wealth.” 
804 Id. Wray argues that “as a consequence, a domestic private sector surplus results in large deficits of the 
federal government to balance against state and local surpluses.  Recall the accounting identities.  There is no 
reason to expect that this would be inflationary, regardless of the level of unemployment.  A very important 
distinction that needs to be made is that providing advances by the Central Bank does not lead to a net savings 
of government currency as financial assets of the domestic private sector since this increases by the size of the 
increase in financial liabilities.  Stated another way, advances have to be repaid so the gain in the government 
currency is only temporary.  Therefore, only a government deficits induced by fiscal policy lead to net savings.  
Monetary policy can change the composition of net saving by substituting currency for other assets, but it 
cannot change the size of net savings” 
805 See supra at 764. 
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2. FINANCIAL  
 




Much has been said already about the monetary capital formation in the financial sector 
and the role of Commercial Banks.807 The riskiest form of the financial sector, shadow 
banking, has retreated but non-bank credit remains important. Credit intermediation chains 
became very long involving multiple layers of securitizations.  High levels of leverage and 
pack distribution of risk.  This was reflected in growing debt issued by financial 
institutions to fund their activities.  Financial sector debt grew from $20 Trillion in 2000 to 
$37 Trillion in 2007 or from 56 percent of global GDP to 71 percent.808   
                                                 
806 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, Randall L., Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics, page 29, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 778 (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_778.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 2014); Figure reproduced. 
807 See supra note 585.  
808 McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging, Executive Summary, (February 2015), 
[online], available at  http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging 
(Accessed at July 28, 2015) 
Page | 160 
 
Much of this debt was in the so called shadow banking system809 whose vulnerability was 
starkly exposed by the financial crisis.  It is a welcome sign then that financial sector debt 
relative to GDP decline in the United States and a few other crisis countries and the 
stabilized in other advanced economies.  At the same time banks have raised capital and 
reduced leverage.810   
 
Moreover the riskiest element of shadow banking are in decline.  For example the assets of 
off balance sheets special purpose vehicles formed to securitize mortgages and other loans 
have fallen by $3 Trillion in the United States.  Repurchase agreement so-called repos, 
collateral debt obligations CDOs and credit defaults swaps, CDS have declined by 19 




However, if we consider the broader context of non-bank credit including corporate bonds 
simple securitizations and lending by various non-banking institutions, we see that non-
bank credit is still an important source of financing for the private and here in particular, 
the corporate sector812.   
 
Since 2007 corporate bonds and lending by non-bank institutions including insurers, 
pension funds, leasing programs and government programs has accounted for nearly all net 
new credit for companies while corporate bank lending has shrunk.  The volume of 
corporate bonds outstanding globally has grown by $4 Trillion since 2007 compared with 
$1 $2 Trillion from 2000 to 2007.813  Most of these forms of non-bank credit have fewer 
the risks of the shadow banking seen before the crisis in terms of leverage, maturity, 
mismatch and opacity.  Some specific types of non-bank credit are growing very rapidly 
such as credit funds operated by hedge funds and other alternative asset managers.814   
 
                                                 
809 Kodres, Laura E., Shadow Banking – Measures for Monitoring and Mitigating? International Monetary Fund 
(November 2013), [online], available at http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/blogs/wp-
content/ourfinancialsecurity.org/uploads/2013/11/LAURA-KODRES-SHADOW-BANKING-PPT.pdf  
(Accessed at 24 August 2014) 
810 See supra note 807.  
811 See supra note 809. 
812 Id.  
813 See supra note 808.  
814 Id.   
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Assets and credit funds for a sample of eight alternative asset managers815 have more than 
doubled since 2009 and now exceed $400 Billion816.  Another small but rapidly growing 
source of non-bank debt is peer to peer lending.  These online lending platforms have 
originated only above $30 Billion817 in loans so far but private equity funds, other asset 
managers and even banks have begun investing in peer to peer platforms suggesting that 
these lenders could build greater scale818.   
 
Currently the risk associated with these new credit intermediaries appear low although they 
should be monitored closely as that could change.  With bank lending likely to remain 
constrained in the future due to new regulations, non-bank credit could fill a growing need.  
If appropriate restrictions on leverage and use with complex financial instruments are in 
place loans from non-bank intermediaries, corporate bonds and simple form of 




Consumer households continues to grow rapidly and deleveraging is rare.  Unsustainable 
levels of consumer household debt in the United States and a handful of other advanced 
economies were at the core of the 2008 financial crisis.  Between 2000 and 2007 the ratio 
of household debt relative to income rose by one-third of more in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.819   
                                                 
815 See supra note 808. 
816 Id.  
817 Id.  
818 Gordon Mills, Karen and McCarthy, Brayden, The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Access during the 
Recovery and How Technology May Change the Game, Working Paper 15-004, Harvard Business School,  (July 
2014), [online], available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/15-004_09b1bf8b-eb2a-4e63-
9c4e-0374f770856f.pdf  
819 See supra note 808. This was accompanied by and contributed to rising housing prices.  When housing prices 
started declining and the financial crisis occurred, the struggle to keep up with this debt led to a sharp 
contraction in consumption and the deep recession.  Since then households in those countries have begun 
deleveraging with the most progress in Ireland and in the United States.  In many other countries however 
household debt has continued to rise rapidly.  In the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway household debt now 
exceeds 200 percent of income; far above U.S. or U.K. household debt at the peak. In other advanced economies 
such as Canada, South Korea and Australia household debt also continues to grow.  Household debt has risen 
rapidly in some developing countries too, quadrupling in China for instance, but remains at much lower levels 
relative to income than in advanced economies.  Why is household leveraging so rare?  Mortgages are the main 
form of household debt in all advanced economies and rising housing prices contribute to more borrowing and 
when buyers can obtain larger mortgages they drive up house prices even more.  We find a strong correlation 
between increases in real estate prices and household debt both across countries and between U.S. states.  
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However, there are significant differences between the borrowing problem faced by 
governments and the borrowing problem faced by private individual consumer households. 
The most significant distinction between economics of sovereign defaults may differ from 
the economics of an individual or corporate bankruptcy820.   
 
First, the most important difference is that it is easier for households and firms to post 
appropriate collateral in order to improve borrowing conditions.  If a private individual 
consumer defaults, the judiciary in the course of an ordinary insolvency procedure, that can 
take the form of a reorganization or a complete liquidation, forces him to hand over the 
assets originally provided as collateral.821  On the other hand, the sovereign cannot commit 
to hand over its assets if it defaults, and in general, there is no authority that can force it to 
do so.  Even if there was a significant amount of government assets abroad, specific 
provisions such as in the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA,822 
that would prevent those assets, with a few possible exceptions, from being confiscated.  
Therefore, sovereign debt is typically unsecured. 
 
Second, the costs of bankruptcy are different from those of sovereign default.  While for 
households and firms, an important part of the costs of debt repudiation is determined by 
bankruptcy law, there is no international legal framework that imposes costs on a 
defaulting sovereign. This is why all those negotiations about sovereign debt restructuring, 
are subject to the tides of political back-door dealings rather than being presented in public, 
transparent insolvency proceedings that are judicial in nature and legally binding in their 
effect. Ultimately, this void in our transnational judicial system is the reason why the 
author is pleading in this thesis for the institution of a Transnational Trade and Investment 
Court which has the judicial authority to terminally resolve such misallocations including 
but not limited to sovereign debt. 823 
                                                 
820 Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Martinez, Leonardo, Sapriza, Horacio, The Economics of Sovereign Default, 
Economic Quarterly, Volume 93, (2007), pp.163-187, [online], available at 
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df/martinez.pdf (Accessed at 19 July 2014)  
821 Liu, Yan and Rosenberg, Christoph B., Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis, A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/44, International Monetary 
Fund (2013), [online], available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf (Accessed at 29 
August 2014) 
822 Stewart, David P., The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, Federal Judicial Center 
(2013), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/fsiaguide2013.pdf/$file/fsiaguide2013.pdf 
(Accessed at 15 August 2014) 
823 See Chapter 6.III A Plea for a Transnational Trade and Investment Court 








Most of the above mentioned conclusions also apply to the Eurozone, but there are specific 
institutional aspects that make the Eurozone treasuries non-monetarily sovereign.   
 
First, there is no direct coordination of Eurozone treasuries with the Central Bank for 
monetary and fiscal policy purposes since this is actually prohibited, Second, 
Eurozone treasuries are not allowed to issue any monetary instrument, whereas the 
U.S. Treasury issues coins to the Federal Reserve. Third, the ECB does not perform 
unconditional outright purchases and sales of Eurozone treasuries, at least before the 
securities market program and outright market transactions programs, the ECB did not 
perform any outright transactions on treasuries.  Because if Eurozone treasuries are in 
trouble, they have no means to bypass existing self-imposed constraints, short of 
leaving the Eurozone.  Finally, the ECB does not provide a refinancing source to the 
Eurozone treasuries.825  
 
 
                                                 
824 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, Randall L., Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics, page 32, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 778 (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_778.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 2014); Figure reproduced. 
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This may seem counterintuitive but it automatically follows from the way the global 
balance of payments works.  If foreign governments intervene in their currencies and 
accumulate U.S. dollars, they push down the value of their currency and will run 
current account surpluses exactly equal to their net purchases.  Purchasing X amount 
of dollars is a policy, in other words, aimed at generating trade surpluses and higher 
domestic employment.  The reverse is true as well, because its trade partners are 
accumulating dollars, the United States must round the corresponding current account 
deficit which means the total demand must exceed total production.  In this case, it is 
a tautology that Americans are consuming beyond their means.  This is the sector 
balance equation, savings minus investment spending equals government spending 
minus tax plus net exports minus net imports, so private savings minus private 
investment spending equals government spending minus tax plus net exports minus 
net imports.827   
 
  
Following the end of the second world war when the United States of America was the 
only creditor nation, it was the only nation whose economy had actually benefitted from 
the second world war and whose factories were operating in full throttle and capable of 
producing a great deal more products than the American economy could itself consume 
                                                 
826 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, Randall L., Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics, page 39, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 778 (November 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_778.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 2014); Figure reproduced. 
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especially after the war ended and all those tanks and airplanes and bullets and armament 
generally would have to be converted into washing machines and cars, washing machines 
and cars that would be so plentiful that the American economy could not absorb them .   
 
Therefore, the Bretton Woods828 era can be seen as an extremely complicated and yet 
simply paradigm of surplus recycling.  American surpluses which were created as a result 
of the United States trade surplus vis-à-vis Europe and Asia, would then be recycling about 
70 percent829 of profits made from sales of American cars, American airplanes, trucks, 
equipment and so on and so forth in Asia and Europe would be recycled back to Asia and 
Europe in the form of either foreign direct investment or direct grants like the Marshall 
Plan.830 
 
Now the problem with this model was that it was predicated upon the existence of 
American surpluses so when Nixon in August 1971 declared the end of this phase831, that 
was not an act of willful destruction, it was simply an acknowledgement of a fact that there 
were no more surpluses to recycle, that America had slipped into a deficit situation.  Now 
what would the Germans have done if they had entered a deficit situation as opposed to a 
surplus one.  They would have tightened their belts and they would have tried to do 
whatever it takes to reduce those deficits.  The Americans did the opposite.  
 
The United States was expanding its trade deficit.832  In other words, it was taking into the 
United States the net exports of Germany, of Japan and later of China and at the same time 
the profits of the Japanese, the Germans and later the Chinese were making, the surpluses, 
the financialized surpluses were being sent to New York, to Wall Street voluntarily, 
because German, Japanese and Chinese investors saw and it was true, that their financial 
                                                 
828 International Monetary Fund, The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972-81), [online], available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm (Accessed at 29 August 2014) 
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September 2015) 
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September 2015) 
831 See supra note 828.  
832 U.S. Census, U.S. Trade in Goods of Services – Balance of Payments Basis 1960-2014, (June 2015), [online], 
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capital would find high rewards in the United States of America in Wall Street. It was 
between $3 and $5 billion dollars every working day for 20 years in constant prices.833  
 
The tragedy of 2008 was that the collapse of the financial markets mortally wounded the 
recycling mechanism, a way in which the goods produced by the Japanese, by the Germans 
and by the Chinese were being taken into the United States generating profits for those 
companies which was then being recycled and sent back to Wall Street in the form of 
investments.  This recycling was what kept global capitalism in root health with all its 
inner qualities and imbalances and incongruities.  In 2008 that mechanism died.834   
 
When we formed the Eurozone in 1999 we tried to pretend that everyone in the Eurozone 
would behave like Germany but by definition this is a fallacy, we cannot do that.  Because 
by definition we cannot all be net exporters because if Germany’s exports are greater than 
the rest of the world’s imports then this means the opposite the rest of the world.  Yes, it is 
an accounting identity.   
 
So what kept those shifting plates from cracking up the Eurozone in 2008?  It was the fact 
that the United States of America was creating so much demand for the world’s net 
exporters including China and Germany835 that the Eurozone could be maintained and the 
Wall Street banks aided and abetted by the Eurozone banks were creating so much private 
capital money that borrowing costs were extremely low, 
 
That created lots of bubbles in Iceland836, in the real estate sector837, in Greece838, the 
public sector, the U.S. stock market and a few more misallocations. It does not mean that 
we cannot salvage the Euro, it means that unless we redesign its architecture, it will be 
history.  
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B. LEGAL RISKS IN THE ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL 
 
CASE STUDY: THE FINANCING RELATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
Does Legal Risk apply in the case of the United States borrowing from the People’s 
Republic of China or as often said: Is China financing the United States? 
 
The Legal Risk that is often alleged in the public debate is that the United States could fail 
to comply with the terms of repayments due to its insolvency. The Legal Risk posed by the 
financing contracts between the United States and China, i.e. the US. Treasury Bills, could 
be qualified under Whalley as the risk of failure to enforce or to comply with the terms of 
the contract, such as the terms of re-payment. Given that the U.S. Treasury Bills constitute 
in essence a contractual agreement, rather than a legal norm, it poses the risk that its 
validity is depending on a set of facts or a lack of competence, following Mahler it could 
also be characterized as Qualification Factual Uncertainty. However, given that such U.S. 
Treasury Bills may still be enforceable, the Legal Risk could possibly be qualified pursuant 
to Hohfeld as Liability, the jural correlative to Power, and an absence of immunity that 
would shield the United States from its obligation to pay its debt.  
 
Pursuant to the Four Determinants of Legal Risk we would argue and assess whether the 
People’s Republic of China indeed would face the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
They key question in this analysis is: How do we pay off China?  First, we need to 
establish that U.S. Treasury debt securities are nothing more than accounts and that the 
government makes on its own books. 
 
All domestic currencies come from the domestic economy, either from the federal 
government of from the non-federal government.  For example, bank deposits.  It 
makes no sense to argue that foreigners supply U.S. dollars to the U.S. government.  
As foreigners cannot create U.S. dollar currency, they must obtain it from the U.S.839   
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How did we get to where we are today with China?  Let's suppose that FEMA wanted to 
buy a billion dollars' worth of trailers from China, and China wanted to sell a billion 
dollars' worth of trailers to FEMA at that price.  First understand that both parties are 
happy.  There is no imbalance.  China would rather have the billion U.S. dollars than the 
trailers, or they wouldn't have sold them, and FEMA would rather have the trailers than the 
money, or they wouldn't have bought them.  The transactions are all voluntary in U.S. 
dollars, but back to a point.  How does China get paid? 
 
China has a reserve account at the Federal Reserve Bank, or Fed840, akin to what we know 
in everyday life as a checking account. It is the Federal Reserve Bank, so they call it a 
reserve account instead of a checking account.841  To pay China, the Fed ads a billion U.S. 
dollars to China's checking account at the Fed.  It does this by changing the numbers in 
China's checking account up by $1 billion.  China then has some choices.  It can do 
nothing and keep the billion in the checking account at the Fed, or it can buy U.S. Treasury 
securities.  A U.S. Treasury security could be seen as a savings account at the Fed.  The 
buyer gives the Fed money and gets it back later with interest.  That is the same what a 
savings account does.  You give a bank money, and you get it back later with interest.842 
 
In our example China buys a 1-year Treasury security.  All that happens is that the Fed 
subtracts a billion from China's checking account at the Fed and adds a billion to China's 
savings account at the Fed, and all that happens a year later when China's 1-year Treasury 
bill comes due is the Fed removes this money from China's savings account at the Fed, 
including interest, and adds it to China's checking account at the Fed.   
 
Now, China is holding some $1.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities843.  So, what do we do 
when they mature and it is time to pay China back?844 
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We remove those dollars from the savings account at the Fed, and add them to their 
checking account at the Fed. This is what happens when all U.S. Government debt comes 
due, which happens regularly. China knows we don't need them for financing our deficits. 
 
How does that work on the balance sheets of our Capital Formation Life Cycle? 845 
 
When a Treasury bill note or bond is purchased by a bank, for example, the government 
makes two entries on its balance sheet.  First, it debits, subtracts, from the buyer's reserve 
account, checking account, at the Fed.  Then it increases, it credits, the buyer's security 
account, savings account, at the Fed.  As before, the government simply changes numbers 
on its own balance sheet.  One number gets changed down, and another gets changed up, 
and when the credit day arrives and the Treasury securities which China holds come due 
and need to be repaid, the Fed again simply changes two numbers on its own balance sheet.  
The Fed debits, subtracts, from China's securities account at the Fed, and then it credits, 
adds, to China's reserve checking account at the Fed.  That's all.  Debt paid.  China now 
has its money back.  It has a very large U.S. dollar balance in its checking account at the 
Fed.   
 
Paying off the entire U.S. national debt is nothing but a matter of subtracting the value of 
the maturing securities from one account at the Fed, and adding that value to another 
account at the Fed.  These transfers are non-events for the real economy and not the source 
of dire stress presumed by mainstream economists, politicians, business people, and the 
media.  Debt paid.  All creditors have their money back.846 
 
What happens if China refuses to buy our debt at current low interest rates paid to them? 
 
Do interest rates have to go up to sweeten the purchase of Treasury securities?  No!  China 
can leave its US dollars in their checking account.  It's of no consequence to a government 
that understands its own monetary system.  The funds are not used for spending as 
previously described.  There are no negative consequences of funds being in a checking 
account at the Federal Reserve, rather than a savings account at the Fed.847  
                                                 
845 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle 
846 Id. 
847 Id. 
Page | 170 
 
Therefore, a monetarily sovereign government, at that crisis, has a choice to default, not an 
ability to make a promised payment.  And that crisis for economic reasons can occur if 
government promises to deliver a foreign currency or if a government has to defend a 
currency peg.  For a sovereign nation that does not promise to peg its currency to a foreign 
currency, there is no process that can lead to involuntarily default.  Although, as the U.S. 
Congress is proving, default by choice remains a possibility848. Albeit, there is a growing 
number of legal scholars such as Jacob Charles of Duke University that perceive the U.S. 
Debt Limit as unconstitutional849 
 
Following this assessment, we would conclude that the Legal Risk of Liability does not 
apply in this case given that there is no factual uncertainty at all about the United States’ 
sovereign ability, power and competence to finance itself in its own currency. Even if 
Congress decided not to pay in a case of voluntary default, from a legal scholar’s point of 
view such stance would not change the qualification of this case in terms of its character as 
a Legal Risk but only as another instance of Erratic, Irresponsible Behavior850, and a 
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IV. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE US, EU AND GLOBALLY 
 
A. CRASH (CRISIS-REACTION-ACCELERATION-SEQUENCE-HISTORY) 
 
Since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash851 at the turn of the 
millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008852 and the 
dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015853 
with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on 
the way caused by war and increasing inequality, we are faced today with an ever recurring 
Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH.854 
 
If we go back the past 30 years, we will find an impressive list of financial crises that we 
have weathered starting with Black Monday (1987)855, the Savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s and 1990s in the U.S856, the Early 1990s Recession857, the 1991 India economic 
crisis858, the Finnish banking crisis (1990s)859, accompanied by the Swedish banking crisis 
(1990s)860, followed by the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico861, the 1997 Asian financial 
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crisis862, the 1998 Russian financial crisis863 and the Argentine economic crisis (1999–
2002)864. Barely arrived in the new millennium, we started right away with the Early 2000s 
recession865, most notably characterized by the Dot-com bubble866, followed by the 2000s 
energy crisis867, the Subprime mortgage crisis,868 the United States housing bubble869 and 
United States housing market correction870 and lately the 2008–2012 Icelandic financial 
crisis871, the 2008–2010 Irish banking crisis,872 the Russian financial crisis of 2008–
2009873, and the European sovereign debt crisis874, in particular the Greek government-debt 
crisis875, the 2014 Russian financial crisis876 and most recently the 2015 Chinese stock 
market crash877. 
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http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/raport_crisis_in_russia_net.pdf (Accessed at 23 September 2015)  
877 Petraeus, David, Don’t freak out over China Dumping U.S. Debt, CNN Money (24 September 2015), 
[online], available at http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/24/news/economy/china-selling-us-debt-petraeus/ 
(Accessed at 25 September 2015)  
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Together with the more recent regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-
called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002878, the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010879, the JOBS Act of 2012880 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II 
in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010881, the European 
Stability Mechanism of 2012882 and the European Banking Union of 2013883, we find in 
the following often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses.  
 
However we pair the regulatory response to the preceding crisis, be it Sarbanes-Oxley 
following Enron884, WorldCom885 and the dot-com bubble, be it Dodd-Frank in answer to 
the U.S. housing bubble and the loose use of Collateralized Debt Obligations, be it Basel II 
and III in the hopes of preventing yet another banking crisis following the post-2008 
banking collapses followed by a bad bank boom that is ending in severe and sordid 
sovereign debt restructurings until to date, in all cases the timid and sometimes even 
overshooting regulatory responses failed its one and only goal. To avoid repeat 
performance. 
 
But who honestly can be surprised, that if you would do more of the same that has failed 
the last time, you would fail again this time all the way to the CRASH? Apparently, the 
CRASH has always been needed, in order to have finally more to gain than left to lose, 
when we ultimately address the two pressing issues, the two fundamental design defects of 
our Global Economic Order, namely the monetary order and the judicial order. Therefore, 
we will be discussing the regulatory responses that were, followed by the fundamental 
systemic changes that should be. 
                                                 
878 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204 (July 30, 2002), [online}, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf (Accessed at 30 July 2014)  
879 H.R.4173 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2009), [online], available at 
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http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/CFH0003811/Ashraf_Javiriyah_201105_BSBA (Accessed at 30 July 2014)  
Page | 174 
 
1. DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010 
 
The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.886 The Act 
aims to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system to end "too big to fail887", to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices 
and for other purposes.  
 
Title II, the Orderly Liquidation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, provides a process to 
quickly and efficiently liquidate a large, complex financial company that is close to 
failing.888  Title II provides an alternative to bankruptcy, in which the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is appointed as a receiver to carry out the liquidation and 
wind-up of the company.  The FDIC is given certain powers as receiver, and a three to five 
year time frame in which to finish the liquidation process.889 Title II is aimed at protecting 
the financial stability of the American economy, forcing shareholders and creditors to bear 
the losses of the failed financial company, removing management that was responsible for 
the financial condition of the company, and ensuring that payout to claimants is at least as 
much as the claimants would have received under a bankruptcy liquidation.890   
 
In 2008, large financial institutions that had always been considered “too big to fail” were 
in dire financial straits. The government attempted to preserve some of these institutions 
                                                 
886 See supra note 879.  
887 Lux, Marshall and Greene, Robert: The State and Fate of Community Banking (2015), [online], available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/publications/awp/awp37 (Accessed at 25 September 2015), Lux and 
Greene argue that the “[…] assessment of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation data finds that community 
banks service a disproportionately large amount of key segments of the U.S. commercial bank lending market – 
specifically, agricultural, residential mortgage, and small business loans. However, community banks’ share of 
U.S. banking assets and lending markets has fallen from over 40 percent in 1994 to around 20 percent today. 
Interestingly, we find that community banks emerged from the financial crisis with a market share 6 percent 
lower, but since the second quarter of 2010 – around the time of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act – their share 
of U.S. commercial banking assets has declined at a rate almost double that between the second quarters of 2006 
and 2010. Particularly troubling is community banks’ declining market share in several key lending markets, 
their decline in small business lending volume, and the disproportionate losses being realized by particularly 
small community banks. We review studies on the impact of regulation, consumer trends and other factors on 
community banks, and examine the consequences of consolidation on U.S. lending markets. We conclude with a 
discussion of policies that could promote a more competitive and robust banking sector.” 
888 Pellerin, Sabrina R. and Walter, John R., Orderly Liquidation Authority as an Alternative to Bankruptcy, 
Economic Quarterly, Volume 98, Richmond Federal Reserve (2012), [online], available at 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2012/q1/pdf/
walter.pdf (Accessed at 1 August 2014)  
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with over $1.7 trillion in bailouts to companies such as Bear Stearns891, Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac892, AIG, the Troubled Asset Relief Program893, Citigroup894, and Bank 
of America.895Despite the bailouts, over 250 banks failed in the period from 2008 to 2010, 
and Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States, filed for 
bankruptcy, the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in U.S. history.896 In light of the failure of 
these “too big to fail” institutions, Congress saw the need for a government authority to 
provide for efficient liquidation of large, complex financial institutions, and to eliminate 
the potential of future government bailouts.897  
 
One final provision of importance is the ban of use of taxpayer funds to preserve a 
company that has been put into receivership under Title II898. In essence, this provision 
prevents any future government bailouts for struggling financial institutions, no matter how 
big, or how impactful their failure might be. This provision makes it even more critical that 
                                                 
891 Ryback, William, Case Study on Bear Stearns, World Bank, Toronto Centre, [online], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/02BearStearnsCaseStudy.pdf (Accessed at 
17 August 2015) 
892 Frame, W., Fuster, A, Tracy, J and Vickery, J. The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Staff Reports, (March 2015), [online], available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr719.pdf (Accessed at 17 August 2015)  
893 Yip, J. The Bank Bailout in Perspective, Harvard Political Review, (2011), [online], available at 
http://harvardpolitics.com/arusa/the-bank-bailout-in-perspective/ (Accessed at 17 August 2015), Yip argues that 
“[c]onvinced that a more comprehensive plan was needed to reassure markets, Bernanke and Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Paulson conceived of TARP, an unprecedented $700 billion authorization to allow the Treasury 
to purchase toxic assets from banks. Congress recoiled at the price amidst growing public outrage, rejecting the 
first iteration of the bill. But as the markets convulsed, Congress passed a marginally amended version of the 
bill. Given the delay, Secretary Paulson decided that purchasing toxic assets was no longer practical and instead 
elected to spend the first $350 billion by directly injecting capital into banks. The nine largest banks, 
representing 75 percent of all American banking assets, were given $25 billion each in exchange for stock. This 
initial round of funding bolstered the banks’ capital reserves, but without any preconditions attached, failed to 
increase lending. As President Bush’s term drew to a close, some $17 billion in TARP funds were loaned to 
General Motors (GM) and Chrysler to avoid bankruptcy. Together, in January 2009, President Bush and 
President-elect Obama requested that Congress release the remaining $350 billion in TARP as further capital 
infusions seemed likely. By the end of the month, TARP had disbursed $301 billion in total. 
Shortly after, the new Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner ordered the TARP banks to undergo stress tests to 
gauge their financial resilience. Expecting poor results, he further laid out a new rescue plan that would have 
created a private- public bank to purchase and hold up to $500 billion in toxic assets. This plan, however, was 
soon abandoned after banks refused to sell their assets at large losses in spite of generous government 
financing.” 
894 Gandel, Stephen, Government banks $15 billion on Citigroup bailout, Fortune Magazine (September 10, 
2013), [online], available at http://fortune.com/2013/09/10/government-banks-15-billion-on-citigroup-bailout/ 
(Accessed at 17 August 2015)  
895 USA Today, Bank of America getting extra $20B in bailout funds (January 2009), [online], available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=6661052 (Accessed at 18 August 2015)  
896 Wiggins, Rosalind Z., Piontek, Thomas and Metrick, Andrew, The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: A 
Overview, Yale School of Management (October 2014), [online], available at 
http://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/001-2014-3A-V1-LehmanBrothers-A-REVA.pdf (Accessed at 20 
August 2015)  
897 Id.   
898 See supra note 879, at 12 U.S.C. § 5394 (Dodd-Frank Act § 214). 
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a liquidation under Title II work quickly and effectively; without the safety net of federal 
bailout money, a failing financial institution will have no choice but to liquidate. 
 
Under Title II, large companies will need to consider this alternate resolution process, and 
produce plans for a quick and orderly wind-up in the case of financial distress or failure.899 
The FDIC will promulgate additional rules to establish standards for the resolution plans 
and credit exposure reports that companies must provide.  Additionally, the claims process 
under an orderly liquidation by the FDIC is modeled like the bankruptcy code claims 
process, but does have some differences that impact how Title II liquidation will operate. 
 Large financial companies will need to keep in mind both the claims process codified in 
Title II and any FDIC rule promulgations that clarify that process. 
 
The so-called Orderly Liquidation Authority900, OLA, is sofar by far the most innovative 
piece of legislation as a reaction to the continuous history of sequences of crisis, reaction, 
acceleration of the time between crises, in short CRASH, as it attempts to terminally 
resolve the misallocation at its root, at the balance sheet of the financial institution, rather 
than liquidate the problem by adding liquidity into the gaping holes of the balance sheets. 
Unsurprisingly, the resulting misallocation have led to increasing inequality, less stability 
in financial markets as we can see in Chinese financial markets these days and as we 
continue to see in Greece that yet has to resolve its sovereign debt in a restructuring that 
will be sustainable.  
 
As the balance sheets of the financial institutions have been flooded indiscriminatorily by 
quantitative easing, the rising tide has equally risen the asset-prices of financial products 
that are unequally distributed in the hands of the population. Interest grows faster than the 
economy as has been pointed out. Increasing Inequality must be result. 
 
Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, at this point is the only piece of legislation, 
which does not protract the moral hazard of those who have failed but attempts terminal 
resolution of misallocations rather than inconsequential bail-outs.  
 
 
                                                 
899 See supra note 888. 
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2. JOBS ACT OF 2012 
 
On the Jobs Act, Jump Start Our Businesses Act901.  The 2012 Jobs Act was a bipartisan 
achievement of consequence.  Republican and democratic members put aside parts and 
differences, overcame substantial difficulties and legislated in the public interest by 
enacting substantial positive reforms to the securities loss.   
 
Existing regulations, imposed primarily by Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X effectively 
impede young innovative companies’ access to the public market and make investors less 
willing to invest.902  Regulation D is the classic regulatory framework for private 
placements and works well.  It has become the most important means of raising capital in 
the United States, particularly for the young dynamic companies that contribute the most 
economic growth and job creation.  In the Jobs Act, Congress came finally to the 
conclusion that the restrictions in Regulation D should be reduced to some degree903.   
 
Small firms’ access to capital should be substantially improved by crowdfunding, provided 
that the regulatory framework does not impose further costs on either issuers or funding 
portals.  It should also improve smaller investors’ access to investments in startup 
companies that ordinarily only accredited investors have or had access to.   
 
Crowd funding’s biggest advantage is to improve small firms to access small investments 
from the broader public.  Start-up companies using crowd funding will almost invariably 
be the smallest of small businesses.  More established firms looking to raise more than 
$1 million will use Regulation D or now Regulation A+.904   
 
The proposed expansion of Regulation A will allow a large amount of capital to be raised 
up to $50 million905.  With access to retail investors, Regulation A issued securities could 
provide an attractive alternative to private offerings that are primarily limited to 
                                                 
901 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, (2012), [online], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf (Accessed at 30 July 2014) 
902 Id. 
903 Id.  
904 Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the 
Securities Act,  (June 19, 2015), [online], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf 
(Accessed at 23 September 2015)  
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sophisticated or accredited investors.  Regulation A issued securities could also provide an 
alternative to a traditional initial public offering where such issues weighing the tradeoff 
between the benefits of reduce disclosure requirements and potential costs from a loss of 
secondary market liquidity that may result from an issuer's inability to have its securities 
quoted on platforms available only for exchange act registered securities. 906  
 
Greg M. Lewis, chief economist and director of the Division of Economic and Risk 
Analysis, in a speech in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on April 15, 2014 at the MIT Sloan 
School of Managements Center for Finance stated,  
 
[T]he notion of encouraging capital formation has been particularly salient over the 
past year or so since the passage of the Jump Start Our Business Startups Act in 2012.  
The stated goal of that legislation is "to increase American job creation and economic 
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.907   
 
On the other hand, this limitation may be offset by the ability to raise capital without limit 
and without registration and ongoing reporting requirements.  These are only a few 
significant considerations to think about regarding the effects these new capital raising 
methods will have on capital formation, and certainly when the commission weighs 
whether to adopt the role of manufacturers, including the importance of protecting 
investors, must be taken into account.   
 
Most recently, on June 19, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently 
adopted rule amendments to Regulation A under the Securities Act of 1933, known as 
Regulation A+ took effect. 908  
                                                 
906 See supra note 904. 
907 Lewis, Greg, The Future of Capital Formation, MIT Sloan School of Management’s Center for Finance and 
Policy’s Distinguished Speaker Series (April 2014), [online], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541497283  (Accessed at 23 September 2015) He argues 
that “The JOBS Act  seeks to reduce search costs by allowing a new financial intermediary (a “funding portal”) 
or a registered broker to connect small businesses and entrepreneurs to retail investors, subject to certain 
limitations.  Moreover, under the crowdfunding rules proposed by the Commission, these issuances would not 
be subject to certain SEC reporting costs that, can be more burdensome for smaller companies. .  Moreover, 
capital raised through crowdfunding intermediaries could provide an alternative to small business bank lending, 
which is often unavailable to small business borrowers because of collateral requirements, and by some 
accounts has fallen since 2008, with less than one-third of small businesses having reported a bank loan” 
908 See supra note 908.  
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3. EFSF/ESM AND EURO-GROUP 
 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created as a temporary crisis 
resolution mechanism by the Eurozone Member States in June 2010909. The EFSF has 
provided financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The assistance was financed 
by the EFSF through the issuance of bonds and other debt instruments on capital 
markets910. 
 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)911 started its operations as a permanent rescue 
mechanism on 8 October 2012. The ESM is currently the only institution providing 
financial assistance to Eurozone Member States. It has done so to Spain and Cyprus. The 
EFSF will phase out. The final EFSF assistance program (for Greece) expired on 30 June 
2015. 
 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is crucial component of the comprehensive EU 
strategy for financial stability within the Eurozone. Like the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), the ESM supports Eurozone Member States experiencing financing 
difficulties. The two institutions operated concurrently from October 2012 (when the ESM 
was inaugurated) until June 2013912. As of 1 July 2013 the EFSF cannot enter into any new 
agreements for financial assistance but will continue the management of any outstanding 
debt. As soon as all loans outstanding under EFSF assistance programs have been repaid, 
all funding instruments issued by the EFSF and any reimbursement amounts due to 
Guarantors have been repaid in full, the EFSF will cease to exist.913 
 
To fulfill its purpose, the ESM raises funds by issuing money market instruments as well 
as medium and long-term debt with maturities of up to 30 years914. ESM issuance is 
                                                 
909 Olivares-Caminal, Rodrigo, The EU Architecture to avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis, OECD Journal Financial 
Market Trends, Volume 2011 – Issue 2 (2011), [online], available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-
markets/49191980.pdf (Accessed at 15 August 2014)  
910 Id 
911 The Economist, The European Stability Mechanism, Gearing up for business (October 2013), [online], 
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912 Id. 
913 ESM, About the Europe Stability Mechanism, [online], available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/ (Accessed at 
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backed by a paid-in capital of €80 billion915, in accordance with the contribution key 
annexed to the ESM Treaty. The ESM cooperates very closely with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Eurozone Member State requesting financial assistance from the 
ESM are expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF.916 
 
The Eurogroup917 is an informal body where the ministers of the Eurozone Member States 
discuss matters relating to their shared responsibilities related to the Euro. Its main task is 
to ensure close coordination of economic policies among the euro area member states. It 
also aims to promote conditions for stronger economic growth. It is also responsible for 
preparing the Euro Summit meetings and for their follow-up.918 The Eurogroup usually 
meets once a month, on the eve of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting. 
According to former Greek Finance Minister Yoannis Varoufakis919, no minutes are kept at 
the meetings of the Eurogroup due to the informal nature of this “non-institution” which 
reminds the author of the many “non-papers”920 he had to learn of when he came to work 
in Brussels for the first time in 1992.  
 
The Eurogroup Working Group921 is a preparatory body composed of representatives of the 
Eurozone member states of the Economic and Financial Committee, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. The Eurogroup Working Group members 
elect a President for a period of two years, which may be extended.  Since January 2012, 
the post of President of the Eurogroup Working Group has been held by Austrian Thomas 
Wieser922, who is also President of the Economic and Financial Committee. 
 
                                                 
915 See supra note 913.  
916 European Parliament, Briefing Macro-Financial Assistance to EU Member States, State of Play (September 
2015), [online], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/497721/IPOL-
ECON_NT(2014)497721_EN.pdf (Accessed at 25 September 2015)  
917 European Council, The Eurogroup, [online], available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/eurogroup/ (Accessed at 25 September 2015)  
918 Id.  
919 Parker, Ian, The Greek Warrior, The Greek Warrior, The New Yorker (August 2015), [online], available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/03/the-greek-warrior (Accessed at 30 August 2015)  
920 European Commission, Non-paper, Guidelines for Project Managers: Making vulnerable investments 
climate resilient, [online], available at 
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(Accessed at August 20, 2015)  
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4. BANKING UNION AND FISCAL UNION 
As yet another reaction to the financial crisis of 2008, the European Commission started 
initiatives to include stronger prudential requirements for banks, to improve depositor 
protection and following to some extent the positive U.S. example set by the Orderly 
Liquidation Authority by developing rules for the management of failing banks with a 
single rulebook for all financial actors in the 28 Member States of the European Union.923  
With the progression of the financial crisis into the Eurozone debt crisis, it became 
apparent that Member States of the Eurozone were even more interdependent and a deeper 
integration of the banking system was needed. Therefore, the European Commission 
developed a roadmap for the creation of the Banking Union924, the EU institutions agreed 
to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism for 
banks. Banking Union applies to countries in the Eurozone925.  
The Fiscal Union is the attempt to formulate an integrated fiscal policy for all the Member 
States of the Eurozone. Decisions about the collection and expenditure of taxes of the 
participating Member States of the Eurozone, within such Fiscal Union shall be taken by 
common institutions of the participating governments926. 
Today most member states of the EU only participate in the economic and monetary union 
(EMU), based on the Euro. However, most decisions about taxes and spending remain at 
the national level. Therefore, the European Union has a monetary union, it does not yet 
have a fiscal union.927 Control over fiscal policy is considered central to national 
sovereignty, and in the world today there is no substantial fiscal union between 
independent nations. However the EU has certain limited fiscal powers. It has a role in 
deciding the level of VAT (value-added-taxes) and tariffs on external trade.928  
 
                                                 
923 European Commission, Memo, Banking Union: restoring financial stability in the Eurozone (April 2014), 
[online], available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/banking-union/banking-union-
memo_en.pdf (Accessed at 25 August 2015) 
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926 Allard, Celine, Brooks, Petya Koeva, Bluedorn, John C., Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area, IMF 
Staff Discussion Note, International Monetary Fund (September 2013), [online], available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1309.pdf (Accessed at 20 July 2014) 
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Laruffa describes the European economic governance as  
[A]n economic constitution made by rules, policies and institutional practices aimed 
to establish a fiscal-monetary policy mix, competition rules, financial markets 
regulations, the single market and international trade policies. When the euro was 
created, monetary policy was established as a centralized policy, while fiscal policy 
remained in the hands of national authorities under some institutional arrangements 
for sound budgetary policy and an ex-ante control by the European Commission.929  
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)930 among members of the Eurozone coordinates the 
fiscal policies of member states reporting their economic plans to the European 
Commission and budgetary objectives., the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers 
decides by qualified majority whether to accept the Commission's recommendation to the 
member state.  
On 2 March 2012, all members of the European Union, except the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom, signed the European Fiscal Compact931, which was ratified on the 1st of 
April 2014.932 The treaty is designed to implement stricter caps on government spending 
and borrowing, including automatic sanctions for countries breaking the rules.  
The results of the treaty on the Eurozone economy, are yet to be known933. With the crisis 
of the Eurozone deepening, more and more attention has been put by scholars on 
completing the fiscal side of the monetary union934.  
                                                 
929 Laruffa Matteo, The European Economic Governance: Problems and Proposals for Institutional Innovations, 
Winning Paper for the Annual Meeting Progressive Economy, Brussels, 6 March 2014., [online] available at 
http://www.progressiveeconomy.eu/sites/default/files/papers/Matteo%20Laruffa%20The%20European%20econ
omic%20governance.pdf (Accessed 17 September, 2015) 
930 See supra note 923.  
931 Burret, Heiko T., Implementation of the Fiscal Compact in the Euro Area Member States, German Council of 
Economic Experts (November 2013), [online], available at http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
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933 Feldstein, Martin, Europe’s Empty Fiscal Compact (February 2012), [online], available at 
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/projectsyndicatefeb2012.html (Accessed at 20 July 2014). Feldstein argues that 
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and, finally, to a modified version of the defunct Stability and Growth Pact of 1997. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel initially proposed the “transfer union,” in which Germany and other strong Eurozone economies would 
transfer funds year after year to Greece and other needy countries, in exchange for the authority to regulate and 
supervise the recipient countries’ budgets and tax collections. The German public rejected the idea of permanent 
transfers from German taxpayers to Greece, while Greek officials and the Greek public rejected the idea of 
German control over their country’s fiscal policy.” 
 
Page | 183 
 
5. SORDID DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
 
The 2003 to 2009 period can be seen as a representative period for financial crises.935 As 
Barry Eichengreen in 1999936 observed the number of years separating default episodes in 
the more recent period is much lower.  Once that is restructured, countries are quick to 
releverage.  Serial banking crisis in Europe and in the United States use to be the norm 
prior to World War II.  With the development of a financial sector in the larger emerging 
markets in the late 1880s, these economies also started to experience those patterns of 
frequent banking crisis during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The United Kingdom, the 
United States and France lead the pack with 12, 13 and 15 banking crisis each.937 
 
The period after World War II started off comparably calm for both the advanced 
economies and the large emerging markets.  However, all except Portugal experienced at 
least one post-war crisis prior to the current episode.938  One observation that sounds 
obvious but needs to be made is that the run up in debts accelerates as the crisis nears. 
Therefore, it holds true that  
 
[H]aving debts is a prerequisite to default. This is not a tautology. The pattern that 
emerges is not indicative of a gradual accumulation of debt in advance of a banking 
crisis or a sovereign default.  Specifically, when we discuss rising debts ahead of the 
crisis, we are referring to surges in capital inflows or more generally in any kind of 
debt.939   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
934 Gros, Daniel and Alcidi, Cinzia, The case of the disappearing Fiscal Compact, CEPS Commentary 
(November 2014), [online], available at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fiscal%20Compact.pdf (Accessed at 
24 August 2015)  
935 Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S., From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis, American Economic 
Review 101 (August 2011), [online], available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/from_financial_crash.pdf (Accessed July 15, 2013) They argue that 
‘[t]here are long periods were a high percentage of all countries are in a state of default or restructuring.  Indeed, 
there are five pronounced peaks or default cycles.  The first is during the Napoleonic War.  The second runs 
from the 1820s through the 1840s935.  Many times nearly half the countries in the world were in default 
including all of Latin America.  The third episode begins in the early 1870s and lasts for two decades935.  The 
fourth episode begins in the great depression of the 1930s and extends through the early 1950s when nearly half 
of all countries stood in default935.  The most recent default cycling encompasses the emerging market debt 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s.” 
936 Reinhart, Carmen and Rogoff, Kenneth S. This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of 
Financial Crises, Annals of Economics and Finance, Harvard University (2014), [online], available at 
http://aeconf.com/Articles/Nov2014/aef150201.pdf (Accessed at 20 August 2015) 
937 Id.  
938 Id. 
939 Id.  
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Reinhart and Rogoff also made the observation that banking crises often, preceded or 
concurred with sovereign debt crisis. Whilst there have been a number of sovereign 
restructuring episodes in lower income developing economies in the past, the experience 
regarding advanced economies is much more limited.  The difference between advanced 
economies from lower income and developing economies are significant insofar as they 
have a larger share of the public debt held domestically and deeper financial systems.940   
 
Reinhart and Rogoff provide three important factors to determine the macroeconomic cost 
and benefits of such a restructuring.   
 
First, the share of sovereign bonds held by households' resident countries compared to 
the share held by foreign residents.  Second, the response of international financial 
investors to the sovereign restructuring insert the private sector at the moment of the 
restructuring. [Third], the private sector's net foreign asset position at the time of the 
sovereign restructuring is relevant as well.  In the model, there are two regions, home 
and foreign, each of a different size.941   
 
However, the structural difference in the case of a monetary union such as the Eurozone 
are significant insofar as we need to take into account two very specific features.  First, 
monetary policy is conducted at the level of the European Union, in particular at the 
European Central Bank without democratic control. Given that disconnect reactions in 
monetary policy are often dissociated or clouded by other interests from the changing 
macroeconomic conditions in the affected country after the restructuring.  Second, fiscal 
policy is managed at the level of the Member State. The results are as follows:  
 
First, after the haircut, GDP shows a decrease which is rather persistent and 
associated with a reduction in consumption and investment by domestic residents.942  
The recovery is slow as it takes more than 3 years for the GDP to return to its baseline 
level.943  Second, the GDP loss is relatively large if the share of public debt held 
domestically is large.  The private foreign debt is large and the spread increases.944   
 
Overall, Reinhart and Rogoff do find that the sovereign restructuring induces a rather 
persistent reduction in microeconomic activity.945 So does the unsustainable absence of it.  
                                                 
940 See supra note 935.  
941 See supra note 940. 
942 Id.  
943 Id. 
944 Id. 
945 Id.  
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6. INCREASING INEQUALITY 
 
The problem is that the fruits of our growth have not been widely shared.  If you look at 
the middle median income today it is lower than in the United States than it was 25 years 
ago.  Median income of a full-time male worker is lower than it was 40 years ago.946  If we 
talk about the CEO pay, it has gone from being 30 times the average of the people who are 
working for them to over 500 times; without absolute no justification other than their free-
wheeling nature. You cannot say these CEOs suddenly got more productive.  That their 
productivity increased ten, let alone five hundred, times faster than the rest of society947.   
 
The rise of inequality appears often to be a response to the failure to solve domestic, social 
and inequality problems and that is partly because inequality has grown in certain countries 
to such a high level that they could not any longer continue to ignore it.948  They put in 
place policies that actually were directed at reducing inequality and it worked  When 
there's a political will you can actually make significant progress in a relatively short time.  
What happened from 1820 to say, 1980, was that large parts of the world fell way 
behind.949  India and China have close to 50 percent of the population and used to have 
close to 50 percent of the global GDP.  And it went down to 8 percent.950   
                                                 
946 U.S. Census, Historical Income Tables: People, [online], available at 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/people/ (Accessed at 29 August 2015)  
947 Davis, Alyssa, Mishel, Lawrence: CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers Are Paid Less, Economic 
Policy Institute, (June 2014) [online], available at http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/  
(Accessed at July 20, 2015). Davis and Mishel argue that “the growth of CEO and executive compensation 
overall was a major factor driving the doubling of the income shares of the top 1.0 percent and top 0.1 percent of 
U.S. households from 1979 to 2007 (Bivens and Mishel 2013). Income growth since 2007 has also been very 
unbalanced as profits have reached record highs and, correspondingly, the stock market has boomed while the 
wages of most workers (and their families’ incomes) have declined over the recovery (Mishel et al. 2012; 
Mishel 2013). It is useful to track CEO compensation to assess how well this group is doing in the recovery, 
especially since this is an early indication of how well other top earners and high-income households are faring 
through 2013. This paper presents CEO compensation trends through 2013 and finds: Trends in CEO 
compensation last year: Average CEO Compensation was $15.2 million in 2013, using a comprehensive 
measure of CEO pay that covers CEOs of the top 350 U.S. firms and includes the value of stock options 
exercised in a given year, up 2.8 percent since 2012 and 21.7 percent since 2010 Longer-term trends in CEO 
compensation: From 1978 to 2013, CEO compensation, inflation-adjusted, increased 937 percent, a rise more 
than double stock market growth and substantially greater than the painfully slow 10.2 percent growth in a 
typical worker’s compensation over the same period. The CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was 20-to-1 in 
1965 and 29.9-to-1 in 1978, grew to 122.6-to-1 in 1995, peaked at 383.4-to-1 in 2000, and was 295.9-to-1 in 
2013, far higher than it was in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. If Facebook, which we exclude from our data 
due to its outlier high compensation numbers, were included in the sample, average CEO pay was $24.8 million 
in 2013, and the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio was 510.7-to-1.” 
948 Infogr.am, Share of world GDP throughout history, interactive chart demonstrating the pro rata share from 
1AD to 2008 AD, [online], available at https://infogr.am/Share-of-world-GDP-throughout-history (Accessed at 
25 September 2015)  
949 Id.  
950 Id.  
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Now, the income of those countries is going up, 500 million people moved out poverty in 
China.951  There have been an enormous number of people who really benefited, and have 
seen their incomes grown in the last 50 years just not in America952. 
 
With respect to the rise in inequality, we need to stress two points. The first point is about 
the return of this patrimonial or wealth-based society in Europe and Japan, and the 
aggregate value of wealth related to income seemed to be returning to very high levels in 
these global countries, and the basic intuition is that in Europe and Japan we see very low 
population growth, much lower than in the U.S., and a slow growth society.  
 
The second point is about the future of wealth concentration.  As pointed out earlier, 
Piketty’s one important message in his recent book Capital in the 21st Century953 is that 
potentially very large inequalities of wealth derive from the gap between R and G, where R 
is the rate of return to wealth, and G is the growth rate.   
 
In other words, what Piketty has found out is that the rate of return on monetary capital 
formation outpaces the growth rate of non-monetary capital formation. If you follow the 
Capital Formation Life Cycle you can come to the same conclusion. Given the fact that 
there is no appropriate instrument for the destruction of money, such as a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Court with the judicial authority to restructure sovereign debt, other 
than taxation and the raise of taxation is politically inacceptable these days, the constant 
flow of additional bail-out money to fill the gaps misallocations created in the balance 
sheets of Commercial Banks necessarily need to lead to higher returns on monetary capital. 
Whilst the balance sheets of Commercial Banks reluctantly get cleaned up only over years 
with so-called bad banks and sovereign debt gets not restructured at all, new money gets 
piled on top of old liabilities whereas without reduction in the balance sheets of the 
financial sector, those bail-out funds get used to invest into financial assets rather than in 
the so-called real economy. All that often exacerbated by new core capital rules such as 
Basel II and III that make it significantly harder to lend to real businesses so long the banks 
could not clean house.  
 
                                                 
951 See supra note 948. 
952 Id.  
953 See supra note 3.  
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The consequence: The monetary sector plays with itself driving up valuations. The real 
economy drives rather hard and dry based on what it can sell in an environment of austerity 
and stagnant wages. Ceteris paribus, the result must be R > G.954  
 
The most important point is that inequality is not just a result of economic forces, but the 
result of policies and politics.  It also is the result of our capital formation structure. But, of 
course, the policies of themselves are infected by the level and nature of inequality, and 
how extremes of economic inequality that we have inevitably get translated into political 
inequality, and particularly when you have the rules of the game, of the political process 
themselves being set in a political processes which themselves are, in which the wealthy 
have undue influence.955   
 
Piketty and Krugman956 point out that it is not just the average return on capital, but it is 
the distribution of the returns, and the persistence of those differences, especially across 
generations.  The most important variable is tax and return to capital, and bequest is that 
determines the relationship between the after tax return and the rate of growth, and some of 
the research shows that increasing the tax rate at the very top, does not have an adverse 
effect on economic growth. There are many instruments at our disposal to create a more 
equal society, and many of these instruments would, at the same time, create a more 
efficient, and better performing economy.   
                                                 
954 See supra note 3.  
955 Id.  
956 Krugman, Paul, Piketty and Pareto, The New York Times, (April 2014), [online], available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/piketty-and-pareto/?_r=0 (Accessed at August 29, 2014), 
Krugman argues that “Piketty doesn’t just assert that fortunes will concentrate, he shows that they have in fact 
concentrated in the past. That’s the whole point of his extended analysis of Belle Epoque France, with its 
dominance by inherited wealth. And for every Bill Gates, there are many families that do all they can to 
perpetuate dynastic wealth. Remember, the 10 wealthiest Americans include 4 Waltons and two Kochs. Second, 
Piketty predicts a high concentration of wealth, but not concentration without limit. He alludes to his modeling 
here rather than presenting it explicitly, but maybe he should have said more. Here’s how I think of it. Imagine 
that once a family acquires a certain level of wealth, it tends to engage in dynastic accumulation, consuming 
only a fraction of its asset returns while saving the rest and passing it on. However, there is in each generation 
some probability that the family fortune will be squandered by a wastrel. In this case there will be an 
equilibrium distribution of family fortunes, comprising families that have accumulated wealth for three 
generations, a smaller number who have accumulated for four generations (smaller because some fortunes get 
squandered), a still smaller number who have accumulated for five generations, and so on. How much wealthier 
will five-generation dynasties be than four-generation? It depends on the rate of return r — and their share of 
wealth also depends on the growth rate g. Furthermore, six-generation dynasties will be to five-gens as five gens 
are to four, etc. The distribution of wealth will follow a Pareto distribution (which is true of actual wealth 
distributions at the top), with the exponent depending on r minus g. So no dynasty lasts forever; there will be a 
slow “circulation of elites.” But some dynasties will last a long time — and if the after-tax rate of return is high, 
those dynasties will control a large share of wealth.” 
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7. BASEL II/III 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision957  was created as a consequence of the 
financial market dislocation after Nixon terminated the Bretton Woods system. Originally 
thought as an institution for regular cooperation between its member countries on banking 
supervisory matters it was designed to enhance financial stability by exchanging 
supervisory knowhow and the quality and level of banking supervision worldwide.958 
The Committee operates by setting minimum standards for the regulation and supervision 
of banks. Besides the continuous exchange over banking supervisory issues, approaches 
and techniques, the goal was to promote a common understanding and to improve cross-
border cooperation; and by exchanging information on developments in the banking sector 
and financial markets to help identify current or emerging risks for the global financial 
system.  
Due to the fact that there is no appropriate legal framework or transnational jurisdiction 
established, it is important to point out that the Committee's decisions have no legal force. 
Other than EU directives they do not get translated into national laws of the member states 
and they also unlike EU regulations do not have direct effect. The Basel Accords do not 
substitute or fill the void for a transnational forum for financial, commercial and trade 
regulation. Depending on the substantive agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, TTIP, could have the potential to provide the formal framework to 
make cross-border regulatory cooperation legally effective. Without passing judgment of 
the quality of the Basel accords, today the Committee only formulates supervisory 
standards and guidelines and recommends sound practices in the expectation that 
individual national authorities will implement them.959  
  
                                                 
957 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A brief history of the Basel Committee, Bank for International 
Settlements (October 2014), [online], available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf (Accessed at May 20, 
2015)  
958 Id. 
959 Basel II: In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework that led to the 
release of the Revised Capital Framework in June 2004. Generally known as "Basel II", the revised framework 
comprised three pillars, namely: 1) Minimum capital requirements, which sought to develop and expand the 
standardized rules set out in the 1988 Accord; 2) Supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and 
internal assessment process; and 3) Effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and 
encourage sound banking practices. The new framework was designed to improve the way regulatory capital 
requirements reflect underlying risks and to better address the financial innovation that had occurred in recent 
years. 
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Basel III: The New Capital Framework960 
 
The need for a revision and reinforcement of the Basel II architecture was obvious even 
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008961. Triggered by too much 
leverage and inadequate equity capital of the commercial banking sector, the financial 
crisis went in full force. Yet again in a too little, too late CRASH-reaction962 to these risk 
factors, the Basel Committee eventually issued Principles for sound liquidity risk 
management963 and supervision in the same month that Lehman Brothers failed. The 
proposed standards were issued by the Committee in mid-December 2010.964  
 
Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and 
monitoring and Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and 
banking systems. The enhanced Basel framework revised and strengthened the three pillars 
established by Basel II.965 Ultimately, the minimum capital requirements, the higher 
minimums for common equity and Tier 1 capital are effective since the beginning of 
2015966.  
                                                 
960 See supra note 957.  
961 See supra note 896. 
962 See supra note 854.  
963 See supra note 957. 
964 Id.  
965 It also extended the framework with several innovations, namely: An additional layer of common equity - the 
capital conservation buffer - that, when breached, restricts payouts of earnings to help protect the minimum 
common equity requirement; A countercyclical capital buffer, which places restrictions on participation by 
banks in system-wide credit booms with the aim of reducing their losses in credit busts; A leverage ratio - a 
minimum amount of loss-absorbing capital relative to all of a bank's assets and off-balance sheet exposures 
regardless of risk weighting (defined as the "capital measure" (the numerator) divided by the "exposure 
measure" (the denominator) expressed as a percentage); Liquidity requirements - a minimum liquidity ratio, the 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), intended to provide enough cash to cover funding needs over a 30-day period of 
stress; and a longer-term ratio, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), intended to address maturity mismatches 
over the entire balance sheet; and Additional proposals for systemically important banks, including requirements 
for supplementary capital, augmented contingent capital and strengthened arrangements for cross-border 
supervision and resolution. 
966 The schedule is as follows: The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements increased from 2% and 
4% to 3.5% and 4.5%, respectively, at the beginning of 2013. The minimum common equity and Tier 1 
requirements rose to 4% and 5.5%, respectively, at the beginning of 2014. The final requirements for common 
equity and Tier 1 capital will be 4.5% and 6%, respectively, beginning in 2015. The 2.5% capital conservation 
buffer, which will comprise common equity and is in addition to the 4.5% minimum requirement, will be phased 
in progressively starting on 1 January 2016, and will become fully effective by 1 January 2019. The liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) is phased in from 1 January 2015 and will require banks to hold a buffer of high-quality 
liquid assets sufficient to deal with the cash outflows encountered in an acute short-term stress scenario as 
specified by supervisors. The minimum LCR requirement will begin at 60% in 2015, rising in equal annual steps 
of 10 percentage points to reach 100% on 1 January 2019. The other minimum liquidity standard introduced by 
Basel III is the net stable funding ratio. This requirement, which takes effect as a minimum standard by 1 
January 2018, will promote longer term funding mismatches and provide incentives for banks to use stable 
funding sources.  
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C. LEGAL RISKS IN ACCOUNTABILITY OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN US, EU AND GLOBALLY 
 




The main problem with inequality today in Europe is really unemployment, youth 
unemployment, in particular.  The level of youth unemployment in South Europe, but also 
in France, is extremely large.  When you have 25-30 percent of the young generation who 
start their life with no professional experience, this will have long lasting multi-
generational effects.  
 
Albeit the author is personally pleased about the fact that Austria in the past 15 years since 
he has been in charge of youth employment as Coordinator of the Vocational Training 
Initiative of the Austrian Government has managed since the passage of the Austrian 
Youth Training Guarantee Act968 to maintain its top spot position alongside Germany as 
the Member States with the lowest youth unemployment a quick look at Figure 21 suffices 
to see that Austria and Germany are rather the exception than the rule in today’s European 
Union.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
967 European Commission, EU measures to tackle youth unemployment (May 2013), [online], available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-464_en.htm (Accessed at June 29, 2014); Figure reproduced.  
968 Republic of Austria, Jugendausbildungssicherungsgesetz (JASG) (1998), [online], available at 
https://www.jusline.at/Jugendausbildungs-Sicherungsgesetz_(JASG).html (Accessed at September 23, 2015) 
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However, a single currency with 19 different public debts, 19 different interest rates in 
which financial markets can speculate, 19 different tax system and in competition with one 
another, is a systems that does not work and will not work and the prerequisite for a 
sustainable resolution of these issues will be the adoption of a Constitution for the 
European Union.  
 
Like Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank said: 
 
Monetary Union requires a political centre that can take relevant fiscal and 
economic decisions.969 
 
As a matter of fact, the European Union as whole is now at a cross-roads due to so many 
other exogenous issues where it must make the fundamental decision to develop further 
into a Federal State of sorts, preferably even further integrated than the United States, 
when it comes to taxation, professional standards and access to local markets. This would 
make the European Union not only a lot more competitive, it would provide Europeans to 
regain the sovereignty to exercise a true European economic and monetary policy that they 
no longer could pursue in their home member states – even if they would revert back to 
their small, domestic national currency – as if North Dakota would like to introduce a 
North Dakota dollar, the ND$. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the absence of a Political Union could be qualified under 
Whalley as the risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of 
care. Given its spread of competence on fiscal and economic matters over 19 jurisdictions 
it poses the risk due to an interpretation of the law that is considered not valid or based on 
competence pursuant to international agreements. Pursuant to Mahler it therefore could be 
also characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, given that in spite of 
having the monetary union on the European level, the United States all fiscal, economic 
and budgetary decisions are made on the national level of the Member State, the Legal 
Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following 
our FDLR-Model the absence of a Political Union in the European Union constitutes the 
Legal Risk of Limitation. 
                                                 
969 Draghi, Mario, President of the ECB, European Central Bank (23 September, 2015), available online at 
www.twitter.com/ecb (Accessed 25 September 2015)  
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The alternative to a bail out is orderly debt restructuring, but that's usually impractical 
because of two market failures, a hold-out problem and a funding problem.971  The hold-
out problem is that any given creditor has an incentive to strategically hold out from 
agreeing to a reasonable debt restructuring plan hoping that the imperative of others to 
                                                 
970 See supra note 838. 
971 Tamura, Kentaro, The problem of sovereign debt restructuring, Harvard Law School (April 2002), [online], 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/education/llm/2001---2002/sp45.pdf (Accessed at 
May 20, 2014)  
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settle will persuade them to allocate to hold up more than its fair share of the settlement or 
purchase the hold out's claim.972   
 
The funding problem is that a country likely to need to borrow new money to pay critical 
expenses during the debt restructuring process, but no lender is likely to be willing to lend 
such funds unless its right to repayment is per the over existing debt claims.  Any effective 
solution to the sovereign debt dilemma would have to address these two problems.973   
 
Addressing the hold-out problem; the hold-out problem can be addressed by legislating 
through international treaty a form of super majority voting on sovereign debt restricting 
plans in which the vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly situated creditors can 
bind dissenting creditors.   
 
This is the tried and true method by which law including Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court successfully and equitably address the hold-out problem in a corporate 
context and achieves consensual debt restructuring.  Because only similarly situated 
creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors and because any outcome of voting will bind 
all those creditors alike the outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of hold outs and 
dissenters as much as the claims of the super majority.974   
 
The Legal Risk posed by sovereign debt restructuring by tribunal, arbitration panel or 
political backdoor-dealing but without the benefits of judicial authority with effective 
transnational jurisdiction  could be qualified under Whalley as the risks of failure to 
enforce or comply with the terms of the contract, such as the use of non-standard terms and 
conditions.  
 
Given that such settlements or even multilateral agreements only constitute a contractual 
agreement rather than a legal norm and given that there no specific minimum criteria, it 
poses the risk that its validity is depending on a set of facts and following Mahler it could 
also be characterized as Qualification Factual Uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
972 See supra note 971. 
973 Id.  
974 Id.  
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Only a judicial authority that is entitled by law to enter a judgment that once in effect, 
unfolds universal effect among all subject of its jurisdiction rather than just binding effect 
between the parties of an agreement that still require a national court in any national 
jurisdiction in order to effectively enforce such terms, if at all possible.  
 
However, given that such agreements may only be enforceable depending on whether the 
claim for debt restructuring is accepted, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to 
Hohfeld as a Liability. 
 
In conclusion, following our FLDR-Model, the sovereign debt restructuring by way of 
tribunal, arbitration panels or political backdoor dealings constitute the Legal Risk of 
Liability. 
 
FIGURE 23: HOUSEHOLD DEBT 1982 - 2009975 
 
 
                                                 
975 Battelino, Ric, Reserve Bank of Australia, Aspects of Australia’s Finances (June 2010), [online], available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-dg-150610.html (Accessed at 20 May 2014)  
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The third risk that we point to is the continued rise in household debt, not so much in the 
United States.  The U.S. stands out as one of the countries that has actually seen a little bit 
of deleveraging, mainly in the private sector976. At the household level, debt to income 
ratios are back to where they were in 2002.  You then take the low interest rates, and debt 
service to income is the lowest on record, compared with data going back to 1980, and 
corporations have also substantially deleveraged. If we look at debt-equity ratios, they are 
where they were before the 2001 recession, around 2000.  Therefore, we are in a much 
more, sustainable position than we were going into the crisis.   
 
 






One question is whether there is a right level, a safe level of government debt in an 
advanced economy?  First of all most matters tend not to have thresholds and, and when 
you see them, it's an artifact of research, and debt, is not a dirty word.  It depends on what 
it IS for and what the context is.   
 
 
                                                 
976 See supra note 975.  
977 See supra note 843 at Eurostat.  
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If we took on more debt to invest more in infrastructure, that would be a good thing for our 
country, a good thing for our economy.  If we took on a lot of debt to build a lot of houses 
people did not need, that would be a bad thing for our economy.  It really depends on what 
you are using it for and then when we talk about policy solutions, whether there's 
distortions that are leading you to have too much, for example, in the corporate tax 
structure.978 
 
But what is the legal risk for corporate and consumer households and their private debt and 
how do we assess the legal risk pursuant to our FDLR-Model for Member States of the 
European Union? First and foremost, we have to take note of the fact they both have in 
common: They are users of the currency979. Neither Member States of the Eurozone nor, 
unfortunately, private households are sovereign in currency matters – aside from those 
busy mines in Bitcoin.980 As we discussed in the Case Study of the Financing Relation 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, there is no Legal Risk 
absent voluntary default which does not qualify as a Legal Risk.  
 
Here our case is different. The Legal Risk of non-payment by either private households or 
EU Member States could be qualified under Whalley as the risks of failure to enforce or 
comply with the terms of the contract, such as in the case of using non-standard terms and 
conditions.  
 
Given that any enforcement of repayments is depending on a set of facts surrounding the 
liquidity, the ability to refinance of the debtors and certain other political condition, 
following Mahler it could also be characterized as Qualification Factual Uncertainty. 
However, given that such agreements may only be enforceable depending on whether the 
claim for payment is accepted, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld 
as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FLDR-Model, risk of non-payment by either 
private households or EU Member States constitutes the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
                                                 
978 Bezemer, Dirk J., Schumpeter May Be Right Again: the Functional Differentiation of Credit, Economics of 
Credit and Debt, [online], available at 
http://www.economicsofcreditanddebt.org/media/research/The_Functional_Differentiation_of_Credit.pdf 
(Accessed at July 17, 2014) 
979 See supra note 840.  
980 See supra note 665. 
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V. PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF LEGAL RISKS IN CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
A. FROM FIAT TO EXIT – THE CAPITAL FORMATION LIFE CYCLE ™  
 




The author’s Capital Formation Life Cycle, see Full Page in Exhibit A, represents the 
entire Life Cycle from non-monetary capital formation by Man and Machines to monetary 
capital formation by the creation of Money via the Three Actors of Capital Formation, 
Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens, demonstrates how FIAT money is created, 
gets allocated to the Five Key Accounts of Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, 
Corporate, Consumer and International Accounts and from there finds its EXIT by way of 
taxation, repayment or judgment by a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court whose 
judicial authority includes the restructuring of transnational sovereign and private debt.  
                                                 
981 See Exhibit A: Capital Formation Life Cycle (Appendix) 
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B. SOVEREIGN MONEY 
 
What happens if you take the power to create money away from the banks and you return it 
to the state or some democratic body? They can actually create money without waiting for 
anybody to go into debt. There would still be a role for banks, banks would still exist, but 
they would do what people currently think they do, which is take money from savers and 
go and lend it to borrowers.  What it does though is it breaks this Catch-22 situation where 
we either have to choose between more money and more debt or less money and less debt 
and it actually allows us to get more money into the economy whilst also having less debt 
as well.  So it changes the dynamics of how our monetary system works. 
 
The proponents of Sovereign Money982 suggest a division between how much money is 
created and what that money is used for. Quantitative Easing (QE) may lead banks to be 
more confident so that they can lend again but also to more debt983.  Sovereign money 
should lead to less debt in the economy.  QE gave a huge boost to the very top 5 percent of 
the nation984, not much for everybody else985.  This system needs to change and Martin 
Wolf who is the chief economics commentator for Financial Times has now been talking 
along the same lines, so he recently said this.   
 
It is astonishing how little this crisis has shaken conventional wisdom.  An expansion 
of private borrowing to buy ever more expensive houses is deemed good; privately 
created credit backed money from the banks is thought sound while government 
created money is not.  None of this makes much sense and there isn't any sound 
economic reason for the fact that we do things the way we do.  It's more based on 
ignorance of how the system really works; a lack of political awareness about the 
implications of these decisions; the fact that only 20 MPs asked any questions about 
quantitative easing.  So what we're trying to do now is say that there is a better way of 
doing this and this sovereign money is something that we need right now to prevent 
us walking into another debt fueled financial crisis.986 
 
                                                 
982 Joob, M. The Sovereign Money Initiative in Switzerland, World Economic Association (2015), [online], 
available at http://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/newsletterarticles/momo/ (Accessed at 23 August 2015)  
983 R.A., What is Quantitative Easing? The Economist (March 2015), [online], available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-5 (Accessed at 15 September 
2015) 
984 See supra note 3.  
985 Id.  
986 Wolf, Martin, Hair of the dog risks a bigger hangover for Britain, Financial Times (February 2014), [online], 
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1cd67c18-93e6-11e3-a0e1-00144feab7de.html#axzz3mltYd9qF 
(Accessed at Jul 10, 2014)  
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We can have sovereign money creation whilst banks are still creating money and in the 
way that banks creating money is adding debt to the economy, sovereign money can be 
offsetting some of that effect.  It is something they can do now so that the government can 
see that it can put money into the economy in a way that is useful and which actually 
benefits the economy and benefits them.  
 
Let us compare the two ways money enters the Capital Formation Life Cycle today: 
 
First: When banks were in charge and they very much still are, they put it all into the 
property bubble or into the next asset class that consequently bubbles up987.  Second: When 
you facilitate it through sovereign money creation, banks no longer need to horde 
additional liquidity in order to fill potential gaping holes from credit-write offs. As this sort 
of Surplus Liquidity (SL) that we currently experience due to QE on the Commercial 
Bank’s balance sheets will not be longer required, banks will no longer be tempted and in 
their fiduciary duty to their shareholders even to a degree obliged to seek rents and 
returns988 for this SL in the financial markets.989 Finally, as financial markets will be 
devoid of excessive SL, artificially inflated asset-prices will likely revert to less 
speculative pricing990. The more attractive way to earn a return is by successfully investing 
it directly into the real economy.   
 
Now if we want to restrict one of those two ways, do we really want to restrict the one that 
actually creates jobs and actually creates growth in the economy? 
                                                 
987 See supra note 29.  
988 Whincop, Michael J. Another Side of Accountability: The Fiduciary Concept and Rent-seeking in 
Government Corporations, Griffith University, Griffith Law School (November 2000), [online], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258668 (Accessed at 20 May 2014)  
989 Coppola, Frances, Liquidity Hoarding and the end of QE, Coppola Comment Blog (May 2014), [online], 
available at http://www.coppolacomment.com/2014/05/liquidity-hoarding-and-end-of-qe.html (Accessed at 23 
August 2015) Coppola argues that “QE increases liquidity in the financial system, or rather in the regulated part 
of it, by buying assets that carry some form of risk - usually duration risk and interest rate risk. This has the 
effect of moving risk from the financial system to the central bank's balance sheet. The consequence of this is 
that the financial system is absolutely awash with the safest form of safe asset, namely cash, and rather short of 
slightly more risky cash substitutes. Those who want safety have no reason to buy longer-dated treasuries when 
there is so much cash around, while those who want yield will still prefer riskier assets. Rather than depressing 
yields on longer-dated treasuries, therefore, QE actually raises them as investors substitute cash for treasuries 
When QE stops, whether suddenly or gradually, there is of course no immediate withdrawal of liquidity. But the 
sudden removal of the INCREASE in liquidity gives the impression of a drought. It's like someone washing 
their hands under a running tap instead of in the sink: when that tap is suddenly turned off, or the flow through it 
is restricted, the washer thinks they have run out of water, even though there is an entire sink full because of the 
previous flow. This is what is happening in financial markets. The Fed is turning off the QE tap.” 
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C. THE NEW CHICAGO PLAN 
 
The Chicago Plan for the reform of the monetary system was a collection of bank reforms 
suggested by University of Chicago economists such as Irving Fisher, Frank H. Knight, 
Lloyd W. Mints, Henry Schultz, Henry C. Simons, Garfield V. Cox, Aaron Director, Paul 
H. Douglas, and Albert G. Hart in the wake of the Great Depression.  A six-page 
memorandum on banking form was given limited and confidential distribution to about 40 
individuals on March 16, 1933991.   
 
Pursuant to the Chicago Plan, the government should provide by way of the Central Bank 
instead of the commercial banks all the money for transactions and that is including the 
electronic book money the same way as coins, and the Central Bank also issues bills.  The 
banks, the commercial banks, would keep this transaction money for its clients on 
accounts, and the individual client would pay a management fee.992  Aside from that, the 
banks would also offer investment accounts that would provide for the provision of credits, 
but such credits could only be provided at that point any longer out of the depository 
accounts of the clients of the bank.993  Thus, it would not be possible any longer by just by 
way of a pure computer entry create money out of thin air.  The banks would become true 
intermediaries between those that have savings accounts and those that have credit 
accounts.   
 
But, the Chicago Plan, of course, was never executed.  It was if it abolished all the profit 
opportunity for those banks that now create money out of thin air. These memoranda 
generated much interest and discussion among lawmakers, but the suggested reforms such 
as the abolition of the fractional reserve system and imposition of 100 percent reserves on 
demand deposits were set aside and replaced by watered-down alternative measures994.   
 
                                                 
991 Phillips, Ronnie J., The “Chicago Plan” and New Deal Banking Reform (June 1992), The Jerome Levy 
Economics Institute at Bard College, available at  http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp/76.pdf [online] 
(Accessed June 15, 2015) 
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The Banking Act of 1935995 institutionalized federal deposit insurance and the separation 
of commercial and investment banking.  It successfully restored the public's confidence in 
the banking system and ended discussion of banking reform.  After apparent recovery in 
the mid-1930s America entered the recession of 1937 to 1938996 and the key elements of 
the Chicago plan resurfaced and a July 1939 draft proposal entitled a Program for 
Monetary Reform but did not result in any new legislation.  The Program for Monetary 
Reform 1939 was never published997.   
 
The Chicago Plan Revisited998 is an IMF report from 2012 by Jaromir Benes and Michael 
Kumhof. The focus of the study is the so-called Chicago plan of the 1930s which the 
authors have updated to fit into today's economy. The basic idea is that banks should be 
required to have full coverage for money they lend. Under this proposal, banks would no 
longer be allowed to create new money in the form of credit in connection with their 
lending activities. Instead, the central bank should be solely responsible for all the creation 
of all forms of money, not just paper money and coins. The advantages of such a system, 
according to the authors, are a more balanced economy without the booms and busts of the 
current system, the elimination of bank runs, and a drastic reduction of both public and 
private debt. The authors rely on both economic theory and historical examples, and state 
that inflation, according to their calculations, would be very low.  
 
                                                 
995 Preston, Howard J. The Banking Act of 1935, University of Washington, [online], available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1824546?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (Accessed at 20 August 2014)  
996 Bernanke, Ben S., Money, Gold and the Great Depression, Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington 
and Lee University, Lexington, Virgina (March 2014), [online], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2004/200403022/default.htm (Accessed at 23 August 2014), 
Benanke argues that “sharp deflation of the price level that occurred during the contraction phase of the 
Depression, by far the most severe episode of deflation experienced in the United States before or since. 
Deflation, like inflation, tends to be closely linked to changes in the national money supply, defined as the sum 
of currency and bank deposits outstanding, and such was the case in the Depression. Like real output and prices, 
the U.S. money supply fell about one-third between 1929 and 1933, rising in subsequent years as output and 
prices rose. Some important lessons emerge from the story. One lesson is that ideas are critical. The gold 
standard orthodoxy, the adherence of some Federal Reserve policymakers to the liquidationist thesis, and the 
incorrect view that low nominal interest rates necessarily signaled monetary ease, all led policymakers astray, 
with disastrous consequences. We should not underestimate the need for careful research and analysis in guiding 
policy. Another lesson is that central banks and other governmental agencies have an important responsibility to 
maintain financial stability. The banking crises of the 1930s, both in the United States and abroad, were a 
significant source of output declines, both through their effects on money supplies and on credit supplies. 
Finally, perhaps the most important lesson of all is that price stability should be a key objective of monetary 
policy. By allowing persistent declines in the money supply and in the price level, the Federal Reserve of the 
late 1920s and 1930s greatly destabilized the U.S. economy and, through the workings of the gold standard, the 
economies of many other nations as well.” 
997 Benes, J and Kumhof M., The Chicago Plan Revisited (August 2012), International Monetary Fund, [online], 
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf (Accessed June 16, 2015) 
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With a historical perspective some see the Athenian leader Solon, whose debt write-offs in 
599 B.C.999 are described as the first known Chicago Plan, as the founding father of this 
school of thought. There is no doubt that the movement to eradicate the debt-based 
monetary system is still considered radical, but the fact that an IMF study1000 now positions 
itself to the radical side, suggests that the global crisis is much greater than our 
governments and mainstream media are willing to acknowledge and also that people in 
high positions know that the decision makers basically are lacking alternatives. And a 
Centre for Economic Policy Research paper agrees with the conclusion that, "no real 
liability is created by new FIAT money creation, and therefore public debt does not rise as 
a result.”1001  
 
Critics from the Austrian School of Economics1002, however, feel that proposals such as 
this would be akin to handing over the money fountain to the state which they believe 
would invariably lead to inflation or hyperinflation and be just as bad to let the state, or the 
central bank in alliance with the state, 'create money out of air' as it is to let the banks do it 
through their fractional reserve banking. Austrian economists believe that the only right 
thing to do would be to let the market take care of the creation of money, with a gold 
standard1003, but without fractional reserve banking1004.  
 
However, the fact remains that seven years of Quantitative Easing have not lead to any 
inflation caused by an increased money supply. This should have convinced even the last 
Thomas, the Doubter.1005 Rather the opposite occurred. Starting out at an inflation rate in 
2008 of 4.1%, we ended up today at an inflation of 0.2%.1006 
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Policy Research, August 2012, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight62.pdf [online] (Accessed 
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The reasons for that are apparent. Inflation, by its very definition, characterized as a 
general increase in prices and fall in the purchasing value of money over a period of time, 
can be found either in the case of limited supply of goods and services, for instance in the 
case of full employment and an ensuing pressure on wages, limited land or housing and the 
subsequent increase in rent or housing prices or in the case of exogenous price pressures 
such as in the case of high energy prices. So long neither of these conditions are present, 
the mere increase in money supply, will not lead to inflation – as proven over the past 
seven years.1007  
 
A complete arbitrary Gold Standard1008, however, that is idolatrized over and over by 
Austrian ideologists1009, which has no correlation to the performance of an economic area 
will simply limit any flexibility in an economy that is necessary to provide any incentive 
for capital formation. Unsurprisingly, this dogma is a billionaire’s darling given that it 
poses an artificial limit on money supply preventing even the slightest risk of devaluation 
of those assets they already have. An artificial limitation in the supply of currency due to 
the gold standard prevents the funding of essential public operations, supply of certain 
essential goods and services must increase in price as a result. 
                                                 
1007 Mitchell, Bill, Modern Money Theory and Inflation – Part 1, Economic Outlook July 2010, [online], 
available at http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=10554 (Accessed at 17 July 2014). Mitchell argues that 
“First, unemployment is always a greater problem than inflation in almost any dimension you want to define it 
and which are calibrated by metrics that different ideological persuasions agree on – such as lost GDP. There is 
nothing ideological in the statement that the losses from unemployment dwarf those associated with inflation. 
Even mainstream textbooks struggle to come up with large estimates of the costs of inflation that they itemize. 
There has been no credible study that shows that overall the losses from these “costs” amount to millions of 
dollars of foregone output every day. There is ample evidence that mass unemployment results in huge 
permanent losses every day in foregone output and income. And then if you study the broader literature (health, 
mental health, sociology, crime, family studies etc.) you realize that the macroeconomic losses from 
unemployment are just the tip of the iceberg. The personal, family and community losses are very large and 
persist across generations. Second, [there is] is a concern for price stability. It is one of the first principles of 
fiscal sustainability. The models developed provide innovative solutions to the twin evils of unemployment and 
inflation, even if we recognize as an empirical fact (independent of our ideologies) that unemployment is a 
much more significant evil. […] While a price rise is a necessary condition for inflation it is not a sufficient 
condition. Observing a price rise alone will not be sufficient to categorize the phenomena that you are observing 
as being an inflationary episode. Inflation is the continuous rise in the price level. That is, the price level has to 
be rising each period that you observe it. So if the price level or a wage level rises by 10 per cent every month, 
then you have an inflationary episode. In this case, the inflation rate would be considered stable – a constant rise 
per period. If the price level was rising by 10 per cent in month one, then 11 per cent in month two, then 12 per 
cent in month three and so on, then you have accelerating inflation. Alternatively, if the price level was rising by 
10 per cent in month one, 9 per cent in month two etc. then you have falling or decelerating inflation. If the price 
level starts to continuously fall then we call that a deflationary episode.” 
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As a consequence, products become exclusively affordable by those who already are 
affluent providing them an additional opportunity to offer the very same goods and 
services to the public at a higher price, essentially triggering an accumulation effect of 
wealth at the top end of the society. In populist terms, the gold standard is the perfect 
instrument for the rich 1% to get even richer on the backs of the 99%1010.   
 
If this sounds similar to what the Eurozone has experienced recently it is true.1011 Of 
course, in the crisis of the Eurozone this is further compounded that the levers of monetary 
policy are based in Frankfurt, not even in Brussels [at the European Commission or 
European Council], let alone in Strasbourg [at the European Parliament] and those of fiscal 
policy are in the capital cities of the Member States and sometime even of their provinces 
of the Eurozone. Even if it is hard enough to agree among 19 member states in Brussels to 
a common policy, it becomes completely impossible when the decisions of economic 
policy are made in about hundred different places across the continent. A comprehensive 
economic policy or strategy can neither be expected nor likely will be the result in that 
case.   
 
After all, the only standard to which the value of a currency, as a means of exchange may 
truly be bound, is the collateral offered in exchange for its credit1012 or in other words, the 
effective product of its economy and ability of capital formation as expressed in one form 
as Gross Domestic Product or GDP.  
 
Similar to the Chicago Plan now Switzerland has started, on June 7, 20141013, a popular 
initiative in which this initiative requires a constitutional change to realize the Chicago 
Plan in Switzerland.  In Switzerland, the monetary supply of M1 swelled, in the last 
5 years, from 270 billion Francs to about 550 billion, and it's still increasing, which 
obviously led to a huge revaluation of the Franc as a consequence.1014 
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D. INSTRUMENTS MITIGATING INCREASING INEQUALITY 
 
FIGURE 25: REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY1015 
 
In their book Inequality and Fiscal Policy1016, authors Benedict J. Clemens, Ruud de 
Mooij, Sanjeev Gupta and Michael Keen show that that fiscal policy, provides the toolset 
to combat inequality by affecting household welfare directly through transfers and taxes 
and indirectly by modifying incentives to work and produce.  
                                                 
1015 Francese, Maura, Harnessing the Power of Fiscal Policy to Mitigate Inequality, International Monetary 
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The authors find that direct taxes levied on income and wealth, such as the personal 
income tax, in contrast to indirect taxes, which are levied on exchanges and consumption, 
such as sales or value-added taxes and cash transfers in the form of direct payments from 
governments to eligible individuals are also two important tools at policymakers’ disposal.  
Measured by the Gini index1017 which measures a country’s income distribution income 
inequality was reduced by about one-third on average in advanced economies. Notably, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Denmark registered particularly large reductions. 
According to the author’s findings two-thirds of the reduction has been due to transfer 
programs and the remaining third to progressive taxation  
Economist Paul Krugman found in his review of Thomas Piketty’s latest work “The 
Economic of Inequality”1018 that  
 
Mr. Piketty and Mr. Saez showed that the actual story of rising inequality since 1980 
or so was dominated not by the modestly rising salaries of skilled workers but by 
gigantic gains at the very top — a doubling of inflation-adjusted income for the top 1 
percent, a quadrupling for the top 0.1 percent, and so on. They also showed that these 
surging top incomes had more or less reversed earlier movements toward equality that 
the concentration of income in the hands of a small minority was back to “Great 
Gatsby” levels.1019 
 
Thus the big expansion of inequality in the United States since the 1970s has so far been 
driven by high salaries, high bonuses and when we were just seeing the explosion of 
inequality.  Ultimately, the United States has a much more unequal distribution of income 
than other advanced countries.1020  
 
                                                 
1017 GINI Index (World Bank Estimate), [online], The World Bank (2015) available at 
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1018 Krugman, Paul, Review, The Economics of Inequality by Thomas Piketty, The New York Times (August 
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Piketty has also found his fair share of critics. Amongst them, a young MIT doctoral 
researcher, Matthew Rognlie.1021 He argues that  
 
[n]either outcome is likely given realistically diminishing returns to capital 
accumulation. Instead—all else equal—more capital will erode the economywide 
return on capital. When converted from gross to net terms, standard empirical 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor are well below 
those assumed in Capital. Piketty’s inference of a high elasticity from time series is 
unsound, assuming a constant real price of capital despite the dominant role of 
rising prices in pushing up the capital/income ratio. Recent trends in both capital 
wealth and income are driven almost entirely by housing, with underlying 
mechanisms quite different from those emphasized in Capital. 
 
Rognlie mistakenly assumes empirically unfounded arbitrage between [predominantly 
public] financial markets and the “real economy” on part of the financial sector. This 
author argues that the underlying reason for higher rates of return on capital versus the rate 
of return on economic growth and salaries, wages and labor lies in the fungibility of assets 
that are either traded on exchanges, over the counter or in highly developed and liquid 
capital markets such as the stock markets and the housing sector opposed to the time and 
transaction cost intensive investments into the “real economy” by way of bank lending or 
equity investment and the fact that in today’s markets we come to face two parallel worlds, 
possibly out of a Kafka novel1022, of financial markets and the economy at large.  
 
The reality of the last decade and certainly since the advent of QE has been that the 
commercial banking sector required an outlet for its well-financed balance sheets to earn 
reasonable returns without the need to enter into complex transactions with uncertain 
liquidity events in highly volatile markets. This hypothesis is supported both by the dataset 
Piketty used as pointed out by Rognlie and the fact that Piketty’s observations with respect 
to CEO pay almost exclusively refers to executives from publicly traded companies.  
 
Therefore, in this author’s opinion, the substitution effect noticed by Piketty is not 
predominantly one motivated just by rent seeking capital looking for the highest return, 
albeit this holds true, but rather one that is an expression of a completed bifurcation of our 
economy into highly liquid financial markets and a comparably illiquid economy at large. 
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Whilst financial markets are characterized these days by highly enhanced liquid balance 
sheets of financial institutions whose even more highly paid executives are even under a 
fiduciary duty1023 to their shareholders to earn the highest return and the fact that a rising 
tide of QE has floated the boat of the entire Dow Jones Industrial Average from 7,000 in 
2008 to 18,000 in February 2015,1024 the rest of the economy at large has seen little of this 
new-found liquidity.1025 Banker say “they are lending to small businesses but have trouble 
finding creditworthy borrowers. In addition, bankers note the dampening effect of 
increased regulatory oversight on the availability of small business credit. Not only is there 
more regulation and higher compliance costs, there is uncertainty about how regulators 
view the credit characteristics of loans in their portfolios, making them less likely to make 
a loan based on “softer” underwriting criteria such as knowledge of the borrower from a 
long term relationship”.1026 Therefore today, the rate of return, G or R, is a function of the 
absorption capacity of liquidity of either financial markets or the economy at large, rather 
than the inverse. 
 
Hence, so long the dominant factor for an investment decision remains the significant 
higher absorption capacity of the enhanced liquidity in capital markets, we will neither find 
diminishing returns on capital as suggested by Rognlie nor a weaker substitution effect by 
capital of labor, or by the financial markets of the economy at large. In order to end these 
continuous dislocations in our economy resulting in unbearable inequities and inequalities, 
it is therefore of utmost importance, to provide for an alternative way to resolve the 
misallocations in our monetary system to QE and the flooding of the balance sheets of 
financial institutions, banks, insurances and publicly traded companies. Certainly, the 
introduction of Sovereign Money held in segregated accounts of Commercial Banks as a 
prerequisite to terminate such misallocations in the future without causing collateral 
collapses of the banking system, followed by a transnational judicial authority1027 with the 
mandate to reform or rescind failed transaction by judgment, would offer a sound solution.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY TTIP –  
NASCITURUS FOR A NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER  
        
I.  THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)  
 
A. TTIP – NASCITURUS FOR A NEW GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
 
Even as we protect our people, we should remember that today’s world presents not 
only dangers, but opportunities. […] And tonight, I am announcing that we will 
launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with 
the European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports 
millions of good-paying American jobs.1028 
 
With these words the President of the United States, Barack Obama, injected new life into 
what possibly may become the nasciturus of a New Global Economic Order, the 
Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership1029, or TTIP.  
 
In this part we will answer why only a New Global Economic Order, enforcing the 
Democratic Rule of Law, thereby reducing Legal Risk and enhancing Legal Certainty will 
lead to more sustainable Capital Formation. Only once the rule of law and commonly 
accepted processes following a transparent democratic process are in place that can be 
transnationally enforced in a system of justice that can be held accountable, outcomes will be 
again become more predictable.  
 
Only institutions such as a TTIC that also wields jurisdiction over sovereign borrowers, will 
manage to reduce Legal Risk, enhance Legal Certainty by being able to more accurately 
price and discount the expected value of future events but also avert the creation of 
unsustainable bubbles and excess accumulation of capital with oligopolistic market 
participants. 
 
It is also important to recall the methodological link to the application of our FDLR-Model 
which will not only prove the model but also help academics and legal practitioners alike 
to systematically identify and understand the components of Legal Risk.  This will serve to 
determine which of the four, Law, Lack of Right, Liability or Limitation applies as a 
                                                 
1028 Obama, Barack H., President of the United States, State of the Union Speech, 12 February, 2013, available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2013 (Accessed at 12 February 2013)  
1029 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, [online], 
available at https://ustr.gov/ttip (Accessed at 27 September 2015). 
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prerequisite to how they may be mitigated, remedied or resolved. In order to assist in the 
assessment of the Legal Risk, please see our comprehensive model of Four Determinants 
of Legal Risk entailing the different methodological and theoretical foundations in Chapter 
1, Section I, D and Chapter 2, Section II.  
Whilst the qualitative research and analysis certainly focuses on the legal framework of - as 
this author has called it - said nasciturus1030 of a New Global Economic Order1031, namely 
the TTIP, providing the operational conditions of business and trade of 50%1032 of this 
planet’s GDP or half of the accumulated Gross World Product1033 and its regulatory effects 
for instance of the elimination of non-tariff barriers in key industries such as the automotive, 
chemicals, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals industries, communication services, construction 
services, wood and paper products, electronics, food and beverage, medical, measuring and 
testing appliances that have a significant impact on growth and are today subject to heavy 
protectionist measures both on the level of member states of the European Union and the EU 
itself as well as the states and the federal state of the United States, in the long protracted 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 all eyes are still directed on the financial sector and 
how a new order for will provide to avert a future collapse.  
Therefore, this case study provides for an especially innovative concept with the proposal for 
the establishment of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court (TTIC)1034. In particular, 
since this concept is able to answer three of the key issues none of its historic predecessors 
could solve: 1) acceptance, 2) financing and 3) minimal bureaucracy.  
What has been proposed anew by President Obama at the beginning of his second term as 
44th President of the United States, in fact has a long history of failed attempts. Already in 
1995, the United States and the European Union agree on what was then called a “New 
Transatlantic Agenda” (NTA)1035.  
                                                 
1030 Naciturus, The fiction of the “unborn child”, Oxford Journals [online] available at 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/1/37.full (Accessed at 4 September 2015)  
1031 See supra note 4.  
1032 Stahl, Lukas M., Business Briefing, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Potential 
Impact and Dimensions of the World’s Largest Trade Agreement, 21st Austria (June 2014) New York, NY, 
[online], available at http://www.21st-austria.at/files/21austria/files/business_briefings/21st_austria_-
_businessbriefing_june_2014.pdf (Accessed at 20 September 2015). 
1033 Id.  
1034 See Chapter 6.III. A Plea for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court 
1035 European Commission, The New Transatlantic Agenda, [online], available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf (Accessed at 23 August 2014)  
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Only a few years later, in 1998 the first more comprehensive proposal for a closer 
economic cooperation was made in the form of “The Transatlantic Economic Partnership” 
(TEP)1036. None of those initiatives produced any significant results.  
 
A number of smaller initiatives follow suit, dealing with “Guidelines for Regulatory 
Cooperation and Transparency” (2002)1037, a “Strategy for Strengthening the EU-US 
Economic Partnership” (2004)1038 and an “Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic 
Integration and Growth” (2005).1039 Arguably, all of those former initiatives helped foster 
an agreement that was ultimately signed by EU Commission President Barroso, German 
Chancellor Merkel and the 43rd President of the United States George Walker Bush 
establishing the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) dealing with issues such as 
“regulation, intellectual property rights, innovation and technology, secure trade and 
investment”1040 that bore the nucleus of today’s TTIP negotiations in the form of a High-
Level Working Group (HLWG). 
 
Almost to the day one month after President Obama’s historic State of the Union Speech 
the United States-European Union High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 
released its Final Report on 11 February 2013 recommending  
 
US and EU Leaders that the United States and the EU launch […] negotiations on a 
comprehensive, ambitious agreement that addresses a broad range of bilateral trade 
and investment issues, including regulatory issues, and contributed to the 
development of global rules. 
 
 
                                                 
1036 Winikoff, Justin, U.S.-EU Trade & the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, July 2013, Fact 
Sheet, [online], available at www.AmericanSecurityProject.org (Accessed at 23 August 2014) 
1037 Office of the United States Trade Representative, TEP Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and 
Transparency Implementation Roadmap, [online], available at 
https://ustr.gov/archive/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Europe/US_EU_Regulatory_Cooperation/TEP_G
uidelines_on_Regulatory_Cooperation_Transparency_Implementation_Roadmap.html (Accessed at 23 August 
2014)  
1038 Council of the European Union, EU-U.S. Declaration on Strengthening our Economic Partnership, (June 
2004), [online], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_119049.pdf (Accessed 
at 15 September, 2014)  
1039 Council of the European Union, EU-U.S. Declaration, Initiative to enhance transatlantic economic 
integration and growth (June 2005), [online], available at 15 September 2014) 
1040  High Level Working Group, Final Report, February 11, 2013, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf (Accessed at June 20, 2013) 
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This time it clearly appears to be different. Only four months after President Obama’s State 
of the Union Speech, on 17 June 2013 in a meeting of President Obama with U.K. Prime 
Minister Cameron, then European Commission President Barroso and then European 
Council President Van Rompuy, Prime Minister Cameron restated his support: 
 
I always said that the whole point of this […] is to fire up our economies and drive 
growth and prosperity around the world -- to do things that make a real difference to 
people’s lives. And there is no more powerful way to achieve that than by boosting 
trade. And there’s no better way than by launching these negotiations on a landmark 
deal between the European Union and the United States of America -- a deal that 
could add as much as a £100 billion to the EU economy, £80 billion to the U.S. 
economy, and as much as £85 billion to the rest of the world. 
 
 
And we should be clear about what these numbers could really mean: 2 million extra 
jobs, more choices and lower prices in our shops. We’re talking about what could be 
the biggest bilateral trade deal in history; a deal that will have a greater impact than all 
the other trade deals on the table put together.1041  
 
President Obama seconded: 
 
As has already been mentioned, the U.S.-EU relationship is the largest in the world. It 
makes up nearly half of global GDP. We trade about $1 trillion in goods and services 
each year. We invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies. And all that 
supports around 13 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And this potentially 
groundbreaking partnership would deepen those ties. It would increase exports, 
decrease barriers to trade and investment. As part of broader growth strategies in both 
our economies, it would support hundreds of thousands of jobs on both sides of the 
ocean.1042 
 
Two significant studies have been presented since about the economic impact of the TTIP. 
One report was published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung1043 and one by the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research1044.  
                                                 
1041 Cameron, David, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Press Conference on June 17, 2013, [online] 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/remarks-president-obama-uk-prime-
minister-cameron-european-commission-pr (Accessed at 3 July 2014) 
1042 Obama, Barack H., President of the United States, id. 
1043 Felbermayr, Gabriel Ph.D. et al, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from 
a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Economic Dynamics, 2013, 
available at http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-GED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf (Accessed at 
3 July 2014) 
1044 Francois, Joseph, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment, An Economic Assessment, Final 
Project Report, Centre for Economic Policy Research, March 2013, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf (Accessed at 17 August 2013)  
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The Bertelsmann report studied two possible policy options: either the simple elimination 
of tariffs in trade between the European Union and the United States or in the alternative a 
comprehensive trade agreement that deals with the vast array of non-tariff barriers.  
 
Whilst eliminating tariffs would likely raise real wages by 0.8%, the reduction or 
elimination of non-tariff barriers is estimated to see real per capita income grow by 13.4% 
in the United States and countries such as Germany or the United Kingdom by 4.7% or 
9.7% respectively.1045 
 
The study conducted by the Centre for European Economic Policy Research1046  came to 
the conclusion that due to the TTIP in the European Union for a family of 4 there will be 
disposable income gains between €306 and €545 annually and between €366 and €655 in 
the United States.1047  
 
Key findings by the CEPR also included that besides possibly bringing  
 
[s]ignificant economic gains as a whole for the EU (€119 billion a year) and the US 
(€95 billion a year) […] liberalising trade between the EU and US would not be at the 
expense of the rest of the world. On the contrary [it would be] increasing global 
income by almost €100 billion. […] EU exports to the US would go up by 28%, 
equivalent to an additional €187 billion worth of exports of EU goods and services. 
Overall, total exports would increase 6% in the EU and 8% in the US.1048  
 
Both studies agree that they key to unlock these significant potential gains for both the 
European Union and the United States is to strive this time for the big prize. Rather than 
just being comfortable and satisfied by eliminating the low number of remaining tariff 
barriers and thus establishing a customs union, both major trading blocs should aim to 
eliminate as much non-tariff trade barriers as possible.  
                                                 
1045 Felbermayr, Gabriel Ph.D. et al, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from 
a free trade deal? Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Economic Dynamics, 2013, 
available at http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIP-GED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf, p.30 
(Accessed at 3 July 2014) 
1046 Francois, Joseph, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment, An Economic Assessment, Final 
Project Report, Centre for Economic Policy Research, March 2013, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf, p.47 (Accessed at 17 August 2013)  
1047 Id.  
1048 Id. 
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And the time appears to be ripe right now. In a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation1049 88% of all respondents believed that the US and EU will come to an 
agreement and although only 37% thought that the agreement will be broad, an 
overwhelming majority of additional 55% were found to believe at least in a moderate 
agreement.1050 
 
Ranking the issues by degree of importance to the successful negotiation of an overall 
agreement, the respondents in the survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation clearly 
placed as their top concern “significant regulatory process convergence across multiple 
sectors”. In other words, businesses, entrepreneurs and investors alike want legal certainty 
in order to be prepared to invest. An insight that Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott 
awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 
20041051. 
 
Their work “Rules Rather than Discretion. The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans” from 
1997, studies the sequential choice of policies, such as tax rates or monetary policy 
instruments1052. They showed that the outcome in a rational-expectations equilibrium 
where the government cannot commit to policy in advance – discretionary policymaking – 
results in lower welfare than the outcome in equilibrium where the government can 
commit. 1053  
 
Whilst a lot of their work has focused on issues of taxation and monetary policy and was 
found highly controversial and laden with ideology in the context of monetary policy and 
the function of central banks, the discussion has since shifted to institutional frameworks 
that would provide consistency over time and lend credibility to policies.  
  
 
                                                 
1049 Barker, Tyson, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Ambitious but Achievable, A 
Stakeholder Survey and Three Scenarios, April 2013, available at http://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-CA819006-5438477D/bst/xcms_bst_dms_37655_37656_2.pdf, p. 2-3 (Accessed at 
20 June 2013) 
1050 Id.  
1051 Kydland, Finn and Prescott. Edward.  Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel (2004), Rules Rather than Discretion. The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1997), [online], available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/advanced-
economicsciences2004.pdf,  p.2 (Accessed at 23 August 2014)  
1052 Id.  
1053 Id.  
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B. REGULATORY COOPERATION  
(ELIMINATING NON-TARIFF BARRIERS – ENHANCING LEGAL CERTAINTY) 
 
With respect to the expected effects of implementing TTIP, Regulatory Cooperation in the 
area of the respective industry verticals should lead to mutually recognized minimum 
standards that lead to a non-discriminatory regime for both US and EU, regardless of 
whether they operate in- or outside the European Union. Regulatory Cooperation meets 
one of its most noble purposes in enhancing legal certainty by reducing or eliminating non-
tariff barriers that by in large pertain to excessive regulations and requirements for foreign 
entities and investors doing business in the US or the EU.  
 
The most eminent non-tariff barriers to this date still are a number of disparities between 
the regulatory frameworks in the EU and US, and the lack of mutual recognition 
agreements relating thereto. Albeit many observers are reluctant to believe that there is still 
work to do in this field, we beg to differ and hope to convince those with our analysis of 
the following nine industry verticals.  
 
The following Case Study will provide us with an analysis of the envisaged regulatory 
cooperation in nine industry verticals of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). It will also afford us the opportunity to assess the legal risks inherent 
in sectors encompassed by the TTIP in the case of inbound transactions into the United 
States. Moreover, it will allow us to develop further insight to what extent, beyond the 
mere reduction of customs and tariffs, the elimination of non-tariff barriers, regulatory 
cooperation and the transnational setting of standards between the United States and the 
European Union effectively affects the exposure of actors in cross-border transactions to 
Legal Risk pursuant to the Four Determinants of Legal Risk (FDLR) developed supra.1054  
 
The implementation of a common jurisdiction for the entire single TTIP market and 
depending on the establishment of a Transatlantic Trade Court (as discussed further infra) 
a uniform application of the law, and the mutually recognized standards, could be enforced 
thus providing an instrument of terminal resolution for any of the current legal risks 
incurred. 
                                                 
1054 See Figure 7. Four Determinants of Legal Risk 




A. CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY STANDARD 
 
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy law (CAFE) was created by the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) and is regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1055 CAFE 
establishes mandatory average fuel economy levels for automobiles and imposes civil 
penalties upon manufacturers for noncompliance.1056 The EU argues that CAFE favors 
large integrated car producers rather than those who target the top end of the market, such 
as EU automakers.1057  
 
Although CAFE standards apply to all manufacturers, it discriminates against foreign 
automakers that are both importers and domestic manufacturers. In such cases, average 
fuel economy must be calculated separately for imported cars (“imported fleet”) and those 
domestically manufactured (“domestic fleet”) and must independently satisfy the CAFE 
standard (known as the “Two-Fleet Rule”).1058 This prevents manufacturers of large 
domestic cars from meeting their domestic fleet requirement by adding small foreign cars, 
which would otherwise offset a poor fuel economy rating. In a dispute brought by the EU 
against the US, the GATT Panel found that the Two-Fleet Rule was a discriminatory 
measure.1059 Although NHTSA may exempt certain manufacturers from the rule, it rarely 
does. The 2012 CAFE legislation not only retains the Two-Fleet Rule despite criticism 
from both domestic and foreign producers, but also makes the requisite fuel economy 
standards far more stringent.1060  
 
                                                 
1055 EPCA, 42 U.S.C. § 6201; CAFE, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (Oct. 15, 2012) (amending 40 C.F.R. §§ 85, 86, 600, 
49 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533, 536-38).    
1056 Summary of CAFE Fines Collected (Apr. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/cafe_fines-040913.pdf. (Accessed at 20 June 2013)  
1057 EC Market Access Database: Trade Barriers, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Payment (Feb. 4, 
2008), available at http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=960072&version=3; see also 
GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R at 8 (Oct. 11, 1994) (unadopted). 
1058 GATT Panel Report, DS31/R at 8, 77. (Accessed at 20 June 2013)  
1059 Id. at 1016, 112-13. 
1060 See, e.g., NHTSA, NHTSA Grants Nissan Petition to Combine Car Fleets under CAFE (Apr. 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/announce/press/pressdisplay.cfm?year=2004&filename=pr18-04.html. 
See also Fed. Reg. 25324 (Oct. 15, 2012) (raising CAFE standard to 54.5 mpg for passenger vehicles). 
(Accessed at 20 June 2013)  
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The Legal Risk posed by CAFE could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Albeit CAFE applies to all 
manufacturers, provisions affecting foreign automakers in- and outside the United States 
that a GATT Panel found discriminatory, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law 
that is considered not valid or based on competence pursuant to international agreements.  
 
Therefore, it could also be characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, 
given that in spite of the GATT Panel’s declaration as a discriminatory measure, the 
United States continues to enforce this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model 
the CAFE rules constitute the Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
B. GAS GUZZLER TAX 
 
The Gas Guzzler Tax law was enacted pursuant to the Energy Tax Act of 1978 and, like 
CAFE, targets automakers who fail to meet certain fuel economy standards.1061 The Tax is 
an excise tax imposed on manufacturers and collected directly by the IRS, does not apply 
to minivans, SUVs or pick-up trucks, which is arguably a protectionist measure since US 
manufacturers are the primary makers of such cars. The statutory standard is set at 22.5 
mpg, much lower than the new CAFE standard, and while it appears to serve the same 
purpose, it has been less controversial than CAFE.1062 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Gas Guzzler Tax could be qualified under Whalley the risk of 
a business failing to implement regulatory requirements. The Gas Guzzler Tax constitutes 
like the CAFE regulations a risk due to the interpretation of the law. However, other than 
the CAFE Regulation it presents a risk due to being an obligation. Following Mahler could 
be also qualified as a Deontic Legal Uncertainty. Given the obligatory nature of the norm, 
pursuant to Hohfeld, it therefore could also be characterized as a Duty. In conclusion, 




                                                 
1061 Energy Tax Act of 1978, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); IRC § 406. 
1062 GATT Panel Report, DS31/R at 113 (finding Gas Guzzler Tax to be consistent with the GATT, Art. III.2).  
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C. LABELING & TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
The American Automobile Labeling Act (AALA) requires vehicles to be labeled with their 
percent content of US and Canadian parts, their country of assembly, and country of origin 
of the engine and transmission.1063 The Act is intended to encourage consumers to 
purchase American-made cars and imposes additional procedural burdens for EU 
automakers. Identifying the precise origin of specific parts may be challenging for EU 
exporters, but the US refuses to recognize the EU as a “country” of origin.1064 
 
The US also imposes technical safety and environmental rules, Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards, many of which do not conform to the UNECE standards and EU 
Directives required within the EU. This lack of regulatory harmony is addressed in a recent 
proposal by the American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC) and European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA) calling for mutual recognition of safety and 
environmental regulations. Regulations that would serve as potential candidates for such an 
agreement are listed on Attachment A hereto.1065  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the American Automobile Labelling Act could be qualified under 
Whalley as the risk of failing to comply with the standard of care and the letter of the law 
of the AALA. However, given that the United States refuses to recognize the European 
Union as “country of origin“, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is 
considered not valid or based on competence pursuant to international agreements.  
 
Following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. 
Given that the US standards neither conform to UNECE standards nor to EU regulation, 
pursuant to Hohfeld, it therefore could also be characterized as a Disability. In conclusion, 
following our FDLR-Model, the American Automobile Labelling Act, constitutes the 
Legal Risk of Limitation.  
 
 
                                                 
1063 49 C.F.R. § 583 (1992). 
1064 ECORYS Report 
1065 See AAPC-ACEA Joint Submission in Response to USTR’s Request for Comments Concerning Proposed 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement (May 10, 2013), in response to US Trade 
Representative, Request for Comments Concerning Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement, 
78 Fed. Reg. 62, p.19566 (Apr. 1, 2013). 
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D. STATE REGULATION 
 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) provides that control of air pollution be primarily regulated at 
the state and local government level.1066 An exception to this presumption, however, 
relates to the regulation of emissions from new mobile sources that have not yet reached 
the consumer. In these cases, regulation of emissions predominantly occurs at the federal 
level.1067  
 
The EPA, however, has granted one state (California) a preemption waiver, authorizing the 
State to create and enforce its own emissions standards, even if more stringent than that 
required by federal law.1068 Other states seeking to implement similar regulations may seek 
to do so by adopting CAA federal or California emission standards and will not be 
preempted, provided that a waiver has been granted in the latter case.1069 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Clean Air Act could be qualified under Whalley as the failure 
to assert non-contractual rights under the CAA given the preemption waiver that has 
already been granted to the state of California. However, given the fact that other states 
may fail to assert a similar exemption for their jurisdiction, following Mahler the CAA 
poses a risk based on a factual uncertainty due to a obligation, permission or prohibition 
and could also be characterized as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty.  
 
Given a fact pattern where a states may fail to assert such exemption, pursuant to Hohfeld 
it could also be characterized as the absence of a right and therefore as No Right. In 
conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, the Clean Air Act, constitutes the Legal Risk of 





                                                 
1066 CAA § 101(a)(3) (1990), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2005). 
1067 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
1068 See CAA § 209(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 1074.105. 
1069 See, e.g., Green Mt. Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302 (2007) 
(Vermont’s GHG standard, insofar as identical to California standard with preemption waiver, is permissible; 
federal statutes governing fuel economy in EPCA and carbon dioxide emissions in CAA were not expressly 
preempted). 
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III. CHEMICALS, COSMETICS & PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
A. CLASSIFICATION DIFFERENCES 
 
One fundamental trade barrier in this arena concerns the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act 
FDCA) classification of products as cosmetics, drugs, or over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, 
which may be classified differently under EU law. Since EU exports must comply with 
FDCA requirements, this in turn generates further regulatory hurdles with respect to 
registration, product safety and labeling requirements. The below chart provides a non-
exhaustive list of differences in product classification between the EU and US.1070  
 
FIGURE 26: PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION DIFFERENCES1071 
 
PRODUCT EU1072 US 
Sunscreen Cosmetic OTC drug 
Anti-acne lotion Medicinal product OTC drug 
Anti-cavity toothpaste Cosmetic OTC drug 
Anti-perspirant Cosmetic OTC drug 
Anti-dandruff shampoo Cosmetic Cosmetic & OTC drug 
Hair dye Cosmetic Cosmetic 
 
In the US, but not the EU, products may fall under more than one classification; EU 
businesses exporting anti-dandruff shampoo to the US, for example, must satisfy FDA 
requirements for both cosmetics and OTC drugs.1073 In general, drugs but not cosmetics 
must obtain FDA premarket approval before entering the market, which is accomplished 
through the New Drug Application (NDA) process or through monograph conformity in 
                                                 
1070 RPA Report, Comparative Study on Cosmetics Legislation in the EU and Other Principal Markets with 
Special Attention to so-called Borderline Products at 7 (2004), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=4557. (Accessed at 20 June 2013) 
1071 Id.  
1072 Effective as of July 11, 2013, EC Regulation No. 1223/2009 will replace the Cosmetics Directive. 
1073 RPA Report at 23.  
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accordance with the FDA’s OTC Drug Review.1074 Although premarket approval is not 
required for cosmetics, EU exporters may be pressured to submit their information through 
the FDA’s Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program to mitigate the risk of detainment or 
denial of entry for importing prohibited items. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act could be qualified under 
Whalley as the risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of 
care. Given that the classifications of the FDCA are interpreted differently under EU law 
than under US law, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is considered not 
valid or based on competence.  
 
Therefore, it could also be characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, 
given that in spite of the disparity in interpretation, the United States continues to enforce 
this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the FDCA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
 
B. LABELING & INGREDIENTS 
 
Under US law, a cosmetic may be prohibited as “adulterated” or “misbranded” for failure 
to follow Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP). Cosmetic GMP, however, consists only of 
guidelines; it does not forth specific minimum criteria to which foreign exporters can 
conform and on which they can rely to ensure compliance.1075 However, there are specific 
labeling requirements that must be satisfied for OTC drugs.1076 The US has also prohibited 
certain cosmetic ingredients that are permitted in the EU, which may create uncertainty for 
EU exporters who, unlike the US, often maintain positive lists of specific ingredients 
permitted in cosmetics.1077  
 
                                                 
1074 FDA, Is It a Cosmetic, a Drug, or Both? Or Is It Soap? (last updated Apr. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ucm074201.htm. (Accessed at 20 
June 2013) 
1075 FDA, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) Guidelines/Inspection Checklist (last updated Apr. 24, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GoodManufacturingPracticeGMPG
uidelinesInspectionChecklist/ucm2005190.htm. (Accessed at 20 June 2013) 
1076 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (2012) (OTC drug labeling requirements). 
1077 RPA Report at 52 (examples of ingredients permitted in EU, but not US, include many color additives for 
eye area cosmetics; various UV filters in sunscreen products; and bleaching products). 
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The Legal Risk posed by the Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) could be qualified 
under Whalley as the risks of failure to enforce or comply with the terms of the contract, 
such as the use of non-standard terms and conditions. Given that the GMP only consists of 
guidelines and thus constitutes a contractual agreement rather than a legal norm and given 
that there no specific minimum criteria, it poses the risk that its validity is depending on a 
set of facts it could also be following Mahler characterized as Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. However, given that such GMP may still be enforceable, the Legal Risk could 
also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FLDR-




Under the FDCA, labeling requirements to which EU exporters must conform differ 
considerably for prescription (Rx) drugs than for OTC drugs.1078 With respect to market 
access, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 allows US industries (not only 
pharmaceuticals) to petition for the restriction of imports from foreign countries on the 
grounds of national security, which the EU worries may be used by US manufacturers as a 
disguise for restricting free trade and competition.1079  
 
FDA approval requirements remain costly and time consuming. A drug manufacturer 
seeking to market a new prescription drug must, as discussed above, submit a NDA and 
undergo a comprehensive and costly testing process, only after which the FDA will grant 
marketing approval.1080 This process requires full reports of investigations into the drug’s 
safety and effectiveness, a list of all component, and complete descriptions of how the drug 
is manufactured, processed and packaged.1081 While the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for a 
less burdensome Abbreviated Drug Application, this has limited application to generic 
manufacturers seeking authorization to market an already FDA-approved brand name 
drug.1082 
 
                                                 
1078 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2012) (Rx drug labeling requirements) 
1079 ECORYS Report, Non-tariff measures in EU-US trade and investment – An economic analysis (2009) 
(written on behalf of the European Commission). 
1080 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
1081 Id. 
1082 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).  
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The EU has argued that other exclusionary measures exist for keeping foreign producers 
out of US markets on the basis of intellectual property rights infringement. For example, 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies to US patent holders by excluding 
the products infringing upon such rights from US markets. However, the Act does contain 
a statutory safe harbor exemption, although ITC investigations against European 
companies often compel them to settle such costly disputes.1083  
 
However, in their recent efforts to combat non-tariff barriers and encourage competition in 
the pharmaceutical industry, the US and EU appear to be in agreement. On June 17, 2013, 
the Supreme Court upheld the FTC’s ruling that a reverse payment settlement agreement 
between an innovative drug maker and a generic manufacturer constituted anticompetitive 
behavior in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act and antitrust laws.1084  
 
Following on the heels of this decision, on June 19, 2013, the European Commission 
imposed a € 93.8 million fine on a Danish pharmaceutical company, and smaller fines on 
other EU pharmaceuticals, for blocking the supply of a cheaper anti-depressant from 
entering the market through a pay-for-delay agreement.1085 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Trade Expansion Act could be qualified under Whalley as the 
risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given that 
the TEA entitles US producer to petition for the restriction of imports, it poses a risk due to 
an interpretation of the law that annihilates the competence to trade. Following Mahler it 
therefore could also be characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, given 
that effectively provides US producers with an immunity against any competition, the 
Legal Risk for EU manufacturers could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the TEA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
 
                                                 
1083 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). For litigation regarding this safe harbor exemption, see Amgen, Inc. v. ITC, 565 F.3d 
846 (2009) (US patent holder’s infringement claim fails regarding EPO produced in and exported from EU; 
imported EPO not subject to exclusion for infringement pursuant to safe harbor exemption); see also Eli Lilly & 
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (safe harbor includes medical devices, noting “[t]he phrase 
‘patented invention’ in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.”). 
1084 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4545 (Jun. 17, 2013). 
1085 European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies 
for delaying market entry of generic medicines (Jun. 6, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-563_en.htm?locale=en. (Accessed at 20 June 2013)  
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IV. COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
 
A. COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act imposes restrictions on foreign ownership 
and investment in the telecommunications sector.1086 Section 310(b) of the act prohibits a 
foreign person, governmental body or other entity from directly holding a common carrier 
radio (for terrestrial wireless and microwave, mobile, or satellite service) or aeronautical 
license, which constitutes a restriction on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The 
Communications Act does, however, allow indirect foreign investment in such licensees, 
subject to the following restrictions: (a) for non-controlling investors with aggregate direct 
or indirect foreign ownership of more than 20%, FCC requires licensee to obtain 
declaratory ruling finding that such ownership would serve the public interest; foreign 
ownership of up to 100% is presumed to serve the public interest for WTO member 
countries (including the EU); and (b) for controlling investors, Section 310(b)(3) prohibits 
direct, controlling ownership in the licensee of more than 20%; for such investments with 
ownership greater than 25%, licensee must obtain declaratory ruling (see subsection (a)).  
 
In April 2013, the FCC relaxed/streamlined certain foreign ownership rules in its Second 
Report and Order in IB Docket No. 11-133, but retained procedures for deferring FCC 
actions on applications for initial licenses and consents for M&A pending negotiation of 
security Resolution arrangements with and to the Team Telecom agencies. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Communications Act could be qualified under Whalley as the 
risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given that 
the CA prohibits a foreign person from holding a common carrier radio, it poses a risk due 
to an interpretation of the law that annihilates the competence to trade. Therefore, it could 
also be characterized following Mahler as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, 
given that effectively provides US citizens with an immunity against any competition, the 
Legal Risk for EU common carriers could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the CA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
                                                 
1086 47 U.S.C. § 609. 
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B. EXON-FLORIO PROVISION 
 
The Exon-Florio provision, adopted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, authorizes exclusionary trade measures on the basis of national security.1087 
The provision authorizes the President to block proposed or pending foreign mergers, 
acquisitions, or takeovers upon a determination that the foreign interest exercising control 
might take action that threatens to impair the national security.1088 An additional deterrent 
to telecommunications operators is the PATRIOT Act requirement that they may be 
compelled to assist law enforcement and national security agencies by implementing 
wiretaps and disclosing call records.1089  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Exon-Florio Provision could be qualified under Whalley as 
the risk of failing to comply with certain terms of a contract, or here an Executive Order. 
Given that the EFP authorizes exclusionary trade measures, it poses a risk depending on a 
set of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to trade.  
 
Therefore, it could also be characterized following Mahler as a Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. However, given that effectively provides US authorities with a power to 
restrain any competition, the Legal Risk for EU common carriers could also be qualified 
pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the EFP 
rules constitute the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
C. CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES 
 
Another regulatory disparity between EU and US law is the FCC’s classification of 
internet services as “information” rather than “telecommunication.” This classification is in 
conflict with the EU’s; it impedes new EU telecom operators from entering the US market 
and conflicts with net neutrality principles since, given the classification, US competitors 
                                                 
1087 50 U.S.C. § 2170, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2007). 
1088 See James K. Jackson, CRS Report for Congress, The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign 
Investment (Mar. 29, 2013). 
1089 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 229, 1001-1010; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1841-46 (2006); Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tolls Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. II, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 
28, 47, 50 U.S.C.). 
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are not required to provide equal access to high-speed connections. Despite its 
discriminatory nature, the Supreme Court has upheld the FCC’s discretion over such 
classification.1090 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the FCC Classification of Services could be qualified under 
Whalley as the risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of 
care. Given that the classifications of the FCC are interpreted differently under EU law 
than under US law, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is considered not 
valid or based on competence.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could also be characterized as a Qualification Legal 
Uncertainty. However, given that in spite of the disparity in interpretation, the United 
States continues to enforce this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model 
the FCC COS constitute the Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
V. CONSTRUCTION SERVICES; IRON, STEEL & OTHER METAL 
 
A. BUY AMERICAN ACT (BAA) 
 
With respect to government funded projects and the purchase of goods from foreign 
suppliers (including, but not limited to, iron, steel and other metal products), the Buy 
American Act (BAA) represents a major domestic preference statute governing 
procurement by the US federal government.1091  
 
BAA applies to any direct purchase by the federal government of more than $3,000 
provided that they are consistent with the public interest, reasonable in cost, and 
“substantially all” (at least 50% of the cost) of the acquisition is attributable to American-
made components.1092 A product is deemed of domestic origin based on the place of 
mining, production or manufacture, and not on the nationality of the contractor or investor. 
                                                 
1090 See NCTA v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967, 980, 992 (2005). 
1091 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8305. For an overview of BAA and comparison to other methods of US procurement, see 
John R. Luckey, CRS Report for Congress, Domestic Content Legislation: The Buy American Act and 
Complementary Little Buy American Provisions (Apr. 25, 2012). 
1092 48 C.F.R. § 25.101; CRS Report, Domestic Content Legislation at 1. 
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The lack of any statutory or regulatory definition as to what is sufficient to constitute 
“manufacturing” has created concerns for the EU about the lack of transparency in 
awarding government funded contracts and whether funds are truly awarded on a non-
discriminatory basis with regard to the manufacturer’s country of origin.1093 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the BAA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of failing 
to comply with certain terms of a contract, or here content prescriptions in public tenders. 
Given that the BAA authorizes exclusionary trade measures, it poses a risk depending on a 
set of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to trade. It therefore 
could also be characterized as a Qualification Factual Uncertainty. However, given that it 
effectively provides US authorities with a power to restrain any competition, the Legal 
Risk for EU construction companies could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the BAA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Liability. 
 
B. BUY AMERICA ACT LIKE RESTRICTIONS (BAR) 
 
Even if BAA, alone, does not constitute an impermissible or unfair restriction on foreign 
trade and investment, the US utilizes other federal and state level regulations with more 
stringent domestic-content requirements.  
 
At the federal level, the Buy America Act (hereafter, “Buy America”) is the popular name 
for several domestic content restrictions on funds administered by the Department of 
Transportation, including Federal Transit Administration funds, 49 U.S.C. § 5323(j); 
Federal Highway Administration funds, 23 U.S.C. § 313; AMTRAK funds, 49 U.S.C. § 
24305; Federal Railroad Administration High Speed Rail Program, 49 U.S.C. 24405; and 
Federal Aviation Administration funds, 49 U.S.C. § 50101.1094  
 
Buy America is one of several Little Buy American Acts used to restrict procurements that 
are not covered by BAA or to impose more stringent domestic content requirements.1095 
Legislation restricting Federal Highway Administration funds, for example, prohibits the 
                                                 
1093 ECORYS Report, Annexes, p. 58 
1094 For more information, see CRS Report, Domestic Content Legislation at 3-6; see also Department of 
Transportation’s Buy America website, available at http://dot.gov/buyamerica. 
1095 CRS Report, Domestic Content Legislation at 2. 
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Secretary of Transportation from awarding federal funds for any highway or transit project 
unless the steel or iron manufactured products used in such project are produced in the 
US.1096 In order to be subject to the Act, the product must be manufactured predominantly 
of steel or iron, which FHWA has interpreted to mean a product that consists of at least 
90% steel or iron upon delivery for installation or construction.1097  
 
While this bright-line rule has the virtue of clarity, there seems to be little rationale for 
defining “substantially all” to mean “at least 50%” for purposes of BAA while defining 
“predominantly all” to mean “at least 90%” for purposes of Buy America. Subsection 
313(g), added in 2012, also considerably extended Buy America’s coverage by providing 
that Buy America’s requirements extend to all contracts for an eligible project, “regardless 
of the funding source of such contracts, if at least 1 contract for the project is funding with 
amounts made available to carry out this title.”1098  
 
The increasing use of appropriations and procurement legislation to deter foreign 
contractors and investors appears to be a current trend.1099 State level regulations may 
provide an additional means for more restrictive trade measures against foreign 
contractors. In connection with a state-funded bridge construction project, the Third Circuit 
upheld the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement, which contains more stringent 
domestic-content requirements than Buy America, finding that the state legislation was not 
preempted.1100  
 
Some Little Buy America Acts impose “super” percentage requirements for domestic 
content, such as The Berry Amendment, other Department of Defense BAA requirements, 
and Department of Homeland Security requirements.1101 
 
                                                 
1096 23 U.S.C. § 313. 
1097 FHWA Memorandum, Clarification of Manufactured Products under Buy America (Dec. 21, 2012), 
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/contracts/121221.cfm. 
1098 23 U.S.C. § 313(g) (2012). 
1099 Indeed, although the BAA has only been amended four times, “since its enactment, every Congress in the 
intervening years has seen fit to enact some form of additional preference legislation.” CRS Report, Domestic 
Content Legislation at 1 & n.4.  
1100 See Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 2012). 
1101 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2533a-b (Berry Amendment, imposing 100% domestic content requirements for certain 
products, generally textiles and specialty metals); 10 U.S.C. § 2534 (other Dpt. of Defense super percentage 
requirements for certain naval vessels and goods relating thereto); 6 U.S.C. § 453b (prohibits Dpt. of Homeland 
Security from using funds to procure certain non-domestic items if the item is directly related to US’s national 
security interest). 
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The Legal Risk posed by the BAR much like the BAA could be qualified under Whalley as 
the risk of failing to comply with certain terms of a contract, or here an Executive Order. 
Given that the BAR authorizes exclusionary trade measures, it poses a risk depending on a 
set of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to trade.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. However, given that effectively provides US authorities with a power to 
restrain any competition, the Legal Risk for EU construction companies could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the 
BAR rules constitute the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
C. AMERICAN RECOVERY & REINVESTMENT ACT (ARRA) 
 
Section 1605 of the ARRA, a well-known US appropriation rider, imposes super 
percentage domestic content requirements to direct government purchases as well as to 
indirect purchases by non-federal recipients of such funds.1102 Section 1605(a) provides 
that none of the funds appropriated or can be used on a project for the construction, 
alteration, maintenance, or repair of any public building or public work, unless all of the 
iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in said project have been produced in the US. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by ARRA could be qualified under Whalley the risk of a business 
failing to implement regulatory requirements. The ARRA constitutes like the CAFE 
regulations a risk due to the interpretation of the law. However, other than the CAFE 
Regulation it presents a risk due to being an obligation.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could be also qualified as a Deontic Legal Uncertainty. 
Given the obligatory nature of the norm, pursuant to Hohfeld, it therefore could also be 
characterized as a Duty. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, ARRA constitutes the 
Legal Risk of Law. 
 
 
                                                 
1102 P.L. 111-5, § 1605, 123 Stat. 115, 303, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. (2009); 48 C.F.R. 25.6 (applies to construction 
projects). 
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VI. WOOD & PAPER PRODUCTS 
 
A. LACEY ACT 
 
The 1990 Lacey Act to combat illegal logging, as amended by the 2008 Farm Bill, requires 
importers of covered plants and planted products, including timber and other wood 
products to produce an import declaration, which must specify shipping information, plant 
details and other information to be in compliance with the Act.1103 This is a discriminatory 
trade measure by the US as domestic products are not subject to these reporting 
requirements. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the Lacey Act could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a 
non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. The Lacey Act has 
been found discriminatory and poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is 
considered not valid or based on competence pursuant to international agreements.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal 
Uncertainty. However, given that in spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, 
the United States continues to enforce this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could 
also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-
Model the Lacey Act constitutes the Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
B. ALTERNATIVE FUEL MIXTURE CREDIT 
 
This tax credit was created by the 2005 Highway Bill (although credit for Black Liquor 
ended in 2010). The US pulp and paper industry qualified for this tax credit, because 
certain by-products of the paper making process qualified as a biofuel. The US industry’s 
use of this tax credit provided significant monetary aid to the paper industry in the US and 
distorted the competition.1104 
 
 
                                                 
1103 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378. 
1104 ECORYS Report, Annexes at p. 196. 
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Overall, there are very few trade and investment barriers remaining between the EU and 
US in this sector and the actual trade between the two in wood and paper products is very 
low, due to steep transportation costs and the fact that the industry is generally more 
regionally-based.1105 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the AFMC could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. The AFMC has been 
found discriminatory and poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is considered 
not valid or based on competence pursuant to international agreements.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal 
Uncertainty. However, given that in spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, 
the United States continues to enforce this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could 
also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-




A. STATE LEVEL REGULATIONS 
 
The EU has expressed concerns about divergent US state legislation concerning 
electronics, in particular certain restrictions on the use of hazardous substances (RoHS), 
but the adoption of such standards appears to have been influenced by existing EU 
regulations and may actually be an instance of greater convergence. For example, 
California RoHS laws are modeled after EU Directive 2002/95/EC and are actually less 
stringent than the EU’s laws.1106 Another, the Electronic Waste Recycling Act of New 
Jersey, bans all manufacturers not in compliance with the Act, but imposes no more 
stringent requirements than those under EU law.1107 
 
 
                                                 
1105 ECORYS Report at p.164 
1106 CA Health & Safety Code §§ 25214.9-25214.10.2; 22 CA Code of Regulations § 66260.202 
1107 P.L.2007, c.347 (C.13:1E-99.95) § 2, as amended (2008); see also Proposed New Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26A-13.  
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The Legal Risk posed by the ROHS could be qualified under Whalley as the failure to 
assert non-contractual rights under the ROHS given the convergence of regulation in the 
state of California. However, given the fact that other states may fail similar convergence 
for their jurisdiction, following Mahler the ROHS poses a risk based on a factual 
uncertainty due to an obligation, permission or prohibition and could also be characterized 
as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. Given a fact pattern where a states may fail to assert such 
convergence, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized as the absence of a right 
and therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, the ROHS, 
constitutes the Legal Risk of Lack Of Right.  
 
B. SAFETY STANDARDS 
 
The EU has also expressed concerns that US regulation of safety standards are developed 
by separate bodies, both OSHA and ANSI. The International Electrotechnical Commission 
develops internationally accepted standards for electrical and electronic technologies, with 
which EU standards are aligned.1108 OSHA and ANSI purportedly rely on IEC standards as 
well, but the agencies do not create standards as to how each safety component is 
considered safe, causing a lack of transparency and possible diverge from international 
standards.1109 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the ESS could be qualified under Walley as the failure to assert 
non-contractual rights under the ESS given the convergence of regulation is dependent on 
two separate bodies. However, given the fact that either OSHA or ANSI may fail similar 
convergence for their jurisdiction, following Mahler the ESS poses a risk based on a 
factual uncertainty due to an obligation, permission or prohibition and could also be 
characterized as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. Given a fact pattern where a states may fail 
to assert such convergence, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized as the 
absence of a right and therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, 




                                                 
1108 IEC 62061 
1109 See IFM, http://www.ifm.com/ifmus/web/prod_tip_safety.htm. 
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VIII. FOOD & BEVERAGE 
 
A. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Regulation is bifurcated between the FDA and U.S. Dpt. of Agriculture (USDA), the latter 
of which has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate meat (beef, lamb, and pork), poultry, eggs, 
and products made therefrom.1110  
 
The FDA has significant regulatory over the following areas and corresponding 
compliance issues (non-exhaustive list): (i) fresh produce- pesticide residues and 
microbiological contamination; (ii) processed foods- microbiological contamination, 
submission of scheduled process documentation for canned foods, and food labeling 
requirements; (iii) dietary and nutritional supplements- ingredient and product safety, 
dietary supplement facts labeling, and marketing claims; (iv) infant formulas- FDA 
minimum nutrition and labeling requirements; (v) fruits and vegetable juices, carbonated 
and functional beverages- permissible food additives and ingredients, safe color additive, 
percent-juice declarations, juice labeling requirements, and nutrition facts labeling for all 
types; (vi) bottled water- FDA bottled water standards, chemical and microbiological 
contamination; (vii) dairy products- specific FDA food standards and import restrictions; 
(viii) seafood products- processing requirements such as Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) regulations; (ix) food ingredients- generally recognized as safe 
(GRAS) status; (x) functional food ingredients- intended uses and food label ingredient 
declarations; (xi) alcoholic beverages- beer, wine, note also disputes with EU relating to 
US wine labels and marketing.1111  
 
One hotly disputed issue concerns the EU’s stringent regulations on Genetically Modified 
Organisms. Here our analysis is limited to US-imposed trade barriers but we can provide 
additional resources to support that those standards shall be maintained.1112  
 
                                                 
1110 See FDA Imports, Food & Beverages, available at http://www.fdaimports.com/industries/food_beverages/. 
(Accessed at 20 September 2015)  
1111 Id. 
1112 For information on the ongoing dispute, see WTO Dispute Settlement, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, DS291 (2006). For recent measures taken by the EU, see Neil Munshi & Gregory Meyer, EU 
urges tests of US wheat imports (May 31, 2013), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7ee5832a-ca1c-11e2-
af47-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Wy9702S5. 
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The Legal Risk posed by the FDA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of failing 
to comply with certain terms of a contract, or here a Regulatory Order by the FDA. Given 
that the FDA may authorize exclusionary trade measures, it poses a risk depending on a set 
of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to trade. Therefore, 
following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Factual Uncertainty. 
However, given that effectively provides US authorities such as the FDA with a power to 
restrain any competition, the Legal Risk for EU food importers could also be qualified 
pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the BAR 
rules constitute the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
B. BIOTERRORISM ACT 
 
In relation to the general FDA-imposed requirements already discussed in Part III, FDA 
registration requirements imposed by the Bioterrorism Act for food and beverage (as well 
as medical device and drug) manufacturers pose an additional burden on foreign producers 
by requiring foreign producers to obtain a US Agent, to give the FDA advance notice of all 
shipments for animal or human consumption, and to register all facilities manufacture, 
process, pack or hold food for human or animal consumption. Products from unregistered 
food facilities cannot be imported and will be removed to secure storage.1113 An additional 
impediment to EU-US trade is compliance with record-keeping requirements by foreign 
businesses to allow for the traceability of food and procedures for the administrative 
detention of foods suspected to be noncompliant with import rules.1114 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the BA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of failing to 
comply with certain terms of a contract, or here a Regulatory Order under the BA. Given 
that the FDA may authorize exclusionary trade measures under the BA, it poses a risk 
depending on a set of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to 
trade. Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. However, given that effectively provides US authorities such as the FDA with 
a power to restrain any competition, the Legal Risk for EU food importers could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the 
BAR rules constitute the Legal Risk of Liability. 
                                                 
1113 21 C.F.R. 1.225-1.243 
1114 ECORYS Report, Annexes at p.168. 
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C. DAIRY EXPORTS 
 
The Grade “A” Pasteurized Milk Ordinance (PMO) provides three options to foreign 
companies seeking to enter the US market. First, the exporting company can sign a 
contract with a US state, agreeing to treat it as within its own jurisdiction, including rules 
concerning inspection and control.1115 Second, the country of the exporting company can 
adopt and comply with US rules in order to become a member of the National Conference 
on Interstate Milk Shipments (NCIMS). Third, the FDA may recognize the program and 
regulations of the exporting country as equivalent to its own.1116 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the BA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of failing to 
comply with certain terms of a contract, or here a Regulatory Order under the DER. Given 
that the FDA may authorize exclusionary trade measures under the DER, it poses a risk 
depending on a set of facts whether measures are taken that annihilate the competence to 
trade. Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Factual 
Uncertainty. However, given that effectively provides US authorities such as the FDA with 
a power to restrain any competition, the Legal Risk for EU dairy importers could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Liability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the 
BAR rules constitute the Legal Risk of Liability. 
 
D. WINE REGULATION 
 
Some US state laws prevent interstate retail sales of wines and spirits, prohibits direct to 
consumers’ shipment of wine to foreign wineries by denying them permits, prohibit EU 
exporters from distributing, rebottling or retailing their wine, require duplicate label 
approvals and impose fees and charges.1117 In addition, recent legislation proposed in the 
House would, if passed, gives states the power to prohibit consumers from purchasing 
imported wines through bans on shipments of wine from out of state retailers.1118 
 
                                                 
1115 For key provisions concerning safety requirements for dairy products, see 21 C.F.R. § 1B.101 (food 
labeling), § 1B.104 (nutritional quality guidelines for foods), § 1B.110 (current good manufacturing practices in 
manufacturing, packing, and handling food for human consumption), and 21 C.F.R. §§58, 131 in various parts 
(standards of identity for milk and milk products). 
1116 See ECORYS Report at p. 170. 
1117 ECORYS Report at p. 171. 
1118 H.R. 1161 (originally proposed in H.R. 5034). 
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The EU has also been concerned about inadequate protections of Geographical Indications 
(GIs), distinctive terms or place names that identify particular characteristics or origins of a 
product, with respect to US wine labels and marketing.1119 US wine labels continue to 
violate EU policy by using such terms, and the US continues to criticize EU restrictions as 
“severely restrict[ing] the ability of non-EU wine producers to use common or descriptive 
and commercially valuable terms to describe their products sold in the EU.”1120 In light of 
the US’s victory in a 2005 WTO Dispute Settlement case against the EU concerning 
trademarks and geographical indications, EU attempts to protect such terms may result in 
continued disputes and litigation.1121 
 
The Legal Risk posed by Wine Regulation could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of 
a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given that Wine 
Regulation entitles US states to enact legislation regarding the restriction of imports, it 
poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that annihilates the competence to trade.  
 
Therefore, following Mahler it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal 
Uncertainty. However, given that effectively provides US producers with an immunity 
against any competition, the Legal Risk for EU manufacturers could also be qualified 
pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the TEA 
rules constitute the Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
IX. MEDICAL, MEASURING & TESTING APPLIANCES 
 
A. FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT 
 
Pursuant to the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA), medical device owners or operators 
must register with the FDA and obtain premarket approval, the requirements for which are 
similar to those discussed in relation to Food & Beverages and Chemicals, Cosmetics & 
Pharmaceuticals.1122 
 
                                                 
1119 EC Regulation 607/2009. 
1120 US Trade Representative, 2013 Report on Technical Barriers to Trade at p.64 (Apr. 1, 2013). 
1121 WTO Dispute Settlement, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications, DS174, 290 (adopted 2005). 
1122 21 C.F.R. §§ 807, 812, 814. 
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The Legal Risk posed by the Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act could be qualified under 
Whalley as the risk of a non-contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of 
care. Given that the classifications of the FDCA are interpreted differently under EU law 
than under US law, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that is considered not 
valid or based on competence.  
 
Therefore, it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, 
given that in spite of the disparity in interpretation, the United States continues to enforce 
this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the FDCA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
 
B. MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTING 
 
Pursuant to the Medical Device Reporting (MDR) regulation, manufacturers, importers and 
user facilities are subject to various reporting requirements with the FDA concerning 
possible malfunctioning or injuries likely to be caused by such devices, which may entail 
high costs in terms of regular monitoring to ensure compliance.1123 Domestic distributors, 
but not importers, are exempt from the MDR reporting requirement.1124  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the MDR could be qualified under Walley as the failure to assert 
non-contractual rights under the CAA given the preemption waiver that has already been 
granted to domestic distributors. However, given the fact that foreign distributors may fail 
to assert a similar exemption for their jurisdiction, following Mahler the CAA poses a risk 
based on a factual uncertainty due to a obligation, permission or prohibition and could also 
be characterized as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. Given a fact pattern where a states may 
fail to assert such exemption, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized as the 
absence of a right and therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, 




                                                 
1123 21 C.F.R. § 803. 
1124 Pursuant to the Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1998. 
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C. SAFE MEDICAL APPLIANCES ACT 
 
Under the Safe Medical Appliances Act of 1990 (SMDA), additional burdensome 
reporting requirements include the requirement that manufacturers of certain high-risk 
devices include a summary of safety and effectiveness data upon application for pre-
market clearance, establish a Device Tracking system for future-patient notification in the 
event of a malfunction, and to submit post-market surveillance protocols.1125  
 
The Legal Risk posed by the SMDA could be qualified under Walley as the failure to 
assert non-contractual rights under the SMDA given that it applies exclusively to certain 
high risk devices. However, given the fact that certain producers may fail to assert their 
rights obtaining clearance, following Mahler the SMDA poses a risk based on a factual 
uncertainty due to a obligation, permission or prohibition and could also be characterized 
as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. Given a fact pattern where a states may fail to assert such 
exemption, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized as the absence of a right and 
therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, the SMDA, constitutes 
the Legal Risk of Lack Of Right.  
 
D. MEDICAL DEVICE USER FEE & MODERNIZATION ACT 
 
Through the Medical Device User Fee & Modernization Act (MDUFA) of 2002 (amended 
in 2012, MDUFA III), other discriminatory measures were imposed such as granting 
reductions and reimbursement of fees charged to obtain premarket approval for US Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), but EU SMEs are not eligible.1126 The 2012 MDUFA III 
amendments make compliance more costly by expanding the definition of types of 
manufacturers that must pay registration fees. Noncompliance with MDUFMA may result 
in a device being found to be “adulterated,” prohibiting import to the US.1127  
 
                                                 
1125 P.L. 102-300, amending FD&CA § 519. 
1126 P.L. 112-14, which includes MDUFA III. 
1127 For an illustration of these complicated requirements, see United States v. Undetermined Quantities of 
Boxes of Articles of Device, No. 07-1769 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38952 (D.N.J. May 30, 2007) (“Read together, [§§ 
381(e)(1) and 382(f) create the following rule: an adulterated device may be exported if it meets the four 
requirements found in § 381(e)(1)(A)-(D); however, this exception does not apply if the product is unapproved 
unless the product…meets the CGMP [current good manufacturing practices] requirements…Moreover, devices 
that fail to meet the requirements of § 360(e) (relating to…premarket approval) are not eligible for export under 
§ 381(e), unless the FDA grants an exception.”) (emphasis added).  
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The Legal Risk posed by MDUFA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given MDUFA applies 
exclusively to US SMEs it was found discriminatory and poses a risk due to an 
interpretation of the law that is considered not valid or based on competence pursuant to 
international agreements.  
 
Therefore, it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, in 
spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, the United States continues to enforce 
this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the MDUFA rules constitute the 
Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
X. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
A. DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION 
 
In a WTO dispute by the then European Communities against the US concerning US tax 
exemptions for Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) with respect to their foreign-source 
trade income, the Appellate Body found that the MFC measure constituted prohibited 
export subsidies under ASCM Art. 3.1(a) (prohibited subsidies – export subsidies), and 
that the US violated Art. 10.1 (export subsidies not listed in Art. 9.1) and subsequently Art. 
8 (export competition commitments) through the use of FSC exemptions with no 
limitations on the amount of exemption and no discretionary element to its grant.1128  
 
The US subsequently adopted the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act 
of 2000 (FSCE), and the Appellate Body found that the FSCE was not justified as a 
measure to avoid double taxation of foreign-source income, that it effectively extended 
certain prohibited FSC provisions, and that it accorded less favorable treatment to imported 
products than to similar US domestic products in violation of GATT Art. III:4.1129   
 
                                                 
1128 WTO Dispute Settlement, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporation,” DS108 (adopted 
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds108sum_e.pdf. 
(Accessed at 20 September 2014) 
1129 Id. (adopted 2002). 
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Similarly, when the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was enacted, the Appellate Body 
upheld the Panel’s finding that “to the extent that the United States, by enacting Section 
101 of the Jobs Act, maintains prohibited FSC and ETI subsidies through the transitional 
and grandfathering measures, it continues to fail to implement fully the operative DSB 
recommendations and rulings…”1130 To the extent such measures continue today, if at all, 
the US remains noncompliant. 
 
The Legal Risk posed by the FSCE could be qualified under Walley as the failure to assert 
non-contractual rights under the FSCE given that it applies exclusively to certain Foreign 
Sales Corporations. However, given the fact that certain sales corporations may fail to 
assert their rights with respect to their exemption from taxation or may not be entitled to it 
due to the fact that they are a domestic sales corporation, following Mahler the FSCE poses 
a risk based on a factual uncertainty due to a obligation, permission or prohibition and 
could also be characterized as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. Given a fact pattern where a 
state may fail to assert such exemption, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized 
as the absence of a right and therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-
Model, the FSCE, constitutes the Legal Risk of Lack Of Right.  
 
B. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers 
requires such issuers to disclose payments made to a foreign government of the US Federal 
Government for the purposes of the development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, and such 
reports must be filed annually. While the measure was purportedly an attempt at increased 
transparency, it may have the effect of deterring transactions with foreign entities and 
restrict foreign investments in such public projects as discussed in Part V above. The 
provision also imposes a very low materiality threshold of $100,000, making reporting 
very costly, and some US companies have even disclosed to investors in 10-K filings that it 
poses a governmental risks that undermines international competiveness.1131  
 
                                                 
1130 Id. (adopted 2006). 
1131 Brigham A. McCown, Oil and Gas Payment Disclosures May Harm Investors (Mar. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brighammccown/2013/03/22/oil-and-gas-payment-disclosure-may-harm-investors/. 
(Accessed at 20 September 2014) 
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The Legal Risk posed by the DFA could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given that the disclosure 
requirements of Section 1504 of DFA apply exclusively to transactions with foreign 
entities, it was found discriminatory and poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law that 
may be considered not valid or based on competence pursuant to international agreements. 
  
Therefore it could also be characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, in 
spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, the United States continues to enforce 
this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the DFA rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
 
C. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (SOX) 
 
Compliance with the SOX, adopted in 2002, is costly for EU firms listed on US exchanges 
as well as EU auditing firms, which may be faced with conflicting laws on audits and 
corporate governance. Section 104(a) of SOX gives the PCAOB authority to conduct 
inspections to ensure compliance and PCAOB Rule 4012 implements the mandate to 
inspect foreign registered firms. The rule sets out a sliding scale approach for cooperating 
with foreign regulators, but it is unclear whether it provides sufficient guidance or 
predictability for foreign firms seeking compliance with US laws.1132 
 
The Legal Risk posed by SOX could be qualified under Whalley the risk of a business 
failing to implement regulatory requirements. The SOX constitutes like the CAFE 
regulations a risk due to the interpretation of the law. However, other than the CAFE 
Regulation it presents a risk due to being an obligation. Following Mahler could be also 
qualified as a Deontic Legal Uncertainty. Given the obligatory nature of the norm, 
pursuant to Hohfeld, it therefore could also be characterized as a Duty. In conclusion, 
following our FDLR-Model, the SOX constitutes the Legal Risk of Law. 
 
 
                                                 
1132 Gray, Elizabeth P. & Matelis, Jessica L, PCAOB Foreign Inspections – A Chinese Conundrum, 44 Rev. 
Securities & Commodities Reg. 12, 145 (Jun. 22, 2011) 
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D. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT (FATCA) 
 
In 2010, the US enacted FATCA, which creates serious barriers for EU financial 
institutions seeking to invest in the US market. Under FATCA, all Foreign Financial 
Intermediaries (FFIs) must enter into agreements with the IRS to carry out burdensome due 
diligence and information reporting tasks with respect to client known or suspected to be 
US citizens. Participating FFIs must also withhold US tax on payments to non-
participating FFIs and to account holders who fail to disclose their identities to US tax 
authorities.1133  
 
Another issue under FATCA is the “Pass thru Payments” rule, which compliance with 
which is especially difficult for FFIs. The rule requires that FFIs must withhold a 30% tax 
on any Pass thru Payments made to an account holder that (1) does not agree to disclose its 
identity, or (2) is a non-participating FFI.1134  
 
The IRS, however, has not defined the scope of pass thru payments and as currently 
drafted, could include payments having no direct or apparent US source. Compliance with 
FATCA, however, may put EU FFIs in breach of EU laws on data protection, customer 
relations, and withholding tax procedures as well as EU Member States’ tax treaties with 
other countries.1135  
 
To avoid this, in 2012 the UK entered into an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) with the 
US, under which UK FFIs must comply with certain reporting obligations and in return, 
will be exempt from FATCA withholding rules. Implementing regulations are expected to 
take effect later this year. The adoption of IGAs by other EU countries, however, may 
create duplicative or inconsistent reporting requirements for FFIs that qualify as residents 
in multiple jurisdictions with different IGAs.  
 
                                                 
1133 See Market Access Database, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) (last updated Dec. 19, 2011), 
available at http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=115416&version=1. 
1134 Id. 
1135 See Devon Robotics v. Deviedma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108573, 10-11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2010) (a foreign 
nondisclosure statute “do[es] not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its 
jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate that statute”); see also Market 
Access Database, SEC Regulations for Securities Firms (last updated 2009), available at 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barriers_details.htm?barrier_id=990025&version=5. (Accessed at 20 September 
2014) 
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The Legal Risk posed by FATCA could be qualified under Walley as the failure to assert 
non-contractual rights under the FATCA given that it applies exclusively to certain Foreign 
Financial Intermediaries. However, given the fact that certain Foreign Financial 
Intermediaries may fail to assert their rights with respect to entering into agreements with 
the IRS or may not be entitled to it. 
 
Following Mahler FATCA poses a risk based on a factual uncertainty due to a obligation, 
permission or prohibition and could also be characterized as a Deontic Factual Uncertainty. 
Given a fact pattern where a states may fail to assert such a right to an agreement with the 
IRS, pursuant to Hohfeld it could also be characterized as the absence of a right and 
therefore as No Right. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model, FATCA, constitutes the 
Legal Risk of Lack Of Right.  
 
E. SEC REGULATIONS FOR SECURITIES FIRMS 
 
While EU securities firms can technically register as broker-dealers or investment advisors, 
in the form of both branches and subsidiaries, this is difficult in practice. The establishment 
of a US broker-dealer branch by foreign firms requires SEC registration, making such 
firms subject to SEC regulation. Foreign mutual funds have been unable to make public 
offerings in the SEC, because SEC requirements make it similarly impractical for a foreign 
fund to register as required by the US Investment Company Act of 1940.1136 However, 
Rule 15a-6 pursuant to the Exchange Act specifies certain exemptions from registration for 
foreign broker-dealers, and the SEC has recently issued a guidance letter for 
compliance.1137 
 
The Legal Risk posed by BDC could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given BDC makes it very 
difficult in practice for foreign firms to set up broker dealer operations in the United States, 
it was in spite of certain exemptions that are subject to interpretation found discriminatory 
and poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law depending on uncertain validity rules.  
 
                                                 
1136 See Market Access Database, SEC Regulations for Securities Firms. 
1137 See SEC, FAQs Regarding Rule 15a-6 and Foreign Broker-Dealers (Mar. 21, 2013, updated Jun. 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-15a-6-foreign-bd.htm. (Accessed at 20 September 
2014) 
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Therefore, it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal Uncertainty. However, in 
spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, the United States continues to enforce 
this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a 
Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model the BDC rules constitute the Legal 
Risk of Limitation. 
 
F. DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
 
IFRS reporting standards, adopted by the EU in 2005, are mandatory in the EU for public 
companies and differ from US GAAP in the following areas, which affects requirements 
for financial statements and thus on the general conduct of IFRS-reporting entities doing 
business in the US: (i) consolidation, (ii) statement of income, (iii) inventory, (iv) earning-
per-Share, (v) development costs.1138 The SEC supports efforts by the FASB and IASB in 
their efforts to attain convergence between GAAP and IFRS standards, with the US GAAP 
moving towards IFRS principles, but the process remains incomplete. Specific differences 
that may result in different reported results have been declining but include that IFRS does 
not allow Last, In, First Out (LIFO), uses a single-step method for impairment write-
downs, rather than GAAP’s two-step method, and does not permit debt for which a 
covenant violation has occurred to be classified as non-current, unless a waiver has been 
obtained.1139  
 
The Legal Risk posed by DAS could be qualified under Whalley as the risk of a non-
contractual obligation failing to meet a defined standard of care. Given DAS makes it very 
costly in practice for foreign firms to set up operations, raise financing or even go public in 
the United States, it poses a risk due to an interpretation of the law depending on uncertain 
validity rules. Therefore, it could be also characterized as a Qualification Legal 
Uncertainty. However, in spite of its declaration as a discriminatory measure, the United 
States continues to enforce this standard and therefore, the Legal Risk could also be 
qualified pursuant to Hohfeld as a Disability. In conclusion, following our FDLR-Model 
the DAS rules constitute the Legal Risk of Limitation. 
 
                                                 
1138 For information on these differences, see Remi Forgeas, Is IFRS That Different From U.S. GAAP? (Jun. 16, 
2008), available at http://www.ifrs.com/overview/General/differences.html. (Accessed at 20 June 2014)  
1139 See IFRS, Questions and Answers, available at http://www.ifrs.com/updates/aicpa/ifrs_faq.html#q10. 
(Accessed at 20 June 2014)  
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XI. PROPOSED MECHANISM OF TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
A. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
As early as 1796, John Adams, after having negotiated for the United States the first Treaty 
on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with France, emphatically highlighted the 
protection of alien property by the rules of international law.1140 
 
There is no principle of the law of nations more firmly established than that which 
entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of another country in 
friendship with their own to the protection of its sovereign by all efforts in his 
power.1141 
 
Under rules of customary international law, no state is obliged to accept a foreign 
investment within its borders in accordance with the concept of state sovereignty. 
However, if a state has admitted a foreign investment, it will be subject to a minimum 
standard towards that investment. Sovereignty also dictates that states may enter into 
treaties with other states. Modern treaties on foreign investment, go far beyond the 
minimum standard required by customary international law with regards to the scope of 




                                                 
1140 Dolzer Rudolf and Christoph Schreuer (2012), Principles of International Investment Law, p.1., Oxford 
University Press 
1141 Id. Dolzer and Schreiner argue that “[u]ntil the Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917 rules protecting 
foreign investment were of no relevance and importance.  Very different though is the picture in recent years 
due to the exponential growth in Bilateral Investment Treaties: in 2005 the global total of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties was put at 2,495. They serve as an international instrument between two State parties to regulate the 
bilateral treatment of foreign investments. Although they provide for different forums of dispute settlement for 
investment disputes, the most common by far is the ICSID Tribunal, which entered into force in 1966 and has 
155 member states.” 
1142 Dolzer and Schreuer argue that [b]efore WWII, most states adopted legislation providing ‘absolute 
immunity from relinquishing property in their state courts. These policies forced any foreign investor with 
commercial disputes to rely on diplomatic negotiations by their home state as a way to resolve claims. This 
often was a careful balance between both states that required political capital and resulted in inaccurate 
remedies. Over time, developed nations began instituting reforms to change this post-WWII absolute immunity 
to restrictive immunity. By the 1980s, many developed and developing states enacted legislation providing their 
national court system “jurisdiction over disputes involving commercial activities, real property, expropriatory 
actions, and a limited number of other specified actions, as well as over disputes in which states had waived 
their immunity, particularly through arbitration agreements.” 
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B. PROPOSED INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM IN TTIP 
 
The proposed arbitration agreements that are currently negotiated in the form of a so-called 
Investor State Dispute Settlement or ISDS mechanism are almost always present in modern 
International Investor Agreements. Usually they mandate that arbitration awards will be 
recognized by parties to the agreement and provide clearly defined enforcement 
mechanisms.1143  
 
States negotiate these international investment arbitration agreements to secure 
investor protection of neutral international dispute arbitration by including provisions 
against both direct and indirect expropriation. They mandate that legal expropriation 
only occurs when it is: (1) done for a public purpose; (2) does not discriminate against 
a foreign investor; (3) involves a “prompt, adequate, and effective” payment of 
compensation; and (4) is in agreement with the due process of law1144.  
 
Customarily, two doctrines are used to determine state and investor rights and obligations, 
the Hull Rule and the Calvo Doctrine. The Hull Rule, argued to be customary international 
law mostly by developed states, declares foreign investors should receive “prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation” when a host state expropriates investments or 
resources.1145  
 
Alternatively, the Calvo Doctrine argued “to be customary international law by mostly 
developing states, conditions that foreign investors should be under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of host state courts with no more favorable rights than the host state’s 
nationals.”1146 Therefore, international arbitration is becoming increasingly more important 
to international trade as states are seeking to avoid either the Hull Rule or Calvo Doctrine 
to resolve disputes. 
                                                 
1143 See supra note 1101. Dolzer and Schreuer argue that “[t]he enforcement procedures depend on whether the 
conflicting parties are both members of the ICSID Convention or if enforcement procedures fall under the New 
York Convention. These are often under the auspices of the New York Convention and ICSID. One example 
can include coercive enforcement against state property. Generally, ISDS provisions are executed as a way to 
protect foreign investors from host state expropriation.” 
1144 Id.  
1145 Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 558 
(1981); Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic Aspects of Bilateral and 
Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 294 (2007). 
1146 R. Dolzer, supra, at 560; Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 294. UN General Assembly Resolution 3171, 
similar to the Calvo Doctrine, declared that states should have the right to use their national legislature to 
determine where international disputes would be settled, how much compensation would be due to investors, 
and which way the compensation would be paid. G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974) 
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The ISDS provisions allow foreign investors to initiate international arbitration claims 
against host states for violations investment agreement violations. They contain provisions 
establishing the treatment of investors, mandating requirements for expropriation and 
nationalization of investments, codifying rules regarding financial transfers and payment 
between parties of different states, and providing for dispute settlement mechanisms1147 
 
C. FAILURE OF ISDS IN THE RESOLUTION OF TRANSNATIONAL RISK 
 
In December 2013, a consortium of more than 100 citizen protection groups signed an 
open letter (“Open Letter”) seeking to exclude ISDS provisions from the TTIP.1148 On 21 
January 2014 the European Commission announced that it will halt certain talks with the 
U.S. over the TTIP until it a public consultation about how to deal with ISDS concerns.1149  
 
Civil organizations opposed provisions that would allow foreign companies to sue host 
governments over policies aimed at public policy and environmental protection goals.  It 
has also been feared that ISDS may award foreign companies large compensations as a 
result of any lost profit or investment money due to any host government’s enacted 
legislation. This has also been referred to as the “Right to Regulate” that needs to be 
protected for any Member State of the European Union and the United States alike.1150 
 
Another major criticism with respect to these investor statement dispute settlement 
mechanisms or arbitration tribunals has been that they are actually creating a separate 
jurisdiction above or besides the national jurisdictions.  Another point of criticism that had 
been featured prominently was that these arbitration tribunals consist predominately of 
attorneys nominated by corporations and attorneys that are actually dependent on such 
corporations' contracts or mandates in the future and therefore cannot arbitrate or judge 
independently or cannot be perceived as judging independently. 1151 
                                                 
1147 Carrie E. Anderer, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU Legal Order: Implications of the Lisbon Treaty, 
35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 856–57 (2010).  
1148 Open letter of civil society against investor privileges in TTIP, BILATERS.ORG (Dec. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/?open-letter-of-civil-society]. (Accessed at 23 June 2014) 
1149 EU Says It Will Hit ‘Pause’ on TTIP Investment Talks Pending Public Debate, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Jan. 21, 
2014), available at http://insidetrade.com/201401212458789/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/eu-says-it-will-hit-
pause-on-ttip-investment-talks-pending-public-debate/menu-id-948.html (Accessed at 23 June 2014)  
1150 European Commission, Investment protection in TTIP, [online], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.5%20Inv%20Prot%20and%20ISDS.pdf 
(Accessed at 4 September 2015)  
1151 See supra note 1148.  
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Several years ago the International Monetary Fund proposed a sovereign debt restricting 
convention that was never adopted because of political opposition in the United States by 
the second Bush administration. At the time, the United States preferred so-called 
collective action clauses, allowing essentially payment terms of a loan facility to be 
changed through super majority as opposed to unanimous one1152.   
 
Another important factor in ISDS was the composition of the actual arbitral tribunal. The 
U.S. Model follows a more traditional approach, whereas the EU Draft creates a new 
process of selecting arbitrators. The U.S. Model specifies that  
 
[T]he tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each of the 
disputing parties and the third, who shall be the presiding arbitrator, appointed by 
agreement of the disputing parties.1153  
 
Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the ICSID acts as the appointing authority for all 
arbitration proceedings. Contrary to the U.S. Model, the EU Draft developed a new 
methodology implemented for  
 
[A]ll future EU investment arbitration agreements in which: 1) each party proposes at 
least five arbitrators of their own choosing; (2) each party selects at least five 
arbitrators “who are not nationals of either Party to act as chairperson of the 
tribunals;” and (3) additional arbitrators, as agreed upon by both parties [..]1154 
 
Furthermore, the EU Draft outlines that arbitrators “shall have a specialized knowledge of 
international law, in particular international public law and international investment law,” 
be independent of affiliation with any government party1155.  
 
                                                 
1152 Schwarcz, Steven L., The Global Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk, Oxford University (November 2010), 
[online], available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2974&context=faculty_scholarship (Accessed at 20 
May 2014) He argues that “There are two fundamental problems with collective action clauses.  First, collective 
action clauses are not always included in sovereign loan and bond agreements.1152  In the Greek debt crisis1152 
for example 90 percent of the total debt was not governed by collective action clauses.1152  Second even if every 
sovereign loan and bond agreement included collective action clauses those clauses only work on an agreement-
by-agreement basis.  Therefore anyone or more syndicated banks or group of bond holders that fails to achieve a 
super majority vote would itself be a hold out vis a vis other creditors.  It therefore is unlikely that collective 
action clauses can ever effectively resolve the hold-out problem in sovereign debt restructuring.  I therefore 
believe that an international convention in which super majority ruling can bind all of a nation's creditors is 
needed to solve the hold-out problem.” 
1153 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, note 103, art. 27(1), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm. (Accessed at 20 June 2014) 
1154 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals 
Established by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, COM (2012) 335 final (May 6, 
2012) 
1155 Id. 
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Here are the most common criticisms against ISDS that prove why ISDS whilst performing 
crucial functions in principle, still is not a very effective provision for the resolution of 
transnational risk: 
 
1) ISDS unravels democratic decisions 
The decision to enter into a Free-Trade Agreement or into any international treaty 
requires a democratic decision making process that in the case of the TTIP, in 
particular involves national parliaments, Congress and the European Parliament. The 
many changes that have already been negotiated are testament to the workings of that 
very democratic process.  
Once adopted, ISDS would be in place to enforce exclusively the terms of this 
democratically legitimated agreement. Neither ISDS nor any other judicial institution 
that would be entrusted with the enforcement of an international agreement would be in 
a position to unravel democratic decisions. However, the Right to Regulate must be 
ascertained and constitutional part of the TTIP.1156  
2) ISDS undermines state sovereignty 
The negotiation of any international agreement between sovereign countries is an act of 
state sovereignty. Therefore, any substantive provisions of an agreement such as the 
TTIP, even including international investment arbitration tribunals such as ISDS are an 
act of sovereignty.  
 
                                                 
1156 Lester, Simon, Talk of a ‘Right to Regulate’ Is Hurting the Trade Debate, HuffPostPolitics (July 2015) 
[online], available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-lester/talk-of-a-right-to-regula_b_7839680.html 
(Accessed at 4 September 2015), Lester argues that “[u]nfortunately, the term "right to regulate" is misleading, 
as it glosses over key distinctions in how international economic law rules affect domestic regulation. It is true 
that such international rules do affect regulation; but they do so in much more nuanced ways than the debate 
acknowledges, and the nuances are important here. In simple terms, international rules may identify and prohibit 
one particular policy goal (e.g., protectionism) that regulations might pursue; or, in the alternative, they may 
hold every policy goal open to review under a broader standard that gives international courts significant 
oversight power. It is this distinction that holds the key to the debate, but it is often ignored. [,,,] Talk of "rights" 
can be unproductive when carried out with a lack of precision, and that is what is going on here. When domestic 
regulation intersects with international economic law, the underlying issue is the scope and extent of the 
constraints imposed by international law, and the allocation of power between the national and the international. 
International law can certainly interfere with the ability of governments to regulate; indeed, that might be the 
point of it.” 
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ISDS or better the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court are necessary to 
enforce the provisions of the agreement whenever there is a difference of interpretation 
or an allegation that either party did not comply. Neither ISDS nor any other judicial 
institution defines the terms of the agreement – it merely enforces the law and policy as 
decided upon between states. 
3) ISDS allows issues of public interest to be decided behind closed doors 
Arbitration conducted under the UNCITRAL-Arbitration Rules of 20141157 would be 
more transparent than many, even most, national courts in the EU. Even if international 
arbitration is typically a confidential proceeding, investor-state disputes are different 
from this norm and more transparent, given that the development is towards more open 
dispute resolution between investors and states.  
However, even UNCITRAL-arbitrations tribunals do not constitute a court integrated 
into the hierarchy of judicial systems in the Member States of the European Union or in 
the state or federal courts of the United States of America.  
4) ISDS favors large corporations 
Investment protection under existing treaties has to a large degree been sought by small 
and medium-sized companies (SMEs). According to a 2012 OECD study, individuals 
or small companies with limited international presence have initiated 22% of cases. 
Statistics from ICSID (2014) also indicate that individuals have initiated 16% of their 
cases.1158  
Hence, while it is true that the majority of cases is carried by larger corporations, the 
reason for this comes also, quite literally, with the territory. Customarily, it will be and 
are larger corporations that operate on a transatlantic level.  
 
                                                 
1157 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, UNCITRAL (April 2014), 
[online], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html 
(Accessed at 20 June 2014)  
1158 European Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Some facts and figures (January 2015), 
[online], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf (Accessed at 6 
August 2015)  
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However, it is also true, given the disintermediation by and the cross-border nature of 
the internet and information technology in general, an ever growing number of even 
young start-up businesses will transact on a transnational level and benefit from 
investor protections in the future. 
5) ISDS is a private system intended to circumvent national courts 
As one important cornerstone of international trade with predictable rules and rule of 
law, arbitration is regulated by legislation which provides for the rules and procedures 
how arbitration must be conducted in order to comply with the rule of law. After all, it 
is the national courts that decide, if necessary, whether or not a specific proceeding has 
been conducted in compliance with the rule of law.  
However, ISDS is not a judicial system of democratically legitimated and elected 
judges living up to the standard of judges we came to be used to in our Article III 
Courts of the United States1159, where judges are nominated by the President and 
confirmed in a Senate Hearing1160 or at the European Court of Justice, where members 
of the Court are nominated by the governments of the Member State whose citizen they 
are and confirmed by the European Parliament.  
ISDS as arbitration tribunals are as mentioned supra in a co-existence with national 
courts than being fully integrated into a hierarchical procedure where national courts 
can ask for a preliminary ruling, an advisory opinion or can order a delegation to them 
as a particular court of competent jurisdiction for either a particular subject matter or 
geographic area, as would be the case with TTIP. Therefore, even if ISDS is not 
                                                 
1159 Resnik, Judith, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, Yale Law School (January 1985), [online], 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1935&context=fss_papers 
(Accessed at 25 June 2014)  
1160 Article III of the U.S. Constitution states: “Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, 
and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
continuance in office. Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between 
two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between 
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens 
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. […]” 
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circumventing national courts, it certainly is neither a part of the regular judicial system 
nor entrusted with the same powers of terminal resolution that compared with a 
judgment that multilaterally takes effect not only between the two parties present at the 
arbitration but also with legal effect towards all potentially interested third parties. 
6) ISDS is mute when you have nations with well working courts  
 
Whether the courts of country are well working or not is not the issue when choosing 
international arbitration. Factors such as neutrality, the language of the domestic court 
and procedural peculiarities, questions of enforcement of the award, knowledge about 
the subject matter on part of the domestic judges and the time that must be expected the 
procedure takes and whether there is an enforceable decision are the issues of concern 
in most cases and they rarely weigh in favor of unspecialized domestic courts.  
 
However, arbitration panels remain still subject to the criticism that they are not 
integrated into the judicial hierarchy and exist in a parallel-structure to existing courts, 
whereas an effective trade and investment court would combine all the advantages of 
international arbitration with the authority and legitimacy of a court that integrated into 
the court systems of its member states. 
 
7) A free trade agreement can be negotiated without ISDS 
 
Also TTIP needs a mechanism to ensure that the terms of the agreement can be 
enforced. In this respect, a contract between two business partners is no different than a 
treaty between states. If an agreement does not provide for the possibility to sue for an 
alleged breach of the agreement, the terms of the agreement will become moot. The 
only remedies to settle a dispute that remain are national courts or arbitration, which 
means that the investor effectively needs to sue in a foreign court, where he must trust 
said court that he in fact operates completely independent from its own government, 
facing on average longer trials than in arbitration with a result that can only be 
enforced in a limited number of countries, for instance in EU countries if rendered by 
an EU court, and in the United States, if rendered by a U.S. Federal or U.S. State Court. 
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Therefore, TTIP, most certainly will require an instrument of enforcement of its own 
terms and conditions. However, it does not necessarily require ISDS or any other form 
or arbitration tribunal with its apparent shortcomings in terms of its democratic 
legitimacy and incorporation into the judicial process of the agreement’s member 
states.  
 
Moreover, neither international arbitration panels or tribunals nor the proposed ISDS 
has any of the competences that are so required with respect to insolvency proceedings 
of private parties that incur a nexus both in the European Union and the United States 
of America and are cross-border in nature, in order to provide for a transnational, 
transatlantic insolvency procedure. Certainly, it needs to include the competence even 
more in demand these days with respect to insolvency proceedings with sovereign state 
debtors that require workouts between sovereign debtors. For instance a member state 
in the European Union, with creditors, both private, institutional, international or 
sovereign in nature that have a nexus both to the United States and the European 
Union, should have the possibility to file for sovereign debt restructuring at a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court.1161  
 
Due to this apparent shortcomings of ISDS it is certainly upon us, to propose an 
alternative judicial institution that encompasses these competences and provides for an 
instrument that effectively has the ability commensurate with its jurisdiction extending 
to cases of breach of contract concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership also to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of 
default with transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations 
without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT. How such a 
judiciary could be modelled, on which principles it should be based, which historical 
examples it could embrace and which values it shall be committed to, we will discuss 





                                                 
1161 See Chapter 6.III. A Plea for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court 
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CHAPTER 6: FROM FIAT TO EXIT 
 
I. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND EQUITABLE DEFAULT 
 
A. SCHUMPETER’S CONCEPT OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 
 
Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction1162 has been 
widely recognized as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one. He coined the seemingly paradoxical term “creative destruction,” and generations 
of economists have adopted it as a shorthand description of creating innovation by an 
almost darwinistic way of survival of the fittest where the market choses those as winners 
who have the ability to adapt the fastest to new demand quickly discarding yesterday’s 
product or business. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942)1163, the Austrian-
American economist wrote: 
 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same 
process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential 
fact about capitalism.1164 
 
Although Schumpeter devoted a mere six-page chapter to “The Process of Creative 
Destruction,” in which he described capitalism as “the perennial gale of creative 
destruction,” it has become the centerpiece for modern thinking on how economies evolve. 
Schumpeter and the economists who adopt his succinct summary of the free market’s 
ceaseless churning echo capitalism’s critics in acknowledging that lost jobs, ruined 
companies, and vanishing industries are inherent parts of the growth system. Schumpeter’s 
conviction was that over time, societies that allow creative destruction to operate grow 
more productive and richer; their citizens see the benefits of new and better products, 
shorter work weeks, better jobs, and higher living standards. 
                                                 
1162 Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1975, orig. pub. 1942) "Creative Destruction" From Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (New York: Harper, pp. 82-85, available at: https://notendur.hi.is/~lobbi/ut1/a_a/SCUMPETER.pdf 
1163 Ibid.., available at http://eh.net/book_reviews/capitalism-socialism-and-democracy/ [online] (Accessed 
September 17, 2016) 
1164 Id. p. 83 
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B. THE CONCEPT OF EQUITABLE DEFAULT 
 
The Concept of Equitable Default in response to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy 
with mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune 
system provides for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that 
have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of 
equity1165 that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by 
way of judicial order1166. 
 
Traditionally, equitable remedies are a distinct category of remedies that can be obtained in 
a breach of contract situation1167.  For instance, the default on the sovereign debt obligation 
would be a classic breach of contract situation.  In general, remedies may be divided into 
two categories, legal and equitable.  Legal remedies allow the non-breaching party to 
recover monetary damages.1168  In contrast, equitable remedies are actions that the court 
prescribes, which will serve to resolve the breach or dispute.1169  Equitable remedies are 
typically granted when legal remedies or monetary compensation cannot adequately 
resolve the wrongdoing1170.  It is often required that legal damages be unavailable before 
court will decide to issue equitable.  The goal in a legal claim is for the defendant to 
compensate the plaintiff and make him or her whole.  If the plaintiff wins the judge will 
order the defendant to pay money to the plaintiff for loss or injury, which is also known as 
damages.  There will be a need to be some notion of compensation.  So compensation will 
inevitably involve some effort to measure what was lost.  Often compensation will require 
some sort of substitution that is an effort to translate the measurement of what was lost into 
some other currency, but compensation is imperfect.   
 
                                                 
1165 Porter, Robert: Contract Claims Against the Federal Government: Sovereign Immunity and Contractual 
Remedies, Harvard Law School (2006) [online], available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/ContractClaims_22.pdf (Accessed at 27 September 2015)  
1166 Klaeger, Roland, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, Cambridge Studies in 
International Law and Comparative Law (October 2013), [online], available at 
http://www.cambridge.org/an/academic/subjects/law/arbitration-dispute-resolution-and-mediation/fair-and-
equitable-treatment-international-investment-law (Accessed at 23 September 2015)  
1167 Id.  
1168 Tan, Daniel: Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements in Federal Courts: Rethinking the Court’s 
Remedial Powers, [online], available at https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-
content/uploads/EnforcementofInternationalArbitrationAgreements.pdf (Accessed at 27 September 2015  
1169 Id. 
1170 Id.  
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Compensation is also imperfect for another reason.  It offers nobody to compel in their 
behavior except payment, so of course there is and has always been bargaining in the 
shadow of the compensation required by law and the solution to this problem is fairly 
obvious.  There must be some way for courts to compel action or non-action.  So in 
contemporary American law this is usually done by means of an equitable remedy, 
especially the injunction, the counting for profits, a constructive trust, an equitable lien and 
specific performance.   
  
Last we clearly know that there is a breach of contract then we clearly also know that any 
court order that requires specific performance would not be to any particular affect.1171  We 
do know from the classic bankruptcy procedure under the reorganization provisions of 
Chapter 11 that for instance Bankruptcy Code §356 works similarly as an injunction 
against all the creditors for a specific period of time until a new plan of organization has 
been submitted to the court and approved by the court where all the creditors are at the 
same time enjoying from litigating and claiming any payments, but at the same time also 
required to still perform any pre-default obligations.1172   
 
Under the construct of specific performance1173 and under the constructive injunction the 
equitable remedies in such a case could be that whenever a sovereign borrower declares its 
need for a reorganization before a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court, the court 
would be in a position to enjoin any of the creditors from requiring payment until a 
restructuring of the outstanding obligations has been adjudicated; however, at the same 
time it could also require specific performance of the creditors of any particular contractual 
obligations that would come along with a particular contract.  At the same time, such court 
would be in a position to make use of two very traditional equitable remedies, the 
rescission and reformation of contract, as we are seeing that the old contract that ended in 
default by one of the parties – that now claims the reorganizational process – is at the same 
time re-written and reformed into a contract by the court rather than by political horse-
trading or not at all – in a way that is equitable to all parties but charts a way forward. 
 
                                                 
1171 Shavell, Steven, Specific Performance versus Damages for Breach of Contract, Harvard Law School (2005), 
[online], available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_532.pdf (Accessed 
at 26 August 2014) 
1172 11 U.S. Code § 365 - Executory contracts and unexpired leases 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/365  
1173 See supra note 1171. 
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Such a legally prescribed judicial process of sovereign debt restructuring or settlement of 
private transnational agreements with a nexus in both the European Union and the United 
States rather should be much preferred than a process or product of political backdoor 
dealing.  At last this would be in contrast of such political backdoor dealing, a transparent 
process given the fact that all these court documents that would be filed would be public 
record and any of the court procedures would be of course also subject to the participation 
of the public.  Other than what we find today where there is little or no or even absolutely 
no minutes of for instance, the meetings of the Eurogroup1174, in this case we would have a 
completely transparent process that would be pursued in a non-political manner, but on the 
principles of equitable relief and distribution.   
 
Now someone will of course claim that this is like an invitation for non-payment and if it is 
as easy as it sounds that sovereign borrows can relieve themselves of the obligations to 
repay, we probably would have to expect a tsunami of sovereign debt in insolvency 
proceedings.  First and foremost, I would hold against that the practical experience is on 
the domestic level with corporate and private households alike is as such that this process 
has rarely ever been abused in any excessive manner other than with a few examples of a 
certain presidential candidate1175, but aside from that it has always been the prime objective 
of ordinary and serious participants in the financial markets to repay the obligation for one 
and one simple reason only, which is that the likelihood to refinance yourself in the future 
is obviously severely hampered if you have a credit rating and a credit history that has 
number of bankruptcy proceedings on your record.  That alone should be motivation 
enough for a number of sovereign debtors to refrain from undergoing this process. 
 
This process is for those that have no other alternative to return to sustainable debt levels, 
but for the reorganization of their debt structures and if we look into the extensive analysis 
of the McKinsey report1176 of the different households that will see that there is either need 
to reduce state debt by way of monetary reform as proposed by me in this thesis or like it 
or not we will undergo either a political restructuring process that can take the form of 
                                                 
1174 See supra note 921.  
1175 A Trip Down Donald Trump’s Bankruptcy Lane, Forbes Business, August 18, 2015 @ 12;44PM 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/debtwire/2015/08/18/a-trip-down-donald-trumps-bankruptcy-memory-lane/ 
(Accessed at September 23, 2015)  
1176McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging, Executive Summary, (February 2015), 
[online], available at  http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging 
(Accessed at July 28, 2015) 
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kicking the can down the road and prolonging and rolling over debt until it is inflationed 
away in the hopes of restructuring the debt by the passing of time as that had happened in 
the past in the case of certain obligations with the predecessor of the United Nations, the 
League of Nations1177, or we consciously decide for a proactive process of debt resolution 
and debt reorganization by way of a court-ordered process that is wielding jurisdiction over 
these complex transnational and often transatlantic contractual credit relations.   
 
C. FROM FIAT TO EXIT-TERMINAL RESOLUTION OF MISALLOCATIONS IN A NEW GEO 
 
Sovereign defaults are not a new feature of financial markets, and the incidence is 
widespread through history.  For example, Spain defaulted six times between 1550 and 
1650, and France defaulted eight times between 1550 and 1800.1178  Moreover, there are no 
reasons to rule out the occurrence of default episodes in the future.  
 
The amount of sovereign debt in default peaked at more than $335,000,000,000 in 1990.  
This debt was issued by 55 countries.  One of the largest defaults in history occurred in late 
December 2001 when Argentina defaulted on $82,000,000,0001179.  The ability of creditors 
to impose higher borrowing costs on defaulting sovereigns has lately received a great deal 
of attention.1180   
 
                                                 
1177 The United Nations Office at Geneva, The League of Nations (1919-1946), [online], available at 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/(httpPages)/17C8E6BCE10E3F4F80256EF30037D733?OpenDocu
ment (Accessed at 5 February 2014)  
1178 See Uanhut, Frogehoff, and Selastano in 2003.  Thompson Wright, Document 250, sovereign defaults by 
106 countries between 1820 and 2004.   
1179 Das, Udaibir S, Papaioannou, Michael G., Trebesch, Christoph, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, International 
Monetary Fund (2012), [online], available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2012/fincrises/pdf/ch19.pdf (Accessed at 15 July 2015) 
1180 Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, Martinez, Leonardo, Sapriza, Horacio, The Economics of Sovereign Default, 
Economic Quarterly, Volume 93, (2007), pp.163-187, [online], available at 
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2007/spring/p
df/martinez.pdf (Accessed at 19 July 2014) Hatchondo et alt argue that “In general, increasing a defaulting 
sovereign's borrowing costs would require coordination among holders of defaulted debt and a lot of potential 
lenders. Such a degree of coordination seems unlikely to occur in competitive credit markets with a large 
number of potential lenders. It is apparent that in the past three decades, the sovereign debt market has become 
more competitive, and this explains how an increase in competition may diminish the creditor's ability to 
coordinate. But coordination is less likely nowadays when almost anyone can buy sovereign bonds.  This 
requirement of increased coordination is also a good argument for the establishment of a transnational trade 
court which, in all actuality, would facilitate this coordination amongst creditors and lenders so that sovereigns 
have less of an opportunity to circumvent the forum of coordinated creditors but actually must make their case 
within a court setting that ultimately has the jurisdiction and legal power to not only resolve potential 
disagreements over sovereign debt but also dissolves reformed contracts in a manner that make the service of 
past debt in the future sustainable and serviceable.” 
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Past lenders can also try to impose financial sanctions that do not require such 
coordination. A very recent example is the example of a hedge fund that managed to obtain 
an injunction in a New York court against the Republic of Argentina that came with an 
attachment on several sovereign assets by the Republic of Argentina that eventually were 
upheld1181.   
 
In any case, there are other financial alternatives available to defaulting economies.1182  
They could issue bonds in local markets, obtain aid, or ask for official credit from other 
governments or multi-lateral financial institutions.  It is not obvious whether a sovereign 
forced to use these alternatives would face higher borrowing costs.1183 
 
Default decisions may have a range of unintended consequences. Increasing the future cost 
of borrowing may be one.  That the government is considered untrustworthy in other areas 
besides the credit relationship with lenders may be another one1184.  
 
At the extreme level, instead of imposing a higher borrowing cost on defaulting 
sovereigns, creditors may exclude the sovereigns from capital markets1185. This is yet 
another good argument for the establishment of the transnational trade court since a court 
of such jurisdiction and scope would effectively be able to enjoin a sovereign debt if 
subject to the jurisdiction of such a trade court from capital markets for a certain period of 
time up until a either defaulted or troubled sovereign debt can be resolved and reformed.   
                                                 
1181 Bloomberg Business, Hedge Funds’ Latest Salvo Is Ignored by Argentina’s Bondholders, (May 2015), 
[online], available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-13/hedge-funds-latest-salvo-is-ignored-
by-argentina-s-bondholders (Accessed at 18 June 2015). Bloomberg reports that “This week, Aurelius Capital 
Management and Elliott Management asked a New York judge to block payments on local Argentine bonds due 
2024 after the country issued $1.4 billion more of the notes in April. They say the notes were offered to overseas 
investors, making them subject to a ban preventing the nation from paying foreign debt before it settles a 
decade-long dispute with them. But while Elliott and Aurelius managed to persuade the judge to stop payments 
on some local notes as recently as March, this time bondholders are skeptical the hedge-fund creditors have 
much of a shot. That’s because unlike those securities -- issued as part of international debt swaps -- the offering 
last month was done through a local auction. The bonds, due in 2024, are little changed at 97.9 cents on the 
dollar since Aurelius sought its court order on Monday.” 
1182 Id.  
1183 Id.  
1184 See supra note 1141. Hatchondo et alt. argue that “[t]his can generate a contraction for lending to domestic 
firms, so an overall reduction in foreign direct investment and, as a consequence, also a credit crunch, which has 
as a result, a sudden reduction in the availability of loans or other forms of credit in the economy in domestic 
credit markets. The signals implied by a government's default decision may also have political consequences.  
The default may reveal important characteristics of the incumbent policymakers such as their competence.  For 
instance, the poor economic conditions that trigger a default decision can be interpreted as the result of bad 
policies.   
1185 Id. 
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II. CURRENT COURT SYSTEMS WITH TRANSNATIONAL JURISDICTION 
 
A. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL JURISDICTION 
 
According to the President of Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association, 
Carl Baudenbacher, the New York University Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals lists forty-three different institutions worldwide, sixteen of which are currently 
active1186.  Following this project  
 
International Courts and tribunals are defined as permanent institutions that are 
composed of independent judges which adjudicate disputes between two or more 
entities, work on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure, and render decisions 
that are binding. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, we have examined the general scope and jurisdiction and 
methods of appointment of judges for the following three courts as they appeared to be the 
most relevant in the context of the analysis of the envisaged Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. These four courts are: The European Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association, The 
International Court of Justice and the U.S. Court for International Trade. 
 
B. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has existed since Western European 
states began integrating their economies and governments after World War II.1187 The first 
of these organizations, the European Coal and Steel Community, was created in 1951, and 
the Court was established the following year. The Court originally had seven members - 
one for each of the six original member states and a seventh appointed in order to break 
ties. As the EU has expanded new judges from each member state have been added to the 
Court.  
 
                                                 
1186 Baudenbacher, C. (2004) The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, [online], Fordham 
International Law, Volume 28 available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=ilj (Accessed at May 5, 2015)  
1187 European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union, [online], available at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (Accessed at 17 August 2014)  
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The current Court consists of 28 judges - one from each current member state. Each judge 
is appointed to a six-year term and can serve multiple terms. In addition to the judges there 
are nine advocate-generals in the Court that are in charge with presenting the opinions of 
each case to the judges. All other minor cases, including those brought by individual 
citizens, are decided by the lower, General Court, which is also considered part of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. The function of the ECJ is stated in Article 220 of 
the Treaty of Rome; the court must [e]nsure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaty the law is observed". 
 
One of the very important tasks of the Court is to submit advance notification of 
interpretation of Community law which it does pursuant to Article 234.  When cases are 
brought before the ECJ, they are first assigned to one judge and one advocate-general. The 
judge issues the case, then accepts written statements from all the aggrieved or offending 
parties in the case. After collection, the judge reviews each statement and prepares a 
summation for the rest of the court to read1188. After this, the Court then decides how many 
judges should hear the oral arguments. Depending on the case's complexity and 
importance, a panel of three, five, 13, or the entire 28-judge Court listen to oral arguments 
from each party. The advocate-general responsible for the case then gives their opinion on 
the case if they believe the legal points in question could create new EU law or 
significantly change existing law. After a period of discussion between the EU judges 
themselves, the ECJ then makes a ruling, which has to be agreed to by a majority of the 
Court.  
                                                 
1188 The ECJ hears complaints brought by individuals through the subsidiary General Court under three 
circumstances under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). First, 
individuals may bring a “direct actions” against anybody of the EU for acts “of direct and individual concern 
to them.” Second, individuals may bring “actions for annulment” to void a regulation, directive or decision 
“adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union” and directly adverse to the 
individual. Third, individuals may bring “actions for failure to act” that can challenge an adverse failure of 
the EU to act, but “only after the institution concerned has been called on to act. Where the failure to act is 
held to be unlawful, it is for the institution concerned to put an end to the failure by appropriate measures.” 
General Court judgments and rulings on an individual action may be appealed, only on points of law, to the 
Court of Justice. The EU recognizes “three sources of European Union law: primary law, secondary law and 
supplementary law. The main sources of primary law are the Treaties establishing the European Union. 
Secondary sources are legal instruments based on the Treaties and include unilateral secondary law and 
conventions and agreements. Supplementary sources are elements of law not provided for by the Treaties. 
This category includes Court of Justice case-law, international law and general principles of law. An 
essential, primary source of EU human rights law is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which covers the civil, political, economic and social rights protected within the EU. The Charter 
binds EU bodies, and also applies to domestic governments in their application of EU law, in accordance 
with the Treaty of Lisbon.” 
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C. THE EFTA COURT OF THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION  
 
The EFTA Court was established under the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance 
Authority and a Court of Justice of 1992.1189 The Court is mainly competent to deal with 
infringement actions brought by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against an EFTA State 
with regard to the implementation, application or interpretation of EEA law rules, for 
giving advisory opinions to courts in EFTA States on the interpretation of EEA rules and 
for appeals concerning decisions taken by the EFTA Surveillance Authority1190.  
 
Thus the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court largely corresponds to the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union over EU States. The proceedings before the EFTA Court 
consist of a written part and an oral part and all proceedings will be in English. In direct 
actions, the judgment is rendered in English only. Advisory opinions are rendered in 
English and in the language of the requesting court.1191 The President of the EFTA Court, 
Carl Baudenbacher explains:  
 
 
In order to avoid constitutional problems in certain EEA/EFTA States, the drafters of 
the Surveillance and Court Agreements have deviated from EC law, particularly in 
two respects: (1) unlike national courts of last resort in the EC with respect to the 
ECJ, national supreme courts of the EEA/EFTA States are not legally obliged to refer 
European law questions to the EFTA Court; (2) unlike preliminary rulings of the ECJ 
under the Article 234 EC procedure, decisions rendered by the EFTA Court in 
response to a question by a national court are, strictly speaking, not legally binding on 
the referring national court. In Article 34 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, 




                                                 
1189 Baudenbacher, C. (2004) The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, [online], Fordham 
International Law, Volume 28, p. 353, available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=ilj (Accessed at May 5, 2015) He states 
that “The EFTA Court is cooperating with national courts of the EEA/EFTA countries under the Article 34 of 
the Surveillance and Court Agreement preliminary reference procedure which has been modeled on Article 234 
of the EC. The EFTA Court has jurisdiction with regard to EFTA States which are parties to the EEA 
Agreement (at present Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).” 
1190 Id 
1191 Id. 
1192 Baudenbacher, C. (2004) The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, [online], Fordham 
International Law, Volume 28, p. 359  available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=ilj (Accessed at May 5, 2015) 
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According to the President of the EFTA Court, Carl Baudenbacher “Opinions of the EFTA 
Court have, as a matter of principle, always been followed by the national courts. If a 
national court were to refuse to follow those Opinions, it would bring its country into 
breach of the EEA Agreement. Therefore, Opinions of the EFTA Court are […] not weaker 
than preliminary rulings of its big sister court, the ECJ. The EFTA Court refers to them as 
“judgments””.1193 
 
It is this notion of an Advisory Opinion, that is not legally binding on a national court but 
still effective, that makes the example of the EFTA Court so particularly attractive for 
consideration as a role model for a judicial authority in the context of the TTIP given the 
constitutional restraints that will always take precedence in the considerations of the 
United States counterparty to any transnational agreement on courts. The Supreme Court is 
the highest court in the United States. Article III of the U.S. Constitution created the 
Supreme Court and authorized Congress to pass laws establishing a system of lower 
courts.1194  
 
Therefore, any U.S. negotiator of any transatlantic agreement will be confronted with a 
constitutional bar whenever it would come to accept a hierarchically higher Court than the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The commonly accepted tradition and practice of 
Advisory Opinions of the EFTA Court under similar circumstances could provide an 
analogy and show the way towards a resolution of this seemingly unresolvable 
constitutional conflict.  
 
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations (UN). It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and 
began work in April 1946. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international 
law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal 
questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. 
                                                 
1193 Baudenbacher, C. (2004) The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, [online], Fordham 
International Law, Volume 28, p. 360  available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1958&context=ilj (Accessed at May 5, 2015). 
1194 Court Role and Structure, U.S. Courts [online], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure (Accessed at June 10, 2015). 
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The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine years by 
the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. It is assisted by a 
Registry, its administrative organ. Its official languages are English and French.1195 
 
Once elected, a Member of the Court is a delegate neither of the government of his own 
country nor of that of any other State.  Unlike most other organs of international 
organizations, the Court is not composed of representatives of governments.  Members of 
the Court are independent judges whose first task, before taking up their duties, is to make 
a solemn declaration in open court that they exercise their powers impartially and 
conscientiously. 
 
E. THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
With the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Congress, equipped the federal judicial system to 
deal effectively and efficiently with the complex problems arising from international trade 
litigation. The Act clarified and expanded the status, jurisdiction, and powers of the former 
United States Customs Court. As described by President Jimmy Carter, the 1980 Act 
 
[c]reates a comprehensive system for judicial review of civil actions arising out of 
import transactions and federal transactions affecting international trade.1196  
 
This system, rooted in the mandate of Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution that "all Duties, 
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,  
 
 
                                                 
1195 The International Court of Justice, [online], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/ (Accessed at 17 
August 2015) “The ICJ is composed of 15 judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Security Council.  These organs vote simultaneously but separately.  In order to be 
elected, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes in both bodies.  This sometimes makes it 
necessary for a number of rounds of voting to be carried out. In order to ensure a measure of continuity, one 
third of the Court is elected every three years.  Judges are eligible for re-election.  Should a judge die or resign 
during his or her term of office, a special election is held as soon as possible to choose a judge to fill the 
unexpired part of the term. The 1980 Act also changed the name of the Court to the United States Court of 
International Trade. The new name more accurately reflects the Court's jurisdiction and judicial functions 
relating to international trade disputes. The geographical jurisdiction of the United States Court of International 
Trade extends throughout the United States. The court can and does hear and decide cases which arise anywhere 
in the nation. The court also is authorized to hold hearings in foreign countries.“   
1196 Customs Court Act of 1980, [online] available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-
94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg1727.pdf  (Accessed at June 10, 2015).  
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[e]nsures expeditious procedures, avoids jurisdictional conflicts among federal courts 
and provides uniformity in the judicial decision-making for import transactions1197. 
 
The different types of cases the court is authorized to decide--that is, its subject matter 
jurisdiction--are limited and defined by the Constitution and specific laws enacted by the 
Congress. The subject matter jurisdiction of the court was greatly expanded by the 
Customs Courts Act of 1980.1198 Under this law, in addition to certain specified types of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the court has a residual grant of exclusive jurisdictional 
authority to decide any civil action against the United States, its officers, or its agencies 
arising out of any law pertaining to international trade.1199 
 
This broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction is complemented by another provision in the 
Customs Courts Act of 1980 which makes it clear that the United States Court of 
International Trade has the complete powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by 
statute upon, other Article III courts of the United States1200. Under this provision, the 
court may grant any relief appropriate to the particular case before it, including, but not 
limited to, money judgments, writs of mandamus, and preliminary or permanent 
injunctions. 
 
The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the nine judges who 
constitute the United States Court of International Trade, which is a national court 
established under Article III of the Constitution1201. The judges, who are appointed for life, 
as are all judges of Article III courts, may be designated and assigned temporarily by the 
Chief Justice of the United States to perform judicial duties in a United States Court of 
Appeals or a United States District Court1202.The chief judge of the Court of International 
Trade is a statutory member of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and convenes 
a judicial conference of the Court of International Trade periodically for the purposes of 
considering the business and improving the administration of justice in the court.1203 
 
                                                 
1197 See supra note 1196.  
1198 Id. 
1199 Id.  
1200 Id.   
1201 Id.  
1202 Id.  
1203 Id.  
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III. PLEA FOR A TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT COURT (TTIC) 
 
A. ORIGINS FOR THE PROPOSAL OF A TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT COURT 
 
One proposal for an ad-hoc arbitration process goes back to the Austrian economist 
Kunibert Raffer and was published for the first time in 1989 and 1990. With some of its 
features further developed it ultimately became what is known as the “Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Process (FTAP)”1204.  
 
The International Monetary Fund made a proposal for a statutory “Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)” in 20031205. More recent proposals were made for the 
establishment of an international insolvency court or the proposal for establishing a 
sovereign debt arbitration chamber at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, 
Netherlands, as well as the proposal for establishing a sovereign debt tribunal under the 
auspices of the United Nations by Christoph Paulus and Stephen Kargman in 2008.1206  
 
Raffer’s proposal suggests the emulation of Chapter 9 of the US Insolvency Code which 
regulates the insolvency of “municipalities”. Raffer postulates that Chapter 9 includes all 
ingredients for a sovereign insolvency if you substitute the insolvency judge with an ad-
hoc arbitration process. There would be, however, clear defined rules and an inclusion of 
all creditors rather than just a group of more important or privileged creditors that have the 
ear of power brokers. Also Raffer’s proposal would not require any new international 
institution to be created. In his case not even a technical infrastructure would be absolutely 
necessary as the process would remain the hands of the parties involved. He also suggests 
the establishment of a technical secretariat located at one of the existing UN agencies, 
presumably in Vienna and New York. However, his proposal does not solve the issue of 
financing of such an organization. 
 
                                                 
1204 Raffer, Kunibert, The Present State of the Discussion on Restructuring Sovereign Debts: Which Specific 
Sovereign Insolvency Procedure? , available at http://r0.unctad.org/dmfas/pdfs/raffer.pdf (Accessed at 4 July 
2014)  
1205 Geithner, Timothy et al., Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, February 2003, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf (Accessed at 30 July 2014) 
1206Paulus, Christoph G., Sovereign defaults to be solved by politicians or by a legal proceeding, Volume 1 – 
Part 2 – 2012, available at 
http://www.laweconomicsyearlyreview.org.uk/Law_and_Economics_Yearly_Review_LEYR_Journal_vol_1_pa
rt_2_2012.pdf, p.203 (Accessed at 4 July 2014) 
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In 2001 right after the events of 9/11 the International Monetary Fund surprised the 
international community with a proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM). At the heart of this proposal was the creation of a Sovereign Debt Dispute 
Resolution Forum (SDDRF). This Forum would be established out of a pool of arbitrators, 
identified by the IMF board. However, neither the United States nor emerging market 
countries supported the proposal and the initiative was ultimately shelved as likely would 
be any future initiative that requires the agreement of any existing international 
organizations and their sovereign member states rather than just creditors to a transaction.  
 
All of these proposals do hold their merits and constitute an important stepping stone 
toward the establishment of a fundamental cornerstone of a New Global Economic Order 
in the form of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court, TTIC. 
 
However, none of the existing proposals manage to address the key issues that need to be 
resolved before such an International Resolution Mechanism can see the light of the day: 
First: How do you build acceptance of such a Court? Second: How do you finance it? Last 
but not least: Who decides about its constitution and membership in light of dysfunctional 
or non-existing international political and democratically legitimated bodies and 
organizations? 
 
B. PROPOSAL FOR A TRANSATLANTIC TRADE COURT FOLLOWING THE EFTA-COURT MODEL 
 
Here, in the proposal for the establishment of a TTIC answers have been found to all three 
of these issues: First, acceptance will be built one contract and one transaction at the time 
each time parties agree to submit under the jurisdiction of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Court. Moreover, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court will be 
incorporated by the Free Trade Agreement itself, much like the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) was founded over 60 years ago1207 or the EFTA Court was established for the 
European Free Trade Association1208.  Second, as mentioned supra, one contract and one 
transaction at the time, TTIC’s secretariat shall receive a pro-mille of the total transaction 
amount. Third, the Court will be guided by its secretariat, but by in large develop its own 
                                                 
1207 60th anniversary of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_93450/ (Accessed at 4 July 2014)  
1208ESA/Court Agreement, available at http://www.eftacourt.int/the-court/jurisdiction-organisation/esa-court-
agreement/ (Accessed at 4 July 2014)  
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body of case law, starting with its initial bench that shall be democratically legitimated by 
the US Senate and the European Parliament and nominated from the ranks of judges, 
attorney generals and attorneys admitted either before the U.S. Court of International Trade 
or the European Court of Justice. 
 
The proposal for a judicial resolution mechanism following the example of the EFTA-
Court was made first by this author in a Business Briefing for 21st Austria about the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership1209, a group of industrialists, entrepreneurs 
and member companies of the Vienna Stock Exchange in New York City in June 2014 
where it was pointed out that: 
 
[R]ecent events during the financial crisis in Europe and in the United States have 
shown that there is a need to provide for a judicial resolution mechanism when it 
comes to investments in sovereign debt and transnational investments. Here, the case 
needs to be made for legal certainty where traditional domestic regulation and courts 
either fall short or deny access to justice. Historically, the establishment of any new 
legal order as once was also the case with the European Free Trade Agreement or the 
European Communities itself always required a resolution mechanism. No citizen or 
investor can be guaranteed any rights under this TTIP if there is no legal recourse to 
enforce those rights effectively. Fortunately, there are several examples that can lead 
the way assuring both those concerned with private investor tribunals becoming the 
enforcer of laws against sovereign states but also ascertaining the rights of citizens 
and investors that put their trust into the guarantees provided by TTIP. One particular 
example that serves to this day well the remaining member states of the European 
Free Trade Association, EFTA, is the EFTA Court.1210 
 
  
Following this briefing in June 2014 until to date the proposal for a judicial resolution 
mechanism gained significant traction, was discussed in a number of conferences of 
several political groups both in Europe and in the United States and also supported in an 
interview in April 2015 by former Austrian Federal Chancellor and Prime Minister Dr. 
Alfred Gusenbauer who endorsed in an interview with the Austrian monthly 
Industriemagazin a solution “following the model of the EFTA-Court”. 1211 
 
                                                 
1209 Stahl, Lukas M., Business Briefing, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Potential 
Impact and Dimensions of the World’s Largest Trade Agreement, 21st Austria (June 2014) New York, NY, 
[online], available at http://www.21st-austria.at/files/21austria/files/business_briefings/21st_austria_-
_businessbriefing_june_2014.pdf (Accessed at 20 September 2015). 
1210 Id.  
1211 Was hat Sie so verwandelt, Herr Gusenbauer? Interview with Dr. Alfred Gusenbauer in Austrian monthly 
Industriemagazin (April 28, 2015), available at http://industriemagazin.at/a/was-hat-sie-so-verwandelt-herr-
gusenbauer (Accessed at 12 September 2015) 
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C. THE LANGE-MARTIN – PROPOSAL OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
Only a year later, the Lange-Martin Proposal on behalf of the S&D Group in the European 
Parliament, dated June 3, 2015 in the context of the negotiations for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership did unequivocally address the issues that justifiably are 
criticized at the proposal for an Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism. 
 
David Martin’s and Bernd Lange’s amendment states:1212 
 
[t]o propose a permanent solution for resolving disputes between investors and states 
– without the use of investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) private arbitration – 
which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential cases are 
treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed independent professional judges 
in public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of 
judicial decisions is ensured and the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and the Member 
States is respected. 
  
 
This Proposal by the former Vice-President of the European Parliament and the Rapporteur 
of the European Parliament on TTIP Bernd Lange already carries the nucleus and describes 
in a few sentences the very important key characteristics of what should become a 
democratically elected Transatlantic Trade Court that completes a most important piece of 
the architecture of a New Global Economic Order in the form of a democratically 
controlled transatlantic jurisdiction in which misallocations can be legally and lawfully 
resolved based on the rule of law rather than following political arrangements. The 
proposal was adopted by the plenary of the European Parliament1213 as part of the entire 
report by Bernd Lange on TTIP with  European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 
containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the European Commission on 
the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
(2014/2228(INI))1214 
 
                                                 
1212Amendment 114, Bernd Lange, David Martin, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A8-2015-0175+114-
116+DOC+PDF+V0//EN  
1213 European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to 
the European Commission on the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
(2014/2228(INI)) [online] available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0252+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (Accessed at September 16, 2015) 
1214 Report of the Vote of the European Parliament on TTIP, July 8, 2015,  [online], available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFW_e0FjJR0 (Accessed at September 16, 2015) 
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D. THE MALSTROEM – PROPOSAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
On 16 September 2015, The European Commission has approved its proposal for a new 
and transparent system for resolving disputes between investors and states – the Investment 
Court System. The Investment Court System would replace the existing investor-to-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism in all ongoing and future EU investment 
negotiations, including the EU-US talks on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP)1215. 
The proposal for an Investment Court System builds on the substantial input received from 
the European Parliament, Member States, national parliaments and stakeholders through 
the public consultation held on ISDS. Built around the same key elements as domestic and 
international courts, it enshrines governments' right to regulate and ensures transparency 
and accountability. 
First Vice-President Frans Timmermans said:  
With our proposals for a new Investment Court System, we are breaking new ground. 
The new Investment Court System will be composed of fully qualified judges, 
proceedings will be transparent, and cases will be decided on the basis of clear rules. 
In addition, the Court will be subject to review by a new Appeal Tribunal. With this 
new system, we protect the governments' right to regulate, and ensure that investment 
disputes will be adjudicated in full accordance with the rule of law.1216 
Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström: 
Today, we're delivering on our promise – to propose a new, modernized system of 
investment courts, subject to democratic principles and public scrutiny," said "What 
has clearly come out of the debate is that the old, traditional form of dispute resolution 
suffers from a fundamental lack of trust. However, EU investors are the most frequent 
users of the existing model, which individual EU countries have developed over time. 
This means that Europe must take the responsibility to reform and modernize it. We 
must take the global lead on the path to reform." She added: "We want to establish a 
new system built around the elements that make citizens trust domestic or 
international courts. I’m making this proposal public at the same time that I send it to 
the European Parliament and the Member States. It’s very important to have an open 
and transparent exchange of views on this widely debated issue.1217 
 
                                                 
1215 Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment 
negotiations, Brussels, 16 September 2015, [online] available at; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5651_en.htm (Accessed at September 16, 2015) 
1216 Id. 
1217 Id.  
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The proposal for the new court system includes major improvements such as: 
 
[A] public Investment Court System composed of a first instance Tribunal and an 
Appeal Tribunal would be set up; judgements would be made by publicly appointed 
judges with high qualifications, comparable to those required for the members of 
permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO 
Appellate Body; the new Appeal Tribunal would be operating on similar principles to 
the WTO Appellate Body; the ability of investors to take a case before the Tribunal 
would be precisely defined and limited to cases such as targeted discrimination on the 
base of gender, race or religion, or nationality, expropriation without compensation, 
or denial of justice; governments’ right to regulate would be enshrined and guaranteed 
in the provisions of the trade and investment agreements.1218 
 
Finally, in parallel to the TTIP negotiations, the Commission will start work, together with 
other countries, on setting up a permanent International Investment Court. The objective is 
that over time the International Investment Court would replace all investment dispute 
resolution mechanisms provided in EU agreements, EU Member States’ agreements with 
third countries and in trade and investment treaties concluded between non-EU countries. 
This would further increase the efficiency, consistency and legitimacy of the international 
investment dispute resolution system.1219 
 
The text proposal states that the right to regulate for public policies is fully preserved.   It 
also clarifies that investment protection provisions shall not be interpreted as a 
commitment from governments not to change their legal framework, including in a manner 
that may negatively affect the investor’s expectations of profits.1220  
 
The text proposes the establishment of a new court system composed of: a Tribunal of First 
Instance (“Investment Tribunal”) with 15 publicly appointed judges and an Appeal 
Tribunal with 6 publicly appointed members. On the Investment Tribunal, the 15 judges 
would be appointed jointly by the EU and the US governments, including, five EU 
nationals, five US nationals and five nationals of third countries.1221 
 
                                                 
1218 See supra note 1215. 
1219 Id.  
1220 Id. 
1221 Id.  
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These judges would be the only ones to hear disputes under TTIP. The judges would have 
very high technical and legal qualifications, comparable to those required for the members 
of permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO 
Appellate Body. Disputes under TTIP would be allocated randomly, so disputing parties 
would have no influence on which of the three judges will be hearing a particular case.  
 
This is a fundamental change compared to the old ISDS system which operates on an ad 
hoc basis with arbitrators chosen by the disputing parties. Taken together, the elements 
proposed for the operation of the Investment Tribunal, are an effective way to insulate 
judges from any real or perceived risk of bias1222.  
 
The appeal tribunal – which is also new - would be composed of six members appointed 
jointly by the EU and the United States including two EU nationals, two US nationals and 
two nationals of third countries. The members of the Appeal Tribunal would be subject to 
strict qualifications and ethical requirements. They would ensure that there could be no 
doubt as to the legal correctness of the decisions of tribunals. Also, in the interest of 
investors and states, the text proposes strict time limits to ensure swift final ruling.  
 
                                                 
1222 Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment 
negotiations, Brussels, 16 September 2015, [online] available at; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5651_en.htm (Accessed at September 16, 2015) Malmstroem announces at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en that [t]oday, 
I’ve presented a major change in our trade and investment policy. I’m proposing to set up a modern and 
transparent system for resolving disputes between investors and states – an Investment Court System. This new 
system will replace the old ISDS model in all our ongoing and future trade negotiations, including in the EU-US 
trade talks.  From the start of my mandate almost a year ago, ISDS has been one of the most controversial issues 
in my brief. […] We must keep in mind that investment protection is an important part of the EU’s investment 
policy. EU investors are the most frequent users of the existing system, which individual EU countries have 
developed over time. This means that we, from the EU side, must take our responsibility to reform and 
modernize it. […] We need to introduce the same elements that lead citizens to trust their domestic courts. 
Concretely, I want to restore trust by setting up an Investment Court System under TTIP – one that is 
accountable, transparent and subject to democratic principles. It will be judges, not arbitrators, who sit on these 
cases. They must have qualifications comparable to those found in national domestic courts, or in international 
courts such as the International Court of Justice or the WTO Appellate Body. Also – the judges will be 
publically appointed in advance. And, like in courts, you won’t be able to choose which judges hear your case. 
Furthermore, we will guarantee there is no conflict of interest. […] The Investment Court System will also 
enshrine governments’ right to regulate […].All this will be done in a system where there is even greater 
transparency than in domestic courts, with all documents online and all hearings open to the public. An 
overview of the proposal can be found here. The full text of the proposal along with a reader's guide is also 
available. Some have argued that the traditional ISDS model is private justice. What I’m setting out here is a 
public justice system – just like those we’re familiar with in our own countries, and the international courts 
which Europe has so actively promoted in the past. As a bigger part of this reform process, the Commission is 
working in parallel to create an international court for investment. 
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E. PLEA FOR DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT COURT 
 
The Jubilee year is the end of seven cycles of shmita (Sabbatical years), and 
according to Biblical regulations had a special impact on the ownership and 
management of land in the Land of Israel. […]. This fiftieth year is sacred – it is a 
time of freedom and of celebration when everyone will receive back their property, 
and slaves will return home to their families1223  
 
The text pertaining to the Jubilee year and the Sabbat year in 3. Mose 25 and 5 Mose 15 
that Jesus refers to in his first recorded sermon1224 at Lukas 4:16 have an astounding 
actuality with respect to the debt crises of this century. Each seventh Shabbat year, i.e. the 
year following seven seven-year cycles, the fiftieth year was the year of relief. Not only 
were the debts to be relieved and the slaves to be released, all mortgaged property should 
be returned to its original owner. Once each generation should have the opportunity to see 
the property returned that its predecessors had lost. 
 
Modern insolvency laws for individuals as well as corporations portray an astounding 
resemblance to those old-testamentary regulations. Individual insolvency laws limit the 
rights of the creditor where the survival of the debtor would be endangered; an existential 
minimum usually remains untouched regardless of the amount owed. 
 
Insolvent corporations tend to be treated in a manner that ensures their ability to remain a 
going concern, if possible. Debt relief is granted whenever necessary. The once-per-
generation rule of the ancient Israelite society gets adapted to the realities of a modern-day 
capitalist global economy. 
 
Insolvency has a (national) legal basis. Neither rich creditors nor powerful governments 
can prevent the application of insolvency laws. Much like the religious authorities of 
ancient Israel were holding their secular leaders to apply the mosaic laws, today the justice 
system is charged with the same. Access to due process and a fair trial has nothing to do 
with charity. It is a right. 
                                                 
1223 Leviticus, 25:10, The Bible [online], available at http://biblehub.com/leviticus/25-10.htm (Accessed at 23 
August 2014)  
1224 Lk 4:16 ff, The Bible [online], available at http://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%204.16%20ff (Accessed at 23 
August 2014)  
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A right, however, that is severely limited to national individuals and corporations, where 
applicable, in civil societies. Today’s insolvency laws do not cover all debtor-creditor 
relations. Neither global corporations can apply to a transnational forum of similar span 
and jurisdiction for debt relief nor so called “sovereign debtors”, i.e. countries, such as 
Greece or many of the African countries that are way over the head in state debt with little 
or no prospect of ever digging their way out of the hole they are solidly put into. 
 
Their creditors reserve the rights to grant debt relief to institutions such as the “Paris 
Club”.1225 The Paris Club grants debt relief based on recommendations by the International 
Monetary Fund1226 or the World Bank1227. With little or no prospect for any assets that can 
be exploited or realized, debt relief is usually not granted. Moreover, International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank are regularly among the major creditors, a classic conflict 
of interest. All that in spite of the fact that there are numerous proposals by leading 
scientists, international organizations such as the United Nations or Non-Governmental 
Organizations, how national insolvency procedure could be adapted to indebted 
sovereigns. 
 
Throughout the entire modern economic history there have been insolvencies by 
sovereigns. Today’s crisis has start to hit close to home and ordinary people have started to 
innately understand that we should not leave our destiny in the hands of unelected officials 
or government ministers known for their chaotic backdoor dealings but come forward with 
a transparent and predictable due process as to how we and future generations will deal 
with both insolvencies that deal with sovereigns as well as entities that span multiple 
jurisdictions in our global economy. 
 
                                                 
1225 The Paris Club, [online], available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (Accessed at 23 August 2014). It states 
that “[t]he Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable 
solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to 
stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provide an appropriate 
debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor countries in the form of rescheduling, 
which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reduction in debt service 
obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment). The origin of the Paris 
Club dates back to 1956 when Argentina agreed to meet its public creditors in Paris. Since then, the Paris Club 
has reached 431 agreements with 90 different debtor countries. Since 1956, the debt treated in the framework of 
Paris Club agreements amounts to $ 583 billion.” 
1226 See supra note 76.  
1227 See supra note 623. 
Page | 275 
 
Arguments are plenty, far and in between such as insolvency are for firms and not for 
countries since countries are sovereign. If one considers the common perception of 
corporate or individual insolvency, this is legally right. However, that is why the purpose 
of chapter 9 is to provide a financially-distressed municipality protection from its creditors 
while it develops and negotiates a plan for adjusting its debts. Reorganization of the debts 
of a municipality is typically accomplished either by extending debt maturities, reducing 
the amount of principal or interest, or refinancing the debt by obtaining a new loan.1228  
 
Another argument often heard is that international law knows no bailiff.1229 Arbitration 
awards cannot be enforced. That, however, applies to all arbitration cases. Nevertheless, 
arbitration works well in international disputes. Formal enforcement is not the concern, so 
long the decision making body has been approved and accepted by all parts involved. No 
less or no more any political decision between Mme. Merkel and Monsieur Hollande, if 
they ever can come to an agreement, can be enforced internationally and still they wield 
the power.  
 
After all enforcement has most to do with a regime that is based in the rule of law and the 
acceptance of the parties involved. In most cases, all parties are well served in the long run 
to achieve predictability of the decisions concerned. Even, if adverse, a decision that can 
be foreseen based on a canon of law and judgments, may be priced into the overall 
calculations, may be insurable and may provide basis for a more cautious handling of 
affairs in the first place. More importantly, if the outcome becomes more certain, and 
actions actually do have consequences, moral hazard is on the decline and cases, in 
particular such as Greece, will see diminishing returns. 
 
                                                 
1228 The first municipal bankruptcy legislation was enacted in 1934 during the Great Depression. Pub. L. No. 
251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934). Although Congress took care to draft the legislation so as not to interfere with the 
sovereign powers of the states guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court held 
the 1934 Act unconstitutional as an improper interference with the sovereignty of the states. Ashton v. Cameron 
County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936). Congress enacted a revised Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act in 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937), which was upheld by the Supreme Court. United 
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938). The law has been amended several times since 1937. In the more than 
60 years since Congress established a federal mechanism for the resolution of municipal debts, there have been 
fewer than 500 municipal bankruptcy petitions filed. Although chapter 9 cases are rare, a filing by a large 
municipality can— like the 1994 filing by Orange County, California—involve many millions of dollars in 
municipal debt. 
1229 Pfaller, Alfred and Lerch, Marika, Challenges of Globalization: New Trends in International Politics and 
Society, [online], available at https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=_Wd2HP83KgwC&rdid=book-
_Wd2HP83KgwC&rdot=1&source=gbs_vpt_read&pcampaignid=books_booksearch_viewport (Accessed at 23 
September 2015) 
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Another argument against a mechanism for sovereign default is that countries will never 
receive any new loans after an insolvency procedure. Not only have we disposed of that 
argument before1230if that held to be true, no reorganized company could ever get any new 
loans. Republican presidential hopeful Donald Trump would be a long time out of business 
following his four corporate bankruptcy proceedings1231. Last but not least a lot less people 
would have been employed and a lot more would have lost their job, if there would not be 
the opportunity to restructure operations and keep what is good and healthy and rid what is 
bad and ill.  
 
However, it is also wrong when it comes to sovereigns. No new investor wants to see his 
money used to repay old debtors. They consider their investment based on the likelihood a 
sovereign will be in the position to repay his debt in the future. That probability, of course, 
is by large enhanced, when service of interest and principal of legacy debt does not 
swallow the entire economic prowess of a country. Hence, the inverse is true. The sooner a 
country can restructure and reorganize its debt in a manner that future investors will not 
come to the conclusion that the sovereign is burdened down to its knees in repayments to 
the past, the earlier they will be prepared again to come to the fore and ramp up their 
foreign direct investments and their bets on that country’s future by buying that foreign 
sovereign debt. 
 
Also another argument is that countries will borrow even more irresponsible and a moral 
hazard ensues. Part of the debt restructuring process is to reduce the debt burden in a 
predictable and structured process. Such process is not without its pains. Much like in the 
process of a company that enters into bankruptcy, a minimum quota may have to be paid 
over a certain period time and all creditor parties involved will still ascertain that such 
quota will be as high as possible. The difference, however, to the endless political 
manifestations, is that an insolvency procedure will result in a definitive and lasting 
resolution of bad sovereign debt. 
 
 
                                                 
1230 See supra note 1184.  
1231  Emily Stewart, The Backstory on Donald Trump’s Four bankruptcies, 09/15/15 - 11:12 AM EDT [online], 
available at http://www.thestreet.com/story/13286068/1/the-backstory-on-donald-trump-s-four-
bankruptcies.html (Accessed 19 September 2015)  
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Here is the ultimate argument of all promoters of small government until - of course - their 
creditors are in trouble. A new international bureaucracy will be created. This is what 
brings us to this chapter. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the unique 
opportunity of our generation not only to enhance legal certainty by eliminating non-tariff 
barriers but also by creating the legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring at least 
within its jurisdiction, the 28 member states of the European Union and the 50 federal 
states of the United States of America.  
 
F. ARCHITECTURE OF A TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT COURT 
 
How should the architecture of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court look like? All 
that is required for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court are three ingredients:       
 
(1) The bench of internationally trained professional judges, 
 
(2) the technical personnel and  
 
(3) A secretariat that could either be organized within the organizational 
framework of the TTIP established as a not-for-profit foundation, which 
documents the cases at hand and provides the continuing education for the 
international bench of judges to ensure consistency of the application of 
law developed. 
 
Aside from the secretariat, the bench for any case before the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Court should be called from a transcontinental group of judges, attorney 
generals and attorneys admitted to the bar of either U.S. Court of International Trade or the 
European Court of Justice. The initial bench should consist of 12 judges for life from each 
continent, electing a Chief Justice out of their middle that rotates between candidates from 
the two constituting courts on a 6-year basis. Each case is judged by a 3-judge panel 
consisting of judges from 3 [EU Member] States of which at least one has to come from 
the [EU Member] State at least one party comes from. The panel decides on a rapporteur 
and finds its decision by 2/3 majority. 
 
Page | 278 
 
Each case can be appealed to the full bench on legal grounds only without any further 
discovery.  However, the full bench can reverse the judgment and bring it on for retrial 
with a 2/3-majority. Otherwise judgment will take effect. 
 
The Members of the TTIC shall be be nominated by former or actual Heads of State, US 
State Governors and EU Prime Ministers or Heads of supranational organizations such as 
the EU, UN etc. In the United States such nominations shall need approval by the Senate, 
in the European Union by the judicial committee and the plenary of the European 
Parliament. 
 
The ultimate decision for admission to the court shall be with the court who decides with 
2/3 majority about the election of a new nominee to the bench. This will guarantee uniform 
application of the law and serve at least as a disincentive to political cronyism. It also will 
ensure a certain global acceptance whilst nominations are performed regionally. This shall 
be a court of educated peers. 
 
The secretariat that is charged with the day-to-day operations of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Court finances itself by requiring that 1/1000 of each transaction submitted 
under the jurisdiction of the TTIC much like an insurance is paid to the secretariat’s not-
for-profit foundation. For instance a $1,000,000 bond would only cost $1,000 to be 
adjudicated by the TTIC, much cheaper than any arbitration.  
 
The three key elements that an effective Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court needs to 
incorporate that are currently not yet appropriately provided for in the Malmström-
European Commission-Proposal are as follows: 
 
1. In order to gain the acceptance and authority in the judicial system of the United 
States and not infringe on the constitutional provisions of Article III Courts in the 
U.S. judiciary system of courts, a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court will 
only be able adjudicate with Advisory Opinions, that ultimately will be 
autonomously reenacted by the national courts, following the EFTA-Model. A 
supranational Transatlantic Court of Justice, following the model of the European 
Court of Justice would neither be constitutional in the United States of America 
nor politically viable in either European Union or the U.S.  
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2. However, a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court, should have the ability to 
adjudicate binding decisions between private parties and sovereigns, for instance 
in the case of Sovereign Debt Financings under two conditions: First, that the 
parties contractually agreed to submit under the jurisdiction of the TTIC and 
second, when a domestic court assigns such an insolvency case to the TTIC for an 
advisory opinion in order to assure the uniform application of the law with the 
intent to autonomously reenact such decision with the authority of its local court. 
 
3. The composition of the TTIC that in the current proposal of an International 
Investment Court is still modeled after the composition of the arbitration tribunals 
with members from the European Union, the United States and „independent“ 
third party countries, needs to be exclusively from the two constituencies, the 
European Union and the United States, preferably from the sitting bench of either 
the European Court of Justice or one of the Article III Courts of the United States, 
such as the U.S. Court of International Trade, pertinent academia or practicing bar 
before one of these courts, in order to gain the acceptance, authority and 
affirmation of the rulings of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court within 
the respective domestic judicial systems. This is of particular importance when the 
uniform application of law is dependent on the autonomous application and 
affirmation of the judgments in the respective [EU Member] States.  
 
Without these three key elements an International Investment Court [Malmstroem] or a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court [Stahl] will always remain short of becoming a 
Court of judicial authority and likely end up being mistaken as the Trojan Horse of an 
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSIONS 
I. REVISITING THE ARGUMENTS 
 
Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in the Capital Formation Life Cycle, the 
author explained with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the 
stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. 
 
Based on the mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, 
Liability and Limitation that we developed in order to assess, and precisely describe the 
respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle we demonstrated their 
application in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the 
European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital 
Formation Life Cycle, we then explored the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their 
historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The 
Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek 
and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential 
expansion of capital formation.  
 
Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, we then moved on to 
explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and showed how 
“value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources 
and industrial production.  
 
Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital 
Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens we readily dismissed a number of 
myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of 
monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and 
consumer citizens. 
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In our second pillar, Allocation, we continued our analysis of the balance sheets of the 
Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary 
Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of 
Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital 
pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. 
 
In our third pillar, Accountability, we then discussed the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-
Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium 
starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another 
seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and 
hundred  thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality.  
Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark 
legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS 
Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the 
European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and 
the European Banking Union of 2013, we analyzed the acceleration in size and scope of 
crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal 
risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible.  
 
II. LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 
The order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two 
fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial 
order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the 
fractional reserve system, the author proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a 
prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and 
transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout 
the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking 
collapses and failed financial institutions.  
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In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, 
as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, my response to 
Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy is my Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an 
immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing 
for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven 
malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows 
for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order.  
 
Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and 
current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, the author advocates as a first step in 
order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way 
of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. 
Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the 
EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association.  
 
Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed 
in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public 
supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David 
Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP 
calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, 
Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on 
September 16, 2015. 
 
III. OPPORTUNITY FOR EXIT 
 
There are seven arguments that strongly speak in favor of taking advantage of this historic 
opportunity the negotiation of the TTIP provides to establish a transatlantic judicial 
instance that will help not only to level the playing field of the this cross-border 
multilateral global market for all market participants, it will also provide a market based 
solution when one of its actors fail. 
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1) Given the fact that TTIC and its bench will be democratically legitimated, it will not 
only enjoy higher acceptance, it also will provide a higher level of predictability given 
that the bench’s opinions will be known. 
 
2) Operating as a judicial institution between the Five Key Accounts of Monetary 
Capital Formation, TTIC will serve the important purpose of terminally resolving 
default contractual relationships in one common forum between contracting parties. 
 
3) Rather than the current situation where there is a real transfer of assets from private 
taxpayers that have to pay by way of beefing up financial institutions for the failures 
of sovereign states, TTIC will be able to declare default, foreclose and resell the 
claims. Instead of taxpayers footing the bill, default sovereign debt can be re-
securitized and resold to the markets by way of public auction. 
 
4) If default becomes a real option, lending will become more cautious and lenders more 
reasonable in their famine for new funds – asset price bubbles become less likely 
based on a self-imposed ceiling on supply and demand of loans – the equilibrium 
shifts south, albeit not geographically. 
 
5) Rather than relying on the unruliness of European and American politics, the process 
of working out sovereign debt, will be based on the rule of law. 
 
6) In effect, over time, the establishment of a body of law, much the same way we have 
learned from the Supreme Court of the United States, the European Court of Justice or 
any High Court in our home countries, will create a certain amount of predictability in 
its decisions and therefore more legal certainty.  
 
7) Last but not least, TTIC limits in several ways the moral hazards that have become 
such a common feature of financial institutions that found themselves “too big to fail” 
thanks to the fact that banking collapses do not any longer have to averted by flooding 
the balance sheets but by voiding failed allocations assuming the introduction of 
sovereign money in segregated accounts as a prerequisite for EXIT. 
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It is now that the negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
provide a unique opportunity. To establish the fundament for a Jubilee year that finally 
tackles the problems and answers with a solution: to set a cornerstone for a New Global 
Economic Order with the creation of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court.  
 
For the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity 
for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of 
our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system 
and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction 
extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may 
complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational 
judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic 
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Discussing the Capital Formation Life Cycle, we have to follow the intrinsically linked balance 
sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle from its creation to its termination.1232  
                                                 
1232 The Capital Formation Life Cycle starts off with three factors of capital formation, the first of which for the 
purposes of monetary capital formation is money. This is the T-account that you see at the very left at the very 
beginning of this Exhibit A and moving upwards towards the right side of this exhibit, you will see the two 
factors of non-monetary capital formation, the T-accounts of machines and man.   
 
How does capital formation work?  This is all there is to it. You have a sovereign represented by either a Central 
Bank or, let's call it Federal Reserve that has the authority to actually create a currency, in the form of bills or 
coins which can legally be used to pay taxes. The fact of the permission to pay taxes with this currency makes 
this newly minted coins and bills the legal tender and therefore money.   
 
This creation can be in the form of printing bills or can be also in the form of minting coins. On our balance 
sheets this is expressed by our Money T-account debiting sovereign money and at the same time credits 
sovereign money. We have an accounting identity and money has been created.  Money may exist, in Latin: 
FIAT.   
 
How about our two T-accounts for non-monetary capital formation?  Machines and Man, or in other words, 
industrial production and human resources or as some modern day economists like to call it human capital. 
Usually machines start with a production facility so we can safely assume that there has been some equity in the 
form of some machinery and production facility, therefore we will show on our Machine T-Account a debit in 
equity and some credit in equity, our accounting identity, followed by a debit on the machine account that 
represents the actual production on that machine. Whatever that machine produces derives from that machine 
and will therefore be debited on the Machine T-account and will have an equivalent in value as a credit on the 
Machine T-account in the form of whatever has been produced including its value added.  
 
For purposes of simplicity, we did not separate out exactly the cost of the production and the cost of the energy 
and the cost of the original raw materials and then the value added but simplified it so it becomes it a lot easier 
to follow through the different stages that on the one end there is a debit to the Machine T-account which shows 
the source of production and the credit to the Machine T-account demonstrating what has been produced in the 
form of the equivalent value on the credit side to the production process at the production facility of the 
machine.  Again, we have an accounting identity. We know that this is a simplified form of depicting a very 
complex processes but it helps to not get distracted and really understand that there is always an accounting 
identity.  There is always a debit for the source where the actual value or production facility or raw material 
comes from, and there's a credit that expresses it as an equivalent on that very T-account as the result of that 
production.   
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Moving along the Capital Formation Lifecycle we come to our next T-account, Man, in other words human 
resources or human capital.  Here we will also find some equity be it in the form of your workforce, your labor, 
and in the case of a one-person business, you yourself, and we'll have provide for a debit on that workforce or 
on yourself showing all the efforts you undertake to produce something, learn something, invent something, or 
to create some intellectual property, code some software, write a book, consult a business, provide legal advice, 
provide tech advice, be a good medical doctor, a fantastic engineer or a huge performer as an artist, for instance, 
and all these efforts get credited on the right side of your Man T-account. Let it be clear that Man here stands for 
men and women.  It stands for mankind, and as we debit on the equity as a source it always has an accounting 
identity in the form of a credit on equity and all the efforts that create that wonderful intellectual property gets 
expressed in the Credit on the Man T-account.   
 
Here we are.  We have three essential credits in our capital formation accounts; a credit of sovereign money, a 
credit on machines, and a credit of man; all expressions of capital formation in one of these three accounts.   
 
How does this non-monetary capital that get actually translated into monetary values and how does money 
actually end up in consumer's hands? 
 
Let me step back again to our Money T-account.  As we said before the money, the FIAT gets created by the 
sovereign, represented by the Central Bank.  Once a Central Bank makes the decision to print money this is a 
debit on the Sovereign T-Account and we see it here as DS, but that has an equivalent with sovereign credit, 
expressed on our T-Account as CS.  Once we go to our Central Bank T-account we see also a number of other 
credits.  Again, for purposes of simplification, we will credit all of these credits against DS, sovereign debit, 
because all of these credits have their origin and source in the sovereign debit.  They are all created by a 
decision by the sovereign as expressed by or delegated to the Central Bank.   
 
What is the significance of all these other credits?  Let us take a step further along the Capital Formation 
Lifecycle on to our next balance sheet that we show here in the form of a T-account for Commercial Banks.  
Commercial Banks in our economic system play a crucial role because all the money that is created by Central 
Bank gets multiplied many, many times over by Commercial Banks by way of extending credit.  Recent 
estimates are that more than 84 percent of our "money" in today's circulation is actually money that has not been 
created by Central Banks but money created by Commercial Banks by way of extending credit to Corporate 
Citizens or Consumer Citizen.   
 
How does that work?  If you look at the debit side of the Commercial Banks T-account, you will see that there is 
a debit of sovereign money in the amount $22.  Because if the Commercial Bank wants to lend out $78.00 then 
it has to deposit at the Central Bank $2.00 and keep another $20.00 as a minimum reserve.  It does not have to 
have this $22.00 as it actually can obtain it from the Central Bank.  Once it has a $22.00 debit, it can actually 
create a books entry $78.00 on the debit side of its T-account.  Why can it do that?  Because the credit in the 
form of the Corporate or Consumer Citizen's liability is an asset on the credit side of its balance sheet. Once 
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again, we have an accounting identity as balance sheets balance out. The loan is a credit on the Commercial 
Bank's balance sheet and balances the debit of $78.00, and the $22 that it has are also credits, of course, as an 
asset on its balance sheet, the $22 that it got from the Central Bank because it has deposited the $2 into Central 
Bank and $20 in its own reserves allows her to actually create $78.00 of new money.  That's important to 
remember and we will address the issue of banking facilities and financial collapses in just a minute.  
 
Next the Commercial Bank debits $44.00 to the Central Bank if it actually wants to lend out $156.00.  In our 
scenario here the Commercial Bank then moves on and lends the $78.00 to a Corporate Citizen and it also lends 
the $156.00 to a Consumer Citizen.  The Corporate Citizen with this new found money of $78.00 then goes and 
actually starts paying salaries of $20 to the Man T-account paying for human resources.  It moves on and moves 
$30.00 to the Machine T-account for all the machine production and facility and keeps $28.00 as a reserve.   
 
Because the Corporate Citizen already plans to enter into a transaction with the Consumer Citizen, who as we 
know already obtained $156 from the Commercial Bank.  That is just enough to pay for the products that the 
Corporate Citizen wants to sell because the Corporate Citizen actually plans to have a 100 percent margin on its 
machine product.  That is a good deal to have, therefore in this transaction, we go to the transaction T-account 
and see a debit of $156.00 coming from the Consumer Citizen.  There is a credit from the Corporate Citizen of 
$78.00 and then there is a net profit of $78.00 on the corporate side, so the $78.00 from the Corporate Citizen 
goes straight, moving all the way in our Capital Formation Life Cycle now back down to the Commercial Bank 
the account on the right side, on the lower right side where Commercial Bank the account now holds $78. 
 
One would like to believe now that this was a great transaction, but unfortunately there is a little problem.  In 
our case study, the Consumer Citizen had to find out that the machine that he actually bought from the 
Corporate Citizen was not working properly and he couldn't make the income from its production that he 
originally expected. Therefore, he went into default and ended up unable to repay the $156 that he originally 
lent from the Commercial Bank in the middle of our Capital Formation Life Cycle.   
 
What to do?  The Consumer Citizen is insolvent and cannot repay the credit to the Commercial Bank.  If this 
would be a situation between a domestic Consumer Citizen and domestic Commercial Bank, for instance, in the 
United States, he could request a Chapter 11 proceeding that would allow him for restructuring and arguably, 
write off the $156 which leaves the Commercial Bank with a debit of $156.00 that leaves a big hole in its 
balance sheet because all the sudden that credit of $156.00 has been wiped out.  That's a dangerous situation for 
a Commercial Bank.  If, as we can imagine in a financial crisis, this does not happen once, not twice, but 
hundreds of thousands of times as we experienced it, for instance, after the collapse of the housing crisis and the 
bursting of the asset price bubble in 2008 but when it happens, it leaves big gaping holes in the T-accounts, or in 
other words, in the balance sheets of our Commercial Banks.  If the equity in the Commercial Bank is not big 
enough, or in the alternative if the Central Bank is not filling up those gaping holes in the balance sheets, they 
can be so big that eventually the bank is insolvent and the bank has to close or to merge with other Commercial 
Banks that together can fill the gaping holes.  We can see where this ends; the more misallocations we have, the 
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more defaults we have in this current structure of the Capital Formation Life Cycle the buck quite literally 
always ends with the Commercial Bank.  But the buck actually started with the Central Bank and therefore the 
buck in our case does not end where it started but somewhere else.  That clearly is a birth defect of our monetary 
order. 
 
How this can be corrected?  One very profound idea to resolve this birth defect in our monetary order has been 
the idea of sovereign money.  It has been reiterated in many versions, it has been discussed as part of the so-
called Chicago plan and in a new version of the Chicago plan that has even found approval by economists from 
the IMF and by many other thought-leaders like Adair Turner or even the chief economist of the Financial 
Times Martin Wolf.  The essence of it is always the same.  Let us end the money where it starts.  Let us exit the 
money where it has been created, where it FIAT which is at the Central Bank.   
 
One prerequisite is the so-called abolition of the fractional reserve system and with that, the creation of money 
by way of credit.  How would that work?  Again, for simplification purposes so it is more apparent, let us go 
back to our T-accounts in the Capital Formation Life Cycle:  This time we look at the new green T-accounts 
below the old black T-accounts, the Central Bank T-account of Sovereign Money is very simple.  If the 
Commercial Bank knows that it wants to lend out $78, it picks up $78 from the Central Bank. In practice, of 
course it might pick up some more because it has to operate itself and has to pay its own people and has 
operational expenses and has to be compensated for its own profits or what used to be the profits that it made off 
the loan process before on the fractional reserve, but in essence it lends out $78.00 and that is what it needs.  It 
still can charge fees to its consumers.  It still can charge interest.  It will no longer have the same leverage it had 
when it created money out of thin air just by extending credit. 
 
But in order to make it very transparent, we will see what happens.  The Central Bank the same way as always 
debits Sovereign Money, in our case now $78 and credits it on a Central Bank    T-account the same time the 
Commercial Bank debits it on its Commercial Bank account. But now something different happens than what 
we used to see before.  The credit on the Commercial Bank's account will be in a segregated account the same 
way we know, for instance, when we hold a brokerage account with securities.  It's a segregated account.  It 
does not belong to the Commercial Bank.  It remains sovereign Central Bank money.  This is what you see here; 
CS78SEG Credit Sovereign $78 Segregated Account.  When the Citizen, the corporate or the consumer gets his 
loan, that money is held in a segregated account and it is still the property of the Central Bank.  It does not 
become the property of the Commercial Bank as is the case today.  That is essential as we will later see when we 
have to unravel this whole Capital Formation Life Cycle.   
 
From there we go to debit at the Citizen T-account and the Corporate Citizen gets his $78 of segregated money.  
We enter into the transaction.  The Consumer Citizen obtained his $156 but now he holds it in a segregated 
account at the Commercial Bank and the $156 are also Central Bank money.  And now we are back to our case 
study.  Unfortunately, the machine doesn’t work, the consumer enters into default, is insolvent, and we are back 
in our domestic bankruptcy court.  If the bankruptcy court now declares that demand by the Commercial Bank 
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invalid, what happens?  It's in the segregated account.  It belongs to the ownership of the Central Bank so if we 
want to void this $156, it's not going to be a problem for the Commercial Bank because it is not any longer on 
the balance sheet of the Commercial Bank.  Since it's in a segregated account, we look straight through to the 
Central Bank's T-account, the credit gets cancelled in the segregated account, and the original debit that entered 
this money into existence, the FIAT, is also cancelled by judicial order on the Central Bank's T-account both on 
the credit and on the debit side.  This is how we come full circle from FIAT to EXIT. 
 
The Commercial Bank is not any longer affected the same way as it would be today as all its segregated 
accounts are separate and apart from the balance sheet of the Commercial Bank.  The balance sheet of the 
Commercial Bank would reflect only the income from operations through fees and interest. A default or 
insolvency or haircut is not going to create any more any of those gaping holes in the balance sheets of 
Commercial Banks that led to their massive collapses or to the many mergers of banks that are once again too 
big to fail.   
 
Hence a side effect of this is not only that Commercial Banks will be immune to this sort of cascading bank 
failures. It will also allow smaller banks to continue to exist. All the community banks, all the local banks, 
regional banks that are known to be much closer to the customer, much closer to the businesses, much more 
precise also in their support and their lending efforts, much closer to the market which is what is always claimed 
as one of the big advantages of allocation of credit by Commercial Banks and sold as a big concern if money 
gets exclusively created by Central Banks, all that could actually continue to exist or exist again because smaller 
banks would have a much easier life to exist. Their performance, their success would only be measured by their 
effectiveness of running their operation and not any more by running a pyramid scheme with money created out 
of thin air that obviously creates bigger leverage effects the bigger the balance sheet.  Under these new 
conditions, Commercial Banks will be more successful if they know their customers better and are closer to the 
market since they will be judged by their operational success and not any longer by balance sheet tricks.   
 
This is the way how we get from FIAT to EXIT with the introduction of Sovereign Money.   
 
Why do we need a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court in this model?   
 
At least in the United States and also in the European Union we do have domestic bankruptcy courts and 
domestic trade courts and we also have the European Court of Justice of the European Union and we have the 
U.S. Court of International Trade, but we do not have a court that has the judicial authority that may adjudicate 
in any commercial trade or investment relationship that goes not only across state borders within the United 
States or the European Union but also across continents.  Currently, that is a space free of a common judicial 
authority that upholds the rule of law.  It is an area that is free of judicial supervision.  It is an area where local 
courts predominantly like New York Courts or English Courts fill the void, but even if they are concerned about 
uniformity of law, they will rule according to their local laws and their local case law and their local precedent 
and will neither follow nor establish a uniform comprehensive body of law which is essential for the reduction 
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of legal risk and predictability of an effective application of the law on both sides of the Atlantic. Now that we 
covered the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT to EXIT, there is the final quarter of our Capital Formation 
Life Cycle still left to go.  We will discuss this final stretch in the course of our China case study.   
 
Why the China Case Study in this model?   
 
Because it is so often claimed that the United States would go bankrupt if China would tomorrow seize to 
finance the United States, and it is just blatantly false.  It is simply not true.  Let's go back to the beginning of 
our Money T-account on the left-hand side of the Capital Formation Life Cycle.  Right below where we 
originally had our first Debit of Sovereign Money there is now also a debit for T-bills; one T-bill that gets sold at 
auction to our Corporate Citizen that made his $78.00 profit and has his money invested via his Commercial 
Bank and then a T-bill of $2 billion that gets sold to China.   
 
How do we do this?  The Money T-account is in essence identical with the Central Bank and its account must be 
identical with the Federal Reserve or what we call the Fed Savings Account. Because, this is what it means for 
our Corporate Citizen customer or for our International Chinese customers. Purchasing T-Bills, they are saving 
their money on a savings account.  In order to do that, both China and our corporate customer has to transfer 
their money first to our Fed Checking Account, which we may safely assume the banks that represent them 
have.  We debit the $2 billion from China, we debit the $78.00 from our Corporate Citizen, credit the Fed 
Checking Account, debit the Fed Checking Account and credit the Fed Savings Account, thus debiting this 
account for the T-Bills both our investors now hold. Of course, there are now many ways to pay this T-Bills 
back. For once, we could just simply refinance, and sell more T-Bills to pay down the old ones. The commonly 
expected solution would be to use tax receipts but what will always remain an option is the following: 
 
The Federal Reserve debits the Money T-Account creating new money you can see in the Fed Savings T-
account as DSRP2B, it takes the T-Bills back from China and credits the Fed Checking Account with DSRP2B. 
China is repaid. So long, at least in the United States, Congress does not impose any artificial debt ceilings, 
there is no reason why China or any other international investor into T-Bills should not be repaid. After all, a 
sovereign currency issuer, always finances herself. This way the cycle from FIAT to EXIT for all investors into 
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